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ABSTRACT
Introduction. The subject of this thesis is government and business relations 
in Thailand. The theoretical basis of this subject mainly originated in studies in 
political science, economics, and sociology. The macro-perspective approach used in 
these studies produces an inaccurate description of government and business 
relations, and generates information which is of limited use to private managers and 
public administrators during their interaction. Studies of the relationship in 
developing countries are also scarce. In the light of these weaknesses, the micro­
level, interactional approach is used to analyse the relationship in this research. Such 
an approach brings out the non-homogeneous nature of the relationship in which the 
government is seen as an institution both offering opportunities and imposing 
restrictions, and business as being both socially responsible and commercially 
selfish.
Method. The research covers both institutional interaction -contact between 
government agencies and companies- and policy interaction -interpenetration between 
government economic planning and business policy. In addition, as government and 
business relations do not exist in a vacuum, the ideological context is also studied. 
Interviews with 30 senior bureaucrats -directors of division or equivalent- in the 
ministries of Commerce, Industry and Finance, and with managers of 41 
manufacturing companies ranked within the top 1,000 companies, were carried out in 
Thailand between April and August 1989.
Conclusions. In contrast to the literature which often places the government 
and business relations of a country somewhere on the spectrum of interventionist and 
non-interventionist states, the research findings here suggest that there is 
inconsistency and even contradiction within each individual senior bureaucrat's or 
business manager's views on government and business relations. In fact, the research 
found that pragmatic considerations and issue-by-issue judgements, rather than 
principles such as the theoretical idea of a free-market economy or state 
interventionism, dominate their views.
In the analysis of institutional interaction, the research found that government 
and business relations are not homogeneous but varied. The nature of interaction 
between government agencies and companies depends on, among other things, the 
types of contact, such as legally compulsory and non-compulsory dealings, and the 
characteristics of companies, such as size, origin and the extent of government 
control in the industry.
The analysis of policy interaction further confirms the heterogeneous nature of 
government and business relations. The nature of a company’s reaction to a 
government policy which affects it as an individual and to that which affects the 
industry as a whole are different. In addition, the government develops different 
policy relationships with companies of different characteristics and the government 
influence on a company varies from one business decision to another.
Implications. Two major implications of the research are: first, the targeting 
and continuity of the government's industrial policy and its plans for the development 
of an industrial infrastructure and the rationalisation of the bureaucracy need an urgent 
review; second, large companies or corporations should set up an internal unit for 
dealing with the government.
Future research. The research findings suggest that future research should 
rely more on the empirical and comparative approaches and on micro-level analysis in 
order to improve its accuracy in describing government and business relations and the 
usefulness of information for management practice in both the public and private 
sectors. In particular, the internal organisation and mechanism for handling the 
government-related activities of companies in Thailand should be examined. Further 
research should also ask whether the companies have a political strategy, what the 
political strategies are, how they are formed within the companies, and how they are 
related to the companies' business policy and competitive strategy?
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGERS
Government and business interaction is increasing in most countries of the world. In 
Japan, the government has long dominated and intervened in business life; in the 
United States, multiple environmental issues have placed great pressure on the 
government to take a rather adversarial stance towards business; and in Europe, the 
full implications of the negotiations between national governments concerning the 
Common Market after 1992 are yet to be discovered by business. However, it is 
unfortunate that present knowledge of government and business relations is not as 
advanced as it should be. There is a lack of guidelines to which business managers 
and public administrators can refer when handling the strains, tensions, or conflicts 
of their interaction. For example, in a handbook of management, one can readily find 
guidelines for management practices in marketing, production, finance and 
organisation, but not in government relations.
The findings of this research suggest that some companies in Thailand should 
now think about setting up a "government relations unit" within their organisation. 
There are several reasons for chief executives to take this initiative. First, the findings 
show that in Thailand, business dominates the government. Government economic 
policy favours business. Ideologically, the Thai bureaucracy also favours business. 
The majority of the senior bureaucrats interviewed in this research believed that 
business should play an initiatory role in its relationship with the government and 
encouraged the participation of business in economic policy making. This favourable 
climate provides many opportunities for business to reap benefits from its relationship 
with the government if companies are willing to try to analyse the pertinent 
circumstances and compare their objectives with those of the present government 
economic policy. Companies must also know whom to approach, when and how. 
The formation of a government relations unit is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of 
these tasks.
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Second, the research findings show that the political activities of a company in a 
pro-business climate are, in contrast to those of an anti-business environment, rarely 
a reaction to unfavourable government regulations. Instead, they are often part of a 
competitive strategy designed to secure greater influence over the government than the 
company’s competitors or even to gain exclusive influence over a policy issue. They 
may also be the result of imitation. In other words, business political activities 
constitute the efforts of a company to out-manoeuvre its competitors or potential 
competitors in the making of "the rules of the game." The success of this ability to 
outmanoeuvre is unlikely to be achieved without the creation of a government 
relations unit within the company.
Finally, recent political developments in Thailand are moving towards 
democracy. As a result, new pressure groups such as environmental groups will 
emerge and the old ones such as labour unions will become stronger, adding a new 
dimension to the external environment of companies in Thailand. It is crucial that 
companies be able to handle these increasingly active social forces.
The setting-up of an internal government relations unit should be the first step 
for a company in improving its relations with the external environment in general. In 
particular it would operate as a link between the company and the government. 
However, as not all companies have to deal extensively with the government, it is the 
large companies or corporations in the industries where the government exerts 
relatively great control which would most benefit from a government relations unit.
The research recommends that a company should assign one of the line- 
managers or the chief executive to be primarily responsible for the management of 
government-related activities, depending on the nature of its dealings with the 
government, since it was found in this research that one senior manager is often more 
involved in the company's government-related activities than the others. Such an 
assignment of responsibility to a line-manager or to the chief executive, as against the 
creation of a new government relations manager, has two advantages. First, it is cost-
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effective. Second, it makes communication and coordination between the government 
relations unit and other business functions easier.
It is recommended that the government relations unit should be mainly 
responsible for three tasks: institutional relations, policy relations, and personnel- 
and-others relations. First, in institutional relations with the government, the unit 
would handle both routine and non-routine contact with various government 
agencies. Routine contact is primarily for dealing with government regulations or 
legal requirements such as tax payments, renewal of factory licences, and export and 
import documentation. Non-routine contact is mainly for non-compulsory dealing 
with government such as applications for investment or export promotion, price 
increase negotiations, foreign trade missions or exhibitions, and industrial dispute 
settlements. Dealings with various government agencies should also be coordinated.
Second, the government relations unit would develop two types of policy 
relationship with the government: the ex ante facto  and ex post facto  modes of 
policy interaction. In the ex ante facto policy relationship, the unit would not only 
scan and identify forthcoming government policies, but also monitor and anticipate 
their future development. The possible impact of these policies, both in terms of the 
opportunities they may present and the restrictions they threaten to impose, should be 
evaluated as a matter of priority in the light of the company’s present objectives and 
future plans. The scanning and anticipation of government policies will enable an 
appropriate strategy to be drawn up. The unit could advocate the policies which are in 
the company's favour, campaign and lobby against those which threaten the 
company, or advise the company to adapt itself in accordance with them. This ex 
ante facto policy relationship should be given careful attention since the research 
findings show that business efforts to influence government economic policy in its 
implementation stage are often greeted with less than satisfactory responses from 
bureaucrats.
In the ex post facto policy relationship, the unit would deal with government 
policies in their implementation stage. The impact of policies can be classified as
xviii
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affecting the company as an individual or the industry as a whole. The research 
findings suggest that an individual company's efforts to influence the government - 
often taken when a policy affects it as an individual- tend to be less successful than 
those of a business association -often the channel used when a policy affects the 
industry as a whole. Therefore, whenever possible, the unit should organise 
collective representation, for example, by trade associations or groups of companies, 
so that the success of its efforts to influence the implementation of government 
economy policy may be enhanced. The majority of senior bureaucrats interviewed in 
this research also indicated their preference for collective participation of businesses 
in public policy.
Finally, the government relations unit would be responsible for making and 
maintaining personnel and other relations with government. Frequent contact leads to 
the development of links between the personnel from business and government The 
research found that an average of up to five contact government officials, whose 
positions can range from clerk or member of administrative staff to director of a 
division, are dealt with by a company in its regular interaction with a government 
agency. However, existing personal relationships based on having formerly been 
colleagues or having attended the same school or university were also found. These 
relationships present an important opportunity for the unit to gain information from 
and influence over the government. Moreover, considering the importance of human 
relationships in the Thai work culture, the government relations unit should make 
sure that the personnel relationships between the company and the government are 
well maintained. It should not hesitate to participate in social activities organised by 
the government, such as charities or sporting events, and make sure that proper 
congratulations and condolences are sent in times of success or misfortune in the lives 
of regular contacts. The goodwill achieved in these informal relationships would play 
an important role in the future influence of the company over the government.
As these three government relations tasks are not separate but closely related,
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they should be coordinated by the government relations unit. The information gained 
from informal relationships developed with bureaucrats during routine contact could 
be used by managers to identify forthcoming government policies. In addition, the 
government relations unit should communicate with other line-functions, giving up- 
to-date information about the external environment of the company to other line- 
managers as well as becoming informed of current internal activities. It should also 
report its operations regularly to top management so that its recommendations can be 
integrated into overall business policy. The government relations manager might 
initiate a modification of the company's new investment project in anticipation of a 
forthcoming government economic policy, or the company might opt for an offensive 
strategy by taking political action to influence the forthcoming policy. The unit should 
follow up the results and evaluate the effectiveness of the initiated actions and 
programmes. The link between the government relations unit and the top management 
would completed by the feedback of the evaluation results.
However, the concept and scope of operation of the type of government 
relations unit just described may be too narrow or inadequate for some large 
companies and corporations. These companies and corporations may also have to 
deal extensively with the local community, media, stockholders, consumers, political 
associations, and business associations. In the long term it would be possible for 
these relations to be integrated into the government relations unit, to form the "public 
affairs function." At this stage the company would be able to stay in touch with its 
external environment through the "window" of the public affairs function and better 
manage the pressure from the wider society, of which it is a part.
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CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This first chapter is a literature review. Its main purpose is to provide the background 
and theoretical framework from which this research is developed. In particular, it will 
bring out the subject matter of government and business relations and their relevant 
theories. It will also identify the present trends of research activities and the 
weaknesses of the literature. The position taken and approach adopted by this 
research are then discussed. Finally, a general outline of the organisation of the thesis 
is given.
1.2 THE SUBJECT MATTER 
OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
It is rather difficult to define the exact boundaries of the subject matter of government 
and business relations since its analysis is multi-disciplinary, involving a variety of 
different theories. In addition, the analysis can be done at different levels, for 
example, at the micro- or macro-level.
M ulti-d iscip linary study. The multi-disciplinary nature of the study of 
government and business relations seems to be unavoidable as government is 
associated primarily with politics and political equity, while business is involved with 
economics and economic efficiency.
In economics, the subject matter of the relationship may be debated under such
2
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titles as industrial policy, commercial policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, industrial 
organisation and adaptation, the promotion and adoption of new technology, the 
restructuring of declining and old industries, and the encouragement of growth in 
fledgling industries.
In political science, its study comes under such topics as the representation of 
industrial interests and the role of organised business.
Often, the subject is discussed from both perspectives, that is, from a political 
economy point of view. In such cases the analysis tends to focus on the public 
policy-making process, who the policy-actors are, and how the policy outcomes 
affect or are affected by the behaviour of the parties concerned.
Discussion of the subject may often become involved with the fundamental 
aspects of a society, for example, the values and ideology prevailing in that society, 
the attitudes towards the role of government in the economy, and the role of the 
business community in that society.
Multi-level analysis. The study of the relationship frequently involves different 
levels of analysis. At a macro-level the units of study can be the government or the 
business community as a whole, while at a micro-level the discussion may focus on 
the interaction between firms and government agencies.
Moreover, several approaches are also employed in the investigation of the 
relationship. Some authors prefer to adopt a sectoral approach by studying the 
relationship between business and government within a particular industry, while 
others pay more attention on the comparative differences of the relationship within 
two industries or among countries.
Industrial policy as the contextual policy. Given the multi-disciplinary 
complexity of the subject and the possibility of multi-level analysis, it is interesting to 
ask: "What then is the heart of the subject of the study of government and business 
relations?" The impression given by the literature is that "industrial policy" seems to
Chapter 1
have dominated the scene for the past few decades. Even though the term "industrial 
policy" partially describes the subject of government and business relations, it is often 
mentioned or used as the contextual policy issue in discussion of the relationship. For 
example, the literature review of government and business relations in industrially 
advanced countries by Wilson revolves around such topics as government 
intervention, regulations, and administrative guidance.1 The dominance of 
industrial policy as the contextual policy is even more obvious in the collection of 
papers by Zukin on business and politics in the United States and France.2
It follows that a brief discussion of the meaning of industrial policy is 
appropriate, although the task of defining industrial policy is beyond the need and the 
scope of this research since each author tends to create his or her own definition to 
suit the purposes of a particular study. For example, Grant defined industrial policy 
as "a set of measures used by governments to influence the investment decisions of 
individual enterprises -public or private- so as to promote such objectives as lower 
unemployment, a healthier balance of payments, and a generally more efficient 
industrial economy."3 In comparison, Johnson held the view that "industrial policy 
is first of all an attitude, and only then a matter of technique. It involves the specific 
recognition that all government measures -taxes, licenses, prohibitions, regulations 
have a significant impact on the well-being or ill-health of whole sectors, industries, 
and enterprises in a market economy."4 Instead, the concept rather than the 
definition of industrial policy is considered here.
Graham K. Wilson, Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (London: MacMillan, 
1985).
2Sharon Zukin, "Industrial Policy as Post-Keynesian Politics: Basic Assumptions in the United 
States and France," in her Business and Politics in the United States and France (New York: 
Praeger, 1985).
3Wyn Grant, Government and Industry: A Comparative Analysis o f the US, Canada and the UK 
(Hants: Edward Elgar, 1989), p.7.
4Chalmers Johnson, "Introduction: The Idea of Industrial Policy," in his The Industrial Policy  
Debate (California: ICS Press, 1984), p.8.
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1.2.1 The Concept of Industrial Policy
Among many factors that make industrial policy a highly controversial issue is its 
concept. Hiroya Uneo described this equivocal characteristic of industrial policy as 
follows:
"Unlike traditional fiscal and monetary policy, industrial policy 
demonstrates no clear relationship between its objectives and the means of 
attaining them. Its conception, content, and forms differ, reflecting the 
stage of development of an economy, its national and historical 
circumstances, international conditions, and its political and economic 
situation, resulting in considerable differences from nation to nation and 
from era to era."5
The contingent characteristic of industrial policy implies that its study and analysis 
should refer to a certain context and situation.
In d u str ia l restructuring. Several authors have drawn up a conceptual 
framework of industrial policy. Schultz described industrial policy as one whose aims 
are to channel the flow of private investment toward some firms- and necessarily, 
therefore, away from others. The government develops, at least in broad outline, an 
explicit conception of the direction in which industrial structure ought to be evolving, 
and then adopts a set of tax, loan, trade, regulatory, and other policies to lead 
economic activity along the desired path. Industrial policy typically has two aspects: 
"picking the winners" and "protecting the losers." Picking the winners involves 
identifying industries that are at the cutting edge of economic progress, with such 
characteristics as high growth potential and high value-added per worker, and then 
providing investment subsidies, research support and other assistance to existing 
firms and new entrants to those industries. Protecting the losers, on the other hand,
^Hiroya Unco, "Industrial Policy: Its Role and Limits," Journal o f Japan Trade and Industry (July- 
August, 1983), p.34, as quoted by Johnson, op.cit., p.6.
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involves supporting and presumably helping to rehabilitate major declining industries. 
The government measures that would be deployed for this purpose include creation of 
barriers against competition from imports, special tax breaks, subsidised loans, and 
selectively regulatory treatment.6
Styles o f  industrial policy. A similar analytical description and classification of 
industrial policy made by Diebold is also of interest. Industrial policy refers to 
discrete governmental measures as well as to the sustained pursuit of certain ends or 
the persistent use of certain methods or devices.7 He broadly divided industrial 
policy into three categories. Those that are "defensive" are mainly concerned with 
keeping in being some structural arrangement, such as the domestic production of 
certain goods that would not survive international competition or a given pattern of 
employment. The second category is "adaptive" policy which facilitates structural 
change by helping to shift resources to new uses that do not require protection or by 
increasing efficiency in the existing lines of activity. The last category of industrial 
policy "initiates change" rather than simply responding to it. This is what 
governments do when they have programmes of economic development for the 
country as a whole or certain parts of it and they seek to become producers of goods 
or services not formerly made at home.8
Levels o f  the intervention o f  industrial policy. On the other hand, 
industrial policy was viewed by Jacquemin mainly as a tool used to increase the speed 
of the process of resource allocation among and within industrial sectors. This 
implies that for a variety of reasons the public authority may be dissatisfied with the 
way the market allocates resources and achieves major structural changes. According 
to the goals pursued by the public authorities, the process of reallocation will be
6Charles L. Schultz, "Industrial Policy: A Dissent," The Brooking Review  (Fall, 1983), p.4.
^William Diebold, Jr., Industrial Policy as an International Issue (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1980), p.6.
8Ibid., pp.7-8.
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retarded or accelerated, facilitated or impeded. He distinguished three (non-mutually 
exclusive) types of industrial policy according to their level of aggregation.9
The "macro-economic" orientation is the least interventionist and leaves the 
functioning of industries and firms to the forces of the market. Industrial policy, if 
any, is then conceived as a policy to improve the general framework within which 
producers' activities and consumers' choices take place, and to facilitate the automatic 
process of industrial adjustment. Such an approach requires an infrastructure of 
quality, a professionally adapted labour force, accessibility of capital and credit, and a 
fiscal policy which is not opposed to economic rationality. Hence the proponents of 
"market industrial policy" trust that spontaneous competitive forces will lead to a price 
system which emits correct signals and that economic agents will react correctly to 
them. This implies that if the macro-economic system is "right", there is no 
justification for a specific industrial policy.10
At a second stage, "sectoral" policies are based on the view that the dynamics of 
competition are multidimensional, that inter-industry variations are important, that 
price flexibility will depend upon the characteristics of each market structure, and that 
without clear micro-economic foundations, macro-economic polices can be 
incompatible with the effective process of adjustment taking place in real markets. 
Sectoral policies aimed at certain industries are then justified when market 
imperfections or "market failure", such as strong externalities, affect specific 
industries, for example, high-technology industries. The precise reasons for market 
imperfection or market failure must then be identified and a policy designed to solve 
the specific problem directly. Industrial policy is then viewed as being able to provide 
non-market mechanisms that improve the response given by the market forces 
existing in the relevant industry.11
9Alexis Jacquemin, "Introduction: Which policy for industry?" in his European Industry: Public 
Policy and Corporate Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p .l.
10Ibid., p.4.
^Ibid-.pp^-S.
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At a third stage, a "micro-economic" industrial policy can lead a government to 
develop various forms of action directed towards specific companies and industrial 
groups. One basis for this approach is the growing importance of the analysis of the 
intra-industry differences in structure and performance, together with the 
development of the notion of the "strategic group" of firms and intra-industry 
mobility. A result of past research is that strategic groups, not industries, respond 
differently to the same market constraints, so industrial policy must take this 
heterogeneity of response into account.12
The dynamic concept o f  comparative advantage. Johnson argued that, in 
more abstract terms, industrial policy is a logical outgrowth of the changing concept 
of comparative advantage. The classical or static notion of comparative advantage 
refers to geographical differences and various natural endowments among economies 
that are supposed to produce a global division of labour. The newer dynamic concept 
of comparative advantage replaces the classical criteria with such elements as human 
creative power, foresight, a highly educated work force, organisational talent, the 
ability to choose, and the ability to adapt. Moreover, these attributes are not conceived 
as natural endowments but as qualities achieved through public policies such as 
education, organised research, and investment in social overhead capital.13
1.3 THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
The study of government and business relations can be portrayed as a two-sided coin. 
In the previous section, industrial policy, the policy issue around which the literature 
of government and business relations often revolves, was identified and discussed. 
But that is just one side of the coin; the other side of the coin is the study of the 
characteristics of the relationship itself. In the latter the questions asked are: "How is
12Ibid., p.5.
13Johnson, op.cit., p.8.
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the relationship described?" and "Why is it as it is?"
1.3.1 Dimensions of Government and Business Relations
A framework for describing the state of business-government relationship is 
portrayed by Murray as a cube (see Figure 1-1). He stated that the description of the 
relationship consists of three dimensions.
Figure 1-1: Framework for Describing the State of Business 
Government Relationship
Congruence 
of Values
High
Mixed
^ J ^ u o o d  
Mixed EffectLow
Bad
Desirability  
for SocietyGovern- Balanced Business 
Dominantment
Dominant
Power in Decision-Making
Source: V.V. Murray, "Introduction," in his Theories ofBusiness-
Government Relations (Toronto:Trans-Canada Press, 1985), p.5.
i) One is in terms of how much congruence or conflict there is on the part of
the key players in government and business, for example, over government policies,
programmes and regulations.
ii) The second dimension has to do with how much power and influence
each has in making decisions on issues of mutual concern.
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iii) Finally, there is the question of how "good" or "bad" the relationship
is . 14
This model is also useful in that it enables one to distinguish between several theories 
which seek to explain the various dimensions (aspects) of government and business 
relations. However, it can be argued that one crucial dimension of the relationship, 
the extent of government intervention in an economy, is missing from his model. 
Even though he mentioned that a fourth way to describe the nature of the relationship 
is solely in terms of the number and kind of involvements that the government has in 
matters relevant to the interests of business, he did not integrate this dimension into 
the model but saw it as a separate method of describing, which fails to suggest to 
what extent both parties desire a state of affairs or how a situation comes about; for 
example, how much business influence there is for or against the various 
involvements.1 ^
Figure 1-2: Modified Framework for Describing the State of 
Business-Government Relationship
Desirability for Society
Good
Congruence 
of Values
—
o llu C  
--------- ►
Extent of
Power in 
D ecision- 
Making
Government
Intervention
Bad
Instead of being viewed as a different way of describing government and 
business relations, the extent of government intervention in an economy should be
14V. V. Murray, "Introduction," in his Theories o f  Business-Government Relationship, (Toronto: 
Trans-Canada Press, 1985), pp.3-4.
15Ibid., p.5.
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integrated into his three-dimensional model, and the desirability-for-society 
dimension then becomes a good-bad scale on which the cubic model slides (see 
Figure 1-2). The modified model not only offers a more complete description of the 
state of the relationship but also provides a way of depicting the "compatibility" 
between a certain type of business-govemment relationship and its context.
A more complete description o f  the relationship. According to his 
framework, six basic types of business-govemment relationship are proposed (see 
Table 1-1). These six types of relationship, however, reveal nothing about 
government intervention in the economy. In contrast, the modified model shows the 
extent of government intervention and offers a more detailed classification of the 
relationship of up to 27 types. From Figure 1-3, it can be seen that each sub-unit 
taken out of the cubic model represents one type of relationship.
Table 1-1: Basic Types of Business-Government Relationship
Relative Influence 
in Decision-Making
Parties' Positions on Issues
High High 
Congruence Conflict
Business-Dominated
Government-Dominated
Relatively-Balanced
I. Pro-Business 
III. Pro-Government 
V. Placid-Stable
II. Anti-Government 
IV. Anti-Business 
VI.Turbulent-Changing
Source: V.V. Murray and C.J. MaMillan, "Business-Government Relations 
in Canada: A Conceptual Map," Canada Public Administration, 
Vol.26, No.4 (Winter, 1983), p.597.
Compatibility. An example will demonstrate this aspect of the modified model. A 
relationship which has a high congruence of values, is dominated by government, 
and experiences a great deal of government intervention, might be compatible with 
Japanese society and therefore is located on the good end of the desirability-for- 
society scale. In comparison, the same type of relationship might not be compatible 
with American society because of its liberal tradition of industrial and political
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development, and consequently, in this case, is located on the bad end of the scale.
Figure 1-3: The Representation of the Relationship between 
Government and Business
Congruence 
of Values
Mixed
A business-govemment 
relationship which has 
high congruence of 
values, is dominated by 
business, and has a great 
extent of government 
intervention.
Small
Great
Govern- Balanced Business 
ment Dominant
Dominant
Power in Decision-Making
Moderate Extent of
Government
Intervention
1.3.2 Determinants of Characteristics of Government and Business 
Relations
Based mainly on the Canadian literature, Murray and McMillan have drawn up a 
conceptual framework for theories of government and business relations. Five major 
schools of thought concerning the explanation of the characteristics of government 
and business relations have been identified.
i) The general social structure and ideological context school (macro­
perspective).
ii) The interpretive school (values, attitudes, and beliefs of the concerned 
parties).
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iii) The failure-of-business school.
iv) The failure-of-govemment school.
v) The mechanism-of-interaction school.16
The macro-perspective school. The view taken by this school of thought is that 
the state of government and business relations is merely a by-product of the 
ideologies and structures of the prevailing social, economic and political institutions 
of a society. Its analysis can be divided into three sub-schools: Marxism, 
corporatism, and pluralism.
The classical Marxists17 take the position that the relationship is strongly 
business-dominated and, on all important matters, the state takes the side of business. 
The essential reason this situation exists is due to the ownership of the means of 
production by the capitalist class. In contrast, Hegelean Marxists18 tend to 
emphasise the effects of ideology, consciousness and legitimisation in shaping the 
ways the state favours business interests and lulls the rest of the society into accepting 
this situation. On the other hand, more recent Marxist-oriented writers19 accept the
16V.V. Murray and C.J. McMillan, "Business-Government Relations in Canada: A Conceptual 
Map," Canadian Public Administration, Vol.26, No.4 (Winter, 1983), p.595.
17Ibid., p.598. They referred to, for example, Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes 
(London: New Left Books, 1973); Michael Useem, "The Social Organization o f the American 
Business Elite and Participation o f Corporation Directors in the Governance o f American 
Institutions," American Sociological Review, No.44 (1979), pp.553-572; and Maurice Zeithlin, 
"Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class," American  
Journal of Sociology, No.79 (1979), pp.1073-1119. Also see R.L. Heilbroner, The Nature and 
Logic o f Capitalism  (New York: Norton, 1986); and G. Causer, "Private Capital and the State in 
Western Europe," in S.Giner and M.S. Archer, editors, Comtemporary Europe: Social Structures 
and Cultural Patterns (london: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
18Loc.cit. They referred to, for example, Antonio Gramsci, Selections from  the Prison Notebooks 
o f Antonio Gramsci, edited by Quinton Hoare and Geofrey Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1971); and G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin, 1971). For a 
classic piece of writing using this approach, see Charles E. Lindbolm, Politics and Markets (New 
York: Basic Books, 1977).
19Loc.cit. They referred to, for example, Claus Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the 
Problem of Policy Formulation," German Political Studies (London: Sage, 1973); and J. O'Conner,
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apparent paradox of capitalist state institutions producing policies which clearly are 
not preferred by the business elite. These writers suggest that the inequities produced 
by the system ultimately activate a sufficient number of the masses who push elected 
officials into imposing regulations on business.
The corporatists20 tend to characterise the overall relationship as one in which 
the apparatus of the state dominates a society and manages to persuade or coerce 
business into serving its ends without necessarily taking full formal control by such 
means as the nationalisation of industry. As Cawson put it: "The state is neither 
directive nor coupled to an autonomous private sphere, but is intermeshed in a 
complex which undermines the traditional distinction between public and private."21 
The essence of corporatism can be captured in terms of three concepts: intervention, 
intermediation (relationships that develop between the state and organised interests 
operating corporatist arrangements), and incorporation (the fact that organised 
interests in corporatist arrangements are necessarily drawn closer to the state).22 The 
corporatist writers agree with the Marxists in seeing the situation as arising out of the 
changing structure of modem Western capitalism, in which business leaders prefer a 
situation of stability with minimum competition, government leaders want to stop 
wild fluctuations in prices and employment levels, and the labour force wants job
The Fiscal Crisis o f the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
20Ibid., p.599. They referred to, for example, Michael Hughes, "Corporatism and Development: The 
State and Interorganizational Relations," paper presented at the Tenth World Congress of Sociology, 
Mexico City, 1982; R. E. Pahl and J. T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism," Challenge (March- 
April, 1975), pp.28-35; J. T. Mcleod, "The Changing Role of Government and the Drift toward 
Corporatism," Business and Government in Canada: Selected Readings, 2nd edition (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1976), pp.334-345; and P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruck, editors, Trends Toward  
Corporatist Intermediation  (London: Sage, 1979). Also see Andrew Cox and Noel O'Sullivan, 
editors, The Corporate State: Corporatism and the State Tradition in Western Europe (Hants: Edward 
Elgar, 1988): Wyn Grant, editor, The Political Economy o f Corporatism  (London: MacMillan,
1985); Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, editors, Patterns o f Corporatist Policy- 
Making (London: Sage, 1982); and Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Modern Corporate State: Private 
Government and the American Constitution (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976).
21 A. Cawson, Corporatism and Welfare (London: Hienemann, 1982), p.66.
22Wyn Grant, Business and Politics in Britain (London: MacMillan, 1987), p. 16.
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security. As a result, all parties will come to acquiesce in a high level of government 
interference in the economy.
Lying between the two extremes of Marxism and corporatism, pluralists23 take 
the view-point that there is a large variation in interest among a large number of 
parties who have some sort of connection with the issues that form the basis of 
business-govemment relationship. Therefore, the power balance between these 
parties is in constant fluctuation, sometimes favouring one side over another.24
The distinction between pluralism and corporatism in terms of interest 
intermediation identified by Schmitter is as follows:
"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports...
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of 
multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierachically ordered and self- 
determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not 
specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled 
in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not 
exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories."25
The interpretive school. The writers26 in this school tend to analyse the
23See, for example, R. E. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1956); and D. B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1962).
24Murray and McMillan, op.cit., p.599.
25Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard 
Lehmbruch, editors, Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, op.cit., p .13-15.
26See, for example, Isaiah A. Litvak, "The Ottawa Syndrome: Improving Business/Government 
Relations," Business Quarterly, Vol.44 (Summer 1979), pp.22-39; James Gillies, Where Business 
Fails (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981); James Gillies, "Where Business 
Fails Revisited," in Murray, op. cit., pp.143-158; and Donald H. Thain, "Canadian Management
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determination of the state of government and business relations in terms of values, 
attitudes, and beliefs held by the parties concerned.27 That is, the characteristics of 
the relationship are the reflection of these factors.
The failure-of-business school.28 The viewpoint taken by the writers in this 
school is that greater control over business and anti-business policy results because of 
the lack of effort, knowledge, and skill on the part of the business community to deal 
with the government.29
The fa ilure-of’government school. A breakdown of government and business 
relations is seen by the writers30 in this school as the fault of the government. This 
is because politicians, with the desire to stay in power, keep up their promises to 
voters by imposing greater control on business.31
The mechanism-of-interaction school. Ignoring the structures and processes 
internal to each party, the writers32 of this school emphasise the various mechanisms 
that govern who interacts with whom and when and how, as being the factors 
shaping the state of the relationship 33
Crisis," Business Quarterly, Vol.46 (Winter, 1981), pp.61-75.
27Murray and McMillan, op. cit., pp.600-602.
28See, for example, Donald H. Thain, "The Mistakes of Business in Dealing with Politics and 
Government," Business Quarterly, Vol.44 (Autumn, 1979), pp.46-54; Gillies, Where Business 
Fails, op.cit.; and Gillies, "Where Business Fails Revisited," op.cit.
29Murray and McMillan, op. cit., pp.602-604.
30See, for example, Donald H. Thain, "The Mistakes of Government in Dealing with Business," 
Business Quarterly, Vol.44 (Winter, 1979), pp.22-29.
31Murray and McMillan, op. cit., pp.604-606.
32See, for example, I-Tjhih Tan, Business-Government Relations in Southeast Asia: A Study o f  
Singapore and Malaysia, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (New York University, 1972); and Joseph 
Badaracco, Jr., A study of Adversarial and Cooperative Relations between Business and Government 
in Four Countries, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Havard University, 1981).
33Murray and McMillan, op. cit., pp.606-607.
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In short, Murray and McMillan have distinguished between macro-level (Marxism, 
corporatism, and pluralism) and micro-level (interpretive, failure-of-business, failure- 
of-govemment, and mechanisms-of-interaction school) theories of government and 
business relations. However, the distinction between the macro- and micro-level of 
the analysis of the relationship was criticised by Burrell as not powerful enough to 
bring out some crucial differences in perspective. He argued that the conceptual unit 
of political and economic life could no longer be the nation-state and that the complex 
inter-relationships between societies in the contemporary world have to be understood 
rather in world system terms. He suggested that government and business relations 
are best seen in the context of the debate on corporatism.
The implication of Burrell's statement that the study of the relationship should 
be on the basis of comparison between nations is acceptable since by comparing, 
some factors can be said to have shaped the relationship if it is found that different 
degrees of the same variable are associated with the differences in the relationship 
being compared. Nevertheless, the limitation of the comparative approach to a 
corporatist model will unnecessarily restrict its analytical scope as forms of 
government and business relations other than corporatist do exist.
On the other hand, Globerman and Schwindt criticised the "business policy 
approach" (another name for what Murray and McMillan described as the micro-level 
theories) as suffering from two major analytical shortcomings. First, it does not 
satisfactorily explain the persistence of poor communications between business and 
government. And second, it fails to define explicit criteria for evaluating what would 
constitute "good" government and business relations. They questioned the 
explanation of why inadequate or insufficient communication should persist if it 
reduces the benefits that private and public sector managers realise from their 
interaction; unless both sets of managers are ignorant of opportunities to promote 
their own interests, it does not seem plausible that this condition could persist 
indefinitely. On the second shortcoming, they suggested that a meaningful
34Gibson Burrell, "Corporatism in Comparative Context," in Murray, op.cit., pp.222-223.
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assessment of government and business relations could only be made in a broad 
social context in which the interaction between business and government is linked to 
social-welfare criteria. They then proposed that a promising basis for this effort was 
provided by insights from the public choice literature, the model of which is that the 
interaction between the public and private sectors is characterised by knowledgeable 
legislators providing a service to specific constituents who are also knowledgeable, in 
order to win re-election.36
However, there are a few drawbacks in this proposition. First, the analysis of 
its approach finally comes down to the controversial question of corporate social 
responsibility, the definition and concept of which are still subject to 
disagreement.36 For example, Friedman claimed that the only social responsibility of 
business is to maximise profits "within the rules of the game,"37 while others such 
as Preston and Post offered public responsibility as a substitute for social 
responsibility and challenged the the traditional understanding that "public policy is 
equal to law."38 Second, the applicability of the public choice model is limited since 
its assumption that the constituents are knowledgeable does not hold in most 
developing countries. Finally, the usefulness of the approach is less immediate to the 
parties concerned than that of the business policy approach, especially to business 
managers because their primary concerns have more to do with commercial survival 
and competitiveness than with social welfare. The latter argument is what this 
research primarily aims to support.
In his literature review and preliminary research on government and business 
relations in Canada, Bartha also came across a question similar to that raised earlier
35Steven Globerman and Richard Schwindt, "Toward a Synthesis and Test of Hypotheses," in 
Murray, op.cit., pp.243-264.
36For more details see Steven L. Wartick and Philip L. Cochran, "The Evolution of the Corporate 
Social Performance Model," Academy of Management Review, Vol.10, No.4 (1985), pp.758-769.
37M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), as quoted 
by Wartick and Cochran, op.cit., p.759.
38L. E. Preston and J. E. Post, "Private Management and Public Policy," California Management 
Review, Vol.23, No.3 (1981), pp.56-65, as quoted by Wartick and Cochran, op.cit., p.761.
Chapter 1
by Globerman and Schwindt concerning the persistence of the poor state of 
government and business relations. He put it this way:
"There is an apparent contradiction here... CEOs today are politically alert 
and aware; many of them are active on public platforms as advocates of 
strategic, as opposed to ad hoc, approaches to governmental and societal 
issues. But the evidence suggests that awareness at the top is not
39translated into corresponding commitment and action in corporations."
He offered a tentative explanation stating that from the CEO's perspective there are 
two distinct aspects of business-government (and business-society) relationship: 
systemic and competitive. At the systemic level are the macro-issues of public policy 
that collectively affect all members of a community, while at the competitive level are 
the micro-concerns that individually influence a firm or a business unit in relation to 
its competitors. He then hypothesised that CEOs are unable or unwilling to accept 
individual responsibility for dealing with collective problems and consequently defer 
it to such collective units as industrial trade associations. At the competitive level, 
pragmatic business considerations, as against ideology, dominate the interaction 
process and a good relationship is defined as one which bestows competitive 
advantages on the firm, regardless of what is happening in the macro-environment. 
He argued that the tendency of chief executives to focus their attention on immediate 
issues and overlook the long-term systemic conditions is due to their lack of 
understanding of how in the long run social developments influence the 
government.40
One of the implications which can be drawn from his hypothesis is that the 
concept of social responsibility is irrelevant to the reality of business operation 
because when a firm acts, the action is aimed more towards gaining competitive 
advantages over its competitors.
39pcter F. Bartha, "Organizational Competence in Business-Govemment Relations: A Managerial 
Perspective," Canadian Public Administration, Vol.28, No.2 (Summer, 1985), pp.206-207.
40Ibid., p.208.
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Moreover, three sources which impede the integration of socio-political factors 
into corporate planning are also identified in his hypothesis. First, the techniques 
available for assessment of a firm environment do not give quantifiable information 
suitable for complicated corporate planning models. Second, prevailing organisational 
structures hinder effective communication between evaluators of socio-political events 
and corporate planners. And third, the formal planning process itself is under 
increasing scrutiny and its usefulness seriously questioned.41 These explanations 
may help answer the question raised earlier by Globerman and Schwindt concerning 
the persistence of inadequate and inefficient communication between government and 
business.
In contrast, Grant explained the unsatisfactory state of government and business 
relations by arguing that collectively, business can be economically strong but 
politically weak. Referring to Britain, he suggested that there is an increasing 
concentration of economic power in the business sector, but that the sector remains 
politically weak and unable to get its political act together. This situation makes it 
difficult for the government to enter into a partnership relationship with business even 
if it wanted to.42
Similarly, Truman, in his classic work in capitalism, stated that economic 
power can be converted into political power only at a discount, variable in size 43
The industrial adaptation school. This is another school of thought in the 
macro-level theories. The literature discussed in this school is mainly based on the
41Ibid., pp.208-213.
42Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, op.cit., p.8. He supported the political weakness of 
business by quoting evidence from C. Leys, "Thatcherism and British Manufacturing: A Question of 
Hegemony," New Left Review, No.151 (1985), pp.5-25; W. A. Brown, "Comments," in F. 
Caimcross, editor, Changing Perceptions o f Economic Policy (London: Methuen, 1980); A. 
Tylecote, The Causes o f the Present Inflation (London: MacMillan, 1981); and J. P. Nettl, 
"Consensus and Elite Domination: The Case of Business," Political Studies, Vol.8 (1965), pp.22- 
44.
43Truman, op.cit., p.258.
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cases of Western European countries and Japan.44 A representative example of this 
literature is that discussed by Wilks and Wright. Their view is that the theories 
pertinent to the relationship between government and business are best seen in the 
context of industrial adaptation. The most widespread and influential theoretical 
explanation for variation in government intervention in the process of industrial 
adaptation centres on an interpretation of the role of the state in society. The argument 
is that political history has shaped state forms and economic history has shaped the 
roles of states in industrial development45
Dyson distinguishes between "state" and "state-less" societies. State societies, 
for example, Germany, France and Japan, are marked by a deference to the authority 
of state organs and implicitly therefore, intervention if desired is regarded as a 
legitimate use of public authority. In contrast, in stateless societies like the United 
States and Britain, there is widespread scepticism over the ability or right of 
government to provide industrial leadership 46
Another version of this cultural and historical approach is that of Gerschenkron. 
He suggested that the later a country industrialises, the more important and assertive 
the role of the state must be in facilitating industrialisation.47 For example, the early
44For a literature review o f government and business relations in Great Britain see, for example, 
Stephen Wilks, "Government-Industry Relations: A Review Article," Policy and Politics, Vol. 12, 
No.4 (1986), pp.491-505; D. Steel, "Review Article: Government and Industry in Britain," British 
Journal o f  Political Science, Vol.12, pp.449-503; and S. Young, An Annotated Bibliography on 
Relations between Government and Industry in Britain 1960-82 (London: Economic and Social 
Research Council, 1984), 2 volumes. For Japan see, for example, Richard Boyd, Government and 
Industry in Japan: A Review o f the Literature (London: Economic and Social Research Council,
1986). For continental European countries see, Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, editors, 
Comparative Government-Industry Relations: Western Europe, the United States, and Japan 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); P.R. Beije et al., editors, A Competitive Future fo r  Europe?: 
Towards a New European Industrial Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Graham Hall, editor, 
European Industrial Policy  (London: Croom Helm, 1986); and Alexis Jacquemin, European  
Industry: Public Policy and Corporate Strategy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
45Wilks and Wright, op.cit., p.277-278.
46K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), as quoted 
by Wilks and Wright, op.cit., p.279.
47This view is also held by A. Cawson in his Corporatism and Welfare, op.cit., pp.65-67.
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industrialisers such as the United States and Britain experienced a market-led, 
company-dominated industrial revolution in which the role of government was 
minimal, while later industrialisers such as France and Japan relied upon the 
government's positive role in industrial activity, and intervention by the state was 
regarded as necessary and legitimate.4^
Similarly, Katzenstein and Krasner suggested that variations in industrial 
adaptation can be explained essentially by features which generate "strong" and 
"weak" states. Britain and the United States are weak states marked by liberal 
traditions, and national attitudes which strongly reject any need for the state to 
intervene extensively in the market. France and Japan, by contrast, are strong states 
with authoritarian traditions, and government intervention is regarded as the natural 
order of things.49
However, the typology of weak and strong states is rejected by Zysman as too 
aggregate. He offered an alternative model in which the structure of the national 
financial system would be an autonomous influence on the political relationship 
between business and government. Three types of financial systems and three models 
of industrial change were identified: first, a state-led type, where a credit-based, 
price-administered financial system allows bureaucrats to intervene pervasively in 
industrial activities, for example France and Japan; second, a company-led type, 
where extensive and efficient capital markets allow companies autonomy and deny 
officials any effective avenue of influence, for example the United States; and third, a 
tripartite-bargained type, where adjustment is achieved in a financial system marked 
by institution-led or bank-dominated capital markets, for example West Germany and 
Sweden. Britain is marked by a failure to make a choice.50
4 ^A. Genschenkron, Economic Backwardness in H istorical Perspective  (Cambridge: Havard 
University Press, 1962), as quoted by Wilks and Wright, op.cit., p.280.
49Z.P. Katzenstein, editor, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies o f  Advanced 
Industrial States (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1978), as quoted by Wilks and Wright, 
op.cit., p.282.
50J. Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics o f Industrial 
Change (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), as quoted by Wilks and Wright, op.cit., pp.284-289.
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Wilks and Wright criticised those theories of industrial adaptation mentioned 
above as having the following weaknesses. First, there is some empirical evidence in 
which the direction of influence runs counter to what the theories would suggest.51 
Second, the theories fail to take into account a variety of informal relationships which 
operate by reference to their own, possibly selfish, logic and do not necessarily 
operate as instruments of either government or industry. Third, the assumption of 
these theories of a monolithic or consistent bureaucratic influence on government and 
business relations does not hold in reality.52
In addition to Wilks' and Wright's reasoning, it can be argued that such theories 
of industrial adaptation and the macro-perspective school of thought (Marxism, 
corporatism, and pluralism) identified earlier by Murray and McMillan, simply fail to 
recognise that the business-govemment relationship itself is neither monolithic nor 
homogeneous. In other words, within a country, relationships in different sectors of 
the economy may differ. Moreover, relationships within a single sector may vary 
over time or contain both cooperative and adversarial elements at the same time, 
depending on a particular issue.
1.4 TRENDS IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
The distinction between the approach and the level of analysis has to be recognised in 
identifying the trends of current research activities into government and business 
relations. The approach used is empirical and comparative, while the level of analysis 
tends to emphasise the micro-perspective of government and business relations.
51They cited Alan Cowson et al., "The Interaction between Firms and the State in france: The 
Telecommunications and Consumer Electronics Sectors," in Wilks and Wright, op.cit., pp. 10-34; 
Wyn Grant et al., "Government-Industry Relations in the Chemical Industry: An Anglo-German 
Comparison," in Wilks and Wright, op.cit., pp.35-60; and David Vogel, "Government-Industry 
Relations in the United States: An Overview," in Wilks and Wright, op.cit., pp.91-116.
52Wilks and Wrights, op.cit., pp.284-289.
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1.4.1 Empirical and Comparative Approaches
Rather than basing their evidence mainly on documentary data53 (as was usually 
done before), recent researchers are more likely to rely on fresh empirical data in 
discussing the congruence of values dimension of government and business relations. 
For example, Jenner surveyed the attitudes and beliefs of managers in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Australia towards the role of government in relation 
to private business. He found that managers tended to agree that government leaders 
should be trained in business and sympathetic to its cause; however, UK respondents 
were significantly less likely to agree. The Australian managers agreed most strongly, 
even though they also believed in the market mechanism. Unexpectedly, US 
managers rejected the proposition that government competition with private enterprise 
is unfair and should be eliminated. Contrary to his expectations, UK managers were 
the group most strongly opposed to government intervention; however, all groups 
tended to agree with the intervention.54 Even though Jenner had brought the 
comparative ideological differences into perspective, he did little to explain the 
variations in attitudes, which task is primary to a comparative study.
Claiming that empirical research in government and business relations was still 
scarce, Islam and Ahmed conducted a survey on the comparative background and 
characteristics of business managers and federal government officials in Canada, and 
on the extent of interaction in their relationship. They found that the two groups 
seemed to be fairly similar in terms of age, social class origin, academic training and 
personality profile. While government officials exhibited a greater degree of 
understanding of the other sector's work and tended to give more importance to the
53See, for example, John Turner, editor, Businessmen and Politics: Studies o f  Business A ctivity in 
British Politics, 1900-1945 (London: Heinemann, 1984);Tom Traves, The State and Enterprise: 
Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government, 1917-1931 (Toronto: Universiry o f Toronto 
Press, 1979); and Leonard Tivey, The Politics o f the Firms (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978).
54Stephen R. Jenner, "The British Roots of Business Ideology," Journal o f General Management, 
V ol.10, N o.l (Autumn, 1984), pp.51-52.
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government and business relations function, business managers showed less 
experience of the government sector's work and the function was likely to be the 
responsibility of upper levels of management rather than the middle level as in the 
government sector.55
Thus, Islam and Ahmed's findings challenged the claim made by Litvak whose 
survey (1978) of 30 CEOs and 30 deputy ministers in Canada indicated that there was 
a deep gulf or division in "personal and personnel" terms between the public and 
private sectors to which, he suggested, many of the basic problems affecting 
government and business relations could be attributed. He added that important 
decisions were being made by public servants with little experience in the private 
sector.56 However, Islam and Ahmed said that the difference between their data set 
(based on 132 and 183 middle, upper-middle and some top managers from a cross- 
section of business and public organisations respectively) and that of Litvak may 
account for the conflicting results.57
In their survey in 1984, Taylor and Murray studied the comparative attitudes of 
Canadian business leaders and senior federal public officers toward the present state 
of government and business relations and what they believed to be the determinants 
of the relationship. The findings were that business leaders believed that their 
relationship with government had deteriorated, and that government had become too 
left-wing in its policies and intervened too often and in the wrong way in the 
economy. Government respondents, while sharing these feelings, did not agree to the 
same extent. The survey also showed that the two groups disagreed to a certain extent 
over the identification of the root problems. Business respondents saw them as 
embedded in various failures within the government while government leaders 
attributed the causes to certain characteristics built into the business leader's role in
55Nasir Islam and Sadrudin A. Ahmed, "Business Influence on Government: A Comparison of 
Public and Private Sector Perceptions," Canadian Public Administration, Vol.27, N o .l (Spring, 
1984), pp.87-101.
56Isaiah A. Litvak, "The Ottawa Syndrome: Improving Business/Government Relations," Business 
Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (Summer, 1979), p.24.
57Islam and Ahmed, op.cit., p.93.
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society- an explanation which business tended to reject. However, the two sides 
tended to agree that the structures and processes of their interaction with each other 
had been inadequate, which resulted in a general failure to communicate. 
Consequently, Taylor and Murray suggested that any improvement of the relationship 
would have to do with the reform of the mechanisms of interaction between business 
and government.58 The implication of their suggestion is that further research should 
approach the relationship from the mechanism-of-interaction school of thought. This 
is, in fact, the approach used in this research, as will be discussed later on.
While other researchers investigated the role of government in the economy, 
Brenner studied the role of business in the political process. He found from his 
survey in 1978 that American managers thought that businessmen's political activities 
had increased but were not much more effective than they had been 10 years before. 
While the managers saw their political role as legitimate participation, the public 
viewed it as illegitimate infiltration.59
Considerable research activity has also been devoted to predicting or drawing a 
picture of government and business relations in the future with the objective that 
managers would be better prepared to deal with an unpredictable environment or with 
government regulations. Thain and Baetz's survey in 1979 found that Canadian 
managers thought the extent of government involvement in their industries at that time 
was high and likely to increase over the next five years, thus posing a serious 
problem for the industries.60 O'Toole's results (published in 1979) from using the 
delphi method indicated that future government and business relations in the United 
States up to the late 1980s would see no radical change in the freedom of business to
58D. Wayne taylor and Victor V. Murray, "An Interpretive Understanding of the Non-Fulfillment of 
Business-Government Relations," Canadian Public Administration, Vol.30, No.3 (Fall, 1987), 
pp.421-431.
59Steven N. Brenner, "Business and Politics -An Update," Havard Business Review  (November- 
December, 1979), pp. 149-163.
60Donald H. Thain and Mark Baetz, "Increasing Trouble Ahead for Business-Govemment Relations 
in Canada?" Business Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (Summer 1979), pp.56-65.
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produce goods and services profitably or efficiently, and that the government would 
probably initiate fewer new controls.61
In contradiction to O'Toole's results, Fleming's results (published in 1979), 
also from the delphi research method, claimed that the federal government would play 
an increasingly active and important role in the regulation of business over the next 20 
years. However, his results suggested the same as O'Toole's results, that there 
would be no drastic changes in the structure of or major discontinuities in institutional 
relationships.62
A comparative approach was also used by several researchers in studying 
government and business relations in Western European countries and Japan.63 For 
example, Badaracco studied the adversarial and cooperative relationships between 
business and government in four countries: the United States, Great Britain, France 
and West Germany. Basing his study on the interaction between chemical companies 
and the government in the four countries, he found that the characteristics of each 
relationship, for example, the decision-making process and the interface, were 
mutually coherent and internally consistent. In other words, no characteristic taken 
alone was either a necessary or sufficient condition for an adversarial or cooperative 
relationship.64 His findings tended to support the macro-perspective theory that the 
characteristics of the relationships between business and government in the four
61James O'Toole, "What's Ahead for the Business-Government Relationship," Havard Business 
Review  (March-April, 1979), pp.94-105.
62John E. Flemming, "The Future of U.S. Government-Corporate Relations," Long Range 
Planning, Vol. 12 (August, 1979), pp.20-26.
^3See, for example, Wyn Grant et al., Government and the Chemical Industry: A Comparative 
Study o f Britain and West Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Francois Duchene and 
Geoffrey Shepherd, editors, Managing Industrial Change in Western Europe (London: Francis 
Pinter, 1987); Ilja Scholten, editor, Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism: Corporatist Integration 
and Societal Cleavages in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1987); Alan Peacock, editor, The 
Regulation Game: How British and West German Companies Bargain with Government (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984); Peter Maunder, editor, Government Intervention in the Developed Economy 
(London: Croom Helm, 1979); Wilks and Wright, op.cit.; Beije et al., op.cit.; Hall, op.cit.; and 
Jacquemin, op.cit.
^Badaracco, op.cit.
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countries are compatible with their respective cultural and historical backgrounds.
A comparative study by Vogel of environmental regulation in Britain and the 
United States suggested that business was much more of an "insider” in the policy­
making process in Britain. While the American business participation in policy­
making largely involved lobbying, an activity directed from outside the place where 
policy decisions were made, the British industry was an active and officially 
recognised participant in the policy process itself.^5
Finally, as one of a very small body of extensive research into government and 
business relations in less industrially advanced countries, Tan’s study of the 
relationship in Singapore and Malaysia found that the extent of interaction between 
business and government, the roles played by business executives, the modes of 
interaction, and the initiation of interaction were affected, for example, by the size of 
companies, the country of origin of the companies, and the nature of the business, 
and that the level of interaction between business executives and government officials 
appeared to be higher in Malaysia than in Singapore.66
1.4.2 Micro-Perspective Analysis
There is also a certain amount of literature and research activity which emphasises the 
micro-perspective of the relationship between business and government, in particular, 
the internal organisation of a business and its process for dealing with the external 
environment, with government regulations, and other relevant socio-political issues. 
The studies in these research activities range from a broad topic like "corporate social 
performance" to narrower topics like "public affairs function," "issues management," 
and "corporate political strategies."
Corporate social performance,67 In order to keep govemmentally imposed
65David Vogel, National Styles o f Regulation; Environmental Policy in GB and the US (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), as quoted by Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, op.cit., p.6.
66Tan, op.cit.
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policies to a minimum, the central proposal of this school is that large, prominent 
companies should voluntarily decide to act in a "socially responsible" way. After 
tracing the evolution of the corporate social performance model, Wartick and Cochran 
synthesised three dimensions of the model: social responsibility; social 
responsiveness which provides the approach to realising social responsibility; and 
social issues management which is the method by which companies generate social 
responsiveness (see Table 1-2). They suggested that the model would be a paradigm 
for the study of business and society.68
Table 1-2: C orporate Social Perform ance Model
P rincip le P rocess P olicies
Corporate Social Corporate Social Social Issues
Responsibilities Responsiveness Management
1. Economic 1. Reactive 1. Issues Identification
2. Legal 2. Defensive 2. Issues Analysis
3. Ethical 3. Accomodative 3. Response Development
4. Discretionary 4. Proactive
Directed at: Diredted at: Directed at:
1. The Social 1. The Capacity to 1. Minimising
Contract of Business Respond to Changing "Surprises"
2. Business as a Societal Conditions 2. Determining Effective
Moral Agent 2. Managerial 
Approaches to 
Developing 
Responses
Corporate Social Policies
Philosophical Institutional Organisational
Orientation Orientation Orientation
Source: Steven L. Wartick and Philip L. Cochran, "The Evolution of
Corporate Social Performance," Academy o f Management Review, 
Vol.10, No.4 (1988), p.767.
67 A resourceful compilation of research in this area has been done in Lee. E. Preston, Research in 
Corporate Social Performance and Policy (Greenwich: JAI Press), V ol.l (1978), Vol.2 (1980), 
V ol.3 (1981), Vol.4 (1982). Also see S. Prakash Sethi, "A Conceptual Framework for 
Environmental Analysis of Social Issues and Evaluation of Business Response Patterns," Academy 
o f  Management Review, Vol.4, N o.l (1979), pp.63-74.
68Wartick and Cochran, op.cit., pp.758-769.
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Public affairs function . Post and others claimed that there are three main 
functions performed by the public affairs unit: collecting and providing social and 
political intelligence coming from the firm's environment; executing external action 
programmes; and communicating to management and employees about the firm's 
environment. Its objective is to narrow the gap between corporate practice and public 
expectations by functioning as a "window out" through which management can 
comprehend the social and political environment and a "window in" through which 
the relevant external constituencies can understand the organisation.69
Recent research efforts have concentrated on surveying the growth of public 
affairs units, their scope and dimensions, the activities performed by a public affairs 
unit, and its relationship with and integration into corporate planning. The main 
impression given by this literature is that there was a big increase in public affairs 
units in the 1970s in the United States. Their activities had been extended to include, 
among other things, the management of government relations instead of being limited 
to traditional public/community relations as in the past; and the relation between the 
public affairs function and corporate planning was rather firm-specific, depending on 
the internal organisation and environmental characteristics of a firm.70
Issues management.71 There are two contexts into which issues management is
69James E. Post et al., "Managing Public Affairs: The Public Affairs Function," C aliforn ia  
Management Review, Vol.XXVI, N o.l (Fall, 1983), pp.135-150.
70See James E. Post et al., "The Public Affairs Function in American Corporations: Development 
and Relations with Corporate Planning," Long Range Planning, Vol.15, No.2 (April, 1982), 
pp. 12-21; James E. Post et al., "Managing Public Affairs: The Public Affairs Functions," 
California Management Review, Vol.XXVI, N o.l (Fall, 1983), pp.135-150; Robert B Dickie, 
"Playing the Government Relations Game: How Companies Manage," Journal o f Contemporary 
Business, Vol.10, No.3, pp.105-118; Barry D. Baysinger and Richard W. Woodman, "Dimensions 
of the Public Affairs/Government Relations Functions in Major American Corporations," Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol.3 (1982), pp.27-41; Thomas G. Marx, "Integrating Public Affairs and 
Strategic Planning," California Management Review, Vol.XXIX, N o .l (Fall, 1986), pp.141-147; 
and John E. Flemming, "Linking Public Affairs with Corporate Planning," California Management 
Review, Vol.XXIII, No.2 (Winter, 1980), pp.35-43.
71For details o f the evolution of issues management, see Charles J. McMillan and Victor V.
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fitted: the corporate social performance model, as mentioned earlier, and the public 
affairs function. In the public affairs function, issues management is seen as a way of 
integrating anticipated public policy issues into the corporate decision-making 
p rocess.72 It involves 6 steps: scanning, identifying, analysing, deciding, 
implementing, and evaluating (see Figure 1-4). The fundamental purpose of issues 
management, be it public issues management, strategic issues management or social 
issues management, is to minimise surprises from a firm’s environment.73
Figure 1-4: Framework for Issues Management
Scan and monitor Identify and Analyse those
what is being said, Prioritise the issues to determine
written, and done issues that have impacts their probable
by public, media, on the company and are impacts on the
interests groups, ^  gaining widespread '^  company
government and support
other opinion
leaders
t *
Evaluate the Implement the Decide on strategy
success of these policies and to take advantage
policies and programmes approved of the favourable
programmes to ^ —  by top management — aspects of those
determine future to achieve issues and
strategy on this those end escape the
and related harmful effects
issues
Source: Adapted from Jon Johnson, "Issue Management -What Are the
Issues: An Introduction to Issues Management," Business 
Quarterly, Vol.48 (Fall, 1983), p.23.
Murray, "Strategically Managing Public Affairs: Lesson from the Analysis of Business-Govemment 
Relations," Business Quarterly, Special Supplement: Managing Business-Govemment Relations in 
Canada, Vol.48, No.25 (1983), pp.94-100; and Steven L. Wartick and Robert E. Rude, "Issues 
Management: Corporate Fad or Corporate Function?" California Management Review, Vol.XXIX, 
N o .l (Fall, 1986), pp.124-140.
72Charles B. Arrington, Jr. and Richard N. Sawaya, "Managing Public Affairs: Issues Management 
in an Uncertain Environment," California Management Review, Vol.XXVI, No.4 (Summer, 1983), 
p.23.
73Jon Johnson, "Issues Management -What are the issues?" Business Quarterly, Vol.48 (Fall, 
1983), pp.22-31.
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The theme of research efforts into issues management is similar to that of 
research efforts into the public affairs function. It concentrates on the use or practice 
of issues management and its relation with strategic planning. However, the research 
is at an early stage and most of the empirical work is based on case studies.74
Corporate Political Strategies.75 Useem identified and distinguished three 
levels of corporate political behaviour: actions by separate companies, by sectoral 
trade associations, and by the corporate community as a bloc.76 Table 1-3 illustrates 
a range of political actions that can be taken by an individual company. Political 
programmes through trade associations are, for example, lobbying legislators and 
government agencies, and running programmes to improve the image of the industry. 
Finally, class-wide political action, a less visible activity, can be described as a 
network of corporations acting together in their collective interests.
Research efforts have been made to study the impact of various stages of public 
policy on corporate political strategy, the effectiveness of various types of political 
strategy such as "political entrepreneurial strategy", and various sets of political 
strategies employed by different business organisations to influence the legislative 
process.77
74See William P. Ehling and Michael B. Hesse, "Use of 'Issue Management' in Public Relations,” 
Public Relations Review, Vol.9 (Summer, 1983), pp.18-35; Wartick and Rude, op.cit.; Arrington 
and Sawaya, op.cit.; and Stephen E. Littlejohn, "Competition and Cooperation: New Trends in 
Corporate Public Issue Identification and Resolution," California Management Review, Vol.XXIX, 
No. 15 (Fall, 1986), pp.109-123.
75For a more detailed literature review on the political activity of business, see Edwin M. Epstein, 
"Business Political Activity: Research Approaches and Analytical Issues," in Lee. E. Preston, editor, 
Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Vol.2 (Greenwich: JAI Press Inc., 1980), 
pp.1-55.
76Michael Useem, "Political, Business and Social Theory: Company, Trade Association, and 
Classwide Business Political Action," in Murray, op.cit., pp.207-209.
77Sec Arieh A. Ullmann, "The Impact of the Regulatory Life Cycle on corporate Political 
Strategy," California Management Review, Vol.XXVIII, N o.l (Fall, 1985), pp.140-154; David B. 
Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein, "Creating Political Advantage: The Rise o f the Corporate Political 
Entrepreneur," California Management Review, Vol.XXVIII, N o .l (Fall, 1985), pp.124-139; and
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Table 1-3: Company Actions Designed to Influence Political 
Processes
Company Action Intended Political Impact
Issues and advocacy Primarily to shape views of opinion leaders;
advertising secondarily to influence public opinion
Contribution programmes Primarily to enhance reputation of the firm; 
secondarily to improve image of business
Political action Promote candidates for federal and federal
committee (PAC) electoral office
Public affairs and Shape legislation and agency policies affecting
lobbying the firm
Management involvement Improve company awareness of political
in politics environment; alter state and national legislation
Source: Michael Useem, "Political Business and Social Theory: Company,
Trade Association, and Classwide Business Political Action," in 
Murray, editor, op.cit., p.209.
1.5 WHAT WILL THIS RESEARCH ACHIEVE 
BEYOND THE PRESENT LITERATURE?
Following the discussion of the literature and research activities, it is now appropriate 
to identify how this research plans to further the present state of knowledge of 
government and business relations. A total of six schools of thought was identified 
earlier: first, the general social structure and ideological context school; second, the 
interpretive school; third, the failure-of-business school; fourth, the failure-of 
government school; fifth, the mechanism-of-interaction school; and sixth, the 
industrial adaptation school (see Figure 1-5). The trends of current research activities 
-the empirical and comparative approach and the micro-perspective analysis- are 
certainly welcome since empirically-uninformed theories should be grounded and 
tested by research data, associated links or even causal relationships between
John C. Aplin and W. Harvey Hegarty, "Political Influence: Strategies Employed by Organization to 
Impact Legislation in Business and Economic Matters," Academy o f Management Journal, Vol.23, 
No.3 (1980), pp.438-450.
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variables can be established by comparative study, and micro-analysis generates more 
relevant and applicable knowledge.
Figure 1-5: Summary of Theories of Business-Government 
Relationship and Current Research Activities
Theories Research Activities
r  \ f
Macro-level: Approach:
- Marxism - Empiricism
- Corporatism ^ ------ - Comparison
- Pluralism - Micro-perspective analysis
- Industrial adaptation school
Micro-level Areas:
- Interpretive school - Corporate social performance
- Failure-of-business school - Public affairs function
- Failure-of-govemment school
- Mechanim-of-interaction school
- Issues management
- Corporate political strategies
However, the research trend itself is not enough to indicate the direction which 
further investigation should take. The answer to the question, "What is the purpose of 
the study of government and business relations?" and recognition of the neglected 
research areas, should finally indicate the direction of further investigation.
1.5.1 Purpose of the Study of Business-Government Relationship
The answer to the question as to what the usefulness of knowledge about government 
and business relations is, is of course, subjective. Being totally unaware or only 
slightly aware of this subjectivity when criticising others' theories, two authors may 
argue against each other without knowing that each of them may be right. For 
example, the macro-level theories, which provide an understanding of how the 
relationship is shaped by economic, political, and social systems, may be criticised by
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the business-policy approach as falling short of giving managers any guidelines for 
handling their interaction with the government. On the other hand, the micro-level 
theories, which indicate for instance ways in which public policy can be influenced 
by business managers, may be criticised by the macro-level theories as failing to 
relate the business-govemment relationship to the society as a whole.
To avoid such a situation, the presumption of this research concerning the 
usefulness of knowledge about government and business relations should be made 
clear first. The presumption is that the study of the relationship should offer 
managers, both public and private, or any parties concerned, information which will 
enable them to manage or handle better the strains, tensions, or even conflicts 
occurring in the process of their interaction. The terms "manage or handle" as against 
"alleviate or eliminate" are used here because the level of strain, tension, or conflict 
wanted is unknown and tends to depend on the specific issue concerned. This 
research would rather disagree with those writers who suggest that such a study 
should aim at indicating ways of improving government and business relations. The 
term "improving" is not applicable since the criteria of a "good" or a "bad" 
relationship are still not agreed, and therefore, it is rather difficult to identify what 
constitutes the desirable relationship at which the improvement aims.
1.5.2 Weaknesses in the Literature
With the presumption that the purpose of the study of government and business 
relations is to create a better informed management of government and business 
interaction, it is now possible to identify what are the weaknesses in the literature.
Figure 1-6 shows the literature discussed earlier but viewed from another 
framework. In this framework, the literature is grouped according to the approaches 
used rather than the level of analysis as discussed previously.
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Figure 1-6: Approaches to the Analysis of Business-Government 
Relationship
Organisational
Approach
Process and 
organisation
Communica­
tion and 
contactPolitical, economic, 
social, 
historical 
and cultural 
systems
Ideologies, 
values 
and attitudes
Structural
Approach
Behavioural
Approach
Interactional
Approach
The structural approach. The structural approach tends to look at the collective 
structural variables, for example, political, economic, social, historical, and cultural 
systems, as factors shaping the relationship. Examples of the theories using the 
structural approach are those identified earlier by Murray and MacMillan as the 
macro-perspective school of thought and the industrial adaptation theories identified 
by Wilks and Wright. This approach gives the least useful information in terms of the 
management of business-govemment relationship since its society-level variables are 
beyond the influence of private managers or public administrators. Nonetheless, it 
gives the managers and administrators an understanding of the context in which they
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interact.
The behavioural approach. The behavioural approach emphasises the 
sociological variables, for example, attitudes, values, and beliefs, as factors shaping 
government and business relations. An example of the theories using this approach is 
the interpretive school. The information given by this approach tells managers and 
administrators about the kind of mental predisposition with which they are dealing. 
However, the likelihood of successful management of government and business 
interaction by influencing attitudes, values, or beliefs is small, especially when the 
interaction is at the intelligent, managerial level.
The organisational approach. The organisational approach emphasises the 
internal processes and organisation of companies and government agencies as factors 
shaping their relationship. Examples of the theories using this approach are the 
failure-of-business school and the failure-of-govemment school. The information 
given by this approach tells managers and administrators how they should be 
internally organised in dealing with interaction and how the actions affect their 
relationship. However, it provides managers with few objectives at which they 
should aim in the interaction, for example, who should be contacted, how and when.
The interactional approach. The areas common to any two approaches shown 
in Figure 1-6 constitute the hybrid approach which emphasises variables belonging to 
more than one approach at the same time. In fact, this is the approach most authors 
use in analysing government and business relations; few are committed to one single 
approach. However, it is the "interactional approach," the area common to the 
previous three approaches, which is used in this research. An example of the theories 
using the interactional approach is the mechanism-of-interaction school. The main 
variables are the communication and contact between business and government. 
These variables, taken as the reflection of the variables of the other three approaches,
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are emphasised as factors shaping the relationship. The approach readily provides the 
framework of objectives for private managers and public administrators in handling 
interaction. They handle and manage the strains, tensions and conflicts in the 
relationship by deciding, for instance, how much communication there should be, 
who should be contacted and how.
Theoretical gap. One of the major weaknesses in the literature is that little 
research has been done using the interactional approach. The theories of government 
and business relations, such as those of the macro-perspective and industrial 
adaptation schools, originated mainly from studies in political science, economics, 
and sociology. Theoretically, these studies produce inaccurate macro-level description 
of the relationship, and practically, generate information which is of limited use to 
private managers and public administrators. The nature of the relationship between 
government and business tends to vary from one issue or industry to another; it is 
neither always adversarial nor completely cooperative as often portrayed by macro­
level theories. In addition, insights given by macro-level theories, for example, that 
the later a country industrialises, the greater the role of the state in the economy 
becomes, are of little help to public administrators and private managers in dealing 
with each other.
Even though there are current research activities which concentrate on the 
micro-perspective of government and business relations, the interactional approach is 
very much neglected in their analysis. Instead, the organisational and behavioural 
approaches are used extensively within the four research areas: corporate social 
performance, public affairs function, issues management, and corporate political 
strategy.
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Figure 1-7: The Relationship between the Interactional Approach and 
Other Approaches.
Structural and Behavioural Approach: 
the Economic and Political Context,
Influence, and the Prevailing Attitudes,Values and Ideologies
Organisational Approach 
-Internal process 
-Internal organisation
Interactional Approach 
-Communication 
-Contacts
Interaction between 
Business and Government 
-Strains 
-Tensions 
-Conflicts
The importance of the interactional approach is brought out here not as a 
substitute for but as a complementary approach to the others (see Figure 1-7). That is, 
while the structural and behavioral approaches provide the context of the relationship, 
the interactional approach gives the framework for the design of the internal processes 
and organisation of firms (or government agencies), the variables emphasised by the 
organisational approach. For example, contact for negotiation should be recognised
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and separated from routine contact and matched with different groups of personnel. 
In other words, the interactional approach offers a "linkage or interface," which is 
neglected by the literature, between the organisational approach and business- 
govemment interaction.
Empirical gap. Another and more obvious weakness in the literature is that 
government and business relations in less industrially-advanced countries are 
neglected and under-researched. Less is known about the relationship in less 
developed countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, or Kenya 
than in more developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, France, or Japan.
With the recognition of these two major weaknesses, the primary task of this research 
is to describe the present interaction between government and business in Thailand 
and its ideological context Its main objective is to generate information to help private 
managers and public administrators to handle interaction effectively. The details of the 
research design and methodology will be discussed in the next chapter.
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
There is ample evidence that government and business interaction in Thailand (and in 
other countries) is high and increasing and will remain so in the foreseeable future. 
With a growth in gross national product (GNP) of about 10 percent each year, the 
government has to spend more on infrastructure facilities such as transportation, 
communication, and energy in order to maintain economic expansion. Some of these 
infrastructure projects are contracted out to private business. Investment by business 
is closely negotiated with the government in order to receive certain promotional 
privileges such as tax concessions. However, rapid expansion of the economy creates 
problems like inflation and the inadequacy of the quantity and quality of the
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government services vital to business operations. The inflation problem is discussed 
by public officials from the central bank and executives of big commercial banks. At 
the same time outdated bureaucratic procedures which obstruct efficient business 
operations are removed at the suggestion of businessmen.
Besides the effects of a rising GNP, rapid technological change and the 
increasing importance of international trade also force government and business to 
meet and plan together to maintain the country’s economic competitiveness in 
international markets.
Moreover, apart from these examples of economic stimulation of government 
and business interaction, present political developments in Thailand make the 
government and politicians more accountable to the voters. Consequently, the 
government is now quicker and more willing, either for reasons of economic equality 
or political gain, to address problems like wages and low agricultural product prices 
by regulating business, which results in more interaction between government and 
business. Meanwhile, businessmen are gaining more experience in influencing 
government policy by employing such tactics as lobbying and supporting promising 
politicians, practices which were firmly suppressed by the government in the past.
Thus, the significance of this research is twofold. First, it enables public 
administrators and private managers to take better-informed decisions or courses of 
actions in their interaction, whether their intentions are based on personal interest, 
benefits to organisations to which they belong, national economic development, or 
social welfare, or on a combination of any of these.
Second, it is hoped that the research will stimulate other studies in order to 
replace the old image of excessively regulatory government and narrow, self- 
interested business, with one in which the government is seen as an institution both 
offering opportunities and imposing restrictions, and business as being both socially 
responsible and commercially selfish. The awareness or recognition of such 
combined nature of each side is essential to the positive development of government
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and business relations.
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The main text. There are 6 other chapters following this one. Chapter 2 will 
discuss the scope of this research, the method, procedure, and data analysis. At the 
end of the chapter, some empirical limitations of the research are given.
The results and discussion of the data will be presented in Chapter 3 to Chapter 
6. Chapter 3 will compare the economic ideology of senior Thai bureaucrats and 
business managers: their views on the economic role of the government, regulation, 
and government financial assistance to firms. Being closely related to Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 will similarly compare the views of senior bureaucrats and managers on the 
role of business in politics and its participation in public policy making. It will also 
make a comparison of their views on the relationship between government and 
business -how business should relate to government and vice versa.
After the ideological context of business-government relationship has been 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse the interaction in the 
relationship itself. Chapter 5 will concentrate on the analysis of institutional 
interaction, as compared with policy interaction which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
In particular, Chapter 5 will study the contact and communication between companies 
and government agencies. Various aspects of contact and communication, such as 
reasons for contact, influence, personnel and personal links, and methods of 
communication, will be discussed. Its main analysis is based on the comparison 
between legally compulsory and non-compulsory dealings between companies and 
government agencies.
Chapter 6 will then analyse the relationship in terms of policy interaction. It will 
identify why companies want to influence government economic policy, what are the 
criteria used by managers in deciding whether a government economic policy is in
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their interest, and how they react to a policy which is not. With regard to the reaction 
of a company, the analysis is based on the comparison between a company's 
response to a government economic policy which affects it as an individual and to one 
which affects the industry as a whole.
Finally, the research findings will be evaluated in Chapter 7. The major findings 
will be summarised and then their implications discussed. At the end of the chapter, 
areas of further research are proposed.
Others. There are also 10 other appendices (Appendices A to J), some of which 
may be essential for those readers who are not familiar with Thailand. Appendices A 
to D will provide the background information about government and business 
relations in Thailand. In particular, Appendix A is about the economic and political 
context of the relationship and Appendix B the actors in the relationship. Appendix C 
will give a macro-view of the relationship from 1932 until recently. And Appendix D 
will discuss the Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC), the first 
ever formal and permanent channel of cooperation between government and business 
in Thailand.
Appendices E to I are about the research instruments -pilot studies, 
questionnaires, and interview schedules. In particular, Appendices E and F present 
the pilot studies which led to the interview schedules used in this research as shown 
in Appendices G, H, and I respectively. In addition, Appendix J gives information 
about the spatial distribution of the ideal population of this research's survey.
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe how this research was carried out and explain its logic. In 
particular, it will bring out the nature of the research and its scope. It will also explain 
how the research instruments -the interview schedules- were created and 
administered. The research data analysis is then discussed. Finally some empirical 
limitations of the research are given.
2.2 THEME OF THE RESEARCH:
EXPLORATORY VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE
Adam and Schvaneveldt wrote:
"The concept of exploration brings to mind the tremendous feats of 
Columbus, Neil Armstrong,... These explorers were seeking new 
information, new insights...While preliminary goals guided their studies, 
these explorers were not locked into a rigid design or ultimate outcome...
The very purpose of exploratory research is to seek out new insights, ask 
questions, and assess phenomena in a different perspective. Exploratory 
studies are less structured, which permits the researcher to seek new 
insights. The less developed an area, the more likely that exploration 
should be the design used."1
If exploration conveys the idea suggested above, then, to a large extent, this research 
is exploratory. Exploratory research has several characteristics suitable for the
h e r a ld  R. Adams and Jay D. Schvaneveldt, Understanding Research M ethods (New York: 
Longman, 1985), p.103.
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%
purpose and nature of the study of government and business relations in Thailand 
(see Table 2-1). Compared with descriptive research which is tightly structured, 
focused and selective, exploratory research is flexible, less structured and covers the 
different perspectives of the problems investigated. These qualities are certainly 
suitable for research into government and business relations in Thailand on which 
little previous literature is available, as already pointed out in Chapter 1.
Table 2-1: Comparison of Two Major Types of Research Design
Research Design
Exploratory Descriptive
Purpose To seek new insights . To make a precise description, 
explanation, etc
Quality Flexible and less structured Tightly structured, usually 
with clear hypotheses
Broad scope of investigation Focus and selective
Advantage Open to opportunity 
(serendipity)
Easily controlled
Disadvantage Difficult to control Lack of serendipity
Activity Asking creative questions Asking important questions
Nature of Problem Little previous knowledge of
the problem
Extensive previous 
knowledge of the problem
Source: Summarised from Gerald R. Adams and Jay D. Schvaneveldt, 
Understanding Research Methods (New York: Longman, 1985),
pp.101-118.
However, the flexibility and the broad scope of investigation of exploratory 
research are achieved at the expense of the control of the research. But it should not 
be assumed here that exploratory research is purposeless and random. Rather, 
exploratory research is purposeful; it starts from a broad focus and gradually narrows 
down its scope as the investigation goes on. Its purposes are to seek new insights and 
explore areas unknown to researchers.
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2.3 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
The main question. In view of the position taken by this research on the purpose 
of a study of business-govemment relationship and the weakness of the literature, the 
simple but fundamental question which forms the basis of other sub-questions is: 
"How can government and business impose restrictions as well as offer opportunities 
to each other?" In particular, the research will try to answer what government and 
business can do to benefit mutually from their relationship. It is against this 
background that the research findings will be evaluated in the conclusion. To achieve 
this end, the research scope is broken down as follows.
Sub-questions. The scope of this study can probably be best seen from the 
conceptual framework of the research shown in Figure 2-1. On the left-hand side of 
the figure, a business is seen as an entity existing in a larger societal context shaped 
by four generic forces: socio-cultural, economic, political, and technological. A firm 
also has to interact with other entities in the environment, such as its competitors, 
customers, trade associations and pressure groups.
This research focuses on the business relationship with one particular entity in 
the environment: the government. As shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2-1, the 
two main focuses of the research are to study the interaction between business and 
government and the ideological context of the interaction.
2.3.1 The Ideological Context
The research compares the ideology of senior bureaucrats and business managers. It 
investigates two areas of their ideology: economic ideology and views on business 
and politics.
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Chapter 2
Econom ic ideology. The research compares three aspects of the economic 
ideology of senior bureaucrats and business managers:
i) The economic role of the Thai government. The questions to be answered 
here are what senior Thai bureaucrats and managers think about a free market 
economy. Will it be the type of economy which they want see in Thailand? Should 
the government own businesses in such industries as transportation, electricity 
generation and telecommunication. Or should the government enter into joint ventures 
with business? And should the government protect certain local industries from fierce 
competition abroad?
ii) Government regulation. The study also investigates the extent to which 
senior bureaucrats and managers agree on the role of the government in regulating 
business. Should prices be controlled by the government in certain circumstances? 
What about product standards and minimum wage levels? To what extent should the 
government regulate them? And should the government interfere with the level of 
interest rates and foreign currency exchange?
iii) Government financial assistance to firms. Finally, the research asks 
whether the government should give financial help to businesses. In what form 
should government financial assistance be? Subsidies, loans, or tax concessions? 
And what kind of company should be given priority?
Views on business and politics. Three aspects of the views of senior 
bureaucrats and managers on business and politics are compared:
i) Forms of government and business relations. The study asks how senior 
bureaucrats and managers would like to see the Thai government relate to business. 
On the other hand, how would they like to see business relate to the government? 
And are the two forms of relationship compatible?
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ii) The political role of business. The study also examines what senior 
bureaucrats and managers think about business involvement in politics. Is it good or 
bad for the Thai economy?
iii) The participation of business in public policy making. Finally, the 
research investigates how senior bureaucrats and managers see the role of business in 
the government’s economic policy making? Should business participate in public 
policy making, and how? And what do they think will be the consequences of 
participation?
2.3.2 Interaction between Business and Government
After discussing the ideological context of government and business relations, the 
research examines the interaction within the relationship. It distinguishes between two 
major types of business-govemment interaction: institutional and policy.
Institutional interaction. In the study of institutional interaction, the research 
investigates contact and communication between companies and government 
agencies. The emphasis is mainly on the comparison between dealings which are 
compulsory because of legal requirements and those which are not. The following 
aspects of the two types of contact are studied:
i) The basis of company contact with government agencies. The research 
first identifies the major government agencies contacted by companies. It asks what 
the reasons for contact are. Do the reasons for compulsory and non-compulsory 
dealings differ?
ii) Influence within contact. The comparative level of government and 
business influence within contact is investigated. To what extent do companies have 
influence over the government agencies they contacted and vice versa?
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iii) Personnel links within contact. The research examines personnel and 
personal links within contact. Do companies develop relationships with personnel in 
the government agencies they contact and with how many? What is the rank of these 
contact officials? How well acquainted are companies with these contact officials? 
Does this acquaintance help companies in their contact with the government?
iv) Patterns of communication within contact. The research further 
investigates the patterns of communication within contact. Do compulsory and non- 
compulsory dealings differ in the frequency and methods of communication? And 
who initiates most of the dealings in the two types of interaction?
v) Satisfaction within contact. Finally, the research evaluates the success of 
the relationship between companies and government agencies during their interaction. 
Do companies experience any difficulty in the interaction? And how satisfied are they 
with their relationship with the government agencies they contacted?
Policy interaction. In the study of policy interaction, the scope of the 
examination can be broadly divided into the interpenetration between government 
economic planning and business policy, and business reaction to government 
economic policy in its implementation stage (the ex post facto mode).
i) The interpenetration between government economic planning and business 
policy. The research asks why companies want to influence government economic 
policy. Are there certain company decisions which are more influenced than others by 
government policy? It also investigates the balance of policy cooperation between 
government and business.
ii) The ex post facto mode of business reaction to government economic 
policy. The research tries to identify the criteria used by companies in deciding 
whether or not a government economic policy is in their interest. In particular, the 
research examines the difference between business reaction to the two types of the 
impact of government policy: individual company and industry-wide. In each type of
51
Chapter 2
impact, the research asks whether companies take any action if a government 
economic policy is not in their interests. If no, why? If yes, what do companies do, 
how do they do it, and how successful is their reaction?
2.4 RESEARCH METHODS
2.4.1 Interview Versus Questionnaire
From the nature, objectives, and scope of the research described so far, it is clear that 
only two contending methods -interview and questionnaire- are appropriate to the 
study. In theory, the questionnaire and interview methods are largely similar: both of 
them use questions to elicit information. The most obvious difference is that while 
questions are read by respondents in the questionnaire method, they are asked directly 
by an interviewer in the interview method. However, in practice, certain advantages 
and disadvantages are associated with these two popular tools of social research, as 
shown in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2: Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Interview  
and Questionnaire Methods
Questionnaire Interview
Fixed set of questions Flexible, probing possible
Shorter sequence of questions Longer sequence of questions
Higher consistency of question Lower consistency of question
wording wording
Less complicated investigation More complicated investigation
Lower control of information Higher control of
filling filling
Less sensitive questions More sensitive questions
Bigger sample size Smaller sample size
Time-saving Time-consuming
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The highly-structured interview was chosen as the method for this research 
since neither of the two methods was appropriate in its unmodified form. The highly- 
structured interview method has the combined advantages of both. It is flexible and 
allows probing and a longer sequence of questions, which is suitable for this kind of 
exploratory research. It also achieves greater consistency of question-wording and 
permits complex investigation, which the research requires. Its advantage of greater 
control of information filling because of the presence of the interviewer is appropriate 
for the context in which the research was conducted, since Thailand is not a research- 
oriented society and consequently its people are less skillful than those in the West at 
filling in questionnaires.
Moreover, some of the questions are rather sensitive, for example, those asking 
about a respondent's attitude towards the political role of businessmen. The presence 
of the interviewer helps make respondents more relaxed in answering such questions 
because he can establish rapport with them and assure them of anonymity.
The choice of the highly-structured interview is further confirmed by a 
conversation with a professor of one of the business schools in Bangkok during the 
fieldwork in Thailand. He attempted some research into small business management 
and sent out hundreds of questionnaires but received only a few replies.
2.4.2 Construction of the Interview Schedules
Because little has been published about government and business relations in 
Thailand, and because the interactional approach has been largely neglected in the 
literature as discussed previously, there is little extensive research available to be used 
as a guide to what types of question are relevant, or how difficult respondents find 
questions concerning government and business relations. Yet, the heart of 
exploratory research is to generate new questions. As a result, two pilot studies were 
conducted.
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First pilot study. It was carried out with the objective of generating new 
questions and testing their effectiveness and sensitivity. The first pilot study took the 
form of a loosely-structured in-depth interview (see Appendix E). The interview is 
divided into several relevant topics, the questions of which were derived from 
research into the content of newspapers, books and other publications. Some of the 
questions were also derived from discussions with colleagues. In addition, probing 
guides are provided at the end of the questions.2
The pilot study should have been administered in Thailand with business 
managers in Bangkok, but due to locational and time constraints, students with 
managerial background attending part-time MBA programmes at the Glasgow 
Business School were chosen instead. An in-depth interview lasting between two and 
three hours was completed on three respondents and recorded. As a result, some 
questions were later discarded as irrelevant or redundant. The rest were then modified 
and subjected to criticism by colleagues and staff members of the Glasgow Business 
School.
Second pilot study. The objective of this pilot study is rather specific. It was 
done in order to select relevant pairs of descriptive adjectives for the semantic 
differential scales to be used in studying the attitudinal aspect of government and 
business relations, such as the attitudes of senior bureaucrats and business managers 
towards each other and their perception of current government and business relations 
in Thailand (see details in Appendix F).
The fin a l interview schedules. Due to the high level of difficulty in finding 
respondents and to time limits, the final interview schedules were tested on only two 
companies and two government officials in Thailand. After a few modifications the
2The style of this pilot study was inspired by "Interview Guide" in Robert E. Lane, The Political 
Ideology: Why the American Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp.481- 
493.
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interview schedules appear as shown in Appendices G (Interview Schedule for 
Business Managers: Form A), H (Interview Schedule for Business Manager: Form 
B), and I (Interview Schedule for Senior Bureaucrats) respectively. Appendix G 
contains the questions about institutional and policy relationships between business 
and government. Appendices H and I show the interview schedules used in the study 
of the economic ideology of senior bureaucrats and managers and their views on 
business and politics.
2.5 RESEARCH PROCEDURE
The research procedure can be divided into two stages: the sampling and the 
interviewing stages.
2.5.1 Sampling M ethod
Graham Kalton wrote:
"It is a useful exercise to start by defining the population as the ideal one 
required to meet the survey objectives -the target population. This 
definition is then often modified to be the survey population to take 
account of practical constraints."3
The above practice is used for the description of the survey samples of this research.
The business sample. The business sample comprises the private companies 
within the manufacturing sector in Thailand. The manufacturing sector was chosen 
because it is the fastest growing sector in the Thai economy (for more discussion of 
the growth of the manufacturing sector, see Appendix A) and consequently, is
3Graham Kalton, Introduction to Survey Sampling, Quantitative Applications in Social Sciences 
Series, No.35 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), p.3.
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involved in many government-related activities. However, from an inquiry with the 
officials of the Business Registration Division, Department of Commercial 
Registration in the Ministry of Commerce, it was found that registered companies are 
not classified according to industries or sectors, but in alphabetical order, thus 
making it impossible to identify the target population of manufacturing companies.
Then the Industrial Economics and Planning Division in the Office of the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Industry was contacted. This Division has 
compiled a list of factories located in Bangkok and other provinces (the statistics are 
shown in Appendix J) but again does not provide the target population of companies 
that can be sampled since only factory addresses are available and not those of their 
company headquarters. However, it does indicate that the manufacturing sector is 
very much Bangkok-based,4 thus providing a spatial framework for the target 
business population.
Fortunately, there is a private publication5 which has compiled information on 
the top 1,000 companies and classified them under various industries by using the 
four-digit International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) system. The target 
population (the manufacturing companies in Thailand) was then transformed into the 
survey population of those manufacturing companies ranked within the top 1,000 
companies according to their competitiveness (measured by sales, profits, and 
assets).
A stratified sampling method was used in order to obtain a sample of companies 
distributed in several industries within the manufacturing sector. A total sample of 41 
companies was achieved. The distribution of the sample industries is shown in Table 
2-3. Even though the sample does not cover every industry, to a certain extent it
4In fact, almost all of major business activities take place in Bangkok, especially those o f big 
business. Even though this is true in most countries, the Thai case tends to carry the concentration 
to the extreme. For details, see Kirkiat Pipatseritham and Kunio Yoshihara, Business Groups in 
Thailand, Research Notes and Discussion Paper No.41 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1983), p. 10.
5International Business Research, Million Baht Business Information Thailand 1988 (Bangkok: 
International Business Research, 1988).
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represents the major manufacturing companies in Thailand.
Table 2-3: The Sample Companies
Industry ISIC Code Number of Companies
Preparing and preserving meat 3111 1
Fruit, vegetable canning 3113 1
Seafood canning and preserving 3114 4
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 3115 1
Grain mill products 3116 1
Baked and steamed products 3117 1
Animal feeds 3122 2
Textile spinning, weaving 3211 1
Carpet, rugs 3214 1
Apparel 3220 2
Footwear 3240 1
Pulp, paper and fibreboard 3411 4
Container, paper box and paperboard 3412 1
Fertilisers and pesticides 3512 1
Tyre and tubes 3551 1
Pottery 3610 1
Glass and glass products 3620 1
Non-metallic mineral products 3699 1
Iron, steel works and rolling mills 3711 2
Iron, steel foundries 2712 2
Fabricated metal products except machinery 3819 2
Engine and turbine 3821 1
Other machinery and equipment except electrical 3829 1
Radio, television and communication equipment 3832 1
Other electrical apparatus 3839 4
Motorcycle, tricycle and bicycle 3844 2
Total 41
The bureaucrat sample. The population of bureaucrats is more easily defined. 
The Thai government consists of 15 ministries (The organisation chart of the Thai 
government can be seen in Appendix B). Senior bureaucrats within the three major 
economic ministries -the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Finance- were chosen as the survey population since the target 
population, senior bureaucrats within all ministries, was too big to be sampled 
because of time limits. Nevertheless, the three ministries chosen are the ones whose 
activities are most immediately related to business. The final sample of bureaucrats 
consists of 13 directors of division or equivalent from the Ministry of Commerce, 10
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from the Ministry of Industry, and 7 from the Ministry of Finance, making a total of 
30 bureaucrats interviewed in all.
2.5.2 The Interview
Two sets of interview schedules were used for one sample company. Interview 
Schedule Form A (see Appendix G) was used to interview the manager whose 
activities most often involved dealing with the government; the person was identified 
after the company contacted had agreed to give interviews. The questions in this 
interview are about the company's contact, communication and policy relationship 
with the government
The second interview using Interview Schedule Form B (see Appendix H) 
might or might not be used with the same manager, depending on the time already 
spent on the first interview schedule (Interview Schedule Form A) since it took some 
managers up to 2 hours to finish the first interview. Therefore, in some cases the 
second interview (Interview Schedule Form B) was used with another manager in the 
company.
The separation of the interview into two forms was chosen because some 
managers did not have enough time to complete the two interviews and might have 
tried to answer the questions briefly so as to finish the interview as soon as possible; 
or they might have become tired after the long interview and unable to give 
appropriate, correct information.
The bureaucrats were asked questions similar to those in the Interview Schedule 
for Business Managers Form B (see Appendix I) for the purpose of making a 
comparison.
For all the interviews in the research, either with business managers or senior 
bureaucrats, cards were used as a form of visual aid to respondents. For example, the 
questions whose answers are in the form of scales or ranking of several items were
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always accompanied by cards showing relevant scales or items.
All the interviews with senior bureaucrats and managers in Thailand were 
carried out between April and August 1989.
2.6 DATA ANALYSIS
2.6.1 Some Definitions
Before discussing how the data is analysed, some of the terms used in this research 
need to be defined.
Company size. There are several ways to measure the size of a company, such as 
in terms of the total assets and the number, of employees. This research uses the latest 
annual turnover of a company as a measurement of its size in order to neutralise the 
effect of the capital or labour intensive characteristic of a company, since the sample 
companies are in several different industries. The research defines three company- 
sizes: small, medium, and large. Medium-sized companies are those whose latest 
annual turnover ranges from 300 to 700 million baht,6 and small and large 
companies are those whose latest annual turnover is below or above that range 
respectively. The choice of 300 and 700 million baht as the classifying points is the 
result of a study of the distribution of turnover of the top 1,000 companies, the 
survey population. The two points are approximately the 30th and 70th percentile of 
the turnover distribution with an average inflation rate of 8% over 3 years 
incorporated in them (This is because the figures were from 1986 but the research 
was carried out in 1989). It should be noted that the classification of the sample 
companies into small, medium, and large is relative since all the companies in the 
research are relatively big in the context of domestic industry.
61 pound is worth about 40 baht.
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Type o f  company. In addition, the research classifies the sample companies into 
three categories according to type: Thai, joint-venture, and foreign companies. The 
classification of a company into a category is done by directly asking the manager 
interviewed which of the above three types his company is. The conventional 
understanding of the three types of companies applies here. Thai companies are those 
based in Thailand, managed by Thai managers, and owned by Thai people. Joint- 
venture companies are those in which the ownership as well as the management is 
shared by Thai and non-Thai people. Foreign companies (or subsidiaries) are those 
whose parent companies are based outside Thailand.
The extent o f  governm ent control o f  industry. Finally, the research 
classifies the companies according to the extent of government control of their 
industry. This classification is a matter of the perception of the managers interviewed. 
The managers were asked the question: "To what extent do you think the government 
controls or regulates the industry in which your company is?" The answers are in the 
form of a four-point scale: (1) No Extent, (2) Small, (3) Moderate, (4) Great and (5) 
Very Great.
2.6.2 Choice of Statistical Techniques
The data analysis of this research relies mainly on non-parametric statistics.7 The 
main argument against the use of parametric statistics is that most of the research 
variables are measured at nominal or ordinal level.8 However, when interval
7For a detailed application of non-parametric statistics and discussion of the occasion in which each 
technique is appropriate, see, for example, Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric S tatistics fo r  the 
Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition (McGraw-Hill , 1989); and John H. Mueller et al., Statistical 
Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp.239-294.
8For a detailed discussion of measurement levels, see, for example, D. A. de Vaus, Surveys in 
Social Research (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp.83-69; C. A. Moser and G. Kalton, 
Survey Methods in Social Investigation (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp.350-377; Arlene Fink and 
Jacqueline Kosecoff, How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985),
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measurement is achieved, appropriate parametric statistics are used. All the statistical 
methods used in the data analysis and the occasions when they apply are shown in 
Table 2-4.9 With regard to the inferential statistics shown in Table 2-4, no 
significance level is applied to the probabilities in the sense of rejecting or not 
rejecting a hypothesis. The nature of the data and the exploratory characteristic of the 
research tend to argue against formal hypothesis testing. Under these circumstances, 
the statistics are applied with the intention of providing rough guidelines of 
significance. The conclusions that emerge from the analysis are based on judgements, 
rather than on formal tests of hypotheses.
The crosstabulation technique is used extensively in the data analysis of this 
research.10 In Chapter 3, it is used to compare the economic ideology of senior 
bureaucrats and business managers, and in Chapter 4 their views on business and 
politics. Medians and Cramer's V figures are reported in each table together with 
Mann-Whitney U tests. The control of certain variables such as age, the place of 
training or study, and the professional subject is also carried out in order to check the 
robustness of the comparison.
In Chapter 5, institutional interaction, crosstabulation analysis is conducted by 
comparing the characteristics of legally compulsory and non-compulsory dealings 
between companies and government agencies. Similarly, the medians of responses, 
Cramer's V figures and Mann-Whitney U tests are calculated for each table. In 
addition, in order to control the influence of the type of contact and examine the 
variation within sub-groups, crosstabulation is also done within each type of contact
pp.33-40; and Harry S. Upshaw, "Attitude Measurement," in Anne B. Blalock, M ethodology in 
Social Research, edited by Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp.60-111.
9The translation of statistical analysis shown here into computer programmes can be seen in SPSS 
Inc., SPSSX User's Guide (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); John Hedderson, SPSSX Made 
Simple (Blemont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1987); and Marija J. Norusis, The SPSS 
Guide to Data Analysis (Chicago: SPSS, 1986).
10The application and logic of crosstabulation technique can be seen in, for example, de Vaus, 
op.cit., ppl20-137; and Hans Zeisel, Say It with Figures, 5th edition (New York: Harper & Row, 
1968).
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across the three variables defined earlier: company size, type of company, and the 
extent of government control of industry.
Table 2-4: The Statistical Methods Used in This Research
Level of Measurement Method and Descriptive
Summary Statistics
Inferential Statistics
One variable: Description
Nominal Frequency Distribution
Ordinal Median
Interval Mean
Two variables: Measures o f association
Nominal/Ordinal Crosstabulation with Mann-Whitney U-test
Cramer's V (0 < V < 1: the (dichotomous nominal
bigger the value of V, the independent variables)
stronger the association)
Ordinal/Ordinal Kendall correlation Test of significance for T
coefficient T (-1 < T < 1: the
bigger the value of T, the
stronger the association;
the sign of T shows the
direction of association)
Two variables: Comparison
Nominal/Interval Comparing 2 means T-test
Nominal/Ordinal Comparing more than 2 Friedman 2-Way Anova
medians
Several variables: Ranking
Ordinal Kendall coefficient of Test of significance for W
concordance W (0 < W < 1:
the bigger the value of W,
the higher the agreement is
the ranking
Similarly, in Chapter 6, policy interaction, the crosstabulation method is used to 
compare business reaction to individual company and industry-wide impact. Here, 
again, medians, Cramer's V figures and Mann-Whitney U tests are shown in each 
table.
Qualitative data. As the interviews with senior bureaucrats and managers were 
conducted in a conversational manner, there are also interesting comments apart from 
the answers to the questions in the interview schedules. These comments are
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presented alongside the quantitative analysis to make the statistics more easily 
understandable and help highlight the findings.
2.7 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
Belson has categorised information commonly sought by survey researchers into 7 
broad categories.11
i) Visibly obvious characteristics. Examples are sex and clothing worn.
ii) Visibly obvious behaviour. Examples are shopping behaviour and work 
patterns on the factory floor.
iii) Information about the respondent's own characteristics and situation, of 
the sort with which the respondent might reasonably be expected to be able to provide 
the survey interviewer. Examples are age, occupation and marital state.
iv) Opinions on some seemingly innocent and non-threatening matters. 
Examples are views about road traffic and reaction to some product just tasted.
v) Information about behaviour that calls for memory effort or that may be 
subject to confusion. Examples are when the respondent last looked at some given 
publication, and number of periods lasting a week or more that the respondent was 
absent from work in the last 12 months.
vi) Information that the respondent will not want to admit because it is 
dangerous or shameful to admit it, or because he considers that it is private. Examples 
are extra-marital sexual activity and bribery.
vii) Attitudes and tendencies and personality traits of which the respondent is 
not fully aware -perhaps not aware at all. Examples are a tendency to say "no" to any 
question or proposition and irrationality.
^W illiam A. Belson, Validity in Survey Research (Cambridge: Gower, 1986), pp.3-5.
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The issues of validity and reliability of measurements made in this research are mainly 
concerned with information falling into categories (iv), (v) and (vi). Even though 
some questions in the research can be categorised as non-threatening ones, yet they 
may be misunderstood by a respondent, and sometimes the respondent may not 
choose or bother to give fully accurate replies.
There are also several research questions which require recall of events which 
took place in the past, for instance, during the past 12 months. Such questions might 
cause the respondent some difficulty in answering because of forgetfulness or 
confusion. However, the interview techniques of probing and repeated confirmation 
were used to minimise this effect.
Some of the research questions may ask for information in category (vi) such as 
the respondent's (managers) personal relationship with government officials. The 
respondent may not give an accurate answer.
Besides these general empirical limitations of asking for information in 
categories (iv), (v), and (vi), which are quite common in most social research, there 
are also other specific ones. First, in some cases, the companies being interviewed 
were involved in important negotiations with the government for certain reasons. For 
instance, there was a shortage of steel rods due to the booming construction industry 
and the steel-rod manufacturing company being interviewed was persuading the 
government to give permission to import them; the managers of the company might 
have been especially cautious in answering the questions and might not have given 
truthful replies.
Second, in a few cases the manager who knew most about the company's 
interaction with government agencies was not available because, for example, he was 
travelling abroad. In such a case, his deputy was interviewed instead. The 
substitution might have had negative effects on the research since the deputy might 
not have known as much about the company's government-related activities as his 
chief.
Finally, some younger respondents were less conservative in answering the
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questions than those who were older. This might have made the measurement of an 
answer on a scale less reliable. However, this was not always the case. In some 
companies or government agencies, older respondents were quite open and 
straightforward in giving an answer. Thus, the errors might compensate each other 
and cancel out, resulting in little overall effect on an average measurement.
2.8 SUMMARY
Due to the scarcity of literature on government and business relations in Thailand, the 
nature of this research is exploratory. Its scope of investigation covers both the 
interaction between government and business and the ideological context. Based on 
two pilot studies, the research developed 3 sets of interview schedules for the 
investigation -one for the interaction study and two for the ideological study. These 
interview schedules were then used on 41 manufacturing companies sampled from 
the top 1,000 companies in Thailand and on 30 senior bureaucrats (directors of 
division or equivalents) in the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry, and 
the Ministry of Finance. Finally, the research data was processed by a computer 
(using the SPSSX programme). The statistical techniques used in the analysis rely 
mainly on non-parametric statistics and crosstabulation.
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY:
A COMPARISON OF THAI BUREAUCRATS AND MANAGERS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It is beyond doubt that the concept of attitude, belief, ideology or similar terminology 
has long been a central part of social science research. For instance, in social 
psychology, many theories concerning the formation and change of attitudes have 
been formulated, whereas in sociology, ideology has been studied in terms of its 
relationship to the larger social context.1 The nature of the ideology study of this 
research is neither of the above two examples: it does not try to arrive at another 
theory of the concept of attitude, belief, or ideology. Instead it is more of an applied 
research, as against a theoretical research. It is an attempt to describe the beliefs 
currently held by the Thai elite, more specifically by senior bureaucrats and 
managers, about government and business interaction.
This is the first of two related chapters on the ideological context of government 
and business relations in Thailand. It is widely known that at the two extremes of the 
spectrum of world economic systems stand two types of economy: the non­
interventionist, market-led economy and the interventionist, centrally-planned 
economy. The question which is of primary concern here is: "Where does the 
economic ideology of Thai elite lie on the above spectrum?" In particular, this chapter
*A literature review of the concept of attitude, belief, or ideology here will be redundant since 
many of such efforts have already been made elsewhere. See, for example, J. Richard Eiser and J. van 
der Pligt, Attitudes and Decisions (London: Routledge, 1988); Donald P. Cushman and Robert D. 
McPhee, editors, Message-Attitude-Behaviour Relationship (San Francisco: Academic Press, 1980); 
Neil Warren and Maria Jahoda, editors, Attitudes: Selected Readings (Middlesex; Penguin, 1973); 
Chester A. Insko, Theories o f Attitude Change (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); and 
Kenneth Thompson, Beliefs and Ideology (London: Tavistock, 1986)
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will investigate and compare the views of senior Thai bureaucrats and managers on 
the economic role of the government, on government regulation, and on government 
financial assistance to firms. Finally, it will examine the consistency of these views.
3.2 THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
A good starting point for exploring the contemporary economic ideology of Thai 
bureaucrats and managers is to examine their perception of the role of the government 
in the economy. Should the government own and operate some businesses or enter 
into joint ventures with the private sector? Should the government act as the protector 
of some domestic industries? And above all, which type of economic system best 
suits Thailand? It is the answers given by the respondents to these controversial 
questions that this section is concerned with.
3.2.1 The Free M arket Economy
From Table 3-1 it can be seen that the managers and the bureaucrats held similar 
opinions about the economic system suitable for Thailand (Cramer's V = 0.24). That 
is, most of the managers and the bureaucrats agreed with the statement that the 
economic system which best encourages the growth o f businesses in Thailand is the 
one with the least government intervention (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.067). 
Around 83% of the managers and 73% of the bureaucrats either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement.
The Table also shows that irrespective of their age and place of training, both 
the managers and the bureaucrats agreed with the statement. However, while most of 
the managers with a professional background in sciences agreed with the free market 
economy, the bureaucrats with the same background were neutral in opinion.
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Table 3-1: Comparison of Views on a Free M arket Economy
Statem ent: The economic system which best encourages the growth of 
businesses in Thailand is the one with the least government 
intervention.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 0 %
Disagree 2 10 13
Neither 3 7 13
Agree 4 49 60
Strongly Agree 5 34 13
Median 4 4
Cramer's V 0.24
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.83
p (two-tailed) 0.067
N Median
Mgrsa Bcrtsb Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Agec
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 4
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 4
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 4
b) Yes 7 15 4 4
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 3
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 4
Note: a Managers.
b Bureaucrats.
c Collapsed categories.
The preference of the managers for less government intervention is 
understandable since few businesses want to be controlled by regulations (except in 
certain cases where the regulation is in their interests). One manager clearly voiced 
this view: "Business is entrepreneurship. It is quick and decisive. The government 
and its bureaucracy are too slow to do business... Business requires experience. 
How can the government know what is better when they do not have the experience 
that businessmen have?" Such an attitude clearly indicates his lack of trust in the
69
Chapter 3
government's competence to intervene.
Compared to the previous finding a little over a decade ago, the data here 
suggest a persistent or even increasing distaste for government intervention on the 
part of managers. In 1978, a survey found that 51% of 129 business respondents 
agreed with the statement that "the government must let business operate freely 
without any intervention or control."2
Moreover, in the light of the way Chinese businessmen were unfairly treated by 
government officials as described in Appendix C, the agreement of senior bureaucrats 
with a free market economy represents an important contrast to past attitudes of 
government officials. One of the bureaucrats interviewed even said, "There is no 
doubt about that... Businessmen are good (at doing business). That is accepted. 
During the past few years, they have become more professional. It would make a 
good laugh if the government tried to tell them what they should do."
3.2.2 Public Ownership
Public ownership is another controversial issue which reflects attitudes towards the 
government's role in the economy. Table 3-2 indicates that the managers and the 
bureaucrats held similar views about public ownership (Cramer's V = 0.20). That is, 
most of the managers and the bureaucrats disagreed that public utilities, such as 
electricity, water, telecommunication and transportation, should be owned and 
operated by the government (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.249). About 71% of the 
managers and 63% of the bureaucrats disagreed with the statement.
2Sawaeng Sanguanrueng, "Kam Gumnod Roopbap Pua Num Pai Sue Kwam Sampan Nai Kam 
Sangsan Rawang Pak Rataban Lae Pak Ekachon" (Towards Creative Relations between Government 
and Business), in Samakom Karn Jadkarn Turakij Hang Prathet Thai (Thai Management 
Association), Ekasarn Tang Wichakarn Prakob Karn Prachum Karn Borihan Pak Rataban Lae Pak 
Ekachon Nai Prathet Thai (The Papers of the Conference on the Public Administration and Private 
Management in Thailand) (Bangkok: Am’arin Press, 1978), p.79. His sample consisted of the 
managers who were members of the Thai Management Association.
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Table 3-2: Comparison of Views on Public Ownership
Statem ent: Public utilities, such as electricity, water, telecommunication and 
transportation, should be owned and operated by the government.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 15 % 7 %
Disagree 2 56 57
Neither 3 12 7
Agree 4 17 30
Strongly Agree 5 0 0
Median 2 2
Cramer's V 0.20
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.15
p (two-tailed) 0.249
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 2 2
b) 51 or above 7 17 2 2
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 2 2
b) Yes 7 15 2 2
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 2 2
b) Social Sciences 31 21 2 2
The result confirms the persistence of anti-state-ownership feeling among most 
business managers. In 1978, about 74% of 129 managers surveyed agreed with the 
statement that "for major industries in the Thai economy, such as petroleum, banking, 
and principle export crops, the government should take over in the public 
interest."3
The major reasons for the dislike of state-ownership among the managers and 
the bureaucrats are probably inefficiency and corruption in state enterprises. As one 
manager put it. "Voltage drop has caused considerable disruption to our production 
from time to time; during the summer there are usually water shortages. These would
3Loc.cit
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not have happened if the services (public utilities) were run by the private sector. But 
I could not see this (the change from public to private ownership) happen in the near 
future since so many interests are involved... If you follow the news, you will see 
that there are changes in the board of directors of several state enterprises. It can be 
seen as a strategy employed by the politicians either to pave the way for future 
privatisation or to reap what they have sewed in past election campaigns." Such a 
view and similar complaints were quite common among the managers interviewed. 
Moreover, his observation about changes in the board of directors of state enterprises 
does reflect several economic ministers' intention to privatise state enterprises. 
Another bureaucrat who disagreed with public ownership added, "I believe that 
finally some of these public enterprises (electricity, transportation, and oil) will have 
to be privatised in order to provide the infrastructure facilities necessary for the 
present economic growth rate of two digits. Most of the public enteiprises now face 
the problem of financial shortages in funding their expansion projects. At the same 
time the government could not incur more foreign debts to finance those important 
projects because there are limits in the loans. The most likely solution is to privatise 
the enterprises... But the labour unions of the state enterprises are mobilising the 
mobs to stop these changes. Unless the government can find an effective way to 
control these mobs, the process of privatisation will be a rough and long one."
The research finding that the majority of the managers and the bureaucrats 
disliked public ownership, despite the fact that most public utilities in Thailand are 
now owned by the government, is against Mazzolini's past prediction. He claimed 
that the trend during the 1970s in most countries other than the United States had 
been toward more state ownership.4 However, the trend did not persist into the 
1980s in some countries including Thailand. The United Kingdom is another 
example. One of the dominant features of the Thatcher government is the privatisation 
programme, for example, the sales of Britoil, British Gas and British Airways.5
4Renato Mazzolini, Government Controlled Enterprises (New York: Wiley, 1979), as quoted by
Thomas K. McCraw, "Business & Government: The Origin o f the Adversary Relationship," 
California Management Review, Vol.XXVI, No.2 (Winter, 1984), p.35.
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3.2.3 Public and Private Joint-Ventures
Table 3-3 shows that the managers and the bureaucrats held a similar opinion on the 
issue of public and private joint-ventures (Cramer's V = 0.20): they were generally 
undecided as to whether joint ventures between the government and companies are a 
good strategy fo r  Thailand in promoting industry (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 
0.188). While the managers were slightly inclined to agree, the bureaucrats were 
almost equally divided between agreement and disagreement with public and private 
joint-ventures as a development strategy. According to the Table, while 42% of the 
managers agreed with the statement and 22% disagreed, 27% of the bureaucrats were 
undecided, with 33% in agreement and 40% in disagreement.
When a comparison was made between those respondents who did not have 
any training or study abroad, most of the bureaucrats disagreed while the managers 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. Moreover, according to the Table, 
the bureaucrats with a professional background in sciences were likely to agree while 
those with a background in social sciences disagreed with the statement.
There seem to be two opposing views about public and private joint-ventures. 
The argument against is probably the inefficiency and corruption previously 
mentioned on the issue of public ownership, while the argument in favour is that 
some crucial industries would not have been created without state-partnership which 
is normally endowed with certain privileges. As one bureaucrat put it: "This (a joint- 
venture) is another form of public ownership... But I think sometimes the 
government needs to get involved to get some industries initiated." Thus, compared 
to complete public ownership, public and private joint-ventures were more acceptable 
to both the managers and the bureaucrats.
^Stephen Wilks, "From Industrial Policy to Enterprise Policy in Britain," Journal o f General 
Management, V ol.12, No.4 (Summer, 1987), p.8.
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Table 3-3: Comparison of Views on Public and Private Joint- 
V entures
Statem ent: Joint ventures between the government and companies are a good 
strategy for Thailand in promoting industry.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 2 % 3 %
Disagree 2 20 37
Neither 3 34 27
Agree 4 42 30
Strongly Agree 5 2 3
Median 3 3
Cramer's V 0.20
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.32
p (two-tailed) 0.188
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 3 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 3 3
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 3 2
b) Yes 7 15 3 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 3 4
b) Social Sciences 31 21 3 2
3.2.4 Industry  Protection
Table 3-4 shows a significant difference of opinion on the protection of industry by 
using trade barriers between the managers and the bureaucrats (Cramer's V = 0.76; 
Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.000). While 53% of the bureaucrats disagreed that 
using trade barriers to protect local companies from the competition o f big foreign 
companies is something that the government should do, about 88% of the managers 
either agreed or strongly agreed.
In addition, the bureaucrats who were in the 51-or-above age group, who did 
not have any study or training abroad, or who had professional background in social
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sciences were likely to disagree with the government's protection of industry.
Table 3-4: Com parison of Views on Industry  Protection
Statem ent: Using trade barriers to protect local companies from the competition 
o f big foreign companies is something that the government should 
do.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 10 %
Disagree 2 0 43
Neither 3 12 30
Agree • 4 66 17
Strongly Agree 5 22 0
Median 4 2
Cramer's V 0.76
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -6.16
p (two-tailed 0.000
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 2
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 2
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 3
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 2
The preference of the managers for industry protection is easily understood 
since such a measure would mean reduced competition from abroad. A manager of a 
paper manufacturing company agreed that industry protection was necessary. "It is 
necessary that the government protects local industry to some extent. Look at the pulp 
and paper industry as an example. It is impossible for us to survive when our 
maximum production capacity is less than 10% of that of the Scandinavian paper 
manufacturing companies. There is a big gap in the economies of scale between ours 
and theirs," he argued. Several of the managers also claimed that similar industry
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protection was practised elsewhere, in their argument in favour of the Thai 
government using trade barriers to protect local industry. One manager of a small, 
garment manufacturing company which exports extensively said, "This is like playing 
a game. Look at the United States for example; the local industry is lobbying to pass 
Section 301 (a part of legislation restricting the import of textile products from abroad 
into the United States) through to get us out of their market. If we do not do the same 
thing back home (in Thailand), how are we going to get bargaining power?"
While the managers wanted less competition, the bureaucrats were concerned 
that there was too little competition. A few bureaucrats mentioned the vicious practice 
of collusion by some producers. "In some industries, it is widely known that only a 
few big companies are reaping a lot of profits out of government protection. In some 
cases, it is nothing less than a monopoly. These companies have been protected by 
the government for years and want to be protected forever." However, a number of 
bureaucrats agreed that infant industry protection was necessary. "It is necessary that 
some industries should be protected by the government in the national interest. For 
example, we should be able to produce some heavy machinery and equipment by 
ourselves rather than relying entirely on imports from abroad. We should be more 
self-reliant. Besides, the economy will be rather unstable if we rely mainly upon 
agricultural products. We should diversify our industries," explained one bureaucrat.
3.3 GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Proponents of regulation contend that many of the rules and directives have yielded 
numerous benefits to the public while opponents say it can simultaneously generate 
disadvantages for business.6 The rationale of government intervention is based 
primarily on sources: market structure (such as monopolies), environmental
6See Allen R. Ferguson and Murry L. Weidenbaum, "Chapter 9 The Problems o f  Balancing the 
Costs and Benefits o f Regulation: Two Views," in James F. Gatti, editor, The Lim its o f  
Government Regulation (London: Academic Press, 1981),pp.l43-166.
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spillovers (no markets for pollution costs), lack of information (no markets for 
information), and social justice (lack of wealth distribution). However, the extent of 
government intervention is still a controversial issue.7
Following the previous section, which discussed the attitudes of the managers 
and the bureaucrats towards the economic role of the government in general, in this 
section their views on government regulation in particular will be examined. It will 
compare the managers' and the bureaucrats' opinions about such important issues as 
price control, product standards, minimum wages, interest rate control, and foreign 
exchange control.
3.3.1 Price Control
Table 3-5 shows that there was a difference of opinion on price control between the 
managers and the bureaucrats (Cramer's V = 0.30): whereas many of the managers 
agreed with the statement that in some industries, price levels may be determined by 
only a few  companies, yet the government should not interfere with pricing, the 
senior bureaucrats were undecided or slightly disagreed (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 
0.037). About 50% of the managers either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, while 40% of the bureaucrats disagreed and the remaining 60% were 
equally divided between those who were undecided and those who agreed.
The Table also shows that the bureaucrats who did not have any training or 
study abroad, or had a professional background in sciences tended to disagree with 
the statement. In contrast, there was a consensus among the managers to agree with 
the statement, except those with a professional background in sciences who neither
7Martin Ricketts and Keith Shaw, "The Theory o f Regulation," in Alan Peacock, editor, The 
Regulation Game: How British and West German Companies Bargain with Government (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp.8-18. For a more detailed and extensive politico-economic approach, as 
against the ideological approach used here, to government regulation, see Barry M. Mitnick, The 
Political Economy o f  Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
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agreed nor disagreed.
Table 3-5: Com parison of Views on Price Control
Statem ent: In some industries, price levels may be determined by only a few  
companies, yet the government should not interfere with pricing.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 2 % 7 %
Disagree 2 24 33
Neither 3 20 30
Agree 4 42 30
Strongly Agree 5 12 0
Median 4 3
Cramer's V 0.30
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.09
p (two-tailed) 0.037
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 3
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 2
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 3 2
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 3
Normally, business would be expected to defend vigorously their right to set 
the prices of their products. While economic principles legitimise government 
intervention in the light of market imperfection or failure, business managers tend to 
ignore this reasoning as irrelevant. Some of the managers interviewed regarded 
government price control as impracticable or as a form of disincentives for hard 
work. For example, one manager of a animal-feed manufacturing company said, 
"Price control cannot be implemented in practice. If the price is fixed for me to sell a 
bag of animal-feed today, what shall I do tomorrow when fishermen want to increase
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the price of their fish sold to me? We will be running our business at a loss until we 
can convince the government that our cost has already increased, which normally 
takes a long time... This is not to mention the fact that the price fixed by the 
government is right or not at the beginning." Another manager of a big business 
group said, "You must have a big market share in order to be able to determine 
prices. You also have to work hard to achieve a big market share. So I could not see 
that it is wrong to set a price when it is a result of hard work... The government are 
punishing good businessmen when they control prices." Such an attitude stands in 
contrast to the finding of the survey in 1978 that 64% of 129 businessmen agreed 
with the statement that "the government should prevent businesses from making too 
much profit."8
In comparison, some bureaucrats who did not agree with price control seemed 
to approach the issue differently: they were more concerned about the interests of 
other non-business groups such as consumers and farmers. One bureaucrat from the 
Internal Trade Department said, "The price of goods such as agricultural produce 
needs to be watched closely by the government because farmers are prone to be taken 
advantage of by the middlemen or by some big industrial companies." Another said, 
"Consumers should be protected from being the victims of the collusive practice of 
business. The government must ensure that the consumers pay a fair price for what 
they buy."
3.3.2 Product S tandards
Table 3-6 indicates that most of the managers and the bureaucrats agreed with the 
statement that regulating the standard o f goods and services is something that the 
government should do (Cramer's V = 0.30; Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.032). 
About 78% of the managers and 63% of the bureaucrats either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement.
8Sanguanrueng, op.cit., p.78.
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Table 3-6: Comparison of Views on Product S tandard Regulation
Statem ent: Regulating the standard o f goods and services is something that 
the government should do.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 0 %
Disagree 2 10 27
Neither 3 12 10
Agree 4 54 57
Strongly Agree 5 24 7
Median 4 4
Cramer's V 0.30
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.15
p (two-tailed) 0.032
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 4
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 4
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 4
b) Yes 7 15 4 4
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 4
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 4
While many of the managers seemed to be reluctant to accept price control by 
the government, they were more ready to welcome product standards regulation. 
When asked to voice his opinion on the statement, one manager responded 
spontaneously, "Yes, this is certainly what the government should do."
Product reputation and reduction in competition may be some of the reasons 
why standards regulation is more acceptable to managers. Being concerned about 
business reputation, one manager said, "The government should ensure that industrial 
products are manufactured up to the required standards, especially those which are 
intended for export because this involves the image of the Thai industry." On the 
other hand, one manager of a major shoe-manufacturing company said, "I completely
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agree with it (standards regulation). For instance, people should not be cheated by 
those manufacturers who sell cheap but well decorated shoes which last for only a 
few months." However, it is rather doubtful whether this manager is more concerned 
about consumer protection than the fierce competition from smaller companies
In contrast, the bureaucrats seemed to prefer the regulation of product standards 
with the reason of consumer protection. A representative example of such concern is: 
"It is necessary that the consumers are protected from unsafe products.," or "The 
government must prevent the consumers from being taken advantage of."
Even though the regulation of product standards was welcomed by both the 
managers and the bureaucrats, its implementation has not been free from problems. 
As one senior bureaucrat at the Thai Industrial Standards Institute (TISI), the 
government agency responsible for product standards regulation, explained, "At 
present we have two types of industrial standards -the compulsory and voluntary 
one... Most of these standards are produced by committees consisting of 
manufacturers, consumers, and experts on the products... In some cases the actual 
testing of products is done by the companies themselves and the results are sent to us 
since the Institute does not have the testing equipment... There is also some problem 
concerning the voluntary standards mark. Sometimes the consumers are doubtful 
about the products with the government standards mark because they are often 
considerably cheaper." Such a lack of confidence in the government's industrial 
standards arises because some companies are targeting at ordinary working people 
such as labourers by selling the products cheaper but with the government standards 
mark guaranteeing the quality. She continued, "These companies came to us and 
applied for the industrial standards mark. Once they have got it, they put it on the 
packaging of their products and sell them cheaply. Such a practice has tarnished the 
image of the mark and effectively discourages other companies form putting the mark 
on their products, even though they have got one."
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3.3.3 M inim um  Wages
Table 3-7 indicates that there was a significant difference of opinion about minimum 
wage regulation between the managers and the bureaucrats (Cramer’s V = 0.54; 
Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.000). That is, where most of the managers agreed that 
regulating minimum wage levels is something that the government should do, the 
bureaucrats were generally undecided.
Table 3-7: Comparison of Views on M inimum Wage Regulation.
Statem ent: Regulating minimum wage levels is something that the 
government should do.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 2 % 3 %
Disagree 2 2 30
Neither 3 10 27
Agree 4 66 40
Strongly Agree 5 20 0
Median 4 3
Cramer's V 0.54
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -4.29
p (two-tailed) 0.000
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 3
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 4
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 3
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 3
According to the Table, about 85% of the managers either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement, while the bureaucrats were divided in opinion, with 33%
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in disagreement and 40% in agreement. However, the bureaucrats who had some 
training or study abroad tended to agree with the statement.
Considering one of the results of the survey in 1978, in which nearly 95% of 
the 129 business respondents agreed that "the government needs to give protection to 
labour for the sake of social justice,"9 the result here indirectly shows the 
persistence of the belief in minimum wage regulation among managers.
In contrast, it is rather surprising that up to 33% of the bureaucrats disagreed 
with the statement since they would be expected to claim ethical reasons for fixing 
minimum wage levels. Some of these observations by the bureaucrats may help 
explain the finding. One bureaucrat said, "I could not see how the wages paid to 
labourers and employees can be effectively checked by the government. There are 
many illegal factories... While big companies are paying wages high above the 
minimum level, those illegal factories, which are mainly the sources of child labour 
abuse, are beyond the eyes and ears of the government." Another bureaucrat said, 
"Fixing minimum wage levels will result in higher unemployment and in fact, I doubt 
that the government can control it (minimum wage) when many small or even big 
companies have two accounts." The disillusionment over the difficulty of minimum 
wage control implementation may be the explanation.
3.3.4 Interest Rate Control
Table 3-8 shows that there was a significant difference between the views of the 
managers and the bureaucrats on interest rate control (Cramer's V = 0.34; Mann- 
Whitney U Test, p = 0.017). That is, while the managers were divided between 
agreement and disagreement, many of the bureaucrats disagreed that the level o f 
interest rates should be allowed to float freely without any control such as the fixing 
o f maximum or minimum rates by the government. About 34% and 49% of the 
managers disagreed and agreed respectively, while around 53% of the bureaucrats
9Loc.cit.
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disagreed with the statement.
Table 3-8: Comparison of Views on In terest Rate Control.
Statem ent: The level o f interest rates should be allowed to float freely without 
any control such as the fixing o f the maximum or minimum rates by 
the government.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 7 %
Disagree 2 34 47
Neither 3 17 23
Agree 4 37 23
Strongly Agree 5 12 0
Median 3 2
Cramer's V 0.34
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.39
p (two-tailed) 0.017
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 3 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 3 2
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 3 2
b) Yes 7 15 4 2
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 2 3
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 2
A few managers and bureaucrats who agreed with interest rate control claimed 
that the measure was necessary for investment and the stability of the economy. For 
example, one manager said, "It will be rather difficult for a fast expanding company 
like ours to make an investment decision if the interest rate keeps changing too much 
and too quickly," while a bureaucrat said, "It is one of the instruments for the 
government to control inflation."
On the other hand, some managers and bureaucrats who disagreed with interest 
rate control based their arguments on the collusive practice of big commercial banks
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and their influence on the Bank of Thailand (the central bank). One manager said, "I 
think this (the fixing of maximum and minimum interest rates) is unfair to smaller 
banks. They (the smaller banks) are more flexible and can offer higher interest rates 
but are prevented from doing so by the regulation. The control makes them less 
competitive when compared to bigger commercial banks which jointly determine the 
rates suitable for themselves."
One bureaucrat also held a similar opinion about the influence of big commercial 
banks. He said, "The Finance Minister was right when he said that Thailand may be 
the only country in the world where the central bank had to discuss its policy with 
commercial banks... A number of senior bureaucrats in the Bank of Thailand have 
resigned or retired to work in big commercial banks, and this allows the banks to 
have a considerable say in the Bank of Thailand's policy. That is why the directors of 
these banks are paid monthly salaries which those at the banks' counters would take a 
life-time to earn." The last two opinions form, in fact, a classic case for the "capture" 
theory of regulation. The basic proposition of this theory is that "as a rule, regulation 
is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."10 
The regulatory agencies are "captured" by the industry they are supposed to be 
regulating. Put another way, this new view of regulation implies that, far from 
supporting the general interest by achieving efficiency gains, regulatory measures are 
enacted and implemented in the interests of specialist producer groups.11
Thus, despite the majority of bureaucrats agreeing with government regulation 
of interest rates, some were dubious about the ability of the government to formulate 
effectively a policy which was free from the influence of big commercial banks.
10G. T. Stigler, "The Theory o f  Economic Regulation," B ell Journal o f  Economic and 
Management Science, Vol.2, N o.l (1971), pp.3-21, as quoted by Ricketts and Shaw, op.ciL, p.15.
^Ricketts and Shaw, loc.cit.
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3.3.5 Foreign Exchange Control
Table 3-9 indicates that there was a significant difference between the managers’ and 
the bureaucrats' views on the issue of foreign currency exchange control (Cramer's 
V = 0.48; Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.000). While most of the managers agreed 
that the control o f foreign currency exchange is something that the government 
should do, the bureaucrats were rather undecided.
Table 3-9; Comparison of Views on Foreign Exchange Control
Statem ent: The control of foreign currency exchange is something that the 
government should do.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 0 %
Disagree 2 5 20
Neither 3 10 40
Agree 4 68 37
Strongly Agree 5 17 3
Median 4 3
Cramer’s V 0.48
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -3.90
p (two-tailed) 0.000
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 4
- Training Abroad 
a) No 34 14 4 3
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject 
a) Sciences 10 8 4 3
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 3
About 85% of the managers asked either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, while 40% and 20% of the bureaucrats agreed and disagreed respectively.
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In addition, the Table suggests that the bureaucrats who were in the 51-year-or-above 
age group tended to agree with the statement.
A few managers and bureaucrats who agreed with government control of 
foreign exchange claimed that such a control was necessary from the standpoint of 
economic stability. One manager said, "I agree because if everybody is allowed to 
exchange money freely, the exchange rate will vary too much... It is difficult for us to 
do trading with our customers abroad if the value of Thai Baht is uncertain." 
Similarly, a bureaucrat stressed that "it is important that the government creates a 
stable environment for businesses, and foreign exchange is part of that environment, 
especially for those in the export industry."
3.3.6 V ariety of Economic Beliefs
Overall the general impression of the findings in this section suggests that business 
managers are not always against government regulations; their opposition to or favour 
of government regulations is selective. While the majority of the managers 
interviewed in this research were opposed to government control over prices, they 
were divided on the issue of interest rate control, and even welcomed government 
regulation concerning product standards, minimum wages, and foreign currency 
exchange.
At the same time the senior bureaucrats were not always in favour of regulations 
as one would expect. Even though the majority of the bureaucrats interviewed were in 
favour of product standard regulation and interest rate control, they were, 
unexpectedly, divided and indecisive on the regulation of prices, the establishment of 
minimum wages and the control of foreign currency exchange. Moreover, compared 
to past findings, the bureaucrats can be said to be becoming more liberal in terms of 
economic ideology. In 1978, a survey found that 93% of 88 middle level bureaucrats 
agreed with the statement that "government control of private business is very 
necessary because if there is no control, private business will seek personal interest to
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an extent which is detrimental to the public interest," and that 73% agreed that 
"government control over private businesses should be increased."12
3.4 GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO FIRMS
Whereas industrial policy is the main subject treated by the literature on government 
and business relations, as mentioned in the Chapter 1, government intervention tends 
to be at the heart of any discussion of industrial policy. In addition to the concept of 
industrial policy discussed earlier, Young broadly gave the definition of 
"intervention" as "those attempts (by the government) to make firms -directly through 
controls and indirectly through non-regulatory measures- act in ways they could not 
or would not have otherwise been able to do."13 In the previous section, one form 
of government intervention, regulation, which can be regarded as "sticks," has been 
discussed; in this section another form of intervention, government financial 
assistance or "carrots," will be looked at. It will examine how senior bureaucrats and 
managers think about the various kinds of government financial assistance (subsidies, 
loans, and tax concessions) to different types of firms (newly established companies, 
expanding companies, and companies in financial trouble).
12Sujit Boonbongkam, "Tasana Tua Pai Kong Kam Borihan Pak Rataban Lae Pak Ekachon" 
(General Attitudes towards the Public Administration and Private Management), in Samakom Kam 
Jadkam Turakij Hang Prathet Thai (Thai Management Association), op.cit., pp.39-40.
13 Stephen Young, Intervention in the Mixed Economy: The Evolution o f British Industrial Policy  
1964-72 (London: Croom Helm, 1974), p.29.
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3.4.1 Assistance to Newly Established Companies
Table 3-10 shows that both the managers and the bureaucrats shared a common 
dislike of subsidising newly established companies (Cramer’s V = 0.23). Most of 
them disagreed that the government should promote newly established companies 
which are not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them subsidies 
(Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.091). According to the Table, about 61% of the 
managers and 80% of the bureaucrats either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement.
A few managers and bureaucrats emphasised the impracticality of government 
subsidies as their reason for disagreement. "It is impossible for the government to 
give a subsidy to every new company. If some companies are chosen to receive a 
government subsidy, there will be a big dispute about the criteria used," one manager 
argued. One bureaucrat also said, "I do not know where the money will come from. 
The government are not rich and there is a big budget deficit now. Moreover, this is 
rather unfair to taxpayers. How does the government know that that particular 
business is going to be successful." The above opinion is, actually, quite 
economically liberal. One manager of an export-oriented garment-manufacturing 
companies added, "Government subsidies will only give another excuse for other 
countries to levy tariffs on our exports."
On the issue of the government giving loans to newly established companies, 
there was a general division of opinion between the managers and the bureaucrats 
(Cramer's V = 0.24; Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.105). While many of the 
bureaucrats still disagreed that the government should promote newly established 
companies which are not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them 
loans at a rate which is lower than that o f commercial banks, the managers were 
divided between agreement and disagreement. According to Table 3-10, whereas 
about 53% of the bureaucrats disagreed with the statement, 32% of the managers
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disagreed and another 41% agreed.
Several managers and the bureaucrats who rejected the idea of government 
loans gave the same impracticality as that mentioned in the case of government 
subsidies as the reason for their disagreement. One manager also added, "By giving 
soft loans to new companies, the government will attract them into indebtedness 
before they can make any profit. I have seen several new companies who were in a 
hurry to expand their operation... they often ended up making profits which had to be 
used to pay off the interest incurred by the loan." But one manager who agreed with 
government loans argued, "Yes, this is necessary because at the beginning most 
companies have difficulty securing loans from commercial banks." At the same time, 
another manager rejected the statement by saying, "No, I do not agree. It is not the 
government’s job. If the business is attractive enough or viable, the commercial 
banks will certainly give loans to them."
However, when it came to giving tax concessions as a kind of financial 
assistance to newly established companies, there was a consensus between the 
managers and the bureaucrats (Cramer's V = 0.28). That is, both of them agreed that 
the government should promote newly established companies which are not strong 
enough to compete in the market by giving them tax concessions (Mann-Whitney U 
Test, p = 0.666). According to Table 3-10, around 75% of the managers and 83% of 
the bureaucrats agreed with the statement. In fact, most of the managers and the 
bureaucrats who disagreed with the use of subsidies or loans positively said, "This is 
okay."
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3.4.2 Assistance to Expanding Companies
Table 3-11 shows that both the managers and the bureaucrats had a similar dislike for 
subsidising expanding companies (Cramer's V = 0.32). That is, while the managers 
disagreed, the bureaucrats more strongly disagreed that the government should 
promote companies which are expanding and are in a growth industry by giving 
them subsidies (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.008). Whereas about 63% of the 
business managers disagreed with the statement, 90% of the senior bureaucrats 
disagreed.
Several of the business managers and senior bureaucrats again mentioned the 
impracticality of government subsidies, giving, for example, scarce money resources 
and the criteria for choosing the firms which would receive the subsidy as their 
reasons for disagreement. One bureaucrat added, "Subsidies are no longer popular 
with the government. Once businesses have been given the subsidy, they never stop 
asking for more money. It is like pouring money into a bag with a big hole in the 
bottom... Subsidies to whatever kind of companies are unwise for and too costly to 
the government."
Voicing their views on government loans as a means of financial assistance for 
expanding companies, the managers and the bureaucrats again had different opinions 
as in the case of newly established companies (Cramer's V = 0.25). That is, while the 
managers were generally divided in opinion, the majority of the bureaucrats opposed 
the idea that the government should promote companies which are expanding and are 
in a growth industry by giving them loans at a rate which is lower than that o f 
commercial banks (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.061). While around 67% of the 
bureaucrats disagreed with the statement, 42% of the managers disagreed and another 
34% agreed.
A few bureaucrats and managers believed that expanding companies ought to be 
able to finance themselves and rely less on government financial support. For
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instance, one bureaucrat said, "Why should the government give loans to expanding 
companies? If they want to expand their business or make further investments, they 
should be able to get the projects going by themselves." One manager of a relatively 
small processed-food company who disagreed with the statement said, "I do not 
agree. The government often gives loans to bigger companies but seldom care about 
smaller companies. Big companies have already made a lot of money and had good 
credit; they do not necessary need the government loans, but the government still 
want to give them... At the same time those small companies which desperately need 
the loans are given little financial help from the government." This opinion seems to 
confirm the suggestion made by Scase and Goffee that small companies are likely to 
ideologically suspicious of government.14
Nevertheless, both the managers and the bureaucrats shared similar opinions 
about using tax concessions as government financial assistance to firms (Cramer's V 
= 0.21). Many of them agreed that the government should promote companies which 
are expanding and are in a growth industry by giving them tax concessions (Mann- 
Whitney U Test, p = 0.274). According to Table 3-11, about 51% of the managers 
and 67% of the bureaucrats either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
It is interesting to note an observation made by one bureaucrat at the Revenue 
Department. He said, "This (tax concessions) is not too bad. Anyway, it is normally 
difficult to collect taxes from businesses." He, quite obviously, held the view that 
companies would usually try to avoid paying taxes. On the other hand, some of the 
managers believed that government tax concessions were necessary for Thai 
businesses to survive in the current fierce competition with foreign companies. A 
manager said, "Giving tax concessions is something that most other countries' 
governments do... If they are not doing it now, they have already done it several 
years ago... Thai companies need government tax concessions in order to be able to 
compete in the present world market."
14See R. Scase and R. Goffee, The Real World o f the Small Business Owner (London: Croom 
Helm, 1980).
94
2
soU
H
2
2casc
fa
#c
C/S
Eas
Q.
£o
U
c/s
C/2
<
ea>
E
suo>
©
O
co
CO
£0)
co
C/2
T
as
©.
Eo
V
cs
co
©
2
«
H
I-si*•*
. I 1
So
£
SC
.ocs
c
oO
' i
sc
8
-C)
C/2co
•
C/2
C/2<uoco
V
X
cS
H
C/2X>S3
C/0
-CS Cj
ca>
Ea>
CG•4a>
<Z)
d} i—HbOTj-
£ II 
§ 2 ;
oCOII
£
*2 /-sd)bOrt
2 IIC *"jr 
C3
O
CO
<U i—i
SP^ 2 II
t>X)
C
' § 5  0$ >
t— CO t CO o  
VO (N
(N  On (N  ^  M  1-4 CS CS CO
co  ©  ©  ot—H r—<
o  vd r~  r"- or-H t-H t-H
CO O  O  t^- O(S^OrH
h ' O h O O
(N CO ^  io
<D
S>
C3
C/2
'b bc
a>
6 5_
! S : z <
<U
£b<
JO
'bbIco
CS VO 
CO
r- vo
VO
CO
CS voi-H
©
CO  0 0  
CS 1• cs
cs
cs O  vo»0 r-H
^  vo
CS
Id
I
s c
*8
00
d> ^
H  g  
O '*
&■»C r Q
<u
01oS T3 *gC/2 >->.
2 n
Chapter 3
3.4.3 Assistance to Companies in Financial Trouble
Table 3-12 indicates that the managers and the bureaucrats shared a common 
disagreement with giving government subsidies to companies in financial trouble 
(Cramer's V = 0.11). That is, most of them disagreed that the government should 
help companies which are in financial trouble because o f bad economic conditions by 
giving them subsidies (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.616). Up to 85% of the 
managers and 83% of the bureaucrats either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement.
Again, the impracticality of government subsidies, as in the case of newly 
established and expanding companies, was raised by several of the managers and the 
bureaucrats as the reason for their disagreement; however, they were more critical in 
the case of companies in financial trouble. As one senior bureaucrat said, "This is the 
worst thing the government can do. If a company cannot make any profit or survive, 
then it should quit and go." Another manager added, "Subsidies in any form are bad, 
but the worst thing is to subsidise a failing company.
In addition, the majority of the managers and the bureaucrats also shared a 
similar disagreement with the idea that the government should help companies which 
are in financial trouble because o f bad economic conditions by giving them loans at a 
rate which is lower than that o f commercial banks (Cramer's V = 0.16; Mann- 
Whitney U Test, p = 0.218). According to Table 3-12, about 66% of the managers 
and up to 80% of the bureaucrats disagreed with the statement.
Disagreeing with the statement, one manager said, "It is just a way of 
postponing the trouble. Giving government loans is not the solution to the problem." 
Another bureaucrat added, "I doubt if the loans can ever be paid back to the 
government when the company is already in financial difficulty."
However, the managers seemed to disagree less when it came to giving tax 
concessions as a kind of government assistance to companies in financial trouble,
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while the bureaucrats still disagreed (Cramer's V = 0.36). Whereas the managers 
were generally divided in opinion, most of the bureaucrats disagreed that the 
government should help companies which are in financial trouble because o f bad 
economic conditions by giving them tax concessions (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 
0.116). According to Table 3-12, while around 37% of the managers agreed and 
another 42% disagreed, up to 70% of the bureaucrats disagreed with the statement.
One bureaucrat said, "Tax concessions are used to foster economic growth and 
more investment, not to prolong economic problems." Another manager said, "The 
management should be blamed if a company is in financial trouble... Why does the 
government have to take the responsibility?" However, one manager who agreed with 
the statement said, "The government tax concessions are OK. Anyway, how can the 
government collect tax from them when they are not making any profit?"
In general, the impression given by the data is that both the managers and the 
bureaucrats were not in favour of or even against protecting companies which are in 
financial trouble.
3.4.4 Choice of Companies and Forms of Government Assistance
Up to this stage of the discussion, it can be seen that whether the managers and the 
bureaucrats agreed or disagreed with government financial assistance to firms, their 
views depended on the form of the assistance as well as the type of companies 
receiving help. While the majority of the managers and the bureaucrats preferred tax 
concessions to loans and subsidies as a means of government assistance; they were in 
favour of newly established companies receiving assistance than expanding 
companies or companies in financial trouble.
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Table 3-13 further confirms the above findings. When comparing the methods 
of government financial assistance, tax concessions were found to be most welcomed 
by both the managers and the bureaucrats. According to Table 3-13, with regard to 
giving financial assistance to newly established or expanding companies, while the 
managers were undecided about government loans and in disagreement with 
subsidies, they agreed with tax concessions (Friedman 2-Way Anova: newly 
established companies, p = 0.000; expanding companies, p = 0.019). Similarly, the 
bureaucrats agreed with tax concessions but disagreed with government loans or 
subsidies (newly established companies, p = 0.000; expanding companies, p = 
0.000). However, with regard to companies in financial trouble, while the managers 
disagreed with both government loans and subsidies, they were undecided about tax 
concessions as a form of government financial assistance (p = 0.003); in contrast, the 
bureaucrats tended to reject all the three methods of assistance without discrimination 
(p = 0.164).
A comparison of the respondents' opinion about the types of company receiving 
government assistance was also made. According to Table 3-13, most of the 
managers and the bureaucrats rejected the idea of the government giving subsidies to 
firms, regardless of the types of company (Friedman 2-Way Anova,: managers, p = 
0.021; Bureaucrats, p = 0.602). In the case of giving loans to firms as a form of 
government financial assistance, the bureaucrats still disagreed regardless of the types 
of the company (p = 0.116), while the managers held the same opinion regarding 
companies in financial trouble but were undecided about newly established or 
expanding companies (p = 0.003). Nevertheless, the bureaucrats agreed with giving 
tax concessions to newly established or expanding companies but not to companies in 
financial trouble (p = 0.000), whereas the managers agreed with the bureaucrats with 
regard to newly established or expanding companies, but were undecided in the case 
of companies in financial trouble (p = 0.000).
In short, even though government loans and tax concessions are actually
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different forms of subsidisation, the managers and the bureaucrats preferred them to 
government subsidies. The preference may be interpreted another way as follows: the 
more indirect the government financial assistance was, the more acceptable to the 
managers and the bureaucrats it became. That is, whereas direct subsidisation is too 
costly and expensive for the government, indirect assistance such as soft loans or tax 
concessions are more affordable and acceptable. Likewise, regarding the types of 
company, the newer and more potentially successful the companies were, the more 
suitable the managers and the bureaucrats believed they were to receive government 
financial assistance.
3.5 CONSISTENCY OF THE ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the literature often seems to suggest a spectrum of 
government and business relations in various countries, in terms of the prevailing or 
dominant economic role of the state. The spectrum of the relations is characterised by 
the United States at one end representing the non-interventionist, market-led state and 
Japan at another end representing the interventionist state. Countries like Britain, 
West Germany, and France are placed between the two ends, ranging from the non- 
interventionist to interventionist state. And more recently, Canada has been placed on 
the spectrum somewhere between the United States and Britain.15 Some features of 
the interventionist state are proactive government discriminatory policy and firm-level 
intervention as well as informal, regular, stable, and cooperative contact and 
consultation between government and business. In contrast, the non-interventionist 
state is characterised by reactive government non-discriminatory policy and industry- 
level intervention as well as formal, irregular, ad hoc, and suspicious contact and 
consultation between government and business.16
15wyn Grant, Government and Industry: A Comparative Analysis o f the US, Canada and the UK 
(Hants: Edward Elgar,1989), p.8.
^Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, Comparative Government-Industry Relations: Western 
Europe, the United States, and Japan (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), Table 12.1.
1 0 0
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The spectrum of government and business relations suggested by the literature 
does not stand alone but is pararelled by a range of ideology characterised by 
"individualism" at one end and "communitarianism" at another end. Whereas the 
traditional ideology of a non-interventionist state like the United State exemplifies 
individualism, that of a interventionist state like Japan, Korea, or Taiwan exemplifies 
communitarianism. I7
Against such classification of countries, the study attempts, as mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, to locate where the economic ideology of Thai elite lies. 
Unfortunately, as far as the consistency of the economic ideology is concerned, the 
attempt has failed. Not only did the managers and the bureaucrats differ, between 
themselves as well as within themselves, in their views on the economic role of the 
government, on government regulation, and on government assistance to firms, each 
individual manager and bureaucrat also showed little consistency in his or her 
economic views. The following correlation analysis will demonstrate this ideological 
inconsistency.
3.5.1 Free Market versus the Economic Role of the Government
Table 3-14 shows that there was little consistency or even contradiction in each of the 
managers' and the bureaucrats' views on a free market economy and on the economic 
role of the government.
17George C. Lodge and Erza F. Vogel, editors, Ideology and National Com petitiveness: An 
Analysis o f Nine Countries (Massachusetts: Havard Business School Press, 1987), pp.9-15.
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Theoretically, it would be expected that the manager or the bureaucrat who 
believed in free market economy would disagree with, to a certain extent, the idea of 
public ownership, public and private joint-ventures, or industry protection (in this 
case the correlation figures should be negative). However, the Table suggests that the 
manager who believed in the free market economy, on the contrary, tended to support 
public and private joint-ventures as a way of promoting industry (Kendall Correlation 
Coefficient T = 0.34, p = 0.02), or vice versa. In addition, it was hardly possible to 
say that there was any association between the manager's free market belief and his 
view on the government ownership of business (T = -0.01, p = 0.935) or on the 
protection of local industry by using trade barriers (T = 0.00, p = 0.977).
Similarly, Table 3-14 also suggests that the bureaucrat who supported the idea 
of a free market economy did not necessarily have to oppose to the idea of creating 
public and private joint-ventures as a way of promoting industry (Kendall Correlation 
Coefficient T = -0.14, p = 0.404). Moreover, as with the managers, there was very 
little association between each of the bureaucrats' free market belief and his view on 
the government ownership of business (T = 0.07, p = 0.664) or on the protection of 
local industry by using trade barriers (T = 0.04, p = 0.829).
3.5.2 Free M arket versus Governm ent Regulation
Table 3-15 indicates that while there was some consistency in each of the managers' 
views on a free market economy and on government regulation, there were 
contradictions in the bureaucrats' views.
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The Table suggests that the manager who supported the idea of a free market 
economy, consistently, was likely to disagree with government intervention in prices 
(Kendall Correlation Coefficient T = 0.29, p = 0.032) and in product standard 
regulation (T = -0.26, p = 0.066), and agreed with the idea of free floating interest 
rates (T = 0.10, p = 0.469), or vice versa. He was, however, slightly likely to agree 
with foreign currency exchange control (T = 0.11, p = 0.446). In addition, there was 
little evidence to suggest that there was any association between the manager's free 
market belief and his view on minimum wage regulation (T = 0.03, p = 0.849).
The inconsistency between the views on a free market economy and on 
government regulation was high for each of the bureaucrats. Table 3-15 suggests that 
the bureaucrat who believed in free market economy was, on the contrary, likely to 
agree with product standard regulation (Kendall Correlation Coefficient T = 0.21, p = 
0.202), government minimum wage control (T = 0.18, p = 0.281), government 
control of interest rates (T = -0.23, p = 0.157), and foreign currency exchange 
control (T = 0.12, p = 0.474), or vice versa. However, there was little evidence to 
suggest what he would think about government price intervention (T = -0.06, p = 
0.717).
3.5.3 Free Market versus Government Financial Assistance
Table 3-16 shows that there was little consistency or even contradiction in each of the 
managers' view on a free market economy and his view on government financial 
assistance to firms but that there was a moderate consistency in these two views of 
the bureaucrats.
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Chapter 3
According to the Table, the managers who believed more in free market 
economy, on the contrary, would support the idea of giving government subsidies 
and loans to newly established companies (Kendall Correlation Coefficient: 
subsidies, T = 0.15, p = 0.288; loans, T = 0.13, p = 0.355). However, he was, 
consistently, likely to disagree with the government giving loans and tax concessions 
to expanding companies (loans, T = -0.13, p = 0.364; tax concessions, T = -0.22, p 
= 0.123). Nevertheless, there was little evidence to establish that there was an 
association between his free market belief and his agreement or disagreement with 
government tax concessions to newly established companies (T = 0.02, p= 0.902), 
with government subsidies to expanding companies (T = 0.09, p = 0.534), and with 
government financial assistance to companies in financial trouble (subsidies, T = 
0.06, p = 0.651; loans, T = 0.04, p = 0.785; and tax concessions, T = -0.01, p = 
0.959).
However, the bureaucrats were more consistent ideologically than the managers 
in this aspect. That is, the bureaucrat who believed more in the idea of a free market 
economy would consistently oppose to the idea of giving government financial 
assistance to companies in financial trouble (Kendall Correlation Coefficient: 
subsidies, T = -0.19, p = 0.256; loans, T = -0.21, p = 0.214; and tax concessions T 
= -0.17, p = 0.318). He also consistently tended to disagree with the government 
giving subsidies to both newly established companies (T = -0.17, p = 0.314 ) and 
expanding companies (T = -0.23, p = 0.177), and with giving loans to expanding 
companies (T = -0.15, p = 0.379). But he, on the contrary, tended to agree with 
giving government tax concessions to expanding companies (T = 0.17, p = 0.328). 
Nevertheless, there was little evidence to suggest that there was any association 
between his free market belief and his agreement or disagreement with government 
giving loans or tax concessions to newly established companies (loans, T = -0.01, p 
= 0.946); tax concessions, T = -0.04, p = 0.804).
107
Chapter 3
3.5.4 Is There an Economic Ideology?
The research findings, showing little consistency or even contradiction between the 
free market belief and the views on the government's economic role, regulation, and 
financial assistance to firms within each of the managers and the bureaucrats, do not 
only prevent the research from putting the prevailing economic ideology in Thailand 
into perspective in relation to the interventionist, state-led and non-interventionist, 
market-led spectrum of government and business relations, but also lead one to ask, 
"Is there something called economic ideology?"
The ideological inconsistency discussed here should be distinguished from 
inconsistent economic practices. Of course, it is known that while several countries 
claim to have a free market economy, the practices of industry protection or 
subsidisation are prevalent, and of course, it is also known that in few situations do 
people behave as they believe or think. But the inconsistency found here is at the level 
of a manager's or bureaucrat's thinking.
Thus, it is asked, "Are the managers or the bureaucrats hypocritical?" Do they 
agree or disagree with certain economic practices out of self-interest? To answer 
"yes" to the above question would certainly run into a less than useful conclusion, 
which was criticised by Sutton and others who studied the American business beliefs 
more than three decades ago. As they put it, "They (the conclusions) reduce to a 
tautology: 'Men act in their own interest' becomes 'Men act as they are motivated to 
act'."18
The explanation for ideological inconsistency offered here is that the free market 
belief may not be the underlying basis for other beliefs such as the government's 
economic role, regulation, or financial assistance to firms. For example, it was rather 
rare in this research that a respondent who disagreed with government regulation of 
product standards or foreign currency exchange control, or agreed with the free
18Francis X. Sutton et alM The American Business Creed  (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 
1956), p.13.
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floating interest rate justified his disagreement or agreement by arguing that because 
he believed in free enterprises, therefore, he rejected this idea and accepted the other. 
Instead, many of the respondents justified their opinions, as discussed earlier, by 
citing other beliefs, such as fairness, economic practicality, industry image, or 
economic stability, just to mention a few, as their reasons for agreement or 
disagreement. Or put it differently, there are beliefs other than the free market belief 
which are considered more important in certain circumstances by Thai business 
managers and senior bureaucrats.
In addition, as one of the managers put it earlier, business is after all 
entrepreneurship. And while entrepreneurship is one of the fundamental driving 
forces of the free market mechanism, it is itself a short-term monopoly. As pointed 
out more than five decades ago by Schumpeter, potential temporary monopoly profits 
are the motives behind entrepreneurship.19 Therefore, the inconsistency of the 
managers' and the bureaucrats' economic ideology may be the result of their 
understanding of the scope of the government's economic role in a free market 
economy.
However, while being able to appreciate the ideological inconsistency by 
accepting the above explanation, one should also be careful in the interpretation of the 
association, when found, between the free market belief and the other beliefs such as 
the government's economic role, regulation, and assistance to firms. For instance, 
those managers or bureaucrats who disapproved of government subsidies might, at 
the same time, believed in free market economy, resulting in the association (high 
correlation) found. But it would be misleading to believe fully that because they held 
the free market belief, they therefore rejected the idea of the government subsidies 
since some of them, regardless of whether they believed in the free market or not, 
may have disapproved of government subsidies because of their impracticality and
^ J . A. Schumpeter, The Theory o f Economic Development (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 
1934), p. 132, as quoted by Martin Binks and Philip Vale, Entrepreneurship and Economic Change 
(London: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p.30.
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3.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter, the economic ideology of Thai senior bureaucrats and business 
managers are examined and compared. Against the tendency of the literature which 
often places a country's business-government relationship on the spectrum of 
interventionist and non-interventionist states, the empirical findings of this research 
suggest that there was little consistency or even contradiction in each of the 
bureaucrats' and the managers' economic beliefs. In fact, it was found that pragmatic 
considerations and issue-by-issue judgement, rather than the theoretical free market 
principle, frequently dominated the managers' and the bureaucrats' economic views. 
This pragmatic domination results in variety in an individual's economic ideology, 
which should be taken into account when interpreting a sweeping suggestion given 
by the literature, for example, that a country has a communitarian ideology and 
government intervention is taken as a fact of life. However, despite the prevalence of 
a variety of opinions, the data suggest that overall the difference between the 
managers' and the senior bureaucrats' economic ideology was not great. Moreover, 
compared with earlier findings, the senior bureaucrats have become relatively 
economically liberal.
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CHAPTER 4 
BUSINESS AND POLITICS: A COMPARISON 
OF THE BELIEFS OF THAI BUREAUCRATS AND MANAGERS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The literature on government and business relations in Thailand suggests that major 
changes in business influence on the government and its bureaucracy have taken place 
since the early 1970s. Riggs argued that during the three decades following the 
overthrow of the country's absolute monarchy in 1932, Thai politics was a 
bureaucratic polity -a political system in which the political elite were drawn from and 
reflected the interests of the bureaucracy.1
Skinner added that in such a political context, the former business community, 
dominated by Chinese immigrants and possessing an alien image, was unavoidably 
confronted by the hostile and nationalistic policy of the government.2 In addition, 
he stated that the Chinese businessmen, facing such difficulties, found it necessary to 
develop business ties with influential Thai officials for several reasons. He reasoned 
that, first of all, such ties were helpful if not essential in obtaining routine licences 
and permits. Second, business ties offered greater security from police interrogation, 
extortion, or arrest. And third, besides facilitating routine business and giving 
security, these ties also yielded special privileges for the Chinese businessmen.3
He also stated that Chinese businessmen had several ways of effecting business 
alliances or connections with influential Thai officials to secure their permanent
^ red  W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization o f  a Bureaucratic Polity  (Honolulu: East-West 
Center Press, 1966), p.319.
2William G. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community o f Thailand (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1958), pp.186-190.
3Ibid., pp.303-304.
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support. First, the Chinese businessmen reorganised many of their commercial and 
financial corporations to include top government officials and members of the Thai 
elite on the boards of directors. Second, new corporations were formed on a 
cooperative pattern, whereby the Chinese supplied the capital and entrepreneurial skill 
and the Thai officials supplied protection for the Chinese, official privileges, and, in 
some cases, government contracts. And third, Chinese businessmen with Thai 
citizenship joined semi-official Thai enterprises in a managerial capacity.4
In effect, government and business relations between 1932 and 1973 resulted in 
clientelism -a complex pattern of vertical linkages arising from the exchange of 
protection and support between a powerful personage (patrons) and a shifting array 
of lesser actors (clients). Business antagonistically cooperated with influential 
government officials.5 More specifically, the influence of business groups on the 
government was minimal and affected the policy of the state mainly in an informal, ad 
hoc and clientelistic manner.
However, recent literature suggests that since the student’s revolution in 1973, 
which led to the overthrow of the military regime, the government and business 
relations have changed.6 For example, Anek Laothamatas stated that under the new 
regime -the semidemocratic government (up to 1988)-7 two modem forms of 
political influence by business have increased remarkably: direct participation in the 
parliament and the cabinet, both through elections and the support of the parties; and
4Ibid., pp.191-192.
5Pisan Suriyamongkol and James F. Guyot, The Bureaucratic Polity at Bay (Bangkok: National 
Institution of Development Administration, 1986), p.4.
6For more detailed discussions o f the formation of pressure groups other than business interests 
groups after the student's revolution see, Prudhisan Jumbala, "Towards a Theory of Group Formation 
in Thai Society and Pressure Groups in Thailand after the October 1973 Uprising," Asian Survey, 
Vol.14, No.6 (June, 1974), pp.530-545.
7Chai-anan Samudavanija, Democracy in Thailand: A Case of a Stable Semi-Democratic Regime, 
paper prepared for the Conference on the Comparative Study of Democracy in Developing Nations, 
Stanford University, December 1985, is an original formulation of the "semi-democratic" model and 
an analysis o f its working, as quoted by Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand: New  
Patterns of Influence," Asian Survey, Vol.XXVII, No.4 (April, 1988), p.452.
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group-based lobbying or membership in the Joint Public-Private Consultative 
Committees (JPPCCs)8 (for more details about the JPPCC scheme, see Appendix 
D of this thesis). He concluded that:
'’Our preliminary study suggests that businessmen now can influence 
politics and policy both particularistically and, what is more significant, 
collectively. This, together with other advantages, such as increasing 
social prestige, employment and investment decision-making power, and 
heavy representation in parties, the parliament, and the cabinet, makes 
business a nonbureaucratic group with substantial political power in 
Thailand today. The 'semidemocratic' policy is different form the 
previous 'bureaucratic policy’ not only in terms of its institutions -a 
competitive party system, and elected house of representatives, and free 
elections- but also in its political power distribution. It has produced the 
environment in which a nonbureaucratic force, other than the monarch, is 
allowed a substantial share in public policy making."9
In view of the impression given above by Laothamatas, this chapter will study how 
the contemporary Thai elite think about the active role of business in public policy 
making. In particular, it will ask the senior bureaucrats and the managers how they 
think business should relate to the government and vice versa. Is business politics 
good or bad for Thailand? Should business participate in public policy making, how, 
and what do they think the consequences of this participation will be?
4.2 FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
The relationship between government and business is dynamic and changes over 
time. Willott, as well as those writers of the macro-perspective school mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 1, held the view that "differing social, economic, educational and 
cultural traditions shape the relationship between government and industry."10 This
8Laothamatas, op.cit., pp.452-461.
9Ibid., p.470.
10Brian W illott, "Relations between Government and Industry," D itch ley Journal, Vol. 3 
(Autumn, 1976), p.39.
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section will examine how contemporary Thai managers and senior bureaucrats believe 
the government should relate to the business community and vice versa. In addition, 
these beliefs will be compared to those of the past.
4.2.1 Current Perception of Government and Business Relations
First, the section looks at how managers and senior bureaucrats think of government 
and business relations in Thailand during the past 12 months (it should again be noted 
here that the survey was carried out between April and August, 1989).
Figure 4-1 shows the comparative profiles of the perception of the bureaucrats 
and the managers of the relationship between government and business during the 
past 12 months, rated on the 7-point semantic differential scales. According to the 
two profiles, both the bureaucrats and the managers similarly held a positive 
perception of the business-govemment relationship. That is, they both perceived the 
relationship during the past 12 months to have been successful, harmonious, good, 
strong, active, stable, fruitful, intimate, valuable, flexible, and relaxed. However, the 
bureaucrats had a more positive perception of the relationship than the managers. For 
example, whereas the bureaucrats rated the relationship as good, strong, and intimate, 
the managers rated it as slightly good, slightly strong, and slightly intimate (T-Test: 
good-bad, p = 0.000; weak-strong, p = 0.009; distant-intimate, p = 0.208).
This positive perception of the business-govemment relationship is likely to be 
a reflection of many efforts currently being made by the government to cater for the 
needs of business and its rapid growth, such as the cut in bureaucratic red-tape and 
consultation with businesses on important economic issues (in fact, these are two of 
the government policies most favoured by the managers as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6).
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Figure 4-1: The Perception of Bureaucrats and Managers of 
Government and Business Relations3
1) Unsuccessful
2) Quarrelsome
3) Bad
4) Weak
5) Passive
6) Changeable
7)
8) 
9)
10)
11)
12)
Biased 
Fruitless 
Distant 
Worthless 
Inflexible 
Tense
Scale
2 3 4 5 6 7
•
Successful
Harmonious
Good
Strong
Active
Stable
Impartial
Fruitful
Intimate
Valuable
Flexible
Relaxed
Managers' Perception of 
the Relations
Bureaucrats' Perception of 
the Relations
Mean T-Test (DF=69)C
Scale
Managers
(N=41)
Bureaucrats
(N=30)
T Prob.
(2-tailed)
1) 5.59 6.03 -2.31 0.024
2) 4.88 4.73 0.62 0.535
3) 5.27 6.17 -4.67 0.000
4) 4.83 5.50 -2.67 0.009
5) 4.85 5.57 -2.56 0.013
6) 4.71 5.17 -1.86 0.067
7) 4.12 3.93 0.59 0.554
8) 5.17 4.53 2.51 0.015
9) 5.12 5.47 -1.27 0.208
10) 5.29 5.40 -0.47 0.638
11) 4.78 5.20 -1.76 0.083
12) 4.85 5.20 -1.39 0.168
Note: a The profiles are plotted by medians.
b The scale is read as follows. On the Bad-Good scale, for example, 
(1) means Very Bad, (2) Bad, (3) Slightly Bad, (4) Neither Good 
Nor Bad, (5) Slightly Good, (6) Good, and (7) Very Good. 
c Pooled variance estimates.
116
Chapter 4
One manager commented, "Prime Minister Chatchai (the present prime minister 
of Thailand) is a businessman turned politician. He has owned several businesses 
himself. He knows what businessmen want from the government. For instance, he 
knows that business cannot develop when its day-to day operation is obstructed by 
the red-tape, or a licence needs to pass tens of tables before being authorised. His 
policy of cutting down unnecessary procedures in dealing with some major 
government departments has helped business a lot." The same manager continued, 
"This is the first time in my business career that I have been asked for more work by 
government officials. In the past I had to beg and push them to process my work... 
This is a good example which shows that when the people at the top are serious about 
solving problems, the system (bureaucracy) can be improved." One manager of an 
animal-feed manufacturing company said, "The relationship between the government 
and business is very good at present. It is because the government has now realised 
that business can be an important partner in solving economic problems and policy 
formulation... The consultation between government and business or a joint public 
and private committee such as the Ko Ro Oo (the Joint Public and Private 
Consultative Committee) is an important step towards a creative relationship between 
government officials and businessmen."
This perception of the relationship stands in contrast with that of the past. In a 
1978 survey, about 9% of 129 managers said the government was an ally of business 
between 1973 and 1976, 33% between 1976 and 1977, and 44% in 1978; whereas 
25% said the government was an enemy of business between 1973 and 1976, 23% 
between 1976 and 1977, and 12 % in 1978.11
^Saw ang Sanguanrueng, "Kam Gumnod Roopbap Pua Num Pai Sue Kwam Sapan Nai Kam 
Sangsan Rawang Pak Rataban Lae Pak Ekachon" (Towards Creative Relations Between Government 
and Business), in Samakom Karn Jadkarn Turakij Hang Prathet Thai (Thai Management 
Association), Ekasarn Tang Wichakarn Prakob Karn Prachum Karn Borihan Pak Rataban Lae 
Ekachon Nai Prathet Thai (The Papers of the Conference on the Public Administration and Private 
Management in Thailand) (Bangkok: Amarin Press, 1978), p.76. His sample consisted of the 
managers who were members of the Thai Management Association.
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4.2.2 The G overnm ent Relationship with Business
With the background knowledge that both the managers and bureaucrats had a similar 
positive perception of the business-govemment relationship, it is expected that they 
would also hold similar views on what the relationship should be.
Table 4-1: Comparison of Views on the Government Relationship 
w ith Business
Q uestion: Please rank the following according to your preference for how the 
Thai government should relate to companies, 
a) As a facilitator b) A sa  co-planner 
c) As a regulator d) As a protector 
e) A sa  stimulator f)  Ay an initiator
Average Rank
■Managers Bureaucrats
(N=41) (N=30)
Facilitator 1.45 (1) 1.93 (1)
Co-Planner 3.44 (3) 3.63 (3)
Regulator 5.37 (6) 4.67 (5)
Protector 3.83 (4) 3.63 (3)
Stimulator 2.77 (2) 2.70 (2)
Initiator 4.15 (5) 4.43 (4)
Kendall Coefficient
of Concordance W 0.50 0.31
X2 (DF=5) 102.50 45.96
Probability 0.000 0.000
Table 4-1 shows the comparative preferences of the managers and the 
bureaucrats of how the government should relate to companies. As expected, most of 
them made a ranking that the government should relate to business first as a 
facilitator, second as stimulator, third as a co-planner, fourth as a protector, fifth as a 
initiator, and finally sixth as a regulator. It is worth noting that the above ranking is 
consistent with the finding in the previous chapter that the managers as well as the 
bureaucrats agreed that the government should intervene least with the economy since 
it can be seen in a different way as the ranking of the least to the most interventionist
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role of the government.
Moreover, the Table 4-1 also suggests that there was a rather high consensus 
among both the managers (Kendall coefficient of concordance W = 0.50, p = 0.000) 
and the bureaucrats (W = 0.31, p = 0.000) concerning the government relationship 
with business. Nevertheless, the consensus was higher among the managers than 
among the bureaucrats. For example, the co-planner role and the protector role were 
closely ranked by the bureaucrats.
It is interesting to discuss how these roles of the government were interpreted 
by the managers and the bureaucrats. A couple of managers interpreted the facilitator 
as a role in which the government could create an economic environment suitable and 
conducive for business operation. One of them said, "The best the government can do 
(for business) is to facilitate business operation, for example by cutting down 
unnecessary regulations and bureaucracy, providing business information, or acting 
as an overseas trade representative." One manager and one bureaucrat saw the role of 
stimulator as encouraging more business investment. The manager said, "By acting 
as a stimulator, the government can induce more investment. For example, the 
government can encourage firms to invest by giving them investment incentives such 
as tax breaks." The co-planner role was understood by a few managers and 
bureaucrats as government consultation with the private sector. One senior bureaucrat 
said, "Businessmen and government officials should meet and talk in order to avoid 
misunderstanding... For example, last week a businessman came to see me and asked 
for permission to expand his factory. We met, and I asked him to change the original 
design slightly. Finally, he agreed with my suggestion. So, the matter was easily 
solved." The protector role was interpreted by several of the managers and the 
bureaucrats as government protection of local industry. One manager said, "Besides 
promoting business , the government should also protect them from fierce sometimes 
unfair competition from foreign companies abroad." By the initator role, the same 
manager said the government taking the leading role in the economy. He argued, "It
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is impossible for the government to lead business. The government cannot be an 
initiator." Finally, the regulator role was clearly understood and rejected by many of 
the managers and bureaucrats. One bureaucrat said, "The era when the government 
controlled and directed business practices has long gone."
4.2.3 The Business Relationship with the G overnm ent
The reverse of the relationship previously studied will next be examined. The finding 
here further confirms that the belief prevailing among the managers and the 
bureaucrats was that business should play a leading role in relation to the 
government.
Table 4-2: Com parison of Views on the Business Relationship with 
the Government
Q uestion: Please rank the following according to your preference for how 
companies should relate to the Thai government.
a) As followers
b) As co-planners
c) As initiators
Average Rank
Managers
(N=41)
Bureaucrats
(N=30)
Followers 2.93 (3) 2.90 (3)
Co-Planners 1.76 (2) 1.83 (2)
Initiators 1.32 (1) 1.27 (1)
Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance W 0.69 0.69
X2 (DF=2) 
Probability
56.78
0.000
41.27
0.000
According to the ranking shown in Table 4-2, both the managers and the 
bureaucrats agreed that companies should relate to the government first as initiators, 
second as co-planners, and third as followers. The ranking can also be seen as the
1 2 0
Chapter 4
ranking of the most to the least leading role of business, which is consistent with the 
previous ranking of the least to the most interventionist role of the government.
Moreover, there was a high consensus among both the managers (Kendall 
coefficient of concordance W = 0.69, p = 0.000) and the bureaucrats (W = 0.69, p = 
0.000) that business should assume a leading relationship with the government.
Even though the finding that the managers believed that business should relate 
to the government as an initiator came out as expected, the sharing in that belief by the 
bureaucrats represents, again, a change from the former attitude in which business 
had been seen generally as lacking social responsibility and, as a result, needing to be 
controlled. In 1978, a survey found that 95% of 88 middle level bureaucrats agreed 
with the statement that "the private sector should bear more social responsibility than 
at present."12
One bureaucrat said, "Businessmen should initiate and do things. If they are 
good and beneficial to the public, we (the government) will support them." Another 
said, "Businesses cannot follow the government. The government does not know 
what to do (about business)."
The finding that the appropriate role of the government was seen mainly by both 
the managers and the bureaucrats as that of facilitator and of companies as that of 
initiator means, to a certain extent, that they assumed that the fundamental function of 
the government, regarding the economy, was to create a framework within which 
firms could compete fairly. Do managers and bureaucrats believe that the government 
can perform this function?
4.2.4 Government Capability as an Arbiter
According to Table 4-3, the managers and the bureaucrats held moderately different
12Sujit Boonbongkam, "Tasana Tua Pai Kong Karn Borihan Pak Rataban Lae Pak Ekachon" 
(General Attitudes towards the Public Administration and Private Management) in Samakom Karn 
Jadkam Turakij Hang Prathet Thai (Thai Management Association), op.cit., pp.39-40.
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views on the capability of the government as an arbiter or "business umpire" 
(Cramer’s V = 0.31). That is, while the majority of the managers agreed with the 
statement that it is rather difficult fo r  the government to oversee and ensure fair  
business competition without bias, the bureaucrats were generally undecided (Mann- 
Whitney U Test, p = 0.02).
Table 4-3: Com parison of Views on Governm ent Capability as an 
A rbiter
Statem ent: It is rather difficult for the government to oversee and ensure fair 
business competition without bias.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 0 %
Disagree 2 15 27
Neither 3 12 27
Agree 4 56 43
Strongly Agree 5 17 3
Median 4 3
Cramer’s V 0.31
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.43
p (two-tailed) 0.015
N Median
Mgrsa Bcrtsb Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 3
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 4
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 4
b) Social Sciences 31 21 4 3
Note: a Managers
b Bureaucrats
Whereas around 73% of the managers agreed, only 47% of the bureaucrats 
agreed and the rest were divided between being undecided and disagreeing.
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However, according to Table 4-3, the bureaucrats with no training or study abroad or 
with a professional background in sciences tended to agree with the statement.
One manager of a sanitary fittings manufacturing company, who agreed with 
the statement, said, "It is not something difficult or easy. It is a question of wanting 
or not wanting to do it. If the government want to make competition fair, they can 
easily do so. They just do not want to do that, for some reasons that inside people 
know well. You can look at the construction industry as an example. One or two big 
companies always get the government contracts. Before the bidding takes place, it can 
be guessed who is going to get the job. Those companies which have good 
connections (with the government) will normally get contracts." While such an 
attitude questions the willingness and intention of government officials to create fair 
business competition, another opinion from one manageress of a canned seafood 
manufacturing company emphasised that in practice it was hardly possible for the 
government to maintain a neutral status as far as business competition was concerned. 
She said, "There is nothing like fair business competition in reality. A company is 
either at an advantage or a disadvantage in relation to others. If the government try to 
narrow this advantage or disadvantage to create fair competition, they are already 
biased in the first place." At the same time, another manager said more 
sympathetically, "We must understand that in certain circumstances government 
officials might not have the information or expertise necessary for making a proper 
judgement. So they have to listen to other people. By listening to other people's 
opinion, they can, of course, possibly be misled by other people."
In contrast, some of the bureaucrats who agreed with the statement saw the 
bureaucracy within the government as an obstacle to the task of ensuring fair business 
competition. One of them said, "I think it is difficult for the government to keep pace 
with fast and changing business competition. The government is a big organisation. 
Its work normally involves several people in order to make sure that it is done 
properly. As a result, it is slow. In comparison, a company is more flexible and
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faster. Sometimes, the government cannot follow them.” However, a few bureaucrats 
who disagreed with the statement believed that the task of ensuring fair business 
competition could be easily done by the government. One bureaucrat said, "I could 
not see any difficulty in that.”
4.3 THE POLITICAL ROLE OF BUSINESS
Just as the government is not limited to government, neither are businesses to 
business. While the government sometimes interferes with the economy, business 
more than often gets involved in politics. Earlier this research has found that 
contemporary business managers and senior bureaucrats believe that less government 
economic intervention is good; in this section it will examine how they think about 
business involvement in politics.
4.3.1 Attitudes of B ureaucrats and M anagers towards Each O ther
Before entering into the discussion of the opinion of business political involvement, 
this section will look at what Thai managers and bureaucrats think of each other. 
Figure 4-2 shows the comparative profiles of the bureaucrats' and managers' 
perception of each other, rated on the 7-point semantic differential scales. The two 
profiles indicate considerable discrepancy between their perception of one another: 
whereas the bureaucrats had a positive perception of the managers, the managers had 
a negative perception of the bureaucrats.
In particular, the managers were seen by the senior bureaucrats as being 
successful, influential, strong, active, slightly stable, competent, cooperative, neither 
biased nor impartial, efficient, slightly helpful, powerful, and slightly flexible. In 
contrast, the bureaucrats were seen by the managers as being neither successful nor 
unsuccessful, influential, neither weak nor strong, passive, neither changeable nor 
stable, slightly competent, neither cooperative nor uncooperative, slightly biased,
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neither efficient nor inefficient, neither helpful nor unhelpful, powerful, and 
inflexible.
Figure 4-2: Attitudes of Bureaucrats and Managers towards Each 
Othera
Scale
1) Unsuccessful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Successful
2) Uninfluential Influential
3) Weak Strong
Active4) Passive
5) Changeable
6) Incompetent
7) Uncooperative
Stable
Competent
Cooperative
Impartial
: J
8) Biased
9) Inefficient * i Efficient
10) Unhelpful
11) Powerless
Helpful
Powerful.—
12) Inflexible -L——:— Flexible
Managers' Perception of 
the Relations
Bureaucrats' Perception of 
the Relations
Mean T-Test (DF=69)b
Scale
Managers
(N=41)
Bureaucrats
(N=30)
T Prob.
(2-tailed)
1) 3.66 6.17 -9.73 0.000
2) 5.88 5.93 -0.22 0.827
3) 3.90 5.57 -5.37 0.000
4) 2.93 6.00 -11.54 0.000
5) 3.95 4.97 -3.68 0.000
6) 4.61 5.97 -4.93 0.000
7) 3.83 5.60 -5.92 0.000
8) 3.02 3.80 -2.83 0.006
9) 3.61 5.83 -7.69 0.000
10) 3.71 5.57 -6.57 0.000
11) 5.76 5.60 0.67 0.505
12) 3.27 5.33 -6.72 0.000
Note: a The profiles are plotted by medians.
b Pooled variance estimates.
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Moreover, the discrepancies in their perception are rather significant, except that 
of both of them think of each other as being influential (T-Test, p = 0.827) and 
powerful (p = 0.505).
With regard to the issue of efficiency, Thai bureaucrats have long accepted that 
private management is more efficient than public administration. In the 1978 survey, 
it was found that 69% of 88 middle-level bureaucrats agreed with the statement that 
"in general, the private sector is more efficient in management than the public 
sector."13
In fact, such a positive view of the managers held by the bureaucrats forms, to a 
certain extent, the basis for their agreement with business involvement in politics, 
which will be discussed next.
4.3.2 Business Involvement in Politics
According to Table 4-4, the managers and the bureaucrats had different views on 
business involvement in politics (Cramer's V = 0.41). Rather surprisingly, whereas 
the managers were generally divided between agreement and disagreement, many of 
the bureaucrats agreed with the statement that the present high level o f involvement 
in politics by businessmen will do more good than harm to the economy o f Thailand 
(Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.918). While around 57% of the bureaucrat agreed with 
the statement; only 36% of the managers agreed, leaving the rest 29% and 24 % being 
in disagreement and undecided respectively.
However, the managers who had some training or study abroad tended to 
agree, whereas the bureaucrats who were aged above 51, or did not have any training 
or study abroad agreed. But the bureaucrats who had a professional background in 
sciences were likely to disagree.
13Boonbongkam, loc.cit.
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Table 4-4: Com parison of Views on Business Involvement in 
P o litics
Statem ent: The present high level o f involvement in politics by businessmen 
will do more good than harm to the economy o f Thailand.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 0 % 0 %
Disagree 2 29 20
Neither 3 24 23
Agree 4 20 53
Strongly Agree 5 27 3
Median 3 4
Cramer’s V 0.41
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -0.10
p (two-tailed) 0.918
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 3 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 3 4
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 3 4
b) Yes 7 15 4 3
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 3 2
b) Social Sciences 31 21 3 4
Even though it can hardly be denied that there is interaction between politics and 
economy, their exact relationship is less than obvious. Nevertheless, a few 
bureaucrats apparently believed that the participation of business in politics was good 
for the Thai economy. One bureaucrat said, "The present good performance of the 
economy must be largely credited to those businessmen turned politicians... They are 
progressive-minded. They come at a time when the world economy is booming. They 
have grasped this opportunity and launched Thailand into a new stage of industrial 
development and into the international markets." Another bureaucrat who agreed with 
the statement added, "The most important foundation of a country is its economy. If
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the economy is good, every thing else is good... If a person does not feel hungry and 
has money to spend, he does not bother to go out and do those sort of things like 
demonstrations. The country will be peaceful... The people in the government should 
be those who can use their authority to create economic prosperity." Similarly, 
despite having rather a pessimistic view of politicians, one bureaucrat also agreed 
with the statement. "One of the bad things about businessmen turned politicians is 
that they have too many interests... But, to be fair, politicians with other professional 
backgrounds also have their own personal interests... Anyway, I still prefer the 
business community to get involved in politics because their interests coincide with 
those of the country."
One manager who agreed with the statement said, "The business involvement in 
politics is a creative relationship between government and business. By participating 
in electoral campaigns, businessmen can make their views known to the government, 
which is important to the country's development."
However, while the pursuit of self-interest was taken as fact by a few of those 
who agreed with the statement, it became a major reason for one bureaucrat's 
disagreement. He said, "Few businessmen have a sense of social responsibility. They 
get involved in politics mainly to protect their business interests. Getting involved in 
politics is costly and expensive. They do not do it for nothing." Such a view 
obviously reflects the remnants of the old attitude of bureaucrats towards 
businessmen. In 1978, it was found in a survey that 71% of the 88 middle level 
bureaucrats asked, agreed that "private businesses usually pursue every method, 
whether right or wrong, to achieve their own objectives."14
However, a manager of a company in the steel industry, an executive of which 
had just been appointed as a senator on the day he was interviewed, frankly said, 
"We do not get involved in politics because we want to but because we have to. Our 
businesses represent an asset of up to thousands of million baht; we need to have 
somebody there (in the parliament) to protect our interests."
14Boonbongkam, loc.cit.
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Finally, there were those who neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 
One of them said, "Businessmen are Thai citizens.So they can campaign to be an MP 
or whatever they want, within the framework of democracy. But it is difficult to 
discern the good and bad things following their involvement in politics and figure out 
which one is more than another."
4.4 BUSINESS PARTICIPATION 
IN GOVERNMENT POLICY MAKING
It is possible to say that one of the principle motivations of firms to enter into politics 
is to influence public policy. Following the suggestion by the analysis in the previous 
section that business participation in politics is more or less welcomed by the Thai 
elite, this section will examine their views on business participation in the 
government's economic policy making. In addition, as pointed out in the Chapter 1 
and at the beginning of this chapter that business has several modes of influencing 
public policy, it will also examine their preference of the method of business 
participation in the government's economic policy making -in particular, the direct 
participation, lobbying, and the use of business associations.
4.4.1 The Perception of Managers of Government Economic Policy
This sub-section will first look at how the recent government economic policy is 
perceived by Thai managers. When asked to rate government economic policy during 
the past 12 months on the 7-point semantic differential scales, the majority of 
managers said that the policy was successful, slightly influential, good, slightly right, 
slightly strong, active, slightly stable, slightly effective, neither impartial nor biased, 
slightly efficient, slightly powerful, and slightly flexible (see Figure 4-3). In short, 
the managers were generally satisfied with the government economic policy at the
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present.
Figure 4-3: The Perception of Managers of Government Economic 
Policy3
Scale
1) Unsuccessful :
2) Uninfluential :
3) Bad :
4) Wrong :
5) Weak :
6) Passive :
7) Changeable :
8) Ineffective :
9) Biased :
10) Inefficient :
11) Powerless :
12) Inflexible :
— h > -
Successful
Influential
Good
Right
Strong
Active
Stable
Effective
Impartial
Efficient
Powerful
Flexible
Note: 3 The profile is plotted by medians.
Against this background of the positive perception of government economic 
policy, the study will next examine how Thai elite think of the business involvement 
in the economic policy making.
4.4.2 Business Involvement in Government Policy Making
Table 4-5 suggests that both the managers and the bureaucrats held a similar opinion 
about business involvement in the government's economic policy making (Cramer's 
V = 0.39). That is, neither agreed with the statement that economic policy making 
should be done by the government only; businessmen should not get involved 
(Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.003). However, the managers were in stronger 
disagreement with the statement than the bureaucrats. All the business respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed, whereas about 83% of the bureaucrats
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disagreed.
Table 4-5: Comparison of Views on Business Involvement in the 
Economic Policy M aking of the Governm ent
Statem ent: Economic policy making should be done by the government only; 
businessmen should not get involved.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 32 % 10 %
Disagree 2 68 73
Neither 3 0 10
Agree 4 0 7
Strongly Agree 5 0 0
Median 2 2
Cramer's V 0.39
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.96
p (two-tailed) 0.003
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 2 2
b) 51 or above 7 17 2 2
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 2 2
b) Yes 7 15 2 2
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 2 2
b) Social Sciences 31 21 2 2
The major argument generally common to both the managers' and the 
bureaucrats' reasons for agreeing with the statement was that because businessmen 
had a direct interest and experience in business, which is the major component of the 
economy, they should have a role in economic policy making. For example, a 
manager said, "It is important that businessmen should be consulted before the 
government put out any major economic policy because they are the people directly 
involved and affected by it... The voice of business will keep government (economic) 
policy in the right direction." Similarly, one bureaucrat explained, "Businessmen's
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opinion plays an essential role in government economic policy. The government 
needs to listen to their concerns because they are directly involved in the economy." 
Another bureaucrat gave an interesting analogy. He said, "The government is like 
theory and business is like practice. While the government have ideas, the 
businessmen have experience. The combination of theory and practice or ideas and 
experience will produce an effective and efficient policy, which is also mutually 
accepted to both the government and the business community."
If business involvement in the government’s economic policy making is not 
rejected by the Thai elite, it is interesting to investigate further how they think about 
the effects of the involvement.
4.4.3 Consequences of Business Participation in Economic Policy 
Making
Table 4-6 indicates that most of the managers and the bureaucrats agreed with the 
statement that the participation o f business in economic policy formulation will make 
policy implementation easier (Cramer's V = 0.35; Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.033) 
For example, 78% of the managers and 70% of the the bureaucrats either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement.
Moreover, the managers who had some training or study abroad tended to be 
more strongly in agreement than those who did not. But the senior bureaucrats with a 
professional background in sciences were undecided.
Also according to Table 4-6, many of the managers also agreed with the 
statement that the participation o f business in economic policy formulation will make 
the policy outcome benefit only a few groups o f people, while the bureaucrats were 
divided in opinion about it (Cramer's V = 0.19; Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.14). 
Whereas about 51% of the business managers agreed with the statement, 33% of the 
bureaucrats were undecided and the rest of them were approximately divided between
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agreement and disagreement. However, the managers who were aged 50 or below, 
had some training or study abroad, or had a professional background in social 
sciences tended to be undecided about the statement.
Table 4-6: Com parison of Views on Consequences of Business 
Participation in Economic Policy M aking
Statem ent: The participation o f business in economic policy formulation 
will make
a) policy implementation easier.
b) the policy outcome benefit only a few  groups o f people.
Strongly Disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
Neither (3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly Agree (5)
Easier Policy 
Implementation
Policy Benefitting 
Only a Few People
Managers
(N=41)
Bureaucrats
(N=30)
Managers
(N=41)
Bureaucrats
(N=30)
0 % 
10 
12 
46 
32
0 % 
23 
7
63
7
0 % 
17 
32 
49 
2
0 %
30
33
37
0
Median 4 4 4 3
Cramer's V 0.35 0.19
Mann-Whitney U Test
Z (corrected for ties) -2.14 -1.48
p (two-tailed) 0.033 0.140
Easier Policy Policy Benefitting
Implementation Only a Few People
N Median Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 4 4 3 3
b) 51 or above 7 17 4 4 4 3
- Training
Abroad
a) No 34 14 4 4 4 3
b) Yes 7 15 5 4 3 3
- Professional
Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 4 3 4 3
b) Soc. Sciences; 31 21 4 4 3 3
A couple of managers and senior bureaucrats were in favour of the consensus
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form of government economic policy. For example, one manager said, "This is true 
because if the policies are agreed upon by both businessmen and the government, the 
implementation is much easier." Another bureaucrat said, "It is not exactly a question 
of easy or difficult implementation but more of relationship. If we announce a 
regulation, they (the businessmen) have to comply with it anyway because that is a 
law. But we try to avoid forcing businessmen to do something. We usually look for 
alternatives or a compromise because a good working relationship is important. We 
do not work with businessmen for today or tomorrow but for many years to come."
In contrast, one bureaucrat stressed the specialisation and technicality of 
economic problems as the factors making the participation of business in economic 
policy making necessary. He said, "There are too many problems which are often 
different and complicated. We need a variety of information from businessmen to 
make a policy which is suitable for a particular problem."
Arguing against the likelihood that the policy outcome would be biased if 
businessmen were allowed to participate in economic policy making, one senior 
bureaucrat explained, "In fact, this is what I usually do. For example, a vegetable-oil- 
distillery company was seeking permission from the government to import soya bean 
oil from abroad. They gave the reason that the local producers could not adequately 
meet the demands of their factories. What I did was to send letters to all those 
companies who used the oil, inviting them to a meeting. In the meeting we discussed 
the issue together. In the end, the shortage was found to be justifiable, so the import 
quotas were equally divided among them. Such a practice is not only fair to every 
party concerned but also creates a good understanding between government officials 
and businessmen. Moreover, nobody can lie in the meeting since their competitors are 
also present. If someone tries to make up figures, even though I do not know, their 
competitors will know... If there is trust and good understanding between the 
government and business, it is much easier to work together. Nowadays, when I go 
out to inspect the agricultural produce stocks in other provinces, I often ask the
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businessmen if they want to come with me. They normally come."
However, there were some bureaucrats who believed that to a certain extent a 
biased policy outcome would result if business participated in economic policy 
formulation. For example, one bureaucrat said, "It must be accepted that big 
companies are better than small companies at influencing government (economic) 
policy."
Finally, neither agreeing nor disagreeing that the policy would benefit only a 
few groups of people, one bureaucrat said, "It depends on how the businessmen 
participate in the government's economic policy making." His comment is, in fact, 
what will be discussed next.
4.4.4 Methods of Influencing Government Economic Policy
Table 4-7 suggests that both the managers and the bureaucrats shared a similar 
opinion about how business should influence the economic policy making of the 
government. That is, most of them preferred representation through business 
associations to direct participation and lobbying respectively. In addition, there is also 
a significant consensus in the above preference among both the managers (Kendall 
coefficient of concordance W = 0.25, p = 0.000) and the bureaucrats (W = 0.67, p = 
0.000).
The bureaucrats' preference for representation through business associations 
such as trade associations or chambers of commerce came out as expected. Wilson 
argued that government authorities would try to encourage sectors such as farming, 
business, and unions to designate a single group as spokesman since such 
aggregation saved them the awkward task of aggregating interests within as well as 
between sectors.15
15Gramham K. Wilson, Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (London: MacMillan, 
1985), p.10.
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Table 4-7: Com parison of Views on M ethods of Influencing 
Governm ent Economic Policy
Q uestion: Which method do you think the private sector should use in 
influencing the government's economic policy making? Please rank 
the following methods.
a) Directly participate in policy-making, for example, by being a 
politician
b) Lobby policy-makers
c) Be members o f business associations such as trade 
associations or chambers o f commerce and operate through these 
associations to influence policy-making
Average Rank
Method
Managers Bureaucrats 
(N=41) (N=30)
Direct Participation 2.10 (2) 2.10 (2)
Lobbying 2.44 (3) 2.77 (3)
Business Association . 1.46 (1) 1.13 (1)
Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance W
X2 (DF=2) 
Probability
0.25
20.10
0.000
0.67
40.47
0.000
As one senior bureaucrat interviewed said, "When a company or a group of 
companies came to see us and complained about something, they were sometimes 
told to go back and do it through their (business) association, because if the complaint 
was accepted, there would be many more to come. These complaints would be 
endless and I could also be accused of treating one company better than another... 
They are often told to reach an agreement among themselves before coming to see 
us." This bureaucrat was speaking with the assumption that companies were equally 
influential within a business association and its resolution was a compromise of all 
interests concerned. But, this is not always the case. As one manager put it, "I do not 
trust my (trade) association. They do not represent me. They represent those big 
companies... I joined the association because I wanted to get my share of the export 
quotas and use some of the services." This is, in fact, a good example of the reason
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why some companies tend to go directly to government agencies by themselves to 
voice their concerns. It also supports Olsen's argument that in order to organise 
successfully, economic interest groups (in this case, business associations) have to 
provide selective incentives to induce their potential members to join. This could take 
the form of coercion, but more usually it would be some form of positive inducement 
such as a service (quotas in this case) provided by the interest groups solely to its 
members.16
Nevertheless, a few managers preferred representation through business 
associations because they thought it was legitimate and accessible to most companies. 
A manager said, "The practices of lobbying or becoming a politician are limited to 
those big businesses, which can afford it. But trade associations or chambers of 
commerce are open to everybody."
It is interesting to note that the method of lobbying policy-makers was ranked 
after the practice of direct participation. Such a preference seems to vary from one 
country to another. For instance, in some countries, such as those in the West like 
Britain or the United States, meetings between the officials of interest groups and 
government officials are regarded as part of everyday life; in other countries such 
gatherings are regarded as potential conspiracies, so that a public record of such 
meetings and their purpose is required.17 Thailand seems to fall into the latter group 
of countries where the practice of lobbying policy-makers is considered as dubious. 
As one manager said, "I would prefer businessmen becoming politicians to lobbying 
because in the former things are done in the open and can be easily checked whereas 
in the latter we do not know what is going on."
The above finding stands in contrast to Vogel's suggestion mentioned in 
Chapter 1 that British business involves in government policy-making from within, 
whereas American business involves in government policy-making from without.
16M. Olsen, The Logic o f Collective Action, (2nd Edition; Cambridge: Havard University Press,
1971),
p.132.
17Wilson, loc.cit.
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When put into a comparative context in this sense, the preference of Thai elite for the 
style of business participation in public policy making lies closer the practice in 
Britain than the one in the United States.
Having found that both the managers and the bureaucrats preferred 
representation through business associations as a way of influencing the government 
economic policy, the study will ask further: "Do they think that it should be the only 
channel of business influence?"
Table 4-8: Com parison of Views on Influencing G overnm ent 
Economic Policy through Business Associations
Statem ent: Business should influence the economic policy making o f the
government through trade associations or chambers o f commerce 
only.
Rating Managers Bureaucrats
Value (N=41) (N=30)
Strongly Disagree 1 10 % 0 %
Disagree 2 61 11
Neither 3 10 13
Agree 4 20 10
Strongly Agree 5 0 0
Median 2 2
Cramer’s V 0.26
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -0.01
p (two-tailed) 0.99
N Median
Mgrs Berts Mgrs Berts
Control for...
- Age
a) 50 or below 34 13 2 2
b) 51 or above 7 17 2 2
- Training Abroad
a) No 34 14 2 2
b) Yes 7 15 2 2
- Professional Subject
a) Sciences 10 8 2 2
b) Social Sciences 31 21 2 2
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4.4.5 Influencing Government Policy through Business Associations
According to Table 4-8, the managers and the bureaucrats held similar views on 
influencing government economic policy through business associations (Cramer’s V 
= 0.26). That is, the majority of them disagreed that business should influence the 
economic policy making o f the government through trade associations or chambers 
o f commerce only (Mann-Whitney U Test, p = 0.99). For example, around 71% of 
the managers and 77% of the bureaucrats disagreed with the statement.
Thus, even though both the managers and the bureaucrats believed that the 
business should influence the government economic policy through business 
associations, they did not think that the method of influencing the policy should be 
limited to it.
One bureaucrat believed that there should be other options. He said, "There 
should not be the word 'only.' It is good to have other alternatives." A manager 
further supported the point of having several channels for influencing government 
economic policy. He said, "In some industries trade associations may not be strong 
or well-organised enough to represent their members, or do not exist at all... There 
may be some issues on which the trade association cannot represent their members 
because of their failure to reach a consensus. There are also issues in which trade 
associations do not want to get involved, for example, those about which the general 
public have bad feelings." Finally, another manager claimed that the freedom to 
choose which channel to influence government policy is another aspect of the "free 
enterprise" economy. He explained, "Businessmen should have freedom to choose. 
If they want to go to lobby the policy-makers by themselves instead of asking the 
trade associations to do the job for them, they should not hesitate to do so. This is 
another good aspect of what we call a free enterprise system."
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4.5 CONSISTENCY OF THE BELIEFS
This section will examine the consistency between the managers’ and the bureaucrats' 
views on the political role of business and their views on business participation in the 
government's economic policy making. If there exists a consistency, some correlation 
between the two views should be expected.
According to Table 4-9, there was a rather high consistency between the two 
views for each of the managers and the bureaucrats. However, individual 
bureaucrats' views were more consistent than those of individual managers.
According to the Table, the more a manager agreed with business involvement 
in politics, the more likely he was to believe that the participation of business in 
economic policy formulation would make policy implementation easier (Kendall 
correlation coefficient T = 0.66, p = 0.000) and the more unlikely he was to believe 
that a policy outcome would benefit only a few groups of people (T = -0.41, p = 
0.003). But the Table indicates little association between his belief that business 
involvement will do more good than harm to the Thai economy and his belief that 
business should not get involved with the economic policy making of the government 
(T = 0.16, p = 0.271).
In contrast, the beliefs of each of the bureaucrats were more consistent. That is, 
the more a bureaucrat agreed with business involvement in politics, the more he 
agreed with business participation in economic policy formulation (Kendall 
correlation coefficient T = -0.53, p = 0.002), the more likely he was to believe that 
the participation would make policy implementation easier (T = 0.69, p = 0.000), and 
the less likely he was to believe that a policy outcome would benefit only a few 
groups of people (T = -0.36, p = 0.028).
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In comparison, the consistency of the beliefs here was higher than that of the 
economic ideology found in the previous chapter. Should the consistency here lead to 
the conclusion that because the managers and the bureaucrats believed in business 
participation in economic policy formulation, they were likely to support business 
involvement in politics, or vice versa? The answer "yes” should be taken with 
reservations. While a number of the respondents who agreed with both business 
participation in the government's economic policy making and business involvement 
in politics, argued on the basis of the economic capability of business and its 
efficiency, and experience, a few also mentioned the democratic freedom of 
businessmen. Moreover, business participation in the government's economic policy 
making is, as a matter of fact, one of the main activities and objectives of business 
involvement in politics, or in other words, the two beliefs are closely related in 
practice.
4.6 SUMMARY
In the light of the literature's suggestion that business political activities and influence 
have increased, this chapter studies and compares the beliefs of senior Thai 
bureaucrats and business managers about business roles in the government's 
economic policy making. The empirical data here suggest that compared to their 
former counterparts, who were rather hostile towards Chinese immigrants (the 
dominant population of the business community), the new generation of senior 
bureaucrats have a relatively high opinion of businessmen. The bureaucrats 
interviewed in this research generally wanted business to relate to the government as 
initiators.Many of them believed that the participation of business in politics was 
good for Thailand and even encouraged business participation in economic policy 
making. Moreover, several of the bureaucrats also believed that such participation 
would make policy implementation easier and dismissed the likelihood that it would
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make a policy outcome biased towards certain interest groups. On the other hand, as 
expected, most of the managers were in favour of business taking an active role in 
politics, the economy, and economic policy making. They wanted the government to 
play the role of a facilitator, creating an environment which was conducive to efficient 
business operation. They also wanted to be consulted by the government on major 
economic issues. And, despite a lingering bad image of the bureaucracy, business 
managers' attitudes towards bureaucrats have become more positive.
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Institutional Interaction between Government and Business
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5 .3  The Basis of Company Contact with Governm ent Agencies
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CHAPTER 5 
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
While the previous two chapters discussed the ideological context of government and 
business relations in Thailand, the next two chapters will investigate the interaction 
within the relationship. In the light of the literature’s neglect of the interactional 
approach as discussed in Chapter 1, this chapter will examine the institutional 
interaction between government and business. In particular, it will identify which 
government agencies are contacted by manufacturing companies in Thailand and for 
what reasons. How much influence do the companies have on the government 
agencies contacted by them and vice versa? It will also investigate the personnel links 
and the patterns of communication within the interaction and the companies' 
knowledge of the government agencies. Finally, the success of the interaction will be 
evaluated. How much difficulty do managers experience in dealing with the agencies 
and how satisfied are they with their relationship with the agencies? Does better 
knowledge of a government agency produce a better relationship? And do personnel 
links help improve the relationship? The analysis of the data will be based mainly on a 
comparison of compulsory and non-compulsory dealings between companies and 
government agencies. In addition, comparisons of government dealings made by 
companies of different sizes and origins and with different degrees of government 
control will also be made.
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5.2 THE GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS OF BUSINESS
The extensive interpenetration of government and business makes it difficult to 
identify areas in which they do not interact. When a business is first established it has 
to register its nature, products to be manufactured and personnel with the 
government. When starting to operate, it is required to manufacture products up to the 
standard specified by the government without, at the same time, causing too much 
damage to the environment. The prices of some goods may be controlled by the 
government, and if there is any profit made it has to pay taxes. These are just a few 
examples. Such closely related government and business activities lead some to say 
that there are shadow government departments or government counterparts of the 
various functional divisions within a company.1 This section will discuss the 
government counterparts of manufacturing companies in Thailand.
5.2.1 M ajor Governm ent Agencies Contacted
Each of the managers in this research was first asked to give the names of the three 
most important government agencies contacted by his company during the past 12 
months. Table 5-1 shows that the major government agencies named by the managers 
centred on a few government departments. Among the departments (or equivalents) 
most frequently contacted were the Office of the Board of Investment (20%), the 
Industrial Works Department (15%), the Customs Department (13%), the Internal 
Trade Department (9%), and the Foreign Trade Department (7%). Together, these six 
departments accounted for nearly 80% of all the government agencies named by the 
managers.
M urray L. Weidenbaum, Business Government and the Public (2nd edition; Eaglewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1981), p.375. He depicted the corresponding government departments o f various 
business divisions of firms in the United States.
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Table 5-1: Major Government Agencies Contacted by 
Manufacturing Companies in Thailand
Q uestion : a) Could you give me the names of the three most important
government agencies that your company contacted or dealt with
during the past 12 months?* Please rank these three government
agencies according to their importance to your company.
b) How important was this agency to your company during the past 
12 months? Use this scale for your answer. 
i =  Not At All 2 = Slightly Important
3 = Important 4 = Very Important
5 -  Extremely Important
Rank All
Agencies
First Second Third
Government Agencyb (N=41) (N=41) (N=41) (N=123)
Board of Investment 51 % 2 % 5 % 20 %
Industrial Works Dept. 2 20 22 15
Customs Dept. 7 27 7 14
Revenue Dept. 17 12 10 13
Internal Trade Dept. 10 7 10 9
Foreign Trade Dept. 5 7 7 7
Thai Industrial Standards Institute 2 5 5 4
Labour Dept. 10 3
Food and Drug Administration 5 5 3
Fisheries Dept. 5 2 2
Agricultural Extension Dept. 2 5 2
Export Promotion Dept. 5 2
Medical Sciences Dept. 5 2
Office of the Secretary, Min. of Industry 2 2 2
Commercial Registration Dept. 2 1
Livestock Dept. 2 1
Royal Forestiy Dept. 2 1
Bank of Thailand 2 1
Importance0 5 4 4 4
Note: a By responding to this question, each company generated 3 cases (3
names of government agencies).
b Government departments or equivalents.
c The figures shown are medians.
However, the managers ranked the six government agencies differently 
according to their importance. The Office of the Board of Investment was frequently 
ranked first (about 51% of the times it was named), the Customs Department second 
(27%), and the Industrial Department second or third (20% and 22% respectively).
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These rankings may be explained by the fact that in recent years the manufacturing 
sector has registered rapid growth and increased exports. Its contribution to the gross 
domestic product has increased annually at an average rate of 41% (calculated at 
current market price) between 1975 and 19882 and its share of the total exports at a 
rate of 11% between 1982 and 19883 (for more discussion of the growth of the 
manufacturing sector, see Appendix A). As a result, manufacturing companies 
frequently have to deal with the Office of the Board of Investment -the government 
agency which grants investment and export incentives to firms, the Industrial Works 
Department -the agency largely responsible for balancing and controlling industrial 
production capacity and giving factory operation licences or expansion permits, and 
the Customs Department -the agency which controls import and export of goods.
Table 5-1 also gives some idea of the degree of importance of the government 
agencies named by the managers, by showing that while most of the agencies were 
rated as being very important, those ranked first were frequently said to be extremely 
important.
From the variety of government agencies mentioned by the managers, this research 
depicts the usual corresponding government departments of manufacturing companies 
in Thailand. Figure 5-1 shows the government counterparts of functional divisions 
within a company. Although the list of government agencies shown in the Figure is 
by no means exhaustive, it shows a simplified and typical form of institutional 
interaction between business and government.
^Office o f the National Economic and Social Development Board, as published in Thailand 
Development Research Institute Foundation, Thailand Economic Information K it (May, 1989), 
Table 3.
^Bank o f Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, as published in Thailand Development Research Institute 
Foundation, op.cit, Table 5.
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Chapter 5
In Figure 5-1, a company is seen as consisting of five major divisions: 
personnel, finance, production, marketing and special task. The personnel division 
deals mainly with the Labour Department on the issues of personnel safety and 
employees' benefits. According to several managers interviewed, the Labour 
Department normally requires a company to state its policy on employee's social 
security.
The finance division deals largely with the Revenue Department on such matters 
as taxes, either payment or rebate, and with the Bank of Thailand on foreign currency 
exchange.
The production division often deals with the Office of the Board of Investment 
on the issue of promotional privileges for new investments and expansion. It also 
contacts the Industrial Works Department concerning factory operation and waste 
control. With respect to product standards, if a company is in a non-food industry, it 
may have to send samples of its products to the Thai Industrial Standards Institute for 
testing. For companies in the food or pharmaceutical industries, samples are required 
to be sent to the Office of the Food and Drug Administration or the Medical Sciences 
Department.4
The marketing division frequently deals with the Internal Trade Department on 
the issues of price and product stocks. It also contacts the Foreign Trade Department 
and the Export Promotion Department on matters such as foreign trade missions and 
negotiations, and trade fairs and exhibitions abroad.The Customs Department is dealt 
with by both the production and marketing divisions when the company imports new 
machines or raw materials and exports its products.
Finally, there is the "special task" division. Unlike other divisions, it does not 
exist in practice. The tasks of this division are either ad hoc or cannot be primarily
4One of the managers explained that there were two government agencies which deal with the 
standard of food because in the process of export, different countries may require different certificates 
issued by the two agencies. The Office of Food and Drug Administration and the Medical Sciences 
Department are mainly responsible for the standard of edible products such as processed foods and 
drugs. In fact, he added that there was another certificate issued by the Foreign Trade Department for 
the export of agricultural produce such as rice, tapioca, maize and sugar.
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associated with other functional divisions. The special task division contacts several 
government agencies, for example, the Livestock Department and the Fisheries 
Department for information on the supply and demand of cattle and fish, or the Office 
of the Ministry of Industry for industrial production capacity figures. It may contact 
the Royal Forestry Department for natural resources concessions such as permission 
to cut down trees, or the Agricultural Extensions Department for new technology 
such as newly developed seed. It may also have to send an annual report to the 
Commercial Registration Department.
While the above description of government contact portrays an almost one-to- 
one relationship between a functional division within a company and a government 
agency, in practice the relationship is multiple and varied. The research found that one 
business division might deal with many government agencies at the same time or vice 
versa. The personnel division of a few sample companies was responsible for most 
contact with the government. As one personnel manager interviewed explained, 
"Other divisions are already very busy with work inside the company... Most 
government relations and contact are my responsibility because one of the main jobs 
of the personnel division is public relations." In addition, the precise nature of contact 
and interaction varied by industry, size of company, type of product and market 
served and management style. For instance, the same manager said, "Our company 
employs several thousands of workers, so we deal extensively with the government 
on labour issues such as personnel safety and employees' social welfare."
It should be borne in mind that the investigation here is based on interaction between 
a company and three government agencies; a company certainly contacts more than 
three government agencies in its entire business undertaking.5 Nevertheless, in 
some interviews, when a manager did give up to five or seven names of government
5The readers may then ask, "Why does this research not ask for all the government agencies that a 
company has contacted?" This is because the questions that follow on each of the three government 
agencies mentioned normally altogether take a respondent about 2 hours to complete.
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agencies contacted by the company, the dealings with the agencies of the fifth or sixth 
importance to the company were often trivial. For instance, one company had to 
check with the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace that the radiation of the lighting 
within its factory was within the safety limit, and another company sought permission 
from the Police Department to dismantle a structure on its premises.
5.2.2 Types of Contact
For each of the three government agencies mentioned by a manager, the research 
asked whether the contact made was required by law or not. Table 5-2 shows that 
most dealings with government agencies were compulsory (81%). The finding leads 
one to ask why the percentage of voluntary contact made with those government 
agencies perceived by the companies as the three most important was rather low. Is it 
because companies do not bother to deal with the government if not required by law 
to do so, or because contact made with the three most important government agencies 
is preoccupied with regulations and legal requirements because there are so many of 
them? It is likely that both of the above two explanations contribute to the situation.
With respect to the latter explanation, Figure 5-1 shows that dealings 
concerning such matters as employment policy, product standards and prices, waste 
control, and export documentation, were the result of government regulations. 
Regarding the former explanation, some managers interviewed did suggest that they 
contacted the government only when necessary. One manager said, "In normal 
circumstances we contact government agencies when the laws require us to do so. 
Such dealings as tax payment or export-import licences form the basis of our day-to- 
day dealings with the government. Only when there is something unusual like an 
industrial dispute or shortages of raw materials will we be involved with the 
government in a different manner." The latter part of what he said is an example of 
legally non-compulsory or voluntary contact.
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Chapter 5
Another manager said, "Our dealing with the government is nothing special... It 
is big business groups who contact the government because they want to influence its 
policy. We are just a single company. We are not in the position to do that."
With respect to the ranking of the three government agencies named by each of 
the managers, it was found that those government agencies perceived by the 
managers as of first importance were more frequently voluntarily contacted. 
According to Table 5-2, about 27% of the government agencies ranked first, 10% of 
those ranked second, and 19% of those ranked third were voluntarily contacted.
Also from Table 5-2, regarding the types of contact with specific government 
departments, it was found that while the dealings with some government agencies 
were a combination of compulsory and non-compulsory dealings, the dealings with 
other government departments were essentially compulsory. For instance, while 
about 54% of the cases of contact with the Board of Investment were non- 
compulsory, all the cases of contact with the Industrial Works Department, the 
Customs Department, and the Revenue Department were compulsory.
The percentage of non-compulsory contact with a government agency may well 
be a rough indicator of a company's perception of the extent of the opportunities or 
benefits offered by that agency. For instance, the Board of Investment is the 
government agency which provides investment incentives. Companies can still 
operate lawfully without contacting it, but do so because they want to receive 
promotional privileges from the agency. In contrast, the Industrial Works 
Department, the Customs Department, and the Revenue Department -all of which are 
mainly regulatory agencies- are contacted by companies basically because of legal 
requirements such as applications for factory operations or permission for expansion, 
export-import documentation, and tax payments or rebates. In the case of the Internal 
Trade Department or the Foreign Trade Department, companies may contact them 
voluntarily on matters such as participation in the regular agricultural produce 
inspection or joining in trade negotiations abroad.
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Chapter 5
It is further investigated whether the proportion of compulsory to non- 
compulsory dealings with government agencies is affected by the characteristics of 
companies and industries. Table 5-3 shows that the larger companies tended to make 
slightly more non-compulsory government contact (Cramer's V = 0.11). About 23% 
of the cases of government contact by the large companies were non-compulsory, 
while 17% and 13% those by the small and medium-sized companies were non- 
compulsory.6
The Thai and joint-venture companies were likely to make more non- 
compulsory contact with the government than the foreign subsidiaries7 (Cramer's V 
= 0.16). About 21% and 19% of the cases of government contact by the Thai and 
joint-venture companies respectively were non-compulsory, whereas all those by the 
foreign subsidiaries were compulsory. The explanation for this absence of non- 
compulsory contact could be that the foreign subsidiaries preferred to keep a low 
profile on government-related activities and only made contact which were required 
by law.
Also from Table 5-3, the companies in industries with a great extent of 
government control made more non-compulsory contact than those in industries with 
a small extent of government control8 (Cramer's V = 0.20) For example, while 
29% of the cases of government contact by the companies which said that there was a 
great extent of government control in their industries were non-compulsory, about 
11% of those by the companies in industries with a small extent of government 
control and 13% of those by the companies with a moderate extent of government 
control were non-compulsory.
Finally, since the classification of compulsory and non-compulsory dealings will play 
an important part in further analysis, their meaning should be carefully noted. In
6For the definition of small, medium-size, and large companies used here, see Chapter 2.
7For the definition of Thai, joint-venture companies, and foreign subsidiaries used here, see 
Chapter 2.
8For the definition of the extent of government control used here, see Chapter 2.
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practice, no dealings with government agencies are purely compulsory or non- 
compulsory. Within a period of twelve months, a company can have both 
compulsory and non-compulsory dealings with one government agency. In addition, 
certain dealings with government agencies can be non-compulsory at the beginning 
but become compulsory later on or vice versa. For example, a company may 
voluntarily apply to receive investment promotion from the Board of Investment, but 
later on, after being granted a promoted status, it may have to ask permission from 
the Board of Investment to import new machines without having to pay customs 
duties. To be more precise, what is meant by "compulsory" and "non-compulsory" 
dealings is "mostly compulsory" and "mostly non-compulsory" (see the wording of 
the question in Table 5-2).
5.3 THE BASIS OF COMPANY CONTACT 
WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
While the interactional approach is neglected by the literature in general, as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 1, the basis of the interaction of firms with government agencies is 
under-researched in particular. While there is extensive literature on the industrial 
roles played by the principal government economic departments, for example the 
British Department of Trade and Industry^ or the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry,10 little empirical research has been attempted into why these
^See, for example, Steven Young, Intervention in the Mixed Economy (London: Croom Helm, 
1974), Chapter 12 The Attempt to Implement ’Disengagement,’ pp.130-146; Edmund D ell, 
Political Responsibility and Industry (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1973); Wyn Grant et al., 
Government and the Chemical Industry: A Comparative Study o f  Britain and West Germany 
(Oxfork: Clarendon Press, 1988), Chapter 4, pp.76-83; and Wyn Grant and David Marsh, The 
Confederation of British Industry (London:Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), pp.97-100 and pp.158- 
159.
10See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (California: Standford 
University Press, 1982), Chapter 5 From the Ministry of Munition to MITI, pp.157-197; OECD, 
The Industrial Policy o f Japan (Paris: OECD, 1972); Philip H. Trezise, ’’Industrial Policy Is Not 
the Major Reason for Japan's Success," The Brooking Review  (Spring, 1983), pp.13-18; Chalmers
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government agencies are contacted by firms. In the case of Thailand, there have also 
been attempts to study the management and role in industry of some important 
government agencies such as the Board of Investment.11 But again, little empirical 
work was carried out to study the basis of the interaction between government 
agencies and companies. In this section, the reasons why companies contact 
government agencies will be discussed.
5.3.1 Reasons for Contact
Companies contact government agencies for several reasons. According to Table 5-4, 
regarding the three most important government agencies, a company contacted them 
to a moderate extent in order to negotiate; to a small extent to complain; to a moderate 
extent to ask for help; to a moderate extent to send information; to a small extent to 
receive information; to a moderate extent to influence; to a moderate extent to maintain 
a relationship; and no contact at all because the government agency was one of its 
customers.
With respect to the ranking of the three government agencies named by each of 
the managers, Table 5-4 indicates that the more important to the company the agency 
was, the more it was contacted or dealt with by the company for the purpose of 
negotiation (Kendall correlation coefficient T = -0.21, p = 0.007); of asking for help 
from the agency (T = -0.14, p = 0.069); of sending information (T = -0.18, p = 
0.022); of attempting to influence the agency's policies (T = -0.11, p = 0.172); and 
of maintaining the relationship with the agency (T = -0.16, p = 0.042).
Johnson, "The Institutional Foundation of Japanese Industrial Policy," in Claude E. Barfield et al., 
editors, The Politics o f Industrial Policy (Washington D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1986), 
pp.187-205; and Christopher Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons 
from  Japan (London: Pinter, 1987), pp.33-39.
11 See Settapom Kusripitak, Samnakngarn Khana Kamakan Songserm Karnlongtoon (The Board of 
Investment) (Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institution Foundation, 1988).
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Chapter 5
In addition, while most of the companies made no complaints at all to the 
government agencies of first importance to them, they complained to the agencies of 
second or third importance to them to a small extent (Kendall correlation coefficient T 
= 0.10, p = 0.226). It is rather surprising that the companies had made so few 
complaints to government agencies since they will certainly have encountered 
problems, for example with bureaucratic red tape. A comment made by one manager 
may help explain it. He said, "I would not like to use the word ’complain.' We did 
contact this agency because of some difficulties or inconvenience in the dealings. We 
suggested or mentioned the problem to them (the civil servants) rather than 
complained about it. So it was rather informal and friendly... People do not like 
hearing complaints, especially Thai civil servants." In addition, a few managers said 
that they did not complain about difficulties because they believed the effort was a 
waste of time or might worsen the problems.
It should be noted from Table 5-4 that in most dealings with government 
agencies, the companies sent more information to the agencies than they received 
from the agencies. One manager explained, "The government sometimes conducts a 
survey, so they send us forms asking for information like sales, production capacity, 
or product stocks. It is compulsory for us to return some of the forms and not others. 
But we normally return all of them if possible in order to gain goodwill... We rarely 
receive information from the government. Sometimes, we try to get information like 
export and import figures. But they are often found to be incomplete, missing, 
unavailable, or out-dated."
Regarding contact for the purpose of maintaining a relationship, one manager 
gave an example. He said, "Human relationships play an important part in working 
with Thai people... When invited, we usually join in the civil servants’ activities like 
sports competitions, religious celebrations, or charities. This sort of participation 
helps develop a good working relationship."
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5.3.2 Different Reasons for Different Types of Contact
Chapter 5
Do the reasons differ in the two types of contact with government agencies? 
According to Table 5-5, there were several differences between the reasons for 
compulsory and non-compulsory dealings. While the companies negotiated with 
government agencies to a moderate extent in both compulsory and non-compulsory 
dealings (Cramer's V = 0.11; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.782), they complained to 
a small extent in compulsory dealings but to no extent in non-compulsory dealings (V 
= 0.24, p = 0.027). The majority of the companies asked for more help from 
government agencies in non-compulsory contact than in compulsory contact (V = 
0.33, p = 0.007). While in general there was no difference between the two types of 
contact in the extent to which information was sent to government agencies (V = 
0.13, p = 0.575), most of the companies received information from agencies in non- 
compulsory contact to a small extent but to no extent in compulsory contact (V = 
0.22, p = 0.159). They tried to influence government agencies in compulsory contact 
more than in non-compulsory contact (V = 0.22, p = 0.505). Finally, there was no 
difference in extent between the two types of dealing for the purpose of establishing 
or maintaining a relationship with the agency (V = 0.06, p = 0.865).
The differences between the reasons for the two types of contact may be 
explained by the earlier discussion that companies usually carry on compulsory 
dealings in order to fulfill normal legal requirements, while non-compulsory dealings 
are carried on with the intention of receiving benefits and incentives from the 
government. Therefore, it should be expected that companies will complain and try to 
influence less, but ask for more help and information from government agencies in 
non-compulsory contact such as applications for investment promotion, than they will 
in compulsory contact such as tax payments or export licence applications. It may 
then be justifiably asked, "Are there not any opportunities, benefits, or incentives for 
firms in such dealings as tax payments or applications for export licences?" Of course 
there are. But the nature of these opportunities is different: while the opportunities in
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non-compulsory contact are advantage-oriented from the standpoint of a company, 
those in compulsory contact are disadvantage-oriented. In other words, they try to 
lose the least in compulsory contact but try to gain the most in non-compulsory 
contact, hence the difference in the reasons for contact.
The variation in reasons for contact by the characteristics of companies and 
industries is next looked at. According to Table 5-6, in compulsory contact, the large 
companies dealt more extensively with government agencies than the small ones for 
negotiating, making complaints, asking for help, receiving information, attempting to 
influence the agency's policy, and maintaining a relationship.
Similarly, compared to the foreign subsidiaries, the Thai companies dealt with 
government agencies to a greater extent for making complaints, asking for help, and 
attempting to influence the agency's policy. However, the foreign subsidiaries 
contacted government agencies to a greater extent than the Thai and joint-venture 
companies for the purpose of receiving information.
Finally, according to Table 5-6, the companies in industries with a greater 
extent of government control contacted government agencies to a greater extent for the 
purpose of asking for help, attempting to influence the agency's policy, and 
maintaining a relationship.
With respect to non-compulsory contact, results similar to those for compulsory 
contact were also found. Table 5-6 shows that, compared to the small companies, the 
large companies contacted government agencies to a greater extent in order to 
negotiate, to ask for help, and to maintain a relationship. Similarly, the Thai 
companies contacted government agencies more often than the joint-venture 
companies in order to negotiate, to ask for help and to maintain a relationship. The 
companies in industries with a greater extent of government control tended to have 
more contact with government agencies for the purpose of asking for help and 
maintaining a relationship.
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Chapter 5
In short, these findings, together with those from Table 5-3 discussed earlier, 
suggest that the large or Thai companies or those in the industries with a great extent 
of government control had more interaction with government agencies for the contact 
reasons studied here than did the small or foreign companies or those in industries 
with a small extent of government control.
5.4 INFLUENCE WITHIN CONTACT
As discussed earlier in the Chapter 1, Murray stated that there are three primary 
dimensions of the description of government and business relations: the congruence 
of values, power balance in the decision-making, and desirability for society12 (see 
Figure 1-1). The power balance in the decision-making or influence dimension has 
been extensively treated by the literature. Marxist thinking suggests that government 
is strongly business-dominated and always takes the side of business,13 while 
pluralist thinking argues that social power is competitive, fragmented and 
diffused.14 It is argued here that such a sweeping macro-description of government 
and business relations as those above, despite its usefulness in enabling one to 
conceive the overall nature of the relations, can often be inaccurate. In fact several 
authors support this view. For example, Islam and Ahmed wrote, "Further empirical 
research is required to investigate the behaviour and perceptions of top level decision­
makers and to study business-government interaction... Business-government 
relations are neither entirely conflictual nor are they completely cooperative."1^  In
12V. V. Murray, editor, Theories o f  Business-Government Relations (Toronto: Trans-Canada 
Press, 1985), pp.3-5.
13David A. Gold et al., "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State: Part I 
and n," Monthly Review (October, 1975 and November, 1975), pp.29-34 and 36-51.
14See, for example, Andrew B. Gollner, "The Dynamics of State Intervention," in Murray, op.cit., 
pp.57-81; and Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). A good 
example of the rise and fall of business influence in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s 
can be seen in David Vogel, "The Power of Business in America: A Re-Appraisal," British Journal 
of Political Sciences, Vol.13 (January, 1983), pp.19-43.
15Nasir Islam and Sadrudin A. Ahmed, Business Influence on Government: A Comparison of
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the comparison of influence within institutional interaction between government and 
business in Thailand, this research relied more on specific empirical evidence by 
directly asking the managers themselves how much influence they thought they had 
over the government agencies contacted and vice versa.
5.4.1 The Extent of Influence
According to Table 5-7, most of the managers said they had no influence or little 
influence on the government agencies contacted by them, but that the agencies had 
moderate or great influence on their companies. The Table also shows that 
government agencies generally had more influence on the companies in non- 
compulsory contact than in compulsory contact (Cramer's V = 0.16). That is, 
government agencies were frequently perceived by the managers as having moderate 
influence on their companies in compulsory contact and great influence in non- 
compulsory contact (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.444). The managers said that 65% 
of the agencies that their companies contacted non-compulsorily and 50% that they 
contacted compulsorily had either a great or a very great influence on their companies.
On the other hand, the managers generally said that their companies had no 
influence on government agencies in compulsory contact and little influence in non- 
compulsory contact (Cramer’s V = 0.39; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.012). The 
managers said that their companies had little or no influence on 92% of the agencies 
in compulsoiy dealings, and on 66% of those in non-compulsory dealings.
Public and Private Sector Perceptions,” Canadian Public Administration, Vol.27, N o .l (Spring, 
1984), p.101.
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Chapter 5
Table 5-7 also shows that comparatively, the companies' influence on 
government agencies in compulsory contact was less than it was in non-compulsory 
contact. This could be because managers have less room for manoeuvre in 
compulsory dealings with the government than in non-compulsory ones. As one 
manager said, "The laws are there. We cannot do anything much." Another added, 
"There is not much need to influence the government on things like paying taxes."
One may ask why there was a considerable gap between the perception of the 
influence of government agencies on the companies and the perception of the 
companies' influence on the agencies. In fact, Islam and Sadrudin also found in their 
survey that Canadian managers felt that their influence on civil servants was rather 
low. They explained that the perception of managers was shaped by their specific 
experience of obtaining favourable outcomes for their individual firms.16 In other 
words, managers may be preoccupied by certain areas of interaction with the 
government in which they are not doing well and overlook the areas where they have 
established some influence. In addition, some managers may have too high an 
expectation of their influence to be satisfied with the outcome of their dealings with 
government agencies. For example, one of the managers interviewed complained, 
"Our company has often been taxed twice by the government We had to talk and deal 
with the authorities of the Revenue Department. We explained the situation and 
showed them the evidence, but it took a lot of our time and resources to settle down 
the matters." The company finally got its tax rebate. This manager would have said he 
had more influence on the agency had he considered only the final outcome, but said 
otherwise because he took into account the amount of time and resources lost during 
the negotiations with the agency.
16Ibid., p.98.
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Chapter 5
5.4.2 The Variation of Influence with Characteristics of Companies 
and Industries
According to Table 5-8, in compulsory contact, government agencies had more 
influence on the small companies than on the large ones. Similarly, the government 
agencies had more influence on the Thai companies than on the joint-venture 
companies and the foreign subsidiaries. And compared to those in industries with a 
small or great extent of government control, the companies in industries with a 
moderate extent of government control tended to be more influenced by government 
agencies.
At the same time, most of the managers of companies of different sizes and 
types said that they had no influence in their compulsory dealings with the 
government. The exceptions were the managers of the companies in industries with a 
great extent of government control, who often said that they had little influence on 
government agencies.
On the other hand, regarding non-compulsory dealings, the managers of 
companies of different sizes, types, and with different extents of government control 
invariably said that government agencies had great influence on their companies but 
conversely, they had little influence on the agencies.
In general, Table 5-8 suggests that there was more variation in the degree of 
influence with the characteristics of companies and industries within compulsory 
contact than within non-compulsory contact. One explanation may be that the nature 
of government dealings of companies of different sizes and types and with different 
degrees of government control may differ more in compulsory contact than in non- 
compulsory contact. For example, in non-compulsory dealings such as applications 
for investment incentives, the government may treat all companies indifferently, 
whereas in compulsory dealings such as routine factory inspections, the government 
may look more carefully at the safety standards of small factories than at those of 
large ones.
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5.5 PERSONNEL LINKS WITHIN CONTACT
The aspect of personnel links within government and business relations has been paid 
considerable attention by the literature. For instance, there is a consensus in the 
literature that in Japan a strong and intimate relationship between members of the state 
bureaucracy and those of the business community has long existed. As Koji Taira and 
Teichi Wada put it:
"Every year, young men of 22 to 25 years old, upon graduation from 
Tokyo University, fan out into the state bureaucracy, big business, and 
other areas of life. Those who have entered the civil service serve out their 
term and become ready to move to private business in their forties and 
fifties. By this time, their former classmates in giant corporations have 
also risen through the ranks and have become seasoned middle-level 
managers, some already contenders for leading positions. At this point the 
two streams of Tokyo University graduates join forces in private 
business. The former bureaucrats among them occasionally return to 
government to participate in policy-making through consultative councils. 
There they encounter high-level civil servants who many years earlier 
were junior civil servants running errands for them when they were in 
leading positions. In this way business also runs government."17
They stated that the business leaders’ and ex-bureaucrats' sons also repeat the above 
cycle and that the exchange of one another's sons and daughters through marital ties 
even further consolidates the privileges of leadership.18
Johnson further claimed that the re-employment of retired government 
bureaucrats on boards of directors also occurred in other countries. He wrote, 
"Although in the United States the preferred insiders are ex-congressmen rather than 
ex-bureaucrats."1^  And in Canada, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, research
17Koji Taira and Teiichi Wada, "Business-Govemment Relations in Modem Japan," in Mark S. 
Mizruchi and Michael Schwartz, editors, Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis o f  
Business (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.265.
18Loc.cit.
^Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (California: Stanford University Press, 1982),
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efforts have also been made to compare the social and educational background of the 
government and business elite.20
Nevertheless, the literature pays little attention to or even fails to recognise the 
personal and personnel links developed during companies' dealings with government 
agencies. In this part these personnel links within interaction will be investigated. 
Compared to the literature's approach of comparing the social and educational 
backgrounds of the elite in business and government, the personnel links discussed 
here are more specific and can be resources of information for managers in improving 
their relations with the government agencies their companies have contacted.
5.5.1 Company Personnel Responsible for Government Contact
In the fieldwork of this research, after a company's consent for an interview, a brief 
discussion was held with a person in the company, usually a senior secretary, to 
designate the person to be interviewed. It was seldom found that a single person or 
division was responsible for the company's contact with government agencies. In 
fact, only one company in the whole sample had a govemment-relations division. In 
most of the companies, each functional division individually and separately handled 
its own contact with the government. However, a company's activities in relation to 
the government were rarely spread equally among various functional divisions; 
usually one or two line-managers or certain chief executive officers were more active 
in dealing with government agencies than others. For instance, one of the sample 
companies which exported its products extensively had the marketing manager 
actively dealing with the government, specifically the Customs Department, whereas 
in another company which concentrated on manufacturing industrial products such as 
car tyres, the production manager was more active than others in the company's
p.70.
20See Isaiah Litvak, "The Ottawa Syndrome: Improving Business/Government Relations," 
Business Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (Summer, 1979); and Islam and Ahmed, op.cit.
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government dealings, in particular with the Industrial Works Department. But this 
was not always the case; in some of the companies the chief executive officers such 
as the managing directors, the presidents or their deputies played a leading role by 
dealing with the government themselves. In a more precise sense, "who is 
responsible" here should mean "who knows best about" the company’s dealings with 
government agencies.
Table 5-9: Company Personnel Responsible for Contact with 
Government Agencies
Frequency
Position (N=41)
Chief Executive Officer 29%
Production or Engineering Manager 5
Marketing or Sales Manager 12
Financial Manager 5
Personnel Manager 29
Others 20
Bearing in mind the above description, Table 5-9 shows that the person 
primarily responsible for government contact in the companies was often the chief 
executive officer or the personnel manager. About 58% of the companies designated 
either the chief executive officer or the personnel manager to be primarily responsible 
for their dealings with the government. However, the percentage distribution shown 
indicates that the government related activities of several of the companies were 
handled in a rather fragmented and ad hoc manner when compared to those of 
companies in advanced industrial countries. For instance, James E Post and others 
surveyed the public affairs function of 1,000 firms in the United States. It was found 
that US companies have recognised the importance of their politicised environment 
and the government and have generally attempted to design and added capabilities to 
organisational mechanisms, public affairs units, to deal with them. According to their 
survey, the function of the public affairs unit tended to revolve around two principal 
areas -government relations and community relations.21
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The above difference may be due to the fact that companies in advanced 
industrial countries such as the United States are much larger and have more 
sophisticated and developed management systems as well as wider and more 
complicated environmental contexts than companies in Thailand. However, as Thai 
companies become larger, more mature and modem, their interests and impact on the 
wider society more evident, and consequently, their involvement with the government 
more extensive, it is likely that a better defined organisational unit within a company 
for dealing with the external factors, especially the government, will be formed. As 
one chief executive interviewed said, "For a big company like ours, what the 
government does and what we do are closely related. In fact, several issues in our 
directors' meetings are concerned with the government and its policies...We are 
thinking of making somebody particularly responsible for these (the company's 
government-related activities)." Another manager of a big business group added, "We 
can no longer look at firms as purely profit-making organisations. The public are 
watching us. Our own workers are also aware of what the management are doing... 
We have to contribute something to the society."
5.5.2 Contact Governm ent Officials
The characteristics of the government officials regularly or primarily contacted by the 
companies are discussed next. Table 5-10 shows that in both compulsory and non- 
compulsory dealings, a company normally communicated with an average of 5 
contact officials when dealing with a government agency (T-test, p = 0.994).
^tjames E. Post et al., "The Public Affairs Function in American Corporations: Development and 
Relations with Corporate Planning," Long Range Planning, Vol.15, No. 2 (1982), pp. 13-14.
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Chapter 5
According to the Table, the large or Thai companies or those in industries with a 
great extent of government control had a slightly higher number of contact officials in 
their dealing with a government agency than the small or joint-venture or foreign 
companies or those in industries with a small extent of government control. This may 
be because the former had greater scope and more dealings with the government than 
the latter.
Table: 5-11: Job-Level of Contact Officials by Type of Contact
Q uestion: (Continuing from the previous question)
a) What was the highest ioh-level o f these contact persons?
h) What was the lowest ioh-level o f these contact persons?
1 = Senior Level (such as the Director o f Division)
2 = Middle Level (such as the Head o f Section )
3 = Ordinary Level (such as members o f the administrative staff, 
clerks, etc.)
Type of Contact
H ighest Compulsory Non-Compulsory
Job-L evel Rating Value (N=100) (N=21)
Senior Level 1 55 % 67 %
Middle Level 2 34 29
Ordinary Level 3 11 5
Median 1 1
Cramer’s V 0.10
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.08
p (two-tailed) 0.282
Type of Contact
Low est Compulsory Non-Compulsory
Job-L evel Rating Value (N=100) (N=21)
Senior Level 1 5 % 19 %
Middle Level 2 15 19
Ordinary Level 3 80 62
Median 3 3
Cramer's V 0.21
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.95
p (two-tailed) 0.051
Table 5-11 shows that in both compulsory and non-compulsory dealings, the 
highest rank of these contact officials can be as high as senior level such as director of
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a division (Cramer’s V = 0.10; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.282). About 55% of the 
cases of compulsory contact and 67% of the cases of non-compulsory contact were 
made with the contact officials whose highest rank was senior level.
Table 5-11 also shows that in both types of contact, the lowest rank of the 
contact officials could be ordinary level such as members of administrative staff or 
clerk (Cramer's V = 0.21; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.051). About 80% of the cases 
of compulsory contact and 62% of the cases of non-compulsory contact were made 
with the the contact officials whose lowest rank was ordinary level.
In short, in its contact with a government agency, whether compulsory or non- 
compulsory by law, a company normally communicates with about five contact 
officials whose positions can range from director of a division to member of 
administrative staff or clerk.
With respect to the characteristics of companies and industries, it was found 
from Table 5-12 that in compulsory contact, the large or Thai companies or those in 
industries with a great extent of government control normally communicated with 
more senior government officials than the small or foreign companies or those in 
industries with a small extent of government control. However, the companies, 
regardless of size, origin or extent of government control were likely to communicate 
equally with ordinary-level officials such as members of the administrative staff or 
clerks.
According to Table 5-12, a similar pattern of personnel links was also found in 
non-compulsory dealings.While the level of the government officials regularly or 
primarily contacted by the large companies ranged from senior level to middle level 
such as head of a section, the level of those contacted by the small or medium-sized 
companies ranged from middle level to ordinary level. And whereas the highest level 
of the contact officials of the Thai companies was frequently senior level, that of the 
contact officials of the joint-venture companies was middle level.
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The different personnel links could be due to the different nature of the 
government dealings of companies with various extents of government control and 
with different characteristics. Referring to earlier discussion (see Table 5-6), it was 
found that during their interaction with a government agency, the large or Thai 
companies or those in industries with a great extent of government control were more 
often engaged in such activities as negotiation, asking for help, attempting to 
influence, or maintaining a relationship than the small or foreign companies, or those 
in industries with a small extent of government control.
5.5.3 The Helpfulness of Contact Officials
After identifying the number of contact officials and their positions, the managers 
were then asked how helpful these officials were.
Table: 5-13: The Helpfulness of Contact Officials by Type of Contact
Question: (Continuing from the previous question)
How helpful were these contact persons in your dealings with this 
agency?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Not At All 2 = Slightly Helpful
3 = Helpful 4 = Very Helpful
5 = Extremely Helpful
Type of Contact
Compulsory Non-Compulsory
Helpfulness Rating Value (N=100) (N=21)
Not At AH 1 3 % 0 %
Slightly Helpful 2 18 5
Helpful 3 57 43
Very Helpful 4 20 48
Extremely Helpful 5 2 5
Median 3 4
Cramer’s V 0.27
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.92
p (two-tailed) 0.004
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Table 5-13 shows that they were more helpful in non-compulsory dealings than 
in compulsory ones (Cramer's V = 0.27; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.004). The 
contact officials were said by the managers to be very or extremely helpful in 53% of 
the cases of non-compulsory contact, whereas they were said to be so in 22% of the 
cases of compulsory contact.
One of the explanations for this difference could be that in compulsory contact, 
such as regular applications for factory operation licences or factory expansion 
permission or product standards testing, the legal restrictions make a company's 
dealings with government agencies rather rigid or less flexible than those in non- 
compulsory contact, such as asking for information or joining in the government's 
seasonal crop inspection. In other words, in compulsory contact, even though 
government officials want to be helpful, they cannot be so because of legal 
restrictions. One manager gave an example of his company's contact with the 
Revenue Department. He said, "In normal tax payment, they (the contact government 
officials) cannot be of much help. There are certain procedures we have to follow... 
They can be helpful when it is something different from the regular tax payment. For 
instance, our company is receiving investment promotion privileges from the 
government, which means that we can claim some the taxes back. The process (of 
claiming) can take as long as a month or a year. They can be helpful in speeding up 
the tax rebate." In addition, in compulsory dealings, it may be that companies do not 
expect the contact officials to be as helpful as in non-compulsory ones because in the 
former, companies only want to fulfill the necessary legal requirements, whereas in 
the latter, they deal with government agencies with the aim of getting some form of 
benefit.
Table 5-14 further confirms the above explanation. It indicates that the contact 
official were equally helpful to most of the companies in compulsory dealings, 
regardless of size, origin or extent of government control. However, in non- 
compulsory dealings, the large or Thai companies were frequently able to elicit more
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help from the contact officials than the small or joint-venture companies. And the 
contact officials were more helpful to the companies in industries with a small extent 
of government control than to those in industries with a great extent of government 
control.
5.5.4 Company Acquaintance with Contact Officials
Finally, in this section the issue of how well acquainted the managers or the 
companies were with the contact officials is discussed. According to Table 5-15, 
there was a similar level of acquaintance with the contact officials in both compulsory 
and non-compulsory dealings (Cramer's V = 0.14).
Table 5-15: Acquaintance with Contact Officials by Type of Contact
Q uestion: (Continuing from the previous question)
How well acquainted were vou personally or vour company with 
these contact persons?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Not At All 2 -  Slightly Acquainted 
3 = Moderately Acquainted 4 = Well Acquainted 
5 = Very Well Acquainted
Type of Contact
Acquaintance
Compulsory Non-Compulsory 
Rating Value (N=100) (N=21)
Not At All 1 17%  5 %  
Slightly Acquainted 2 21 24 
Moderately Acquainted 3 34 33 
Well Acquainted 4 25 33 
Very Well Acquainted 5 3 5
Median 3 3 
Cramer's V 0.14 
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.21
p (two-tailed) 0.225
Generally, in both types of dealings, the managers said that they or their 
companies were moderately acquainted with the government official with whom they 
normally communicated when dealing with the agency (Mann-Whitney U test, p =
Chapter 5
0.225). In 34% of the cases of compulsory contact and 30% of the cases of non- 
compulsory contact, the managers said they or their companies were moderately 
acquainted with the contact officials.
It is interesting to note the variety of personal acquaintance described by the 
managers. One manager said, "After years of contact, we have become acquainted 
with each other. In fact, I know some of them (the civil servants) quite well. During 
weekends, we sometimes go and play golf together." Another manager said, "I know 
them well because we used to study in the same class at university." One personnel 
manager who used to work in the Labour Department explained, "I am more 
acquainted with the civil servants in the (Labour) Department because several of my 
colleagues are still working there. Sometimes I am invited to lecture or organise a 
seminar or training for the Department." Thus, the managers' or the companies' 
acquaintance with the contact officials can be due to connections other than their 
regular dealings, such as having attended the same university or being former 
colleagues.
Table 5-16 suggests that almost regardless of size, origin or the extent of 
government control in the industry, most of the companies were moderately 
acquainted with the contact officials. However, in compulsory dealings, the small 
companies were slightly acquainted with the contact officials, while in non- 
compulsory dealings, the joint-venture companies were slightly acquainted with the 
contact officials.
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5.5.5 The Relationship between the Helpfulness of Contact Officials 
and Company Acquaintance with Contact Officials
While the literature on the personnel links aspect of government and business 
relations stresses the sharing or lack of common social and educational backgrounds 
of personnel in government and business as the factors shaping the characteristics of 
their interaction, it offers little empirical evidence concerning the connection between 
acquaintance with government officials and their helpfulness.22 Why do companies 
participate in charity events organised by government departments? Or why do some 
companies, especially the larger ones, appear to be willing to pay good salaries to 
attract former senior bureaucrats onto their board of directors? To a certain extent, it is 
widely presumed that it is because managers believe that some form of personal 
acquaintance with government officials will be helpful to their dealings with 
government agencies.
Table 5-17: Correlation between Acquaintance with Contact Officials 
and the Helpfulness of Contact Officials
Type of Contact
Compulsory Non-Compulsory
((N=100) (N=21)
Kendall Correlation
Coefficient T 0.66 0.72
Significance (two-tailed) 0.000 0.000
The figures in Table 5-17 support the above assumption. According to the 
Table, the more acquainted the managers or the companies were with the government 
officials regularly or primarily contacted, the more helpful the contact officials were 
said to be in their dealings with the agency. And this applied in both compulsory
22See, for example, Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968), pp. 12-26.
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(Kendall correlation coefficient T = 0.66, p = 0.000) and non-compulsory dealings 
(T = 0.72, p = 0.000). One of the managers interviewed made this comment, "The 
civil servants are ordinary people like you and me. They are likely to help the persons 
they know better than others. Moreover, certain values in Thai culture such as paying 
respect to older or more senior people encourages such a tendency. For instance, 
most bureaucrats still have respect for their former bosses, who may now be working 
in private companies."
5.6 PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN CONTACT
This section will examine the pattern of communication in the interaction between 
companies and government agencies, an area largely neglected by the literature. What 
are the methods and the frequency of company communication with government 
agencies? Do some methods of communication dominate in the interaction, compared 
to the others, or they are equally used? Are the patterns of communication different 
between compulsory and non-compulsory dealings? And who initiates the 
communication? The answers to these questions will strengthen the literature on the 
mechanism-of-interaction school discussed earlier in Chapter l.23 in particular, they 
address the question: How do business and government interact?
5.6.1 Frequency and M ethods of Communication
According to Table 5-18, the companies, on average, generally contacted a 
government agency once a month. Specifically, on average, they contacted a 
government agency by letter or report about 1-2 times a year, by telephone once every 
three months, and by face-to-face meeting about monthly. In other words, the 
companies relied more on face-to-face meetings in their communication with a
23Also see, Charles J. McMillan and Victor V. Murray, "Strategically Managing Public Affairs: 
Lessons From the Analysis o f Business-Govemment Relations," Business Quarterly, Vol.48, No.2 
(1983), p.97.
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government agency than on other methods such as telephone calls or letters.
Table 5-18: Frequency and M ethods of Communication
Q uestion : a) During the past 12 months, how frequently has your company
communicated or been in contact with this agency? 
b) Specifically, how frequently did your company communicate 
with this agency through each o f the following ways during the 
past 12 months?
1) Telephone calls
2) Letters, reports, etc.
3) Face-to-face meetings
Use this scale for your answer.
0 = No Contact 1 = 1-2 Times
2 = Once Every 3 Months 3 = About Monthly
4 = About Every 2-3 Weeks 5 = About Weekly
6 = About Daily 7 = Many Times Daily
General Specific Method
Frequency of Rating Letter Phone Meeting
Communication Value (N=123) (N=123) (N=123) (N=123)
No Contact 0 0 % 11 % 18 % 3 %
1-2 Times 1 8 44 32 14
Once Every 3 Months 2 26 22 20 29
About Monthly 3 36 20 18 32
About Every 2-3 Weeks 4 12 2 7 11
About Weekly 5 12 1 5 8
About Daily 6 6 0 0 4
Many Times Daily 7 0 0 0 0
Median 3 1 2 3
Some managers' comments made during the interviews may help to explain 
why face-to-face meetings were used more extensively than other methods in their 
companies’ dealing with government agencies. Several managers similarly and 
consistently indicated that they preferred to communicate through meetings than 
through telephone calls or letters. One manager explained, "Letters make things even 
more bureaucratic. They are also slow and too formal. Direct talking is the most 
effective way of dealing with government agencies... Usually, a series of dealings 
with a government agency begins with letters. This followed by telephone calls or 
meetings." Another said, "Communicating through letters or talking on a telephone
187
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can cause misunderstanding. There are several matters during contact which need to 
be explained, discussed, and resolved. You cannot have a discussion on a letter or 
give a good explanation on a telephone. You have to go to see them (the civil 
servants) and talk... In a face-to-face meeting, communication is more interactive and 
matters can be explained right away."
In addition, the predominance of face-to face meetings as a method used in 
communication may be due to the nature of the companies' dealings with government 
agencies. As one manager explained, "Contact with the government for paying taxes 
or export documentation often involves filling in forms. If every thing is okay, the 
contact ends there. But usually there are problems. And this brings us to the stage of 
negotiating with or trying to influence government officials, which can only be 
efficiently done by meeting and talking directly with them."
However, the finding that the companies generally contacted a government 
agency once a month, or that they communicated with a government agency by letter 
about 1-2 times a year, should not be taken literally. For example, one manager said, 
"The frequency of our contact with government agencies varies greatly. In normal 
circumstances, we may not have any contact at all. But when something unusual like 
a shortage of component parts happens, we may be dealing almost every day with the 
government." Thus, when interpreting the finding, it should be borne in mind that the 
answers concerning the contact frequency given by the managers represent averages 
over 12 months; the actual frequency of dealing may vary greatly from one period to 
another, and fluctuate within the period itself.
It should also be noted that the total of the average frequencies (medians in this 
case) of the three specific methods of communication is higher than the average 
frequency of contact in general (see Table 5-18). This is because the managers’ 
approximate division of the general frequency of contact into three sub-frequencies, 
one for each specific method of communication, initially involves some small errors, 
and consequently generates the result described above.
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5.6.2 Communication within Different Types of Contact
The analysis further asks whether compulsory and non-compulsory dealings involve 
different frequencies and methods of communication. Table 5-19 shows that the two 
types of dealings differed slightly in frequency and method of communication. 
Generally, on average, the companies made contact with a government agency once a 
month in both compulsory and non-compulsory dealings (Cramer's V = 0.19; Mann- 
Whitney U test, p = 0.440). However, specifically, while meeting about monthly 
with the relevant government officials in both compulsory and non-compulsory 
dealings (V = 0.26, p = 0.931), the companies communicated more frequently with a 
government agency by letter and telephone in non-compulsory contact than in 
compulsory contact (telephone: V = 0.19, p = 0.414; and letters: V = 0.17, p = 
0.921)
The differences described above may, again, be explained by the different 
characteristics of compulsory and non-compulsory dealings (see Table 5-5). 
Compared to non-compulsory contact, the companies were engaged to a greater 
extent in compulsory contact in such activities as making complaints or attempting to 
gain influence, hence their greater reliance on or preference for face-to-face meetings. 
On the other hand, in non-compulsory contact such as asking for information, help or 
advice from government agencies, letters or telephone calls can be complementary to 
face-to-face meetings.
Regarding the variation in contact frequency and methods of communication 
with the characteristics of companies and industries, it was found from Table 5-20 
that in general, most of the companies, regardless of size, origin or extent of 
government control dealt with a government agency once a month on average in both 
types of contact.
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However, with regard to specific methods of communication, there was a 
considerable variation in the frequency of contact made by the companies of different 
characteristics. That is, in compulsory contact, the small or foreign companies dealt 
more frequently with government agencies through face-to-face meetings than the 
large or Thai companies; and the companies in industries with a moderate extent of 
government control communicated less through face-to-face meetings than those in 
industries with a small or great extent of government control. In non-compulsory 
contact, the small companies communicated more frequently with government 
agencies by letter than the large companies; the Thai companies dealt more frequently 
by letter or telephone than the joint-venture companies; and while the companies in 
industries with a greater extent of government control used letters, telephone calls and 
face-to-face meetings equally in their dealings with government agencies, those in 
industries with a lesser extent of government control relied more on face-to-face 
meetings than on letters or telephone calls.
Table 5-21: The Initiation of Contact by Type of Contact
Q uestion: (Continuing from the previous question)
In general, what percentage of all this contact and communication 
with this agency was initiated by Deovle in vour company during 
the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = 0-20 % 2 = 21-40 %
3 = 41-60 % 4 = 61-80 %
5 = 81-100 %
Type of Contact
Company-Initiated Compulsory Non-Compulsory
Contact Rating Value (N=100) (N=23)
0-20 % 1 0 % 9 %
21-40 % 2 3 9
41-60 % 3 8 4
61-80 % 4 20 26
81-100% 5 69 52
Median 5 5
Cramer’s V 0.31
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -1.76
p (two-tailed) 0.078
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5.6.3 The Initiation of Contact and Communication
Finally, the managers were asked who initiated the contact and communications. 
According to Table 5-21, most contact and communications with government 
agencies were initiated by the companies. However, government agencies initiated 
slightly more contact and communications in non-compulsory dealings than in 
compulsory dealings (Cramer's V = 0.31; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.078). While 
18% of the cases of non-compulsory contact were in the range of 0-40% company- 
initiated contact, only 3% of the cases of compulsory contact were in the same range.
The above result should be expected since in compulsory contact, companies 
are required by law to deal with government agencies, whereas in non-compulsory 
contact, government agencies may initiate the contact if for example, they want 
information or cooperation from a company. For instance, one manager said, "Most 
of the time, it is our company who contacts government agencies. Government 
agencies will only contact us when they need help or cooperation from us, which is a 
rather rare situation."
5.7 SATISFACTION WITHIN CONTACT
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the broad hypotheses that emerged from the 
business policy approach in the business-govemment relationship literature is that 
both business and government will more satisfied with the outcome of their 
interaction if each is more knowledgeable about the motives, objectives and likely 
behaviour of the other party.24 To explore this hypothesis in the case of the 
institutional interaction between the government and business in Thailand, the 
research asked the managers about their knowledge of the government agencies they 
had contacted and their satisfaction or difficulty in dealing with the agencies. Later,
24Steven Globerman and Richard Schwindt, "Toward a Synthesis and Test o f Hypotheses," in 
Murray, op.cit., p.245.
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the research will examine whether there is any connection between the managers' 
knowledge of the agencies and their satisfaction with the dealings. However, when 
interpreting the results here, it should be borne in mind that the manager interviewed 
in each company may not be the only person responsible for the company’s dealings 
with the government; several others such as middle-level managers can also be 
involved. While it cannot be denied that the experience and knowledge of government 
agencies of persons in the company other than the manager interviewed are also 
important, it is not practical to assess the knowledge and satisfaction of every person 
involved in a company's contact with the government.
5.7.1 Knowledge of G overnm ent Agencies
According to Table 5-22, most of the managers interviewed were well informed about 
the government agencies they contacted. In particular, in both compulsory and non- 
compulsory dealings, the majority of the managers were well informed about the 
agencies' objectives or policies (Cramer's V = 0.34; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 
0.411), moderately informed about their internal operations, activities or work 
processes (V = 0.24; p = 0.852), and internal organisation or structure (V = 0.36; p = 
0.589). The result suggests that even though the managers were equally 
knowledgeable about the government agencies in both types of contact, they knew 
more about the agencies' objectives than about their internal operation and 
organisation. For example, one manager said, "We know about the general objectives 
of most government agencies... Unless we have to deal extensively with a particular 
government agency, its internal operation and organisation are rather irrelevant to us."
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Chapter 5
With respect to the characteristics of the companies and industries, Table 5-23 
shows that, in compulsory contact, the large companies knew about the objectives, 
internal operations and organisation of the government agencies they had contacted 
better than did the small companies.The Thai and foreign companies knew more 
about the agencies' objectives than did the joint-venture companies. And the 
managers of the companies with a great extent of government control were slightly 
more knowledgeable about the government agencies they contacted than did those of 
the companies with a small extent of government control.
Table 5-23 also suggests that, in non-compulsory contact, the managers of the 
large companies knew more about the internal organisation of the government 
agencies they had contacted than did those of the small companies.
The different levels of the managers' knowledge may be explained by the 
different nature of the contact of companies with different characteristics. As 
discussed earlier (see Table 5-6), the larger or Thai companies or those in industries 
with a greater extent of government control contacted government agencies for the 
purposes of negotiating, gaining influence or asking for help more than the other 
types of company. Therefore, they should be expected to know more about the 
agencies with which they dealt than did the others.
5.7.2 Difficulty and Satisfaction
The managers were finally asked how much difficulty or satisfaction they had in their 
dealings with the agencies. According to Table 5-24, overall, the managers said they 
had little difficulty and were satisfied with the relationship between their companies 
and the government agencies they had contacted. Specifically, however, the managers 
experienced more difficulty in compulsory contact than in non-compulsory contact 
(Cramer's V = 0.32). That is, while most of the managers experienced little difficulty 
in compulsory contact, they had no difficulty at all in non-compulsory contact (Mann-
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Whitney U test, p = 0.030). Whereas the managers said they had no difficulty in 31% 
of the cases of compulsory contact, they said so in 65% of the cases of non- 
compulsory contact.
Table: 5-24: Difficulty and Satisfaction within Contact by Type of 
Contact
Q uestion : a) Overall, how much difficulty did you experience in your contact
with this agency during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = No Difficulty 2 = little Difficulty
3 = Moderate Difficulty 4 = Great Difficulty
5 = Very Great Difficulty
b) How satisfied were you with the relationship between your 
company and this agency during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 -  Not At All 2 = Slightly Satisfied
3 = Moderately Satisfied 4 = Very Satisfied
5 = Extremely Satisfied
Type of Contact
D ifficulty Rating Value
Compulsory
(N=100)
Non-Compulsory
(N=23)
No Difficulty 
Little Difficulty 
Moderate Difficulty 
Great Difficulty 
Very Great Difficulty
1
2
3
4
5
31 %
32 
22 
10
5
65 % 
4 
22 
9 
0
Median 2 1
Cramer’s V 0.32
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.17
p (two-tailed) 0.030
Type of Contact
Compulsory Non-Compulsory
S atisfaction Rating Value (N=100) (N=23)
Not At All 1 4 % 0 %
Slightly Satisfied 2 17 0
Satisfied 3 42 35
Very Satisfied 4 33 61
Extremely Satisfied 5 4 4
Median 3 4
Cramer's V 0.27
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.75
p (two-tailed) 0.006
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Also according to Table 5-24, the managers were more satisfied with the 
relationship between their companies and government agencies in non-compulsory 
contact than in compulsory contact (Cramer’s V = 0.27). That is, while most of the 
managers said that they were satisfied with the relationship in compulsoiy contact, 
they were very satisfied in non-compulsory contact (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 
0.006). Whereas the managers were very satisfied with the relationship in 61% of the 
cases of non-compulsory contact, they were so in only 33% of the cases of 
compulsory contact.
In short, the managers experienced less difficulty and had more satisfaction in 
non-compulsory than in compulsory interaction with the government. One of the 
explanations could be that whereas non-compulsory contact has more to do with 
matters such as asking for advice or recommendations and receiving information, 
compulsory contact is preoccupied with other activities such as making complaints or 
trying to influence the agencies (see Table 5-5).Moreover, as mentioned earlier, from 
the perspective of a company, while compulsory contact is disadvantage-oriented, 
non-compulsory contact is advantage-oriented. For instance, a company is likely to 
have relatively more difficulty in compulsory dealings such as getting goods through 
customs or seeking government permission to install a new piping system in a 
factory, than in non-compulsory dealings such as asking for information or joining a 
government trade mission abroad. In addition, the environment of non-compulsory 
contact like application for export credit, is likely to be more hospitable than that of 
compulsory contact like product standards testing.
With respect to the characteristics of companies and industries, Table 5-25 
suggests that regardless of size and origin or extent of government control of the 
industry, the companies experienced a similar extent of difficulty and satisfaction in 
their contact, whether compulsory or non-compulsory, with government agencies.
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Chapter 5
5.7.3 C orrelation  between Knowledge of G overnm ent Agencies and 
Satisfaction within Contact
The figures in Table 5-26 support the general hypothesis of the literature. According 
to the Table, the more knowledgeable the managers were about the government 
agencies they contacted, the less difficulty and more satisfaction they were likely to 
have in their dealing with the agencies. In addition, the Table shows that the above 
stated association was stronger in compulsory dealings than in non-compulsory 
dealings.
Table 5-26: Correlation between Knowledge of Governm ent
Agencies and Difficulty and Satisfaction within Contact
Compulsory Contact (N =100)
Difficulty Satisfaction
Knowledge 
of the Agency
Kendall Corr. Sig. 
Coeff. T (two-tailed)
Kendall Corr. 
Coeff. T
Sig.
(two-tailed)
Objective
Operation
Structure
-0.28 0.002 
-0.30 0.001 
-0.36 0.000
0.27
0.40
0.34
0.002
0.000
0.000
Non-Compulsory Contact (N =23)
Difficulty Satisfaction
Knowledge Kendall Corr. Sig. Kendall Corr. Sig.
of the Agency Coeff. T (two-tailed) Coeff. T (two-tailed)
Objective 0.31 0.110 0.30 0.133
Operation 0.00 0.000 0.39 0.050
Structure 0.14 0.481 0.10 0.619
Table 5-26 indicates that, in compulsory contact, a manager had less difficulty 
in dealing with a government agency if he knew more about the agency’s objectives 
or policies (Kendall correlation coefficient T = -0.28, p = 0.002), internal operations 
or activities (T = -0.30, p = 0.001), and internal structure or organisation (T = -0.36, 
p = 0.000). Similarly, a manager was more satisfied with his company's relationship
2 0 1
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with a government agency if he was better informed about the agency's objectives or 
policies (T = 0.27, p = 0.002), internal operations or activities (T = 0.40, p = 0.000), 
and internal structure or organisation (T = 0.34, p = 0.000).
In non-compulsory contact, the association between a manager’s knowledge of 
a government agency and his experience of difficulty and satisfaction was relatively 
less strong. While the manager who knew more about the objectives or policies of a 
government agency experienced less difficulty in his contact with it (Kendall 
correlation coefficient T = -0.31, p = 0.110), there was little association between his 
experience of difficulty and his knowledge of the agency's internal operations or 
activities (T = 0.00, p = 0.000), and internal structure or organisation (T = 0.14, p = 
0.481). Similarly, a manager was more satisfied with the relationship between his 
company and a government agency if he was better informed about its objectives or 
policies (Kendall correlation coefficient T = 0.30, p = 0.133) and internal operations 
or activities (T = 0.39, p = 0.050). However, there was only a weak association 
between a manager's satisfaction of the relationship with the agency and his 
knowledge of the agency’s internal structure or organisation (T = 0.10, p = 0.619).
The finding that the association between a manager's knowledge of a 
government agency and his experience of difficulty or satisfaction in the interaction 
with it was stronger in the compulsory dealings than in the non-compulsory dealings, 
could be because in non-compulsory contact, managers are often guaranteed a 
positive outcome, whereas in compulsory contact, they have to work for satisfactory 
results. For example, some of the companies interviewed which were trying to claim 
money back from the Revenue Department on the basis that they had been taxed 
twice, had to spend a considerable amount of effort and time to obtain their rebates; it 
was likely that the companies which had more information about the organisation or 
the decision-makers of the Department would be more successful in the task. On the 
other hand, in non-compulsory dealings such as asking the Fisheries Department for 
the forecast amount of fish likely to be caught next year, most companies would 
usually be satisfied to get the information wanted, even though some companies may
2 0 2
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have known more about the Department better than others.
In addition, the managers who knew more about a government agency's 
objectives, internal activities or organisation may have better understood its 
capabilities as well as its limitations. Thus, they may have been satisfied with contact 
outcomes which would have otherwise appeared less than satisfactory to those who 
were not aware of the agency's limitations. For example, one manager said, "Overall 
dealings made with government agencies are slow and time-consuming... But we 
understand that that's the way bureaucracy is."
5.7.4 C orre la tion  between Personnel L inks and Satisfaction within 
C ontact
Referring to the personnel links in the companies' contact with government agencies 
discussed earlier, the research further examines whether there is any association 
between them and the difficulty or satisfactory experienced by the managers.
Table 5-27: Correlation between Acquaintance with Contact
Officials and Difficulty and Satisfaction within Contact
Compulsory Contact (N =100)
Difficulty Satisfaction
Personnel
Link
Kendall Corr. Sig. 
Coeff. T (two-tailed)
Kendall Corr. 
Coeff. T
Sig.
(two-tailed)
Number
Acquaintance
-0.06 0.469 
-0.35 0.000
0.15
0.42
0.070
0.000
Non-Compulsory Contact (N =23)
Difficulty Satisfaction
Personnel Kendall Corr. Sig. Kendall Corr. Sig.
Link Coeff. T (two-tailed) Coeff. T (two-tailed)
Number -0.10 0.567 0.36 0.048
Acquaintance 0.10 0.607 0.18 0.375
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According to Table 5-27, personal acquaintance helped reduce difficulty and 
improved satisfaction in contact with government agencies. The companies' or the 
managers' acquaintance with the contact officials helped decrease difficulty (Kendall 
correlation coefficient T = -0.35, p = 0.000) and increase satisfaction within 
compulsory contact (T = 0.42, p = 0.000), although the number of contact 
government officials had little significance in the relationship. However, in non- 
compulsory contact, there was a rather weak association between the personnel links 
and the difficulty and satisfaction experienced by the managers.
The finding that personal acquaintance played a more important role in 
compulsory contact than in non-compulsory contact may be explained by reasons 
similar to those in the association between the managers' knowledge of the agencies 
and their experience of difficulty or satisfaction within contact. That is, greater 
personal acquaintance brings more help from contact government officials. While the 
helpfulness of government officials can make managers more satisfied with the 
outcome of non-compulsory dealings, it may account for the difference between 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory results in compulsory ones.
5.8 SUMMARY
In this chapter, the interactional approach has strengthened several weaknesses of the 
existing literature on the business-govemment relationship. In particular, the findings 
showed that government and business relations are by no mean homogeneous but 
varied. The interactional approach has demonstrated that the nature of the relations 
depends on, among other things, the types of contact, such as compulsory and non- 
compulsory dealings, as well as on the characteristics of the companies involved in 
the relations, such as size, origin, and the extent of government control in the 
industry. The analysis suggested that from the standpoint of a company, non- 
compulsory dealings with government agencies are advantage-oriented, while 
compulsory dealings are disadvantage-oriented. That is, a company will try to gain
204
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the most in non-compulsory contact but to lose the least in compulsory contact. This 
finding generally forms the underlying explanation for other differences in the two 
types of contact: the basis of contact, influence and patterns of communication within 
contact, and satisfaction with the contact relationship. In addition, the size and origin 
of a company and the extent of government control in its industry also play an 
important part in shaping the relationship. Generally, large or Thai companies or 
those in industries with a great extent of government control have more extensive, 
varied and superior connections with government agencies than small or foreign 
companies or those in industries with a small extent of government control in terms of 
the basis of contact, influence, and personal and personnel links.
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CHAPTER 6 
POLICY INTERACTION 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the previous chapter which analysed institutional interaction between 
government and business, this chapter will examine policy interaction between the 
two sides. It will concentrate on influence and means of influence within the 
interpenetration between government economic policy and business policy. In 
particular, this chapter will identify the basis of the effort of business to influence 
government economic policy. How are current government economic policies 
affecting manufacturing companies in Thailand? And what are the criteria they use in 
distinguishing whether or not a government economic policy is in their interests? The 
chapter will also look at how companies react to a policy which they find is not in 
their favour (the ex post facto mode of policy interaction). The comparison of the 
effort to influence a government economic policy when it affects a company as an 
individual and when it affects the industry as whole will form the basis of the 
analysis. In addition, as in the previous chapter, comparisons of policy interaction 
between the government and companies of different characteristics -size and origin 
and the extent of government control in the industry- are also made.
6.2 THE BASIS OF BUSINESS EFFORTS 
TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY
As mentioned in Chapter 1, corporate political strategy is one of the major current
207
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research areas in government and business relations. In surveying the American 
literature on business and politics, Epstein classified modem writing on the topic into 
five categories: first, efforts to model the relationship of firms with the political order; 
second, studies of the effects of external political influences upon business political 
behaviour; third, examinations of intra-corporate relationships in political terms; 
fourth, examinations of the political ideologies of the American business elite; and 
fifth, studies of business involvement in the electoral political process.1 Often, the 
literature seems to take for granted the reasons for firms' efforts to influence public 
policy, in the analysis of the political behaviour and effectiveness of business and its 
consequent impact.2 For instance, trying to relate the economic and industrial 
structure to the political performance of firms, Salamon and Siegfried have paid little 
attention to the different bases of the political activities of firms of different 
characteristics.3 This research does not deny that such variables as firm size, 
industry size, market concentration within the industry, profit rates, or the degree of 
geographical dispersion play an important part in the model of business political 
behaviour. On the contrary, while recognizing these variables, the research wishes to 
highlight the non-homogeneous influence of the government on various business 
decisions within a company as well as among companies, which should be taken into 
account in the explanation of firms' government-related activities. Even though recent 
writers of industrial policy like Zukin stressed the role of government intervention as 
shown in Figure 6-1, she did not bring out the gradient of the impact of government 
economic policy on various business decisions. To strengthen this weakness in the
1 Edwin M Epstein, "Business Political Activity: Research Approach and Analytical Issues," in Lee 
E. Preston, editor, Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy, Vol.2 (Greenwich: JAI 
Press, 1980), p.6.
2See, for example, J. J. Pincus, "Pressure Groups and Patterns o f Tariffs," Journal o f  Political 
Economy, Vol.83, No.4 (1975), pp.457-778; Russel Pittman, "Market Structure and Campaign 
Contribution," Public Choice, Vol.31 (Fall, 1977), pp.37-58; and David B. Yoffie, "How an 
Industry Build Political Advantage," Havard Business Review  (May-June, 1988), pp.82-89.
3Lester M. Salamon and John J. Siegfried, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact 
o f Industry Structure on Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Vol.71, No.3 (1977), 
pp.1026-1043.
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literature, this research will investigate government influence on company decisions, 
which forms the basis of the effort of business to influence government economic 
policy.
Figure 6-1: The Government's Central Role in Business Strategy
Old Industries
1
Lowering Production Costs
- Reduce output 
(Authorise plant shutdowns, 
negotiate output quotas)
- Modernise
(Award capital grants and 
tax credits)
- Reorganise 
(Authorise mergers and 
divestitures)
- Finance R & D (Award 
defence contracts)
- Train and retrain work force 
(Local school boards put 
computers in school, states 
create advanced technology 
centers)
I
Securing Product Markets
- Restrict imports
- Subsidise exports
- Require local content
- Approve joint production 
and joint R & D
- Protect foreign copyrights
- Select for military or other 
agency procurement
Raising Investment Capital
- Use fiscal policy
(Tax credits, tax shelters)
- Use financial policy 
(Loans, loan guarantees)
- Broaden equity participation 
(State ownership, community 
ownership, worker ownership)
t
New Industries
Source: From Sharon Zukin, "Industrial Policy as Post-Keynesian Politics:
Basic Assumptions in the United States and France," in her 
Industrial Policy: Business and Politics in the United States and 
France (New York: Praeger, 1985), Figure 1.2.
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6.2.1 The Government of Business
Before discussing the influence of government economic policy upon company 
decisions, the research will look first at how important the government is to 
companies, compared to other external factors such as business competitors and 
customers.
Figure 6-2: Forces Affecting Enterprise Management
Government
Business
Associations
Local CommunitiesSources of Finance
Directors
CustomersManagement Enterprise
Manpower
Social 
Pressure GroupsMaterials
Suppliers Competitors 
and Potential 
Competitors
Sources: Adapted from R.E. Thomas, The Government o f Business
(Oxford: Philip Allan, 1981), Figure 1.1, p.23.
In his book The Government o f Business, Thomas depicted a firm as part of a 
wider economic and socio-political system, as shown in Figure 6-2. On the left-hand 
side of the figure are the inputs into the firm, and on the right-hand side are the users 
of the output and the wider community represented ultimately by the government. He 
then referred to the three basic models for the behaviour of business directors in 
relation to external factors: the profit maximisation, stakeholder, and Marxist
2 1 0
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approaches.4 The details of each approach do not concern this analysis. The 
relevance of his concept is that it provides a framework for this research in assessing 
the importance of the government against other external factors.
Table 6-1 shows that most of the companies ranked the government after such 
external factors as customers and competitors but before the political climate and the 
money market (Kendall coefficient of concordance W = 0.24, p = 0.000).
The Table also shows that the large companies rated the government higher than 
did the small companies, although both regarded customers and competitors as the 
two most important external factors. One of the explanations for this could be that 
because of the nature and larger scale of their interests, larger companies are involved 
more with the government. The government is also likely to pay more attention to 
what big businesses do because of their size and their impact on the wider society. In 
addition, the reason that the money market is relatively more important than the 
government to smaller companies may be that their financial status is comparatively 
less stable than that of larger companies, making them more sensitive to changes like, 
for example, the increase in interest rates on the money market.
According to the Table, different types of company ranked the external factors 
rather differently. The Thai companies ranked the government after the customers and 
competitors, the joint-venture companies ranked the government immediately after the 
customers, and the foreign subsidiaries ranked the government last, equal with the 
political situation. A possible explanation could be that joint-ventures companies 
usually receive industrial incentives from the government (specifically from the Office 
of the Board of Investment).
4J. Child, The Business Enterprise in Modern Industrial Society, (Collier MacMillan, 1969), 
Chapter 6, as quoted by R. E. Thomas, The Government o f Business, 2nd edition (Oxford: Philip 
Allan, 1981), p.23.
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Chapter 6
Moreover, the finding that the money market was relatively less important to the 
Thai companies than to the joint-venture or foreign companies may be the result of the 
fact that several joint-venture companies manufacture products for export, and foreign 
subsidiaries have to repatriate their income to their parent companies abroad, which 
makes the latter two types of company more concerned than Thai companies about 
changes such as fluctuations in the exchange rate on the money market. The Table 
also shows that the joint-venture companies were less concerned about their 
competitors than other types of companies.This is plausible since several of them 
were established because initially there were too few companies in that particular 
industry. For example, the government, as part of its industrial policy, may invite 
foreign investors to form joint-venture projects with local companies in import- 
substitution or export-oriented industries.^ One manager of a government-promoted 
company said, "In fact, it can be said that we are in this industry (sanitary fittings) 
partly because there is little competition in it."
Finally, according to Table 6-1, the government was more important to the 
companies in industries with a greater extent of government control. The finding is 
self-explanatory. However, it should be noted that one external factor, competitors, 
was ranked last by the companies in industries with a great extent of government 
control. This is likely because such industries are often characterised by a 
concentrated or monopolistic structure of competition.
Nevertheless, the companies1 ranking of external factors should not be taken as 
static: the priority or attention given by a company to external factors can change over 
time. As one manager of a foreign subsidiary said, "It also depends on which period 
you are talking about... Two years ago when there was a general election, the 
political situation was rather volatile and consequently received more attention then 
than now."
5The Board o f Investment, Rai Ngarn Prajumpee 2530 (Annual Report 1987), p.9.
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6.2.2 The Extent of Government Influence on Company Decisions
Whereas the previous chapter, concentrating on institutional interaction, studied the 
influence of government agencies on companies; this chapter, emphasising policy 
interaction, examines the influence of government economic policy on companies.
Table: 6-2: The Extent of Government Influence on Company
Decisions3
Q uestion : a) In general, how much influence do you think the Thai
government's economic policy has on your company's business 
decisions during the past 12 months? 
b) Specifically, how much influence do you think the Thai 
government's economic policy has on these decisions within your 
company during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = No Influence 2 -  Little Influence
3 = Moderate Influence 4 = Great Influence
5 = Very Great Influence.
Government Influence
Company Decisions (N=41)
General 3
Specific
1) Pricing decisions 3
2) Decisions to decrease or increase production capacity 3
3) Salary and wage decisions 3
4) Output level decisions 3
5) Manpower decisions 2
6) Decisions to enter new markets abroad 2
7) Decisions to enter new markets within Thailand 1
8) Decisions to develop or launch new products or services 1
9) Decisions to abandon existing products or services 1
10) Decisions to employ new technology 1
11) Sales promotion decisions 1
12) Product or service distribution decisions 1
Note: a The figures shown are medians.
According to Table 6-2, in general, the managers said that the Thai 
government's economic policy had some influence on their companies' business 
decision-making. Specifically, they said that government economic policy had a 
moderate influence on their pricing decisions, decisions to decrease or increase
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production capacity, salary and wage decisions, and output level decisions, although 
it was said to have little influence on their decisions to enter new markets abroad and 
manpower decisions. On such decisions as entering new markets within Thailand, 
developing or launching new products or services, abandoning existing products or 
services, and employing new technology, government economic policy was mainly 
said to have no influence. It also was said to have no influence over company 
decisions on sales promotion and product or service distribution.
The pattern of policy interaction or the influence of government economic policy 
on company decisions above apparently matches with the pattern of the institutional 
interaction or company dealings with government agencies discussed at the beginning 
of the previous chapter. That is, as the Internal Trade Department, the Office of the 
Board of Investment, the Industrial Works Department, and the Labour Department 
were the government agencies most often dealt with by the companies, so pricing, 
production and wage decisions represented the areas of business policy most 
sensitive to government economic policy.
The Internal Trade Department is primarily responsible for the demand and 
supply of goods in the country and for business competition. Therefore, it has a 
direct impact on company pricing decisions. Several of the managers interviewed 
indicated that they had to seek permission for changes in the prices of their products 
or reported them to the Internal Trade Department However, as already shown in the 
discussion of the ideological context in Chapter 3, most managers were against this 
government influence. For example, one manager said, "This is the major annoyance 
from the government which often causes trouble to our company."
The policies of the Office of the Board of Investment and the Industrial Works 
Department concentrate, sometimes in coordination, on the production activities of 
companies. For instance, according to the managers interviewed, before granting 
promotional privileges or giving a factory operation licence or production expansion 
permission to a company, these two government agencies normally consider the
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existing production capacity or output level in the industiy in order to avoid excessive 
competition. In addition, one manager said, "The government not only controls the 
increase in production capacity, it also controls the decrease in production capacity. 
This is because it is afraid that some companies might collude to create a shortage of 
supply in order to increase prices. So, often our company is required to report our 
stock and output to the government."
Salary and wage decisions are influenced by the Labour Department, which 
implements the minimum wage regulations.
When the influence of government economic policy on company decisions is 
looked at in terms of business functions, it can be seen from Table 6-2 that 
government economic policy had a moderate influence on the companies' 
manufacturing function but had little influence on their decisions on research and 
development activities. This may be because some companies rarely invest in or pay 
little attention to product research and development but prefer to buy or import 
technology from abroad. In addition, the research found that several companies held 
the view that with regard to new technology, the government was of little help to 
them. As one manager of a motor-cycle manufacturing company said, "Our 
production technology is rather specific and specialised... The government 
understands little about our technology."
On the other hand, the Table shows that, apart from pricing decisions, 
government economic policy had little influence on other decisions within the 
companies' marketing function, such as decisions on entering new markets, sales 
promotion, and product distribution. Most managers interviewed indicated that 
buyers or customers were more important in such decisions. For example, one 
marketing manager said, "The government has little to do with the way we sell our 
products. Customers and competitors come first in this sort of decision."
The above findings bear some similarity to findings on government influence on 
companies in some advanced industrial countries. For example, in a survey in 
Canada, most managers said that the government had a rather big influence on their
216
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companies’ finance and accounting control, a moderate influence on marketing, 
production and personnel and labour relations, and little influence on engineering and 
research and development.6
6.2.3 The Variation of Government Influence with Characteristics of 
Companies and Industries
The pattern of the influence of government economic policy on business decisions 
varied considerably with the characteristics of companies and industries. Table 6-3 
suggests that the decision-making of the large companies was generally more 
influenced by government economic policy than that of the small companies. This 
should be expected for the reasons discussed earlier when the government was 
ranked according to its importance against other external factors. Specifically, the 
decisions of the large companies on pricing, manpower and production capacity were 
more susceptible to government economic policy than those of the small companies. 
One manager of a major animal-feed manufacturing company said, "Whenever there 
is trouble in the industry the government will look at the bigger companies, either for 
the cause of the problems or for the solutions."
However, the wage and output level decisions of the medium-sized companies 
were more influenced by government economic policy than those of the others. This 
could be because several medium-sized companies are in the import-substitution 
industry, which is often characterised by labour-intensive production. The same 
explanation may also be applied to the finding that the medium-sized companies’ 
decisions to enter new markets abroad were only slightly influenced by government 
economic policy since their products are mostly sold within the country.
6Donald H. Thain and Mark Baetz, "Increasing Trouble Ahead for Business-Govemment Relations 
in Canada?" Business Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2 (Summer, 1979), p.59. His sample consisted o f top 
or middle-level managers from a wide variety of economic sectors, but predominantly manufacturing.
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Chapter 6
Table 6-3 also indicates that the Thai companies were generally more 
susceptible to government economic policy than the others. In particular, the Thai and 
joint-venture companies' decisions on entering new markets abroad, production 
capacity, or output level were more influenced by government economic policy than 
those of the foreign subsidiaries. This, again, may be partly explained by the reason 
discussed earlier when the former two types of company ranked the government 
higher against other external factors than did the latter. That is, several joint-venture 
companies receive industrial incentives from the government because they mostly 
manufacture products intended for export. However, the foreign subsidiaries' wage 
decisions were more susceptible to government economic policy than those of the 
others.
Finally, Table 6-3 also shows that the decision-making of the companies in 
industries with a greater extent of government control was more influenced by 
government economic policy. Specifically, their pricing decisions, decisions to enter 
new markets abroad, manpower decisions, production capacity and output level 
decisions were comparatively more susceptible to government economic policy than 
those of the companies in industries with a small extent of government control.
6.3 CRITERIA USED BY FIRMS IN DECIDING W HETHER 
AN ECONOMIC POLICY IS IN THEIR INTERESTS
Arguing against some writers who claimed that the American business community 
had undergone a remarkable ideological transformation and formed a new partnership 
with the government,7 David Vogel stated that the American corporate executives' 
hostility or distrust toward government officials still persisted.8 However, he 
accepted that while granting both the sincerity and persistence of executives' beliefs,
7See, for example, Levitt Theodore, "The Johnson Treatment," Havard Business Review, Vol.45, 
N o .l (January, 1967), p .l 14; and John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.314.
8David Vogel, "The Persistence of the American Business Creed," in Preston, op.cit., p.79.
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one could still be sceptical of the degree to which they reflect corporate behaviour. He 
quoted V.O. Key, Jr. as contending:
"Despite the extraordinary diversity of their political actions, business 
spokesmen expound more or less uniformly a philosophy of laissez-faire: 
free competition, free enterprise, and the 'American Way.' But this is an 
orthodoxy of ritual rather than of practice. In their actions businessmen 
pragmatically advocate state intervention today and non-intervention 
tomorrow. "9
This discrepancy between ideology and practice and the inconsistency within the 
ideology itself is also reflected in the views of the managers interviewed in this 
research as discussed earlier in Chapters 3 and 4. For example, a manager who 
supports the principle of a free market economy may, at the same, be in favour of 
government protection of local industry. However, what concerns this research here 
is not the inconsistency or double standards of business executives but their 
judgement of a good or bad government economic policy. As Vogel put it:
"Executives do, in fact, support governmental policies that they perceive 
to be in their interest and oppose those that are not; in any event, to do 
otherwise would be rather bizarre. Yet, by collapsing the distance between 
the interests of business executives and their perceptions of the impact of 
governmental policies, this statement begs the issue: in terms of what 
criterion do executives decide whether governmental agencies are in their 
interest?"1®
In an attempt to answer the question raised above by Vogel, this research asked the 
managers to name the three most important government economic policies which have 
had a good effect on their companies and another three which have had a bad effect. 
Then it inferred from the policies mentioned, some of the criteria used by the 
managers in distinguishing between good and bad government economic policies
9V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1962), p.77, 
as quoted in Vogel, op.cit., p.81.
10Vogel, op.cit., p.81.
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with regard to their interests.
6.3.1 A Good Governm ent Economic Policy
According to Table 6-4, the two government economic policies which were most 
popular among the managers were investment (28%) and export promotion (13%).
Table 6-4: Government Policies or Regulations M entioned by 
M anagers as Having Had a Good Effect on Their 
Com panies
Q uestion : Could you briefly and clearly describe the three most important 
government economic policies, regulations or the like which have
had a good effect on your company during the past 12 months?a
Frequency
Government Economic Policy (N=107)
Investment promotion such as various tax concessions 28 %
for a certain period, reduction or exemption from import
duties on imported machines used in investment
or from business taxes, etc.
Export promotion such as export tariff concessions or 13
exemptions, foreign trade exhibitions, market information, etc.
Protecting domestic industries by such measures as tariffs 12
and quotas
Government consultation of private sector opinion, 9
for example, in the form of joint committees or the informal
consideration of business policy-suggestions
Rationalisation of important government economic 8
departments by, for example, cutting down procedures and
shortening the processing time of each procedure
Others 29
Note: a By responding to this question, each company generated 3
cases (3 government economic policies). However, some companies
did not manage to name as many as 3 government economic
policies.
According to the Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977), companies
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receiving privileges from the Office of the Board of Investment are exempt from 
corporate income tax on net profits for a period of between 3 and 8 years.11 Some 
reduction and/or exemption from import duties and business taxes on imported 
machines or raw materials is also granted to them subject to the approval of the Board 
of Investment.12 With regard to production for the purpose of export, companies are 
exempt from import duties and business taxes on raw materials imported to produce, 
mix with or become components of exported products.13 In addition, the exported 
products are also exempt from export duties and business taxes.14
Following investment and export promotion, the government policies of 
protecting domestic industries 02%), of consulting with the private sector during the 
policy-making process (9%), and of rationalising and cutting down of bureaucratic 
procedures (8%) were also popular among the managers. The protection measures 
used by the government, mentioned by the managers, ranged from a complete ban to 
the imposition of tariffs or quotas on imported products. Examples of the government 
policy of consulting with the private sector on important economic issues mentioned 
by the managers were the discussions and negotiations within the Joint Public and 
Private Consultative Committee (for more details of the JPPCC, see Appendix D) and 
other joint committees consisting of public administrators and private managers in 
several other government departments. And the policy of rationalising government 
bureaucracy such as the cutting down of procedures within contact with the Customs 
Department, the Industrial Works Department and a few other economic departments 
was most appreciated by the managers as facilitating their business operations.
Other government economic policies welcomed by the managers included, for 
example, the promotion of farming education, the stabilisation of the value of the 
baht, the reduction of personal income tax, and efforts to stop wars in the Indo-China 
region.
^Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520, section 31-32.
12Ibid., section 28-30.
13Ibid., section 36.
14Loc.cit.
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Chapter 6
When asked about the benefits of the policies, the majority of the managers said 
that they had a very good effect on their companies. According to Table 6-5, while 
the policy of protecting domestic industry was rated by the managers as having an 
extremely good effect on their companies, other government policies were rated as a 
having very good effect.
Table 6-6 indicates that while the companies, regardless of size, equally liked 
the investment promotion policy, the small companies welcomed the export 
promotion policy more than the others did. In addition, whereas the policy of 
protecting domestic industry was equally welcomed by the companies, regardless of 
size, the rationalisation of bureaucracy was mentioned more frequently by the 
medium-sized companies more than by the others. But the policy of public and 
private consultation was more popular among the small and large companies than 
among the medium-sized ones.
Table 6-6 also shows that while the policies of investment promotion and 
domestic industry protection were more popular among the foreign subsidiaries than 
among the Thai companies, the policies of export promotion and public and private 
consultation were mentioned by the managers of Thai and joint-venture companies 
only. However, the joint-venture companies did not mentioned the policy of 
bureaucracy rationalisation at all.
Finally, while the policy of public and private consultation was liked more by 
the companies in industries with a great extent of government control than by the 
others, the policies of investment promotion and bureaucracy rationalisation were 
more popular among the companies in industries with a small extent of government 
control than among the others.
6.3.2 A Bad Government Economic Policy
Table 6-7 indicates that the two most unpopular government policies mentioned by 
the managers were concerned with the complicated, lengthy, outdated bureaucratic
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procedures still present in certain government economic departments and the uncertain 
and ambiguous nature of government economic policies and regulations.
Table 6-7: Government Policies or Regulations M entioned by 
M anagers as Having Had a Bad Effect on Their 
Com panies
Q uestion: Could you briefly and clearly describe the three most important 
government economic policies, regulations or the like which have 
had a bad effect on your company during the past 12 months?a
Frequency
Government Economic Policy (N=101)
Complicated, lengthy, out-dated bureaucratic procedures 24 %
present in certain government economic departments
The uncertain and ambiguous natures of government 15
economic policies and regulations such as taxation or import
or export control
The control of the price of certain products 13
The lack of infrastructure facilities such as electricity, water, 7
communication, transportation, etc.
The lack of development of government personnel such as 4
low motivation to work, inappropriate attitudes, etc.
The lifting of bans on certain goods or of trade barriers 3
such as import tariffs, quotas, etc.
Others 35
Note: a By responding to this question, each company generated 3
cases (3 government economic policies). However, some companies
did not manage to name as many as 3 government economic
policies.
About 24% of all the policies named by the managers as having had a bad effect 
on their companies were concerned with the multiplicity of business laws and 
regulations and the embodiment of unnecessarily long and time-consuming 
procedures in them. The laws and regulations mentioned involved various steps in 
business undertakings ranging from import through production to export. In another 
15% of the policies perceived as having had a bad effect on the companies, the
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managers said that they found it difficult to understand or interpret the description of 
several business laws and regulations as well as when one law, instead of another, 
was to be applied. Some of the managers interviewed even said that their companies 
hired a special company, usually in the shipping industry, to take care of their 
dealings with the Customs Department in order to save time, or for fear of 
misinterpreting the regulations and laws governing export and import. For instance, 
one manager said, "All of our dealings with the Customs Department are contracted 
out to a shipping company... These companies (in the shipping industry) know about 
the procedures for export and import documentation very well. They also have special 
connections with the 'insiders.' Some of them have developed a kind of code with 
officials so that when the code is identified their papers and documents get through 
quickly."
The problem faced by the managers concerning the complicated and ambiguous 
nature of business laws and regulations, either in the form of acts or decrees, was 
further compounded by the power of ministers to make rules and notifications which 
have effects as legally binding as those laws or regulations made in the parliament. As 
one manager said, "The matters get worse when ministerial rules or notifications are 
announced. These rules and notifications can come out with little notice. They prevent 
our company from making long-term plans and lead to short-term problem solving. 
This is because while a draft bill spends months or even years being debated in the 
parliament, ministerial rules and notifications take a few weeks to be thought out by 
ministers. Consequently, businesses are given little time to adapt to the changes." The 
same managers said further, "Sometimes you cannot blame some civil servants for 
being corrupt or not diligent because the nature of laws and regulations governing 
business activities themselves create a situation in-built with obstacles and conducive 
to corruption. For instance, if a businessman thinks he is at risk of losing an order by 
going through all the bureaucratic procedures, he might be willing to buy time and 
writes that down as part of his costs."
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The policy of price control was also unpopular among the managers. According 
to Table 6-7, about 13% of the policies perceived by the managers as having had a 
bad effect on their companies were concerned with the government's price fixing or 
minimum-maximum price regulation. The lack of a proper government policy on and 
investment in infrastructure facilities such as electricity, water, communication or 
transportation, and government personnel problems such as low motivation to work 
or inappropriate attitudes were also said as having had a negative effect on the 
companies. The low level of government investment in infrastructure facilities is 
likely to be one of the reasons why some managers preferred the privatisation of 
public enterprises as discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, Table 6-7 also indicates that the 
lifting of bans or import tariffs and quotas on certain goods was not welcomed by the 
managers.
Other aspects of government operation perceived by the managers as having a 
negative effect on their companies included, for example, control of factory waste 
disposal, corruption, lack of business information, inflation, and high business taxes.
In general, the policies perceived by the managers as bad, as discussed above, 
bear some similarity to the problems faced by businessmen in the past. In his survey 
in 1978, Sawaeng Sanguanrueng found that about 17% of the problems mentioned 
by the managers in connection with government and business relations in Thailand 
concerned corruption, 15% concerned the time-consuming nature of dealings with 
government agencies due to the lack of coordination between government 
departments, 13% concerned the uncertain characteristic of government economic 
policies due to the frequent changes of government, and 7% concerned the lack of 
basic public services which facilitate business operations.15
15Sawang Sanguanrueng, "Kam Gumnod Roopbap Pua Num Pai Sue Kwam Sampan Nai Kam 
Sangsan Rawang Pak Rataban Lae Pak Ekachon" (Towards Creative Relations between Government 
and Business), in Samakom Karn Jadkam Turakij Hang Prathet Thai (Thai Management 
Association), Ekasarn Tang Wichakarn Prakob Karn Prachum Karn Borihan Pak Rataban Lae Pak 
Ekachon Nai Prathet Thai (The Papers of the Conference on the Public Administration and Private 
Management in Thailand) (Bangkok: Amarin Press, 1978), p.77. His sample consisted o f the 
managers who were the members of the Thai Management Association.
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Chapter 6
When asked to rate the impact of each policy, the managers generally said that 
the effect was very bad, as shown in Table 6-8. Specifically, while the effect of the 
lack of the development of government personnel was rated as bad, the effect of all 
the other policies was rated as very bad.
With regard to the characteristics of companies and industries, Table 6-9 
suggests that while the smaller companies commented relatively more about lengthy 
and complicated bureaucratic procedures, the larger companies were more worried 
about the government's price control and the lifting of trade barriers. This may be 
because smaller companies are less likely to spend resources on dealing with 
government agencies or establishing relationships with government officials, thus 
making them less efficient than larger companies in handling government contact. On 
the other hand, larger companies are likely to be more preoccupied with such 
government economic policies as price control or the easing of trade barriers since 
these policies threaten their monopolistic advantage and create greater competition. 
Table 6-9 also suggests that the medium-sized companies are more concerned about 
the ambiguous and uncertain nature of government economic policy and the lack of 
infrastructure facilities than were the others. This may be because several medium­
sized companies are in the expansion stage; therefore, they want to be sure of the 
government's long-term industrial policy and the support of infrastructure facilities.
In addition, the foreign subsidiaries were more concerned about lengthy and 
complicated bureaucratic procedures, the ambiguous and uncertain nature of 
government economic policy, and the lack of infrastructure facilities more than were 
the others. The finding that the non-Thai companies, especially the foreign 
subsidiaries, mentioned the negative effect of complicated government procedures 
more frequently than did the others may be because some of these companies were 
reluctant to spend their resources on developing and maintaining a relationship with 
government officials.
Finally, as shown in Table 6-9, while the companies in industries with a lesser
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extent of government control were preoccupied with the negative effect of lengthy and 
complicated bureaucratic procedures, those in industries with a greater extent of 
government control were more concerned about the government's price control.
It should be noted here that strictly, some of what is shown in Table 6-7 is not policy 
but the effect of policies. This suggests that several managers did not have a clear 
picture of the government economic policies which had a negative effect on their 
companies. It was also observed during the interviews that it took them some time 
before they could describe the bad effect of some government economic policies.
6.3.3 The C riteria
Answering the question put earlier at the beginning of this section, Vogel wrote:
"The business community has been remarkably consistent in its 
opposition to the enactment of any government policies that would 
centralize economic decision-making or strengthen the authority of 
government over the direction of the business system as a whole... The 
criterion by which business evaluates government policy has remained 
quite firm: does the proposed intervention strengthen or weaken the 
autonomy of management."16
According to Table 6-10, the criteria used by the managers in deciding whether or not 
a government economic policy was in their interest -inferred from their classification 
of a policy as good or bad- support the above statement. For the mangers, a 
government economic policy was good if it made their costs lower, helped them 
extend their markets, or created and encouraged a monopolistic situation in their 
advantage.
16Vogel, op.cit., p.81.
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Table 6-10: Some Criteria Used by Managers in Deciding Whether a 
Government Economic Policy Is in Their Interests
Good Policy
Lower costs (taxes and customs duties 
incentives, etc.)
Market extension (market information, 
trade negotiations, etc.)
Monopoly-like situation (import tariffs, 
quotas, etc.)
A say in public policy (government 
consultation with the private sector, for 
example, in the form of a joint committee)
Swift business operation (cut in 
bureaucratic procedures)
Bad Policy
Operational inefficiency (complicated 
and lengthy bureaucratic procedures)
Environmental uncertainty (policy 
ambiguity, changes in regulations, etc.)
Threats to management autonomy (price 
control)
Restricted planning (lack of 
infrastructure facilities such as water, 
electricity, transportation, 
communication, etc.)
Threats to competitiveness (lifting of 
trade barriers)
One manager said, "The government's investment promotion policy is good... 
Such measures as tax concessions make several new investment projects more viable 
for us." Another added, "The government incentives for export make our products 
more competitive abroad. The measure helps us to penetrate into the international 
markets by enabling the products to be sold at lower prices." The same manager 
continued, " The recent setting up of new trade information centres in several other 
countries by the government is also a sensible measure... Thailand has several goods 
which can be very attractive to foreign buyers. But few potential buyers know about 
Thailand. The government certainly has a crucial role in getting Thai products known 
abroad."
Moreover, a policy which allowed them to participate in government policy 
formulation, or one which facilitated efficient business operation was also welcomed 
by the managers.One manager explained, "Some of our executives are participating in 
Ko Ro Oo (the JPPCC scheme)... This is a good sign. It means that the government 
is listening to us."
On the other hand, government economic policies which made business
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operation inefficient, created uncertainties in the business environment, or threatened 
management autonomy were disliked by the managers. For example, one manager 
said, "Government interference with pricing is bad... Pricing is a strategic 
management decision. It involves managerial responsibility in terms of competition." 
Moreover, they also did not like an economic policy which restricted their business 
planning or threatened their companies' competitiveness.
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, Umseem stated that corporate political 
behaviour occurs at three levels: company political action, industrial trade association 
political action, and classwide political action. In other words, he suggested that there 
are policy issues which divide as well as those which unite companies, thus resulting 
in different levels of business political behaviour.17 It is proposed here that this is 
partly because when applying the criteria such as those shown in Table 6-10, 
managers of different companies may differently perceive or classify the same policy 
as having a good or bad effect on their companies, hence the different degrees of 
cooperation or competition with each other in their response to the policy.18 
However, the degree to which the criteria for classifying a policy and the context of 
their application dominate other factors such as industrial structure, products made or 
the interlocking of boards of directors,19 in shaping a firm's responses to a policy, 
still needs more research.
17Michael Useem, "Political, Business and social Theory: Company, Trade Association and 
Classwide Business Political Action," in V.V. Murray, Theories o f Business-Government Relations 
(Toronto: Trans-Canada Press, 1985), pp.209-214.
18For more evidence and examples, see Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Solu Pool, and Lewis Anthony 
Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (Chicago: Atherthon Press, 1972).
19For discussion on board of director interlocks, see Jeffrey Pfeffer, "A Resource Dependence 
Perspective on Intercorporate Relations, " in Mark S. Mizruchi and Michael Schwartz, editors, 
Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis o f  Business (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987) pp.42-44; and Johannes M. Pennings, Interlocking D irectorates: Origins and  
Consequences o f Connections Among Organizations' Boards o f Directors (San Francisco: Jossey 
Bass, 1980).
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6.4 POLICY COOPERATION 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
After having identified the three most important economic policies which had a good 
effect on their companies and another three which had a bad effect, each of the 
managers was asked to assess the overall effect of the six government economic 
policies and of the government's economic policies in general.20 Whereas earlier the 
influence of the government on the means of business operation, business decision­
making, was discussed; in this section the influence of government economic policy 
on the ends of business operation, the primary objectives of business, are 
investigated.
6.4.1 The Impact of Government Economic Policy
According to Table 6-11, the managers said that overall the six government economic 
policies mentioned slightly lowered their total product costs and increased their 
growth, profit, competitiveness and sales volume. However, the product quality or 
efficiency of work in their companies remained the same. Table 6-11 also indicates 
that the majority of the managers said that overall government economic policy was 
generally in their favour. Some comments made by the managers are, for example, 
"The government's economic policies seem to be in our favour," "I think the 
government now cares more about business opinions. They keep in touch with major 
business groups," and "The government is becoming more friendly towards 
businessmen."
The implication of the above findings is that the managers felt that the negative 
effect of such policies as complicated and lengthy bureaucratic procedures, price
20A manager was asked to assess the impact o f the six government economic policies he just 
mentioned, instead of that of the government economic policy in general, on various aspects o f his 
company's operation because it is desirable here to see the impact o f the policies specifically 
mentioned by him.
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control, or the lack of infrastructure facilities were overridden by the advantages 
generated by such policies as investment and export promotion, or domestic industry 
protection. This should not be a surprise, considering the amount of financial benefit 
a company can gain from various tax concessions or exemptions and the increase in 
competitiveness.
Table 6-11: The Overall Im pact of Government Economic Policies
Q uestion: a) What was the overall impact o f the six government economic
policies vou iust mentioned on these specific aspects o f your
company's operation during the past 12 months?a
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Much Lower 2 = Lower 3 = Slightly Lower
4 = The Same
5 = Slightly Higher 6 = Higher 7 = Much Higher
b) In general, what was the overall imnact o f government
economic policy on your company during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Very Bad 2 = Bad
3 = Slightly Bad 4 = Balanced Or No Effect
5 = Slightly Good 6 = Good
7 = Very Good
Median
Aspects of Company Operation (N=41)
S pecific
1) The total costs of products or services 3
2) The quality of products or services 4
3) The efficiency of work in your company 4
4) The growth of your company 5
5) The profit of your company 5
6) The competitiveness of your company in the market 5
7) The sales volume of products or services 5
G eneral 6
Note: a Previously, the respondents were asked to identify three government
economic policies which had a good effect on their companies and
another three which had a bad effect, thus making a total of six
government economic policies.
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Chapter 6
With respect to the characteristics of companies and industries, Table 6-12 
indicates that the large companies benefited more from the government's economic 
policies more than the small companies in terms of lower costs and higher profits. In 
addition, the medium-sized companies benefited more from the policies in terms of 
higher growth or expansion than did the others. This may be because, as stated 
earlier, several medium-sized companies are at the expansion stage.
As regards the types of company, the Thai and joint-venture companies 
benefited more from the government's economic policies in terms of higher growth, 
competitiveness, and sales volume than did the foreign subsidiaries. This is plausible, 
considering the earlier finding that the Thai and joint-venture companies enjoyed a 
great advantage from the export promotion policy (see Table 6-6).
Table 6-12 also shows that while the companies in industries with a lesser 
extent of government control benefited more from the government's economic 
policies in terms of growth, they suffered more from the policies in terms of work 
efficiency than did the others.
Finally, Table 6-12 suggests in general that the larger or joint-venture 
companies or those in industries with a greater extent of government control benefited 
more from government economic policies than did the others.
Michael Useem argued that in the united States, the increase of business 
political activity came from two main sources: declining company profits and rising 
government regulations.21 The evidence and findings here that overall, the 
companies benefited from the government's economic policies and that the 
government was trying to rationalise the bureaucracy and consult with the private 
sector on major economic issues, do not support his argument in the case of 
Thailand. A more plausible explanation may be that companies in Thailand view the 
political involvement as part of their competitive strategy. In other words, each 
company or a group of companies, especially the bigger ones, tries to achieve a
21Useem, op.cit., p.214.
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greater, sometimes exclusive, influence over economic policy making than their 
competitors. Some may do it defensively, for example by lobbying against or in 
favour of a policy; others may choose to be offensive, for example by initiating a new 
regulation to their own advantage. But the common objective is to have a better 
control of their business environment than their competitors.
6.4.2 The Balance of Policy Cooperation
The finding that overall the government’s economic policies had a beneficial effect on 
the companies leads this research further to ask whether the companies made any 
effort to reap the benefits from the policies, whether the government just gave the 
benefits to them, or was it the result of policy cooperation between government and 
business. According to Table 6-13, it is suggested that to a great extent the Thai 
government seems to cater for business needs. For example, of all policies said to 
have had a good effect on their companies, 56% were said by the managers to be 
policies that the government intentionally designed to benefit their companies, while 
about 28% were said to be due to government and business cooperation. In only 1% 
of all the policies mentioned did the managers say that their companies intentionally 
planned their operations to receive the benefits of the government's economic 
policies.
In particular, the benefits from investment (80% of the times the policy was 
mentioned) and export promotion policies (50%) were often said by the managers to 
be due to the government's intention to help companies. For example, one manager 
said, "I think the government wants to help business to be able to invest and expand."
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Chapter 6
Another added, "It is not likely for a company to directly plan its operation in 
order to get grants from the government. It tends to be the other way round: the 
government makes policies in order to give grants to businesses. For instance, a 
company invests because it sees a commercial opportunity or a gap in the market. If 
government support coincides with the company's intention, it just makes the new 
investment more attractive to the company." The same manager continued, "The 
government itself cannot create economic growth. It is businesses which make 
economic progress. So what the government can do is to provide a variety of 
opportunities to business and companies will make choices."
Similarly, the benefits from the policies of domestic industry protection (77% of 
the times the policy was mentioned) and bureaucracy rationalisation (67%) were 
perceived by the managers as the government's intention. And the benefits from the 
policy of public and private consultation were said to be due to the cooperation 
between government and business (50%).
The finding that policy cooperation between government and business was in 
favour of business is consistent with the prevailing views on government and 
business relations discussed earlier, in which the managers and the bureaucrats 
agreed that business should play an initiatory role in relation to the government, and 
the government a facilitatory role in relation to business (see Chapter 4). However, it 
stands in contrast to the finding on the comparative influence of government and 
business in the institutional interaction discussed before (see Chapter 5). That is, 
whereas in institutional interaction the managers said that they or their companies had 
little influence over the government agencies they contacted, in policy interaction the 
government supported and cooperated with companies.
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6.5 THE REACTION OF FIRMS TO AN ECONOMIC POLICY 
WHICH IS NOT IN THEIR INTERESTS:
THE EX POST FACTO MODE
The reaction of business to a public policy after it has become effective, as against 
when it is being debated or formulated, is another research area often neglected by the 
literature on government and business relations. For example, after identifying the 
past research on business political behaviour as discussed earlier, Epstein carried out 
further research based on the hypothesis that as a result of recent electoral legislation 
and regulation in the United States, unions and business organisations now have 
greater legal flexibility in the electoral process through their political action 
committees (PACs).22 Similarly, recent writers on strategic issues management and 
public affairs functions tend to stress the crucial role of chief executive officers in 
identifying, anticipating, and influencing external socio-political issues.23 This 
research wishes to argue that while the significance of research into the influence of 
business on public policy in its formulation stage cannot be denied, the task of 
dealing with the impact of an already enacted government economic policy facing 
business managers is also hard to ignore. Thus, the research further asked the 
managers how they reacted to the government economic policies which had had a bad 
effect on their companies.
6.5.1 Classification of the Bad Effect of an Economic Policy
In the study of business and public policy, different authors have developed different 
ways of classifying policy issues in order to identify different business political 
behaviour. For example, Lowi argued that the policies shape the pattern of politics
22Epstein, op.cit., p.44.
23Isaiah A. Litvak, "External Issues, Public Affair and Corporate Boards," Business Quarterly 
(Spring, 1988), p.60; and James Gillies, Where Business Fail (Montreal: Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, 1981), Chapter 4 Dealing with Government: Strategies, pp.45-58.
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associated with them. He stated that there are three major types of policy which shape 
the pattern of politics. According to him, they are distributive policies (such as tariffs 
or government contracts), redistributive policies (such as progressive taxation and 
welfare), and regulatory policies (such as the imposition of rules concerning pollution 
by government on industry).24 Also, Young developed a method of classifying 
policies for analysing the nature of the relationship between government and 
business, using the intention of the government in the policy as well as the 
instruments of the policy. As regards the intention of the government in a policy, he 
distinguished three levels of intention: first, policies that are impartial towards 
primary, manufacturing and service industries; second, policies that discriminate 
between industries; and third, policies that discriminate between firms within 
industries. Concerning the policy instruments, he divided the means into economic 
and legal frameworks (such as economic and fiscal control and legal regulations) and 
non-regulatory measures (such as encouragement and exhortation, provision of 
advice and services, and financial inducements).25
On the other hand, in his analytical framework for managing corporate external 
issues, Bartha has classified four major issue types: universal issues, advocacy 
issues, selective issues, and technical issues.2** Examples of universal issues include 
energy crises and unemployment, advocacy issues include environmental or 
consumer protection and economic nationalism, selective issues include export-import 
tariffs and quotas, and technical issues include mainly those involved with the 
government’s day-to-day regulatory activities such as establishing product standards, 
negotiating with foreign countries, and making grants.
24Theodore Lewi, "American Business, Public Policy Case Studies and Political Theory," W orld 
Politics, Vol. 16, No.4 (July, 1964), pp.677-715.
25Stephen Young, Intervention in the Mixed Economy: The Evolution o f British Industrial Policy 
1964-72 (London: Croom Helm, 1974), pp. 16-28.
26Peter F. Bartha, "Managing Corporate External Issues: An Analytical Framework," Business 
Quarterly (Spring, 1988), pp.84-85.
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Chapter 6
However, due to the objective of this research and consequently its nature, most 
of the above methods of policy classification cannot be employed here. Instead, the 
classification of the bad effect of a government economic policy by the managers 
interviewed as either affecting their companies only or the whole industry is used to 
analyse the reaction of the companies to it.
According to Table 6-14, most bad effects of government economic policies 
were said by the mangers to be industry-wide. About 77% of all the policies named 
were classified as having a bad, industry-wide effect. Specifically, about 58% of the 
cases of the bad effect of the lengthy and complicated procedures, 60% of the policy 
ambiguity, 85% of the price control and 71% of the lack of the infrastructure facilities 
were classified by the managers as industry-wide.
It may be asked here why a government economic policy can be classified as 
affecting a company as an individual and an industry as a whole at the same time. 
This is a question of the managers' perception as well as what actually has happened. 
On one hand, it should be accepted that the industry-wide effect of a policy consists 
of several effects on individual companies, and conversely that each effect on an 
individual company may be part of a wider effect on the whole industry; thus the 
classification was due to the perception of the managers to a certain extent. On the 
other hand, the classification may be according to what has actually happened to the 
companies. For example, while it is well known that the ambiguity of taxation laws 
has caused concern among most companies, it can hardly be said that the effect of the 
situation in which a company was investigated by the Revenue Department on 
suspicion that it had not properly paid taxes two years ago was industry-wide. 
Similarly, the effect of the case when, despite retroactive permission form the Board 
of Investment, the Customs Department refused to release merchandise imported by a 
company receiving investment incentives, based on the allegation that the goods did 
not have promoted status, was individual rather than industry-wide in fact. Thus, 
later interpretation of the analysis should take into account the nature of the policy
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classification described above.
6.5.2 Company Decision to Make a Complaint about the Bad Effect
According to Table 6-15, regarding all the policies perceived as having had a bad 
effect on them, the companies frequently did not complain to the responsible 
government agencies.
Table 6-15: Company Decision to Make a Complaint about the Bad 
Effect of Governm ent Economic Policy
Q uestion : Did your company complain about this policy to the government 
agencies responsible for it?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Yes 2=  No
Type of Impact
Individual Industry-
All Policies Company Wide
Decision to Complain (N=101) (N=23) (N=78)
Yes 41 % 78 % 30 %
No 59 22 70
Cramer's V 0.42
X2 Test (DF=1) 15.56
Probability 0.000
About 59% of the policies were not complained about by the managers. 
However, concerning the behaviour of the companies in each type of impact, 
different patterns of decision to make a complaint were found (Cramer's V = 0.42). 
That is, the companies were likely to make complaints to government agencies if a 
policy affected them individually, but were unlikely to make any complaints if a 
policy affected the whole industry (X2 test, p = 0.000) While the managers 
complained of about 78% of the policies which affected their companies individually, 
they only complained about 30% of those which affected the whole industry.
The above finding indirectly supports what was stated by Bartha as discussed
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earlier in Chapter 1. To repeat, he argued that there are two distinct aspects of 
business-government relations from the chief executive officers' perspective: 
systemic and competitive. At the systemic level are the macro-issues of public policy 
that affect collectively all members of an industry, a sector, or even the business 
community as a whole, while at the competitive level are the micro-concerns that 
influence individually a firm or a business unit in relation to its competitors. He then 
claimed that the chief executive officers are unable or unwilling to accept individual 
responsibility for dealing with collective problems and consequently refer it to such 
collective units as industrial trade associations. On the other hand, at the competitive 
level, pragmatic business considerations dominate the interaction process, regardless 
of what is happening in the macro-environment.27
However, Bartha did not spell out specifically whether his explanation applied 
at the stage when a public policy was being formulated or implemented or both. Even 
though the evidence from this research shows that the companies' reaction to an 
already effective government economic policy (the ex post facto  mode) is in 
accordance with his argument, the validity of his argument concerning the companies' 
activities when a government economic policy is being debated or formulated (the ex 
ante facto mode) still needs to be confirmed by more empirical research.
With regard to the characteristics of companies and industries, Table 6-16 
shows that the large or Thai companies or those in the industries with a great extent of 
government control, were relatively more active in complaining about or exerting 
influence on the implementation of government economic policy, than the small or 
foreign companies or those in industries with a small extent of government control.
27Peter F Bartha, "Organizational Competence in Business-Govemment Relations: A Managerial 
Perspective," Canadian Public Administration, Vol.28, No.2 (Summer, 1985), p.207.
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Chapter 6
Table 6-16 also shows that this was likely regardless of the types of impact. 
The large companies made complaints about 89% of the policies which affected them 
individually, whereas the small companies made complaints about 57% of them; 
while the Thai companies made complaints about 92%, the foreign companies made 
complaints about 67%; and while the companies in industries with a great extent of 
government control made complaints 80%, those in the industries with a small extent 
of government control made complaints about 57%. Similarly, while the large 
companies made complaints about 36% of the policies which affected the whole 
industry, the small companies only made complaints about 10% of them; and while 
the Thai companies or those in industries with a great extent of government control 
made complaints about 38% and 37% respectively, the foreign companies or those in 
the industries with a small extent of government control did not make any complaints 
at all. This may be due to different characteristics of the policies affecting the 
companies with different characteristics as discussed earlier (see Table 6-9).
6.5.3 Company Reasons for Not M aking a Com plaint
The research further examines why some companies did not complain about the bad 
effect of a government economic policy to the responsible government agencies. 
According to Table 6-17, regarding all the policies perceived as having had a bad 
effect on them, the main reason for the decision of the companies not to make any 
complaints was that they did not think the agency responsible for the policy would 
listen to their complaints. For example, one manager said, "I do not think our 
complaints will make things (bad road conditions around the factory) better."
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Chapter 6
Similarly, they did not think that the complaints were worth the time and effort. 
For example, one manager said, "You are wasting your time if you go to the 
bureaucrats and tell them that their services are not efficient. They will ask you, 'Do 
you think I am not aware of that?"1 To a small extent, they did not complain because 
the procedure for complaining is too troublesome. However, that it was difficult to 
identify which government agency was responsible for the policy, that there were no 
clear or explicit ways of complaining available, and that the effect of the policy was 
not too bad, were apparently not the reasons why the companies did not try to 
influence the responsible government agencies. One manager said, "We know where 
to make the complaints. We just do not believe we are in a position to change the 
policy (regulation on food labelling)." Another manager in the motor-cycle industry 
explained, "This is a policy level issue (the ambiguity of the government policy on 
imported component-parts). I know how and where to negotiate about this... But I do 
not think that my company should take on the responsibility to the extent of initiating 
the complaints." Another manager cautioned, "I do not want any bureaucrats to have 
hard feelings against my company (if the company complained about the way 
government information was distributed among garment manufacturing companies, 
which it thought was biased)."
In the comparison of company decisions not to make a complaint within the two 
types of impact, Table 6-17 suggests that difficulty in identifying which government 
agency was responsible for the policy and the absence of a clear or explicit way of 
complaining were more often the underlying reasons in the cases of impact on an 
individual company than in the cases of impact on the industiy as a whole (the former 
reason: Cramer's V = 0.33, Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.268; and the latter reason: V 
= 0.39, p = 0.078). An example of this from the interviews is the case in which the 
construction of a company's project, which was situated within an industrial estate 
belonging to the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT -a public enterprise 
under the Ministry of Industry), had been delayed by the lack of electricity and a
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water supply. At that same time the position of the IEAT governor was vacant. As a 
result, the company did not know what to do or who to talk to because the authority 
of the IEAT had refused to make any decision.
According to Table 6-17, the complexity of the complaints procedure was more 
frequently the underlying reason for company decision not to make any complaints in 
the cases of impact on an individual company than in the cases of impact on the 
industry as a whole (Cramer's V = 0.55; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.069). This is 
likely since if a policy has an industry-wide effect or affects many companies, the 
relevant trade associations readily provide a channel for making complaints, exerting 
influence, and negotiation.
In addition, a low expectation of the success of an effort to influence a 
government economic policy was more frequently the reason for not making a 
complaint in the cases of impact on an individual company than in the cases of impact 
on the whole industry (Cramer's V = 0.33; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.119). This is 
likely since the government will normally pay more attention to complaints made 
collectively by a group of companies or a business association than to those made 
individually by a company. It also may be because the companies were likely to make 
complaints to government agencies about the policies which affected them 
individually only when the bad effect was serious. According to Table 6-17, the 
managers more frequently said that the effect of the policy was not too bad in the 
cases of impact on an individual company than in the cases of impact on the whole 
industry (Cramer's V = 0.39; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.052)
6.5 .4  C h a n n e l s  fo r  M a k in g  a  C o m p la in t
Having decided to make a complaint, how did the companies go about it? According 
to Table 6-18, the companies tried to influence a government economic policy which 
had a bad effect on them either through business associations such as trade
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associations and chambers of commerce, or directly to the government agencies 
responsible for the policy. But none of the companies attempted to exert influence on 
the agencies by both of the above methods at the same time.
Table 6-18: Channels for Making a Complaint by Type of Impact
Q uestion: I f  yes, how did your company complain to the agency about this 
policy?
1 = Through a trade association or a chamber o f commerce
2 = Directly to the responsible agency
3 = Both 1 and 2
Type of Impact
Individual Industry-
All Policies Company Wide
Channel (N=41) (N=18) (N=23)
Business associations 56 % 33 % 74 %
Direct 44 67 26
Both 0 0 0
Cramer's V 0.41
X2 Test (DF=1) 5.20
Probability 0.023
In other words, what Table 6-18 suggests is that making a complaint about the 
bad effect of a government economic policy through a business association and 
directly to the responsible government agencies are mutually exclusive. This could be 
because when a business association is dealing collectively with the government on 
an issue, it is unlikely that a company will contact the government directly concerning 
the same issue at the same time, for fear of trespassing into the authority of the 
association, of complicating the issue, or of offending other companies. For example, 
one manager of a vegetable oil refining company said, "The issue (price control) is 
being handled by the trade association. I do not think the association would be happy 
if we try to contact the government ourselves."
In addition, when a company has chosen to complain directly to the government 
about the bad effect of a policy, it may have already decided at the beginning that due 
to its nature and characteristics, the issue cannot or should not be handled by a
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business association or vice versa. For example, one manager said, "I do not think 
the trade association is interested in getting involved in this (time-consuming contact 
with the Office of the Board of Investment)." On the other hand, one manager of a 
paper manufacturing company said, "This (the lifting of bans on imported paper) is a 
matter of collective concern. A single company will not have enough influence to 
persuade the government on the issue."
Accordingly, Table 6-18 indicates that when the effect of a policy was perceived 
by the managers as affecting their companies individually, complaints were often 
made directly to the responsible government agencies, whereas when the effect was 
perceived as industry-wide, efforts to exert influence on the agencies were channeled 
through the relevant business associations (Cramer's V = 0.41; X2 test, p = 0.023). 
While complaints about 67% of the cases of individual company impact were made 
directly to the responsible government agencies, 74% of the cases of industry-wide 
impact were channelled through business associations.
The explanation for the above result is quite straightforward: most companies 
are affiliated with a trade association or a chamber of commerce and will try to 
influence government economic policy through it when the issue is of collective, 
industry-wide concern. At the same time, there are issues which are rather specialised 
and of individual concern; therefore, companies have to deal directly with the 
government themselves. However, this is not to say that the difference between the 
individual company impact of policies and the industry-wide impact of policies is 
absolutely decisive in pointing out which method companies will use to deal with the 
government. For instance, even though some issues may have an industry-wide 
impact but are also issues in which the companies concerned are divided, a business 
association may not wish to take a position and, consequently, fail to act; thus, the 
companies may be on their own in dealing with the government.
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6.6 SUCCESS OF THE REACTION
Finally, as in the previous chapter, the success of policy interaction, or in particular 
the success of the efforts of firms to influence government economic policies which 
are not in their interests, is assessed. After the managers had stated how they made 
complaints, they were further asked how responsive the government agency was to 
their complaints, and how satisfied they were with the response.
6.6.1 Government Responsiveness and Company Satisfaction
According to Table 6-19, government agencies were relatively more responsive to 
complaints made by the companies about industry-wide impact than to those about 
individual company impact (Cramer's V = 0.46). That is, while the agencies were 
only slightly responsive to complaints about the policies which had a bad effect on an 
individual company, they were moderately responsive to complaints about the 
policies which had a bad effect on the whole industry (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 
0.011). About 74% of complaints about industry-wide impact were said by the 
managers to be greeted by government agencies moderately responsively or very 
responsively, whereas about 72% of those about individual company impact were 
greeted by the agencies with slight or moderate responsiveness.
Similarly, the companies were apparently more satisfied with the response of 
the government to complaints about industry-wide impact than to complaints about 
individual company impact (Cramer's V = 0.48). That is, while the majority of the 
managers were slightly satisfied with the response of government agencies in the 
cases of impact on the whole industry, they were not satisfied at all with the response 
in the cases of impact on an individual company (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.003). 
Whereas the managers were not satisfied at all with 72% of government responses to 
their complaints about individual company impact, they were slightly satisfied or
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moderately satisfied with 60% of government responses to complaints about 
industry-wide impact.
Table 6-19: The Responsiveness of Government Agencies to 
Complaints and Company Satisfaction with the 
Responses by Type of Impact
Question: (Continuing from the previous question)
a ) How responsive was the agency when your company 
complained about this policy?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Not At All 2 = Slightly Responsive
3 = Moderately Responsive
4 = Very Responsive 5 = Extremely Responsive
h) How satisfied were vou with the resoonse when your comnanv 
complained to the agency about this policy?
Use this scale for your answer.
1 = Not At All 2 = Slightly Satisfied
3 = Moderately Satisfied
4 = Very Satisfied 5 = Extremely Satisfied
Type of Impact
Individual Industry-
Responsiveness Company Wide
and Satisfaction Rating Value (N=18) (N=23)
Agency
R esponsiveness
Not At All 1 28 % 9 %
Slightly Responsive 2 22 17
Moderately Responsive 3 50 39
Very Responsive 4 0 35
Extremely Responsive 5 0 0
Median 2 3
Cramer's V 0.46
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.54
p (two-tailed) 0.011
Company
Satisfaction
Not At All 1 72 % 26 %
Slightly Satisfied 2 17 30
Moderately Satisfied 3 11 30
Very Satisfied 4 0 13
Extremely Satisfied 5 0 0
Median 1 2
Cramer's V 0.48
Mann-Whitney U Test Z (corrected for ties) -2.99
p (two-tailed) 0.003
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The above findings may be due to the nature of the issues complained about as 
well as the methods used to make complaints. For instance, the government is likely 
to be less responsive to complaints from companies concerning water quality or 
interference in the telecommunication system of their factories or offices than to those 
from a trade association concerning issues like price control or impractical regulation 
of product standards. Two managers gave contrasting examples. While one said, 
"Our complaints about the bad quality of water seem to disappear into nowhere," 
another said, "The government officials were concerned about the complaint (about 
the increasing price of soya beans). They held a meeting with major soya bean users a 
week after that."
As regards the methods of making complaints, it was discussed earlier that 
while complaints about industry-wide impact were likely to be channelled through the 
relevant business associations, complaints about individual company impact often 
went directly to the responsible government agencies. This tendency, together with 
the result shown in Table 6-20 may further help explain the above findings. 
According to Table 6-20, government agencies were more responsive to complaints 
made by business associations than to those made by individual companies in both 
types of impact (individual company impact: Cramer's V = 0.44, Mann-Whitney U 
test, p = 0.154; industry-wide impact: V = 0.53, p = 0.089). In the case of impact on 
an individual company, up to 42% of complaints made directly to the responsible 
government agencies, compared to none of those made through business 
associations, were said by the managers to be received with no response at all by the 
agencies. However, even though the managers said they were satisfied with 33% of 
the responses when the complaints were made through business associations, overall 
they did not seem to be satisfied with the response regardless of the methods of 
making complaints used (Cramer’s V = 0.51; Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.096).
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Regarding the cases of industry-wide impact, about 82% of the complaints 
made through business associations, compared to 50% of those made directly to the 
government, were dealt with by government agencies moderately responsively or 
very responsively. The managers were more satisfied with the response from 
government agencies when the complaints were made through business associations 
than when they were made directly by the companies (Cramer's V = 0.60; Mann- 
Whitney U test, p = 0.058). While the managers said they were moderately satisfied 
or very satisfied with 53% of government responses when the complaints were made 
through business associations, they were so with only 17% when the complaints 
were made directly by the companies.
6.7 SUMMARY
The analysis of the policy interaction here has refined the literature on government 
and business relations to a certain extent. In particular, it has refined the general 
assumption of theories on business political activities by showing that in addition to 
such variables as profit rate and geographical dispersion, company size, origin, and 
the extent of government control in the industry also shape the basis of business 
efforts to influence government economic policy. It has also demonstrated that the 
influence of the government varies from one business function to another and that 
business political activities do not necessarily have to respond to hostile government 
intervention but can be part of an overall business strategy with regard to competitive 
advantage. In addition, the analysis of policy interaction has offered an explanation 
for the suggestion of the literature that there are policy issues which unite as well as 
divide business, by identifying some of the criteria used by companies in deciding 
whether a government economic policy is in their interests. These criteria may be 
differently applied by companies. Finally, the distinction between individual company 
impact and industry-wide impact has also proved to be fruitful in explaining business 
inaction as well as reaction to economic policies which are not in its favour.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter will summarise the major findings of the research. It will then bring 
out both the practical and theoretical implications of these findings. In response to the 
central research question raised at the beginning: "What can government and business 
do to gain greater benefit from their relationship?" (Chapter 2), the practical 
implications will be evaluated in terms of their recommendations on business 
management and public policy, and in the light of the weaknesses of the literature 
(Chapter 1), the theoretical implications will be evaluated to suggest future research 
approaches and areas of investigation.
7.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
As stated in Chapter 2, the two main intentions of this research are to study the 
interaction between the government and business (the manufacturing sector) in 
Thailand and its ideological context. The research was conducted in the light of the 
literature’s failure to carry out interactional analysis of the business-govemment 
relationship and the scarcity of empirical findings on this relationship in industrially 
non-advanced countries. The principal findings of the research can be summarised as 
follows:
7.1.1 The Ideological Context
Economic ideology. Overall, the research findings have suggested that in terms 
of economic ideology, the senior bureaucrats and the managers were not much
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different. In addition, the bureaucrats have become more economically liberal than 
past research findings suggested.
The summary of the findings on the comparison of economic ideologies of the 
bureaucrats and the managers is as shown in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1: Comparison of Economic Ideologies of Thai Managers 
and Senior Bureaucrats3
COMPARISON OF VIEWS 
ON...
Disagree Agree
....................................
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
The economic system which best encourages the growth of businesses
in Thailand is the one with the least government intervention.
Public utilities, such as electricity, water, telecommunication, 
transportation, should be owned and operated by the government.
Joint ventures between the government and companies are a 
good strategy for Thailand in promoting industry.
Using trade barriers to protect local companies from the competition 
of big foreign companies is something that the government should do.
Managers
Bureaucrats
m ste m A
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In some industries, price levels may be determined by only a few 
companies, yet the government should not interfere with pricing.
Regulating the standard of goods and services is something that the 
government should do.
Regulating minimum wage levels is something that the government 
should do.
The level o f interest rates should be allowed to float freely without any 
control such as the fixing of the maximum or minimum rates by 
the government.
The control o f foreign currency exchange is something that the 
government should do.
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Table 7-1: C ontinued
Disagree
i
Agree
I 1 1 1 I
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO FIRMS 
The government should promote newly established companies which 
are not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them
a) subsidies
b) loans at a rate which is lower than that of commercial banks
c) tax concessions
The government should promote companies which are expanding and 
are in a growth industry by giving them
a) subsidies
b) loans at a rate which is lower than that of commercial banks
c) tax concessions
The government should help companies which are in financial trouble 
because of bad economic conditions by giving them
a) subsidies
b) loans at a rate which is lower than that of commercial banks
c) tax concessions
Note: a The bar chart is plotted by medians.
Except on the issue of protecting local industry, it can be seen from Table 7-1 
that both the bureaucrats and the managers shared similar views on the economic role 
of the Thai government. That is, both generally disagreed with government 
intervention and ownership of business but were undecided about joint ventures 
between business and government as a way of promoting industry. However, while 
the bureaucrats preferred more competition from abroad, the managers did not.
263
Chapter 7
There was also not much difference in the bureaucrats' and managers' views on 
government regulation. In fact, on the issues of minimum wages and foreign 
currency exchange, the managers preferred government regulation more than the 
senior bureaucrats did. Both believed that the standards of goods and services should 
be regulated. However, the managers rejected government price control, which is 
consistent with the later finding of the policy interaction analysis that price control 
was viewed by the managers as a threat to management autonomy (Chapter 6). With 
regard to the issue of free-floating interest rates, while the bureaucrats disagreed with 
it, the managers were undecided.
Concerning the issue of government financial assistance to firms, the senior 
bureaucrats and the managers similarly distinguished between the types of company 
receiving assistance as well as the types of assistance given. That is, both gave 
priority to newly-established companies rather than expanding companies or those in 
financial trouble. They also preferred the financial assistance to be in the form of tax 
concessions rather than subsidies or soft loans from the government.
Nevertheless, as discussed at the end of Chapter 3, little consistency was found 
in each individual senior bureaucrat's or business manager's economic views. For 
example, a manager or a bureaucrat could support the spirit of free enterprise and 
encourage the government's protection of local industry at the same time. This 
ideological inconsistency could be due to an individual bureaucrat's or manager's 
perception of the extent of the government's role in a free market economy as well as 
to the domination of other pragmatic considerations over free market ideals in the 
mind of an individual bureaucrat or manager.
Business and politics. The views of the senior bureaucrats and the managers on 
government and business relations were harmonious and similar to a large extent.
With regard to the form of the relationship, they both believed that businesses 
should play a leading role in relation to the government, and that what the government
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should do is to facilitate business initiatives. In other words, both the senior 
bureaucrats and the managers preferred the scenario in which the government acts as 
an onlooker but at the same time makes sure that business undertakings are properly 
carried out. However, as shown in Table 7-2, which summarises the responses to the 
statements concerning views on government and business relations, the managers 
accepted that it was rather difficult for the government to carry out this task.
Table 7-2: Comparison of Views of Thai Managers and Senior 
Bureaucrats on Business and Politics
COMPARISON OF VIEWS 
ON BUSINESS AND POLITICS
It is rather difficult for the government to oversee and ensure fair 
business competition without bias.
The present high level of involvement in politics by businessmen 
will do more good than harm to the economy of Thailand.
Economic policy making should be done by the government only; 
businessmen should not get involved.
The participation of business in economic policy formulation will 
make
a) policy implementation easier.
b) the policy outcome benefit only a few groups of people.
Business should influence the economic policy making of the 
government through trade associations or chambers of commerce only.
Note: a The bar charts are plotted by medians.
With respect to business involvement in politics, while the bureaucrats 
encouraged it, some managers were hesitant about it. Nevertheless, both believed that 
business should have a role in the government's economic policy-making. It was also 
found that those bureaucrats and managers who were in favour held the view that this 
participation would make policy implementation easier but rejected that it would create
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bias in policy formulation.
Finally, both the bureaucrats and the managers agreed that business 
participation in the government's economic policy-making should be channelled 
through business associations, although neither ruled out other possibilities such as 
the direct participation of businessmen-tumed-politicians or lobbying.
7.1.2 Government and Business Interaction
After having discussed the ideological context of government and business relations 
in Thailand, the research analysed the relationship itself. The analysis distinguished 
between institutional interaction and policy interaction.
Institutional interaction. The summary of the responses to the questions asked 
in the study of institutional interaction between companies and government agencies 
is shown in Table 7-3. The important features of these responses are summarised 
below.
It was found that contact and communication between manufacturing companies 
and the government in Thailand centre on a few government departments or their 
equivalents. The nine government agencies listed in Table 7-3 represented more than 
80% of the agencies named by the managers as the three most important government 
agencies their companies contacted. This finding highlights the tendency that the 
extent of company interaction with various government agencies is not homogeneous 
but depends on the characteristics of the industry. While the manufacturing industry, 
currently characterised by rapid growth and export expansion, was found to deal 
extensively with the Office of the Board of Investment, the Industrial Works 
Department and the Customs Department for new investments, production expansion 
and export, other industries like the Banking industry might be more involved with 
the Bank of Thailand or the Fiscal Policy Office on monetary issues.
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Table 7-3: Comparison of Characteristics of Compulsory and 
Non-Compulsory Dealings between Companies and 
Government Agencies
Q u estio n  I F ind ingsa
Could you give me the names of the three most 
important government agencies that your 
companies contacted or dealt with during the past 
12 months?
Board of Investment, Industrial Works Dept., 
Customs Dept., Revenue Dept., Internal Trade 
Dept., Foreign Trade Dept., Thai Industrial 
Standards Institute, Labour D ept, Food and 
Drug Administration (the nine government 
agencies most frequently named)
How important was this agencv to vour companv 
during the past 12 months?
Very Important
Most o f the time, was it legallv compulsorv for Compulsory 1 Non-compulsory
your company to contact or deal with this 
government agency during the past 12 months?
80% 120%
During the past 12 months, to what extent was 
your company involved with this agency for the 
following reasons?
C o m p u ls o r y 1 N o n -C o m p u ls o r y  
1 
1
a. To negotiate (e.g. agreements of contracts, 
disputes, joint projects, etc.)
Moderate Extent 1 Moderate Extent 
1
b. To complain (e.g. about difficulties, 
government regulations, etc.)
Small Extent 1 No Extent
c. To ask for help (e.g. financial help, advice, 
recommendations, opinions, etc.)
Moderate Extent 1 Great Extent 
1
d. To send records, reports, or other documents 
required by this agency
Moderate Extent 1 Moderate Extent 
1
e. To receive records, reports, or other documents 
from this agency
No Extent 1 Small Extent 
1
f. To influence (e.g. the agency’s services, 
operations, policies, etc.)
Moderate Extent 1 Small Extent
g. To establish or maintain a relationship with Moderate Extent 1 Moderate Extent
this agency
h. This government agency is one of your 
customers
No Extent 1 No Extent 
1
Overall, how much influence did this aeencv 
have on your company during the past 12 months?
Moderate Influence 1 Great Influence 
1
On the other hand, overall, how much influence 
did your company have on this agency during the 
past 12 months?
No Influence 1 Little Influence 
1 
1
How manv contact persons did vour 
company normally communicate with 
when dealing with this agency during the past 12 
months? For example, company A normally 
contacted the Director of the Industrial Economics 
Division when dealing with the Ministry of 
Industry?
5 personsb 1 5 persons 
1
1
1
1
1
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Question I Compulsory I Non-Compulsory
What was the highest iob-level of these contact 
persons?
Senior Level 1 Senior Level
What was the lowest iob-level of these contact 
persons?
Ordinary Level 1 Ordinary Level
How helpful were these contact persons in vour 
dealings with this agency?
Helpful 1 Very Helpful
How well acquainted were vou Dersonallv or vour 
company with these contact persons?
Moderately Acquainted 1 Moderately Acquainted
During the past 12 months, how frequentlv has 
your company communicated or been in contact 
with this agency?
About Monthly 1 About Monthly
Specifically, how frequentlv did vour companv 
communicate with this agency through each of the 
following ways during the past 12 months?
a. Telephone calls
b. Letters, reports, etc.
c. Face-to-face meetings
1-2 Times 
1-2 Times 
About Monthly
1 Once Every 3 Months 
1 Once Every 3 Months 
1 About Monthly
In general, what percentage of all this contact 
and communication with this agency was 
initiated bv people in vour companv during the 
past 12 months?
81-100% 181-100%
How well informed were vou of the following 
aspects of this agency?
a. Its objectives or policies
b. Its internal operations, activities, or work 
processes
c. Its internal organisation or structure
Well Informed 
Moderately Informed
Moderately Informed
1 Well Informed 
1 Moderately Informed
1 Moderately Informed
Overall, how much difficulty did vou experience 
in your contact with this agency during the past 
12 months?
Little Difficulty 1 No Difficulty
How satisfied were vou with the relationship 
between your company and this agency during 
the past 12 months?
Satisfied 1 Very Satisfied
Note: a Unless otherwise specified, the findings shown are the medians of
the responses to the questions, 
h Average.
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Such an association of an industry with the group of government agencies it 
primarily contacted has important implications. The association helps explain intra- 
government disputes, which theories based on the assumption of monolithic or 
consistent bureaucracy fail to explain or even recognise. For instance, the officials of 
the Office of the Board of Investment may not be satisfied with the way companies 
they promote are treated by the officials of the Revenue Department. Such intra- 
govemmental tension can develop since a government agency develops different 
relationships and works on different bases with different industries, sometimes even 
with different companies within the same industry.
The research further distinguished between legally compulsory and non- 
compulsory dealings between companies and government agencies. Despite having 
mostly been initiated by companies, the two types of contact differed in several 
aspects. It was found that the companies were more involved in such activities as 
attempting to gain influence over and making complaints to government agencies in 
compulsory contact than in non-compulsory contact. But such activities as asking for 
help or information from government agencies were more prevalent in non- 
compulsory contact than in compulsory contact. However, such activities as sending 
information to government agencies, and negotiating and establishing or maintaining 
a relationship with government agencies were common to both types of contact
The findings suggest that from the standpoint of companies, while compulsory 
contact is disadvantage-oriented, non-compulsory contact is advantage-oriented. That 
is, companies try to lose the least in compulsory contact but try to gain the most in 
non-compulsory contact. This may be one of the reasons why the majority of the 
managers said that they were more satisfied with their relationship with the 
government in non-compulsory contact than in compulsory contact. For instance, a 
company is likely to have relatively more difficulty in such compulsory dealings as 
getting their goods through customs or seeking permission to install a new piping 
system in its factory, than in such non-compulsory dealings as asking for information 
or joining a government trade mission abroad.
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These different bases and orientations of compulsory and non-compulsory 
dealings may also account for the different patterns of communication in the two 
types of interaction. It was found that the companies relied mainly on face-to-face 
meetings as a means of communication in compulsory contact with the government 
due to the extensive activities of negotiating, attempting to gain influence and making 
complaints involved in such interaction. But in non-compulsory contact, other 
methods of communication such as letters or telephone calls were used as a 
complement to face-to-face meetings in such interaction as asking for help or 
information.
Concerning personnel links within contact, it was found that in both types of 
contact, a company normally communicated with an average of 5 contact officials in 
its regular dealings with a government agency. The rank of these contact officials 
ranged from ordinary level such as members of administrative staff or clerks to senior 
level such as division directors. The personnel links were the result of informal 
acquaintance due to regular contact, of being former colleagues, or of having studied 
in the same class. These personal and personnel links raise the question of the 
adequacy of the approach of some writers which emphasises the sharing of social and 
educational backgrounds by senior bureaucrats and the business elite in analysing 
government and business relations, but ignores their informal relationship developed 
during regular interaction.
Finally, even though the companies said that they had little influence on the 
government agencies they contacted and that government agencies had a great 
influence on them, they were generally satisfied with their relationships with 
government agencies. In addition, the research findings support the broad hypothesis 
of the literature that the more knowledgeable managers are of the government 
agencies they contact and the more acquainted they are with the contact officials, the 
more successful their relationships with the agencies are likely to be.
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Policy interaction. In the second part of the analysis of the business-govemment 
relationship, the research has identified some of the major driving forces of policy 
interaction. It was found that government control of companies' pricing decisions, 
production capacity and output level decisions, and wage decisions formed the basis 
of business efforts to influence government economic policy. Other than the company 
decisions mentioned above, the Thai government had little influence on such 
marketing decisions as sales promotion, product distribution, and launching new 
products or abandoning existing products. The findings also refine the assumptions 
of the theories of business political activities by showing that government influence 
on company decisions varies from one business function to another.
However, there was little evidence that the companies' decision-making was 
considerably disrupted or regulated by the government. In fact, the findings suggest 
that in Thailand, government economic policy is generally pro-business. The 
evidence of this pro-business economic policy is that the majority of the managers 
interviewed said that overall, government economic policy contributed positively to 
their companies' costs, growth, profits, competitiveness and sales volumes. Such a 
policy environment is consistent with the ideological context discussed earlier, in 
which businessmen are encouraged by bureaucrats to participate in economic policy 
making.
In addition, with regard to the balance of policy cooperation between 
government and business, the research found that the companies needed to do little in 
order to become entitled to the benefits from the government' economic policies. 
Clearly, the government has designed economic policies with the intention of 
fostering the interests of business.
Such a pro-business scenario makes inapplicable and inadequate in the case of 
Thailand, the literature’s statement that business involvement in politics is due to the 
adversarial intervention of the government and the increasing number of regulations. 
None of the research findings show that the political activities of companies in
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Thailand primarily respond to government regulations as do those of companies in 
Western industrial countries such as the United States. This research hypothesises 
that this scenario not only prevails in Thailand but also in other developing countries 
where, for instance, employees' injuries or environmentally unfriendly factories are 
taken as facts of life. The alternative explanation offered by this research is that in a 
pro-business environment, business political activities are seen by firms as part of 
their competitive strategy or are the result of imitation of their competitors' actions. 
Firms try to secure greater influence over government economic policy than their 
competitors or even to gain exclusive influence over a policy issue.
Some of the economic policies most frequently mentioned by the managers as 
contributing positively to business were investment and export promotion, protection 
of domestic industry, government consultation with business on economic policy, 
and rationalisation of the bureaucracy. Some of the economic policies most frequently 
mentioned as contributing negatively to business were bureaucratic red tape, the 
uncertain and ambiguous nature of public policy, price control, lack of infrastructure 
facilities, lack of development of government personnel, and the lifting of trade 
barriers on certain goods.
These government economic policies perceived as either having a bad or good 
effect on companies suggest that the managers had some criteria for deciding whether 
or not a policy was in their interests. By deductive reasoning, it is obvious that the 
managers saw as good, an economic policy which lowered their costs, extended their 
markets, created a monopoly-like situation to their advantage, encouraged swift 
business operation, and which they participated in. They saw as bad an economic 
policy which made business operation inefficient, created environmental uncertainty, 
threatened management autonomy, restricted business expansion, and undermined 
their competitiveness. Such criteria help explain why there are policy issues which 
unite as well as divide business, since the criteria may be differently applied by 
different companies. These pragmatic criteria also help explain the ideological 
inconsistency discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 7-1: The Ex Post Facto Mode of Policy Interaction between 
Business and Government
PRO-BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT OF POLICY INTERACTION
FIRM
Policy Impact
Individual Company CRITERIA
GOVERNMENT BAD GOOD
Industry-Wide
BUSINESS
ASSOCIATION
The research further studied the reaction of a company to government economic 
policies which had a bad effect on it (the ex post facto mode of policy interaction). 
The results are conceptually summarised in Figure 7-1. When negatively affected by a 
government economic policy, a company can choose whether to react to the 
government or not. The research found that the companies were likely take action or 
make complaints to the government if a policy affected them as an individual but did 
little or nothing if a policy affected the industry as a whole. It was also found that 
having decided to take action in response to a policy, the majority of the companies 
complained directly to the responsible government agencies in the case of individual 
company impact but channelled the action through business associations in the case of 
industry-wide impact.
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It was found that when the companies did not take action in response to a policy 
which had a bad effect on them, the main reasons were that they did not think the 
action was worth the necessary time and effort, or that the government agencies 
responsible for the policy would listen to their complaints. In addition, in the case of 
individual company impact, the absence of clear or explicit ways of making 
complaints and the complexity of the complaints procedure also contributed to the 
companies' inaction.
Finally, the research findings suggest that the majority of the managers found 
the government's response to complaints made by business associations about an 
industry-wide impact more satisfactory than its response to complaints made by 
companies directly to the government about individual company impact. This could 
be due to the different nature of the two types of impact as well as the associated 
channels of action taken. As pointed out in the study of the ideological context 
(Chapter 4), Thai bureaucrats prefer business efforts to influence government 
economic policy to be channelled through business associations.
7.2 IMPLICATIONS
The section will discuss the implications of the research findings for management and 
public policy.
7.2.1 Implications for Management
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the interactional approach should be seen as the interface 
between the structural and behavioural approaches and the organisational approach. 
This research would be incomplete if it did not address the issue of how business 
managers should organise an internal mechanism to deal with the government. The 
more immediate questions facing the managers are: "Why should a company set up an 
internal unit to deal with the government?" and "What kind of company should have
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one?"
Setting-up a government relations unit. The findings of this research suggest 
that there are several reasons for companies to set up a mechanism for dealing with 
the government. First, as discussed earlier, the managers and the senior bureaucrats 
were not much different in their views of the role of the government and its 
relationship with business in the Thai economy. The senior bureaucrats encouraged 
private business to become involved in politics and participate in the government’s 
economic-policy making. The overall government economic policy also seems to 
promote the interests of the business community. Such a pro-business environment, 
in terms of both ideology and practice, provides many opportunities and advantages 
as well as a positive basis for business to influence the government if a company is 
prepared and willing to make an effort to analyse the situation and compare its 
objectives with those of the prevailing government economic policy, and knows 
whom it should approach and when and how. The above state of preparedness and 
willingness is unlikely to be achieved without the existence of a government relations 
unit inside a company.
Second, the investigation of the research into institutional interaction shows that 
there is a considerable amount of government related activity going on inside 
companies. It was found that a company normally contacted a government agency 
once a month and developed some kind of relationship with up to 5 contact officials 
in the agency. Suppose a company deals extensively with 5 government agencies, it 
means one government dealing each week and a relationship with 25 government 
officials. This does not include the periods in which special issues concerning the 
government, such as industrial disputes, arise. These activities with the government 
certainly need to be organised, coordinated, and managed with a sense of direction. 
For instance, it would be rather awkward if a manager who was negotiating with a 
government agency were not aware of previous meetings that his colleagues had
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already had with the agency.
Third, the investigation of the research into policy interaction suggests that the 
effort of business to influence a government economic policy in its implementation 
stage (the ex post facto  mode) is often ineffective or greeted with less than 
satisfactory responses from the government. Therefore, a company should be able to 
monitor an emerging or forthcoming government economic policy and anticipate its 
likely impact on the company so that it has time to influence the policy or adapt itself 
in accordance with the policy.
Finally, recent political developments in Thailand have been in favour of 
democracy and are likely to be so for the foreseeable future. As with most 
democracies, new pressure groups such as environmentalists or consumer groups 
will emerge and the old ones such as labour unions will become stronger, exerting 
pressure on business as well as on government. The situation would be made worse 
for business if the government tried to shift this pressure onto business alone. 
Therefore, companies should be well prepared to deal with these emerging social 
pressures in Thailand.
All the above statements argue for the creation of a government relations unit 
inside a company. However, not all companies need to deal extensively with the 
government. The research findings show that big or Thai companies or those in 
industries with a great extent of government control deal more extensively with the 
government than small or foreign companies or those in industries with a small extent 
of government control. It was found that the business decisions of the former group 
of companies, such as pricing or production capacity and output levels were 
significantly linked to the government's economic policy. They have also developed 
more extensive personnel links with the bureaucracy and the government than have 
the latter group of companies. Thus, it should be the former group of companies 
which should be more concerned than the latter to develop a unit for dealing with the 
government and for coordinating their government-related activities. However, the
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research found that only one out of the whole sample of 41 companies had a 
government relations division.
For a company which decides to develop a mechanism to handle its 
government-related activities, this research has several recommendations to offer. In 
view of the scarcity of resources in business competition, the immediate setting-up of 
a government relations unit would be too costly and unattractive to several 
companies. The alternative would be that a company could assign one of the line- 
managers or the chief executive to be primarily responsible for the management of 
government-related activities, depending on the nature of the company's dealings 
with the government, since it was found in this research that one senior manager was 
often more involved in the company's government-related activities more than the 
others.
Such an assignment of responsibility to a line manager or the chief executive 
officer as against the creation of a new government relations manager has two 
advantages. First, it is cost-effective since a company does not have to hire a new 
manager. Second, it helps overcome the problem of communication with other senior 
managers and facilitate the integration of the government relations task into the overall 
business policy. For example, as also pointed out by the literature, public affairs 
managers often lack the credibility to or fail to persuade their peers in board of 
directors meetings to take action on social issues because of other line-managers' lack 
of understanding of or insensitivity to the importance of external environment 
management.
Nevertheless, depending on the amount and nature of a company's dealings 
with the government, there should be a number of personnel permanently responsible 
for the operation of the government relations unit.
Government relations tasks. If such an unit was initiated within a company, 
several government relations tasks, which were previously found to be fragmented 
and ad hoc, could be coordinated and effectively carried out.
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As shown in Figure 7-2, there are three major areas in which the government 
relations unit would operate: institutional relations, policy relations, and personnel 
and other relations. Institutional relations can be divided into routine and non-routine 
dealings with various government agencies. Routine dealings are mainly the 
compulsory contact discussed in this research, such as renewal of factory licences, 
tax payment, and export and import documentation. The non-routine dealings are 
often non-compulsory contact such as applications for investment or export 
promotion, price increase negotiations, foreign trade missions or exhibitions, and 
industrial dispute settlements.
On the other hand, policy relations with the government can be divided into the 
ex ante facto  and ex post facto  modes of dealing. In the ex ante facto  policy 
relationship, the government relations unit would not only scan and identify emerging 
policy issues, but also anticipate and monitor their future development. The likely 
impact of policy issues, both in the form of disadvantages and opportunities, should 
be given appropriate priority and evaluated in the light of the company's present 
objectives and future plans.
In the ex post facto policy relationship, the unit would deal with government 
economic policies in their implementation stage. The impact of policies can be 
classified either as affecting the company as an individual or as affecting the industry 
as a whole. The research findings suggest that efforts to influence the government in 
the case of individual company impact are often less successful than in the case of 
industry-wide impact. However, the distinction between individual company impact 
and industry-wide impact is a matter of perception. For example, while the case of a 
company caught in the tension between two government agencies whose regulations 
are contradictory, may be taken as affecting the company individually, the company 
can also see it as a policy-level problem of the lack of coordination of government 
economic policy and get the relevant trade associations involved in the case. Thus, in 
certain cases of individual company impact, if a company can involve the participation
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of the relevant business association, the success of its efforts to influence government 
economic policy may be enhanced.
Finally, the government relations unit would also be responsible for making and 
maintaining personnel links and other relationships with the government. For 
example, in view of the importance of human relations in the Thai work culture, the 
unit should make sure that it sends proper congratulations or condolences in times of 
success or misfortune in the lives of the regularly contacted bureaucrats. In addition, 
whenever possible, the mechanism should not hesitate to participate in other non- 
work activities of the government such as charities or sporting events. The goodwill 
achieved in these informal relationships would play an important role in the 
company's future institutional and policy relations with the government.
Integration into business policy. The above three government relations tasks 
are by no means separate but are closely related. Therefore, they should be 
coordinated within the government relations unit itself. For example, managers may 
use the information gained from informal relationships developed with bureaucrats 
during their routine dealings, in identifying emerging government policies.
The govemment-relations unit would communicate with other line-functions, 
giving up-to-date information about the company's external environment to other 
line-managers as well as receiving information about current internal activities from 
them. It would also report its operation to the top management so that its 
recommendations could be integrated into overall business policy. This is the point 
when the advantages of assigning the government relations task to one of the line- 
managers or chief executives are seen. Due to his acquaintance with other line- 
managers and with the nature of the company's business, that manager would 
experience no difficulty in translating the government relations unit's suggestions into 
action. For instance, the govemment-relations manager might initiate the action of 
modifying the company’s new investment project in anticipation of an emerging 
government economic policy. Or, if possible, the company might opt for an offensive
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strategy by taking political action to influence the emerging policy.
The link between the government relations unit and top management would be 
completed by the evaluation of the initiated actions and programmes and the feedback 
of the evaluation results.
However, the concept of a government relations unit may be too narrow for big 
companies and corporations. They may also have to deal extensively with the local 
community, media, stockholders, consumers, political associations, and business 
associations. In the long-term, these relations can be integrated into the government 
relations unit, forming the "public affairs function." At this stage the company would 
be able to stay in touch with its external environment through the "window" of the 
public affairs function and better manage the pressure from the larger society of 
which it is a part.
7.2.2 Implications for Public Policy
Policy relationship . The research findings also have several important 
implications for public policy. First, the government can benefit as much from the 
similarity of the views held by senior bureaucrats and managers about economics and 
the business-govemment relationship as business can. As Grant put it:
"It would be misleading to portray the relationship between business and 
government in terms of a political struggle between lobbiers and lobbied.
There is an exchange relationship from which government secures three 
types of benefits: information for policy design; consent for policy 
clearance; and cooperation for policy cooperation."!
Bearing in mind that companies have a mass of information at their disposal, the 
government can use the personnel links developed during the institutional interaction 
discussed in this research to obtain information for policy formulation. Companies 
!\Vyn Grant, Business and Politics in Britain (London: MacMillan, 1987), p.37.
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should be more than willing to give the information since they would also gain 
something back from the cooperation, such as goodwill from bureaucrats. In 
addition, the research findings suggest that managers are eager and willing to enter 
into consultation with the government. The government could use this as a base for 
gaining their consent and cooperation in policy implementation.
In order to counterattack criticisms that such participation by businessmen 
would make a policy outcome biased, the government can use the "pluralistic tactic," 
as mentioned by a senior bureaucrat in Chapter 4, of bringing more businessmen or 
relevant parties into the dialogue between business and government. Such a tactic 
would create a negotiation environment which would reduce the dominance of a 
single company or interest group, since it is unlikely that the interests of all parties 
concerned would completely coincide and may even counterbalance each other. In 
addition, as one senior bureaucrat said in Chapter 3, the government is like theory 
and business is like practice; the business experience will keep the government policy 
in touch with reality.
Policy targeting. Second, the research shows that even though overall, 
government economic policy is in favour of business, its benefits are apparently more 
concentrated within large companies than within small companies. While the 
prosperity of large companies should be maintained, for example for the reasons of 
the country's international commercial competitiveness, the growth of smaller 
companies should also be encouraged in order to ensure healthy local business 
competition and diversification. Therefore, some government economic policies 
should possess a discriminatory quality to distinguish between various types of 
company. For example, government investment or export incentives should be 
limited in duration or made contingent upon the size, annual turnover, profit rate, and 
performance of a company.
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Policy continuity. Third, the Thai government seems to lack or is unable to carry 
out a clear, long-term industrial and commercial policy. To a certain extent, such 
policy uncertainty has prevented businesses from long-range planning and, at the 
same time, forced them into ad hoc coping with their external environment. Even 
though regular changes of government as a result of the less than stable political 
atmosphere, are partly responsible for this, unnecessary ’’surprise" regulations such 
as ministerial rules and notifications should be reduced. However, in an urgent case, 
if ministerial rules or notifications are necessary, they should be discussed with the 
parties concerned before becoming effective.
Industria l infrastructure. Fourth, the lack of infrastructure facilities mentioned 
by several managers in the research can cause long-term set-backs for the 
development of the economy. For example, the uncertain power supply is a major 
obstacle to the utilisation of industrial capacity and expansion. In addition, the lack of 
good transport networks, both in terms of quality such as bad road-surface conditions 
and quantity such as severe traffic jams within Bangkok and the surrounding 
provinces, also hinders industrial growth and expansion into rural areas. Long-term 
planning of infrastructure development both within Bangkok and other industrial 
provinces should be taken more seriously by all parties concerned. The government 
should speed up its privatisation programmes of state-enterprises so that more private 
funds can be drawn into infrastructure investment. The problem demands immediate 
attention and, more importantly, action from the government.
B u reaucracy  ra tiona lisa tion . Finally, the bureaucracy, the giant driving 
machine in the implementation of public policy and the day-to-day operation of the 
government, urgently needs further rationalisation. Even though there are now 
several joint public and private committees looking into the matter, the improvements 
in the bureaucracy are still less than satisfactory. In addition, the rationalisation and 
changes in various government departments should be coordinated.
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7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH
Like most exploratory studies, this research has raised other questions which are 
more important than those it has already answered. In this section, the theoretical 
implications of the research findings are first pointed out and then future areas of 
investigation and research approaches are proposed.
7.3.1 Theoretical Implications: Towards the Theory of M ultiple 
Government-Business Relations
The principle theoretical implication of the research findings is that the macro­
perspective theories, such as those of the Marxist and the pluralist schools, even 
though useful and necessary, are insufficient to bring out or even fail to recognise the 
multiplicity and complexity of government and business interaction. Examples of 
macro-perspective statements other than those of the strong-weak typology discussed 
in Chapter 1 are as follows.
"It is precisely in those countries in which employers have encountered a 
significant threat from an organized working class -countries such as 
Britain, Sweden, Norway, Austria and Germany- that employers, too, 
have created strong organizations. The USA, the country in which the 
challenge to capitalism has been the weakest, is also the country in which 
employers' organizations have been the weakest."2
"Political culture has played a vital role in shaping the political role and 
involvement of business. ...countries such as the USA in which the 
political culture has been highly favourable to business, the incentive to 
organise for the protection of businessmen's collective interests has been 
less than in political cultures more likely to sustain a challenge to 
business."3
2Graham K. Wilson, Business and Politics (London: MacMillan, 1985). p. 130.
3Ibid., p.131.
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"The political structure of a country exerts a powerful influence on the 
form of business-political involvement: countries which have a strong, 
centralised government are more likely to have strong, centralised interest 
groups."4
"In highly-concentrated economics, employers may thus be more likely to 
join interest groups than in less-concentrated economies... In economies 
which are extensively involved in international trade, the capacity of 
governments to plan the economy is reduced."5
At several points in the analysis of this research, it has been shown that government 
and business relations are non-homogeneous, dynamic and neither completely 
conflictual nor cooperative. As a result, the sweeping, static, aggregate statements of 
the macro-perspective theory such as those shown above become inadequate, despite 
their contextual usefulness.
In fact, in his literature review, Murray has touched upon the above 
shortcomings of the macro-perspective theory. He suggested that any analytical 
model or set of recommendations for improving government and business relations 
must simultaneously deal with intra-business and intra-govemmental factors and the 
mechanisms of interaction, and be particularly sensitive to the subjective interpretation 
of reality highlighted by the interpretive school.6
In addition, in the light of this inadequacy of the literature, Wilks and Wright 
offered a new analytical framework as shown in Figure 7-3. The basic principle of 
the analytical framework shown is that the guidance offered by the macro-perspective 
theory such as the strong and weak dichotomy is not more than a first, and often 
inaccurate, approximation of the interpretation of government and business relations 
and a more fine-grained analytical schema is needed.7
4Ibid., p. 132.
5Ibid., pp.135-136.
6Victor V. Murray, "Business-Govemment Relations in Canada: A Conceptual Map," Canadian  
Public Administration, Vol.26, No.4 (Winter, 1983), p.608.
7Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, editors, Comparative Government-Industry Relations;
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Figure 7-3: Framework for the Analysis of Policy Community
Policy Level Example Policy Actors
Policy area Industry, Education, Transport, Health, etc. Policy universe
I
Policy sector Chemicals, Telecommunications, etc. v
^  ^Policy communities
Policy sub-sector Basic chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Paints, etcr 
(focus)
Policy issues e.g. e.g. Policy networks
Health & Safety Drug Licensing 
R&D Company Profits
Over-Capacity Limited List
(i) Policy area or function refers to discrete areas of government activity (industry, education, 
transport, housing, etc.)or functions of government (expenditure control, audit, establishments).
(ii) Policy universe refers to all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy 
area or function (e.g. industrial policy universe).
(iii) Policy community refers to a group of actors or potential actors drawn from the policy universe 
whose community membership is defined by a common policy focus.
(iv) Policy focus is identified by such qualities as product, service, technology, market, size o f firm, 
’batch’.
(v) Policy network describes the general properties of the processes by which members o f one or 
more policy communities interact in a structure of dependent relationships.
(vi) Policy issues and policy functions provide the occasion or a policy network.
Source: Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, editors, Comparative
Government-Industry Relations; Western Europe, the United 
States, and Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp.299-300.
Grant also came across the heterogeneous nature of government and business 
relations in his study of business and politics in Britain. While Fidler summarised the 
view of business power in Britain as follows: "the government that is, in practice, the 
cabinet plus senior civil servants, controls business, not business the 
government,"8 Grant’s data suggested that there is a closer relationship between 
business associations and the government in Britain than in other European
Western Europe, the United States, and Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.289.
8J. Fidler, The British Business Elite (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p.231, as quoted 
by Grant, op.cit., p.7.
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countries.9 He explained this somewhat contradictory evidence by arguing that a 
distinction between the government relationship with business persons and with 
business association officials should be made. The distinction between the 
government relationship with large companies and with small companies is also 
important.10
The findings of this research have also shown that the interactional approach 
has much to offer in strengthening the weaknesses of the macro-perspective theory. 
First, though pursuing a rather different line of investigation, the interactional 
approach finally comes out with a conclusion similar to that of the policy community 
and network analysis. As shown in the earlier summary, the manufacturing 
companies' contact with the government clustered around a few government 
departments or two or three ministries, forming what is equivalent to the policy 
community defined previously by Wilks and Wright. Apart from being responsible 
for the intra-govemmental disputes and the variation of business relationships with 
different government departments, the primary association between an industry sector 
and a particular section of the government may also explain the intra-business 
relationship. For example, as a result such an association, companies from different 
sectors of industry as well as within the same sector may compete against each other 
to gain influence over a government agency or group of agencies.
Second, as mentioned in the earlier summary, the research shows that 
compulsory and non-compulsory interaction between companies and government 
agencies differ in terms of the basis of contact, influence, pattern of communication, 
significance of informal personnel and personal links, and the success of the 
interaction. These differences are rarely discussed by the macro-perspective theory in 
the analysis of the interaction. This research suggests that the distinction between the 
interaction which is voluntary and that which is legally compulsory is one of the 
explanations of why the business-govemment relationship is neither absolutely
9Grant, op.cit., p.7.
10Grant, loc.cit.
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conflictual nor cooperative.
Third, with respect to policy interaction, the research shows that a company 
reacts to a policy which affects it as an individual and to that which affects the 
industry as a whole in a different manner. In addition, the means of reaction also 
differ in the two types of impact, as mentioned in the earlier summary of findings. 
This distinction further refines the explanation of why companies are more successful 
in their efforts to influence one government policy than in another, a refinement 
which the macro-perspective theory rarely achieves.
However, the arguments thus far should not be interpreted as completely 
rejecting the macro-perspective theory but rather as pointing to new approaches which 
strengthen and complement the existing literature. In fact, it is the macro-perspective 
which provides a base enabling the new approaches to make further refinement, 
distinction, classification and comparison of the business-govemment relationship. 
The direction taken by the new approaches is towards a "theory of multiple 
government-business relations," which, while having an overall view of the 
relationship, would also be sensitive enough to account for the multiple variations of 
interaction within the relationship itself.
7.3.2 Future Investigation
Even though this research has answered certain questions on government and 
business relations in Thailand, there are still other important issues which need more 
research to be done.
Appropriate future research can be best seen in three dimensions: research 
approach (empirical, documentary and comparative), level of analysis (micro and 
macro), and theoretical approach (structural, behavioural, organisational and 
interactional). This study supports the trend in the literature of using an empirical and 
comparative research approach and micro-level analysis for the purposes of
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grounding theory and improving the accuracy of description of government and 
business relations, as discussed in Chapter 1. The theoretical implications and the 
practical implications discussed earlier suggest that future research can greatly benefit 
from the interactional approach in terms of the advancement of the theory of 
government and business relations and new information for practitioners in their 
handling and understanding of the relationship.
More specifically, the interview schedules of this research can be directly used 
or modified for a comparative study of the relationship between the Thai government 
and other sectors, such as the banking sector. This could also be extended for the 
comparison of the same sector or industry in different countries, such as Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia.
Further research in Thailand should now proceed to examine the internal 
organisation of company handling of government-related activities. Even though this 
research has emphasised both institutional and policy interaction, it has touched little 
upon a company's internal organisation and communication for its dealing with the 
government. In the light of the research finding that very often there is not a formal 
government relations unit within a company, further research may examine how a 
company's informal mechanism for dealing with the government operates. How 
effective, efficient, and adequate is this mechanism in its performance? How is the 
government relations task or function defined by managers? And do managers handle 
compulsory and voluntary dealings with the government differently?
Further research may also ask whether companies in Thailand have political 
strategies. What are these political strategies? How are they formed inside the 
companies? And how are they related to the companies' business policy and 
competitive strategy? This may lead to analysis of the intra-business policy 
relationship.
In addition, the implications for public policy suggest that research is needed 
into the intra-government relationship and the effectiveness of certain economic 
policies such as investment and export promotion.
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Finally, as it is said "Bangkok is not Thailand.” Government and business 
relations at provincial level should also be high on the agenda of future research.
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APPENDIX A
THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS
IN THAILAND
A .l INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides information about the economic and political development of 
Thailand. The first two sections will discuss the structural change in the Thai 
economy and the sources of the change. Later, a brief account of major political 
events in Thailand are given.
A.2 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE THAI ECONOMY
With an average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) of 
approximately 50% in nominal terms and 12% in real terms between 1970 and 1988, 
the Thai economy can be said to have been performing very well. According to Table 
A -l, the GDP growth rate between 1970 and 1975 had been as high as 31% in real 
terms or 6% per annum. The figure rose considerably to 47% between 1975 and 
1980 or 9% per annum but then fell back to 32% between 1980 and 1985 or 6% per 
annum. The growth rate of the economy (GDP) picked up slightly again to 13% 
between 1985 and 1987 or 6% per annum. The growth rate finally settled at a rather 
high figure of 11% between 1987 and 1988.
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Table A -l: Gross Domestic Product and Its Growth Rate (1970- 
1988)
Value (Million Baht)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988
GDP 
GDP at 
1972 price
147,385
155,694
303,319 658,509 1,014,399 1,234,030 1,465,736 
204,428 299,472 394,113 446,361 495,374
Total Growth Rate During the Period(%)
1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1987 1987-1988
GDP
GDP at 1972 Price
105.80 117.10 54.05 21.65 18.78 
31.30 46.49 31.60 13.26 10.98
Sources: Adapted and calculated from the Office of the National Economic 
and Social Development Board and the Bank of Thailand, as 
published in Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, 
Thailand Economic Information Kit (Thailand Development 
Research Institute Foundation, May,1989), Table 1.
Considering the high growth rate of the GDP or in other words the rapid 
expansion of the economy, it is interesting to investigate further the development and 
performance of various components of the GDP. Is there a structural change in the 
economy or the production structure? Is there any particular sector which has 
contributed significantly to this rapid growth of the GDP? At the same time is there a 
decline in other sectors? If there is, what are the underlying factors for the decline of 
one sector and the prosperity of another? Two prominent developments of the 
economy can give satisfactory answers to these questions: the rapid growth of the 
manufacturing sector and the decline of traditional agriculture.
A.2.1 Rapid Growth of the Manufacturing Sector
The high performance of the economy has been due largely to the rapid growth of the 
manufacturing sector. The evidence of this can be seen in its share of the GDP and of 
the total exports.
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Table A-2: Gross Domestic Product at Current Market Price by 
Industrial Origins (1975-1988)
Value (Million Baht)
1975 1980 1985 1987 1988
Agriculture 81,521 152,852 169,895 198,284 247,748
Mining & Quarrying 6,582 22,147 40,167 38,203 44,333
Manufacturing 56,636 139,936 224,456 295,512 357,851
Construction 11,594 34,764 56,824 62,995 74,524
Electricity & 3,417 6,289 23,590 31,858 37,487
Water Supply
Transportation 16,790 37,863 78,076 92,947 106,834
& Communication
Wholesale & Retail 58,117 110,176 153,130 192,381 232,231
Trade
Banking, Insurance 8,019 19,926 35,988 48,671 60,032
and Real Estate
Ownership of 13,546 22,798 41,091 48,802 52,702
Dwelling
Public Administration 13,368 30,711 48,545 52,712 56,242
and Defence
Services 33,669 81,047 142,637 171,665 195,572
GDP 303,319 658,509 1,014,399 1,234,030 1,465,736
Share (%)
1975 1980 1985 1987 1988
Agriculture 26.88 23.21 16.75 16.07 16.90
Mining & Quarrying 2.17 3.36 3.96 3.10 3.02
Manufacturing 18.67 21.25 22.13 23.95 24.41
Construction 3.82 5.28 5.60 5.10 5.08
Electricity & 1.13 0.96 2.33 2.58 2.56
Water Supply
Transportation 5.54 5.75 7.70 7.53 7.29
& Communication
Wholesale & Retail 19.18 16.73 15.10 15.59 15.84
Trade
Banking, 2.64 3.03 3.55 3.94 4.10
Insurance and Real Estate
Ownership of 4.47 3.46 4.05 3.95 3.60
Dwelling
Public Administration 4.41 4.66 4.79 4.27 3.84
and Defence
Services 11.10 12.31 14.06 13.91 13.36
GDP 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: The Office of the National Economic and Social Development
Board, as published in Thailand Development Research Institute
Foundation, op.cit., Table 3.
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It can be seen from Table A-2 that of all four major components of the GDP 
(agriculture, manufacturing, the wholesale and retail trade, and services), the 
manufacturing sector is the emerging winner. Its share of the GDP had increased at 
an average rate of 2.4% per annum between 1975 and 1988. This is in contrast to the 
decreasing or very slightly increasing share of the other three major industries. The 
agricultural industry's GDP share had fallen at an average rate of 2.7% per annum 
during the same period and the wholesale and retail trade industry's at 1.3%. 
However, the services industry's share had expanded slowly at an average rate of 
1.6% during the same period.
Table A-3: Exports by Major Sectors (1982-1988)
Value (Million Baht)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988a
Agriculture 73,150 66,484 78,292 73,398 79,397 83,259 104,514
Fishing 7,636 8,225 8,684 10,590 14,853 18,163 20,466
Forestry 102 109 104 365 620 819 783
Mining 9,824 6,806 7,588 10,126 6,283 5,851 6,767
Manufacturing 63,025 61,358 76,095 95,615 129,170 188,031 266,129
Sample and Other 2,122 1,340 1,312 1,518 1,772 2,967 2,876
Unclassified Goods
Re-Export 3,689 2,150 3,162 1,754 1,288 763 1,240
Total 159,728 146,472 175,237 193,366 233,383 299,853 402,838
Share (%)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Agriculture 45.80 45.39 44.68 37.96 34.02 27.77 25.94
Fishing 4.78 5.62 4.96 5.48 6.36 6.06 5.08
Forestry 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.19
Mining 6.15 4.65 4.33 5.24 2.69 1.95 1.68
Manufacturing 39.46 41.89 43.42 49.45 55.35 62.71 66.08
Sample and Other 1.33 0.91 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.99 0.71
Unclassified Goods
Re-Export 2.31 1.47 1.80 0.91 0.55 0.25 0.31
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: a Preliminary.
Source: Adapted from the Bank of Thailand, as published in Thailand
Development Research Institute Foundation, op.cit., Table 5.
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With respect to its share of the total exports, Table A-3 emphasises further the 
role of the manufacturing sector in the economy. The data clearly suggests the 
manufacturing sector's increasing share of the total exports. The growth rate of its 
export share had been as high as 11% per annum between 1982 and 1988 while other 
sectors' shares had either slightly increased or significantly decreased. For example, 
the agricultural and the mining industries' shares of the total exports had decreased at 
a rate of 7% and 12% per annum respectively during the same period. Since 1986 the 
manufacturing sector alone has accounted for more than half of the total exports (55% 
in 1986, 63% in 1987, and 66% in 1988).
The principal manufactured exports. The principal manufactured exports of 
Thailand are textile products and integrated circuits (see Table A-4). Due to the 
abundant supply of cheap labour, Thai textile products are quite competitive in the 
world market. It took a share of 25%, 26% and 22% of the total manufactured 
exports in 1985, 1987 and 1988 respectively (calculated from Tables A-3 and A-4). 
Similarly, the integrated circuits industry, enjoying the abundant cheap labour as well 
as the government promotional privileges, took shares of 9% and 8% of the total 
value of manufactured exports in 1985 and 1987 respectively (calculated from Tables 
A-3 and A-4).
Other manufactured exports. The growth of the manufacturing sector is not 
limited to those two industries mentioned above. Table A-4 shows a strong growth in 
the processed-food industry such as canned fish, canned pineapple, and frozen fowl. 
For example, the canned fish industry had a growth rate of 30% and 45% during 
1985-1987 and 1987-1988 respectively. This strong growth was encouraged further 
by the strengthening of the Japanese yen which had pushed up the cost of canned 
food from Japan, a major producer and exporter of canned food, and by the accident 
at Chernobyl nuclear power plant which had caused great concern among Europeans
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and forced them to turn to safer products from Asia.1
Table A-4: Major Export Items (1985-1988)
Value (Million Baht) Growth Rate (%)
1985 1987 1988a 1985-1987 1987-1988
Principal Exports
Rice 22,524 22,703 34,636 0.40 42.24
Rubber 13,567 20,539 25,984 20.73 23.52
Maize 7,700 3,928 3,662 -33.65 -7.01
Tapioca Products 14,969 20,661 21,685 16.11 4.84
Prawns 3,439 5,749 9,553 25.69 50.78
Tin 5,647 2,344 2,242 -43.96 -4.45
Sugar 6,247 8,573 9,394 15.83 9.15
Integrated Circuits 8,248 15,179 8,668 30.50 -56.03
Textile Products 23,578 48,555 58,379 36.12 18.43
Precious Stones 6,350 11,550 13,772 29.91 17.60
Total Principal Exports 112,269 159,781 187,975 17.65 16.25
Other 81,097 140,072 214,863 27.33 42.78
Total 193,366 299,853 402,838 21.94 29.52
Other Exports
Frozen Fowl 1,467 4,020 5,009 50.40 22.00
Coffee 883 1,099 1,212 10.94 9.79
Fresh Fish 1,377 2,493 3,125 29.68 22.59
Canned Pineapple 3,292 3,728 4,671 6.22 22.55
Canned Fish 5,204 9,516 14,989 30.18 45.43
Leather Gloves 347 464 532 14.53 13.68
Artificial Flowers 913 1,486 2,032 24.36 31.29
Wall and Floor Tiles 315 671 894 37.81 28.69
Wood Products 1,901 3,740 4,019 33.84 7.19
Jute Products 1,561 1,697 927 4.18 -60.47
Footwear 2,368 5,915 9,624 45.77 48.68
Furniture and Parts 1,317 3,387 6,619 47.23 67.00
Plastic Products 1,262 2,215 5,465 28.13 90.31
Jewellery 2,168 8,257 9,690 66.86 16.00
Total 24,375 48,688 68,808 34.59 34.59
Note: a Preliminary.
Source: The Bank of Thailand, as published in Thailand Development 
Research Institute Foundation, op.cit., Table 6.
international Business Research, Million Baht Business Information Thailand 1988  (Bangkok: 
International Business Research, 1988), p. 13.
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Other industries such as footwear, furniture and parts, and plastic products, 
despite their small shares of the manufacturing sector, also became increasingly 
important, in the light of their high growth rates. The footwear industry had growth 
rates of 46% and 49% during 1985-1987 and 1987-1988 respectively, furniture and 
parts 47% and 67%, and plastic products 28% and 90% (see Table A-4).
A.2.2 Decline of the Agricultural Sector
While the manufacturing sector of the economy is performing well with regard to its 
growth and exports, the equally important agricultural sector is in decline. It is 
apparent from Table A-2 that the agricultural sector's share of the GDP has been 
decreasing steadily. With a share of 27% in 1975, it was the biggest component of 
the GDP, but its share has fallen steadily and has finally been overtaken by the 
manufacturing sector's share for the first time in 1985. Since then its share of the 
GDP has been lacking further behind the manufacturing sector's share.
Moreover, according to Table A-3, the 1980s had seen a steady decline of the 
agricultural sector's exports. Considering a share of 46% of the total exports in 1982, 
nearly one half, the sector had performed rather poorly to register a share of 26% of 
the total exports, or only one quarter, in 1988 (see Table A-3). In 1985 its export 
share was surpassed by that of the manufacturing sector. Overall, between 1982 and 
1988, the agricultural sector had had a negative growth rate of 7% per annum.
The principle agricultural exports. The principal agricultural products of 
Thailand are rice, rubber, tapioca products, sugar, and maize respectively. Table A-5 
shows that these five major crops together take approximately a 90% share of the total 
agricultural exports. However, Table A-4 shows that the growth rates of these five 
major crops are quite uncertain. For example, during 1985-1987 rice had registered a 
growth rate of only 0.4% but the figure jumped to 42% during 1987-1988 while the 
rubber growth rate had improved slightly from 21% during 1985-1987 to 24% during
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1987-1988. At the same time tapioca products, sugar and maize had performed rather 
badly. The tapioca growth rate had deteriorated from 16% during 1985-1987 to 5% 
during 1987-1988, and sugar from 16% to 10% during the same period. Finally, 
maize had had a negative growth rate of 34% and 7% during 1985-1987 and 1987- 
1988 respectively.
Table A-5: Shares of Major Crops in the Total Agricultural Exportsa 
(1985-1988)
Share (%)
1985 1987 1988
Rice 30.69 27.27 33.14
Rubber 18.48 24.67 24.86
Tapioca Products 20.39 24.82 20.75
Sugar 8.51 10.30 8.93
Maize 10.49 4.72 3.50
Others 11.44 8.22 8.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: a Calculated from Tables A-3 and A-4.
A.3 SOURCES OF THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The structural change in the Thai economy can be attributed largely to four major 
factors: investment promotion privileges given by the government; gaps left behind 
by other newly industrialised countries (NICs) in Asia; exchange rate policy; and the 
decline in the prices of agricultural products. The details of each factor are discussed 
below.
A.3.1 Investment Promotion Privileges
One of the Thai government's industrial development strategies is to offer 
promotional privileges such as tax concessions and exemptions from customs duties
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to targeted investment projects. These incentives help boost the feasibility of a great 
number of investment projects which would not otherwise have operated profitably. 
Table A-6 shows the number of applications, with their total investment value made 
to the Board of Investment (the agency responsible for the investment promotion 
policy in Thailand) for promotional privileges. The number of applications had 
increased from 188 projects in 1982 to 2,125 in 1988, representing about an eleven­
fold increase, or from 20,313 million baht to 530,292 million baht during the same 
period, a twenty-six-fold increase in value. The number of applications approved had 
increased proportionately from 97 to 1,454 projects, representing a fifteen-fold 
increase, or from 9,168 to 200,894 million baht, a twenty-two-fold increase in value. 
The number of projects starting operations had also grown from 79 to 224, 
representing about a three-fold increase, or from 10,244 to 17,930 million baht, a 
two-fold increase in value.
Table A-6: Investm ent Prom otion (1982-1988)
Applications Applications Projects Starting
Approved Operations
Number Value Number Value Number Value
(MBaht) (MBaht) (Mbaht)
1982 188 20,313 97 9,168 79 10,244
1983 342 56,079 140 8,989 107 10,924
1984 330 40,405 266 33,202 76 7,225
1985 325 59,583 210 54,197 78 8,201
1986 431 59,688 295 34,610 145 20,809
1987 1,058 209,029 625 67,290 172 18,577
1988 2,125 530,292 1,454 200,894 224 17,930
Source: Adapted from the Office of the Board of Investment, as published in
Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, op.cit., Table 
18.
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Moreover, the incentives have attracted a big inflow of direct foreign investment 
into Thailand each year, especially in the manufacturing sector. Table A-7 shows that 
the value of direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has been much 
higher than in the agricultural sector. While the growth rate of investment in the 
manufacturing sector had increased quickly and been as high as 67% and 121% 
during 1986-1987 and 1987-1988 respectively, that of the agricultural sector had 
decreased steadily to 24% during 1987-1988, compared to 94% during 1985-1986.
Table A-8: Foreign and Domestic Investm ent in Export-O riented 
P ro je c tsa (1983-1988)
Value (Million Baht)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Export 5,702 11,044 33,153 16,290 44,521 113,846
Number of Projects 52 114 124 167 483 1,057
Other 3,287 22,158 21,044 18,321 22,769 87,048
Number of Projects 88 152 86 128 142 397
Total 8,989 33,202 54,197 34,610 67,290 200,894
Number of Projects 140 266 210 295 625 1,454
Share (%)
Export 63.43 33.26 61.17 47.07 66.16 56.67
Number of Projects 37 43 59 57 77 73
Other 36.57 66.74 38.83 52.93 33.84 43.33
Number of Projects 63 57 41 43 23 27
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of Projects 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: a Export-oriented projects are those projects which export 80-100 % 
of their production output.
Source: Adapted from the Office of the Board of Investment, as published in 
Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, op.cit., Table 
21.
According to Table A-8, a growth trend of export-oriented projects is also 
evident. The export-oriented projects' average share of the total value of promoted
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investment had been over 50% between 1983 and 1988 and their share of the total 
number of projects promoted had also been over 50% between 1985 and 1988.
A.3.2 The Gap Left behind by Other NICs in Asia
The second major source of the structural change is the gap in the international market 
of basic manufactured products resulting from the transition of the other Asian NICs 
towards products other than traditional labour intensive manufactured exports such as 
textiles. The newly industrialised countries (NICs) in Asia such as Korea and Taiwan 
have reached a point where they are no longer competitive in most of these items. 
Korea is turning towards more capital and technology intensive exports such as 
automobiles, and Taiwan is currently flooding the world market with compatible 
desktop computers.2 The businessmen in Thailand seem to have been sensitive to 
this opportunity and quick to grasp it. Therefore, the manufactured exports from 
Thailand are penetrating quickly into the world market and filling the gap.
A.3.3 Exchange Rate Policy
The third source is the exchange rate policy that has been pursued by the government 
in recent years. The baht-doilar exchange rate has changed relatively little since the 
end of 1985, with a slight overall appreciation of the baht against the dollar of about 
3%. However, during that time the dollar had depreciated against the yen by 32%, 
against the Deutsch mark by 31%, and against the pound by 14%. Thus, the baht has 
significantly depreciated against the currency of Thailand's major trading partners.2 
This stable and slightly depreciation-oriented exchange-rate policy has partly made the
2Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Production Structures, Labour M arkets and Human C apital 
Investments: Issues o f  Balance fo r  Thailand, Offprint No.7, reprinted from the NUPRI (Nihon 
University Population Research Institute) Research Paper Series, N o.46 (1988) (Thailand 
Development Research Institute Foundation, 1988), pp.4-5.
2 Ibid., p.5.
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A.3.4 The Decline in Agricultural Products Prices
The fourth major source of the structural change is the trend in commodity prices 
since the early 1980s.4 Table A-9 shows a declining trend in the prices of all major 
crops between 1980 and 1986. The average export price per ton of rice fell by 8% per 
annum, rubber fell 4%, tapioca 1%, sugar 14%, and maize 5% between 1980 and 
1986. Even though the prices of all major crops picked up in 1987, they, except that 
of tapioca, are still well below the price levels in 1980.
Table A-9: Export Price per Ton of Major Crops (1980-1987)
Price (Baht per Ton)
Rice Rubber Maize Tapioca Sugar
1980 6,968 27,145 3,314 2,853 6,586
1981 8,697 22,962 3,243 2,625 8,557
1982 5,948 17,429 2,943 2,527 5,861
1983 5,798 21,235 3,192 2,961 4,124
1984 5,618 21,969 3,227 2,527 4,205
1985 5,545 19,663 2,768 2,112 3,623
1986 4,491 19,867 2,308 3,021 3,708
1987(9m) 4,683 22,133 2,298 3,316 4,344
Growth
(80-86)a
-8.12 -3.62 -4.68 -0.94 -13.48
Note: a The average growth between 1980 and 1986 calculated by log
regression.
Source: The Bank of Thailand, as published in Chalongphob Sussangkam,
Production Structures, Labour Markets and Human Capital 
Investments: Issues o f Balance for Thailand, Offprint No.7, 
reprinted from the NUPRI (Nihon University Population Research 
Institute) Research Series, No.46 (1988) (Thailand Development 
Research Institute Foundation, 1988), Table 5, p. 12.
4Ibid., p.10.
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A.4 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND5
The modem political development of Thailand can be said to have started in the 
1900s. Under the influence of Western ideology, the bureaucracy which was 
developed to administer modem Siam (Thailand's former name) soon acquired beliefs 
which clashed with the principle of royal absolutism and patronage. The climax of 
this opposition to the traditional absolute monarchy was reached in 1932 when a 
bloodless coup brought to an end the absolute rule of King Prajadhipok (Rama VII, 
1925-1935). Between 1932 and the present, political development in Thailand can be 
generally divided into four periods: the military-bureaucratic rule period (1932-1973); 
the democratic revolution period (1973-1976); the short revival of military rule 
(1976-1979); and the semi-democratic period (1980-1988)). At present (1989) 
Thailand can be said to be in full democracy since the present prime minister was 
elected, not appointed as in the semi-democratic period.
A.4.1 The Military-Bureaucratic Rule (1932-1973)
In 1932, a group of European-educated radicals led by Pridi and Maj. Phibun and 
backed by one of the highest ranking commanders, Col. Phahon, successfully staged 
a bloodless coup against the country's long tradition of absolute monarchy. Then 
Phahon became the prime minister. However, real power later shifted towards 
Phibun who was largely responsible for defeating the abortive coup led by Prince 
Bowaradet to restore the monarchist system. Phibun finally replaced Phahon as prime 
minister in 1938. Faced with the ethnic Chinese economic success in Thailand and the
5This section is an abstract from several pieces of writing about Thailand, for example, Europa 
Publications, The Far East and Australia 1989 (London: Europa Publications,1989); Clark D. 
Neher, Modern Thai Politics (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1979); Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The 
Modernization o f a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); and John L. 
Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
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dominance of the British in the region, he pursued an anti-Chinese and anti-Western 
campaign and favoured the Japanese in order to balance the British threat. In the early 
1940s Phibun joined the Japanese in declaring war on Britain and the United States. 
Consequently, when the war ended, he was removed and went into exile. Seni was 
made prime minister in 1945. In 1946, Pridi, one of the leaders of the 1932 
revolution, himself became prime minister. In the same year King Anada (Rama VIII) 
died in mysterious circumstances. Pridi was forced to resign, and Phibun regained 
power and became prime minister again in 1948. Later, in 1957, Sarit emerged as a 
new powerful army commander. In the light of the vote-rigging election of 1957, he 
seized power and finally became prime minister in 1958. His rule was characterised 
as authoritarian. Sarit died in 1963. Gen. Thanom succeeded as prime minister. In 
1972 the students became politically active and demonstrated against the military 
regime which was overthrown in October 1973.
A .4 .2  T h e  D e m o c ra tic  R e v o lu tio n  (197 3 -1 9 7 6 )
The 1973 student-led revolution brought changes in Thai politics. The long military 
rule was ended and pressure groups were formed. However, the governments of this 
period had little authority and were rather unstable. A caretaker regime under a 
university rector, Sanya Thammasak, was appointed by the King following the 
collapse of Thanom's regime. Later, a coalition government was formed after an 
election held in 1975 under Kukrit. It lasted for less than a year and the new election 
in 1976 brought his brother, Seni, into power. But, again, the regime was still weak 
and unable to keep public order. The military then took this opportunity to seize 
power again in 1976.
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A.4.3 The Short Revival of Military Rule (1976-1979)
In 1976 the military-dominated national administrative reform council took over 
power, banned political parties, dissolved the national assembly, and set up a 
government which was headed by a supreme court judge, Thanin. However, his 
government was overthrown in the following year by a military coalition headed by 
the armed forces commander-in-chief, Gen. Kriangsak. He restored some elements 
of democracy and presided over three cabinets. In March 1980, due to his 
government's failure to find proper solutions to economic problems, Kriangsak was 
replaced by the army commander-in-chief and defence minister, Gen. Prem.
A.4.4 The Semi-Democratic Period (1980-1988)
Prem's regime, like Kriangsak's, was based on a combination of military and civilian 
leaders. Ultimate power lay with the armed forces, but the political parties played a 
major role in linking the military, civilian bureaucrats, and business interests. Prem's 
rule, like his predecessor's, was marked by indecisiveness and instability, and he 
was nearly removed by two army coups in April 1981 and September 1985. Prem 
headed five cabinets between 1980 and 1988. He unexpectedly dissolved the 
parliament in April 1988. The election in the following July resulted in a coalition 
government formed by the Chat Thai Party, the Social Action Party, the Democratic 
Party, the United Democratic Party, and the Mass Party. Prem was invited to 
continue heading the coalition government, but he refused the invitation. The Chat 
Thai leader, Chatchai Choonahavan, then became prime minister. There was 
widespread scepticism concerning his leadership and competence following the 
appointment. However, the scepticism has largely subsided since November 1988 
and he is gaining in popularity.
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A.5 SUMMARY
The 1980s saw a rapid transition in the Thai production structure from basic 
agricultural produce to manufactured products. This transition has been largely due to 
several major factors. First, the investment incentives designed by the government 
have induced a large number of new projects in the manufacturing sector. Second, 
several of the manufactured products of these new projects have managed to find 
gaps in the market abroad, especially the markets of labour-intensive industry created 
by the transition of other Asian NICs to technology-intensive industry. Third, the 
depreciation of the baht against other major currencies has also helped to make Thai 
manufactured exports more competitive abroad. Finally, the world commodity prices 
seem to be on a downward trend.
With regard to political development, Thai politics have been rather unstable and 
dominated to a large extent by the country's military establishment. After 
experiencing several coups since the revolution against the absolute monarchy, 
Thailand moved away from the bureaucratic polity between 1932 and 1973, through 
the period of change and instability between 1973 and 1979, to the semi-democratic 
period between 1980 and 1988, and is now enjoying full-democracy. The growth of 
interest groups and the middle class has also been marked.
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The Actors in Government and Business Relations in Thailand
B . 1 In troduction
B .2  The Thai Public Adm inistration System
B .3  The Thai Business Community
B .4  Representation of the Private Sector and Some Relevant 
Legal Aspects
B .5  Sum m ary
APPENDIX B
THE ACTORS IN GOVERNMENT BUSINESS RELATIONS
IN THAILAND
B.l INTRODUCTION
The structure of the Thai government and major characteristics of the Thai business 
community will be presented in this appendix. It will also generally describe the 
representation of business by the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai 
Industries, and the Thai Bankers Association. In addition, some relevant legal aspects 
governing representation are discussed.
B.2 THE THAI PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM
Thailand practices democracy under a constitutional monarchy with the King as head 
of state. Under the present Thai constitution (1978), His Majesty the King delegates 
administration of the Thai state to three branches: the executive branch represented by 
the cabinet; the legislative branch represented by the parliament with an elected lower 
house (the house of representatives) and an appointed upper house (the senate); and 
the judicial branch represented by the courts of justice (see Figure B-l). The division 
of the administration into various ministries or equivalents is as shown in Figure B-2.
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Figure B -l: Thai Government Organisation Chart
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Development Administration, December, 1987), p.ii.
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Figure B-2: Ministerial Organisation
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B.3 THE THAI BUSINESS COMMUNITY
Several major characteristics of the Thai business community, some of which are 
common among the developing countries in Asia such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, are as follows.
Chinese dominance. During the past several centuries, Chinese immigrants came 
to Thailand and became traders, labourers, and artisans, and soon occupied a 
dominant position in the commercial sector of the economy. After the signing of the 
Bowring treaty in mid-nineteenth century, Thailand became involved in international 
trading. Even though some Thais exploited this opportunity but it was the Chinese 
who were quicker to seize the opportunity and finally dominated the commercial 
sector.1
C ontro l o f  big business by a sm all num ber o f  rich  fa m ilie s . The
ownership of big business groups is in the hands of a few families (mostly with 
Chinese origins). In 1978 it was found that three fourths of the total assets of the 
financial sector belonged to only five groups of commercial banks and that business 
concentration tended to increase. A similar concentration was also found in export 
businesses and important manufacturing industries.2
Prevalence o f  shared ow nership w ithin big business groups. The Thai 
pattern of big business ownership is quite different from that of the Japanese. While 
Japanese "zaibatsu" families do not share ownership with other families, Thai 
business families are more willing to do so.2
^Kirkiat Pipatseritham and Kunio Yoshihara, Business Groups in Thailand, Research Notes and 
Discussion Paper No.41 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), p.10.
2Kirkiat Pipatseritham, Vikroa Luksana Karnpenchaokong Thurakit Kanad Yai Nai Prathet Thai 
(An Analysis o f the Ownership Pattern o f Big Businesses in Thailand) (Bangkok: Thammasat 
University Press, 1982), p.368.
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Businesses are Bangkok-based. Almost all major business activities take place 
in Bangkok, especially those of big business. Even though this is true in most 
countries, in Thailand there is a tendency to carry the concentration to the extreme.4
The im portance o f  po litica l patronage. In Thailand, if a business family 
wants to stay competitive, it is essential to have patrons in the government. The level 
of business dependence on the government has been even stronger in Thailand than in 
Japan.5
O riginal capital accum ulation through trading. Most families presently 
controlling big business in Thailand first gained their capital through trading and later 
diversified into other fields.6
D ependence on fo re ig n  capital and  technology. Dependence on foreign 
capital and technology is particularly common among industry-centred groups, but 
companies in the financial fields are largely wholly Thai-owned. Manufacturing 
companies, especially those set up under the import substitution policy, depend 
heavily on foreign capital and technology.7
B.4 REPRESENTATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
AND SOME RELEVANT LEGAL ASPECTS
The representation of the Thai private sector is quite different from those of other 
countries in that it is not under one organisation but three private institutions: the Thai
3Pipatseritham and Yoshihara, op.cit., p. 18.
4Ibid.,p.20.
5 Ibid., p.25.
6Ibid., p.15.
7Ibid., p.19.
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Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, and the Thai Bankers 
Association.
B.4.1 The Thai Cham ber of Commerce (TCC)
Objectives. It was established in 1933 and later registered as a chamber of 
commerce in 1966 when the Chamber of Commerce Act, B.E. 2509 (1966) came into 
use. The present Thai Chamber of Commerce has the following objectives:
i) To promote enterprises in the interests of trade, industry, agriculture, 
finance, and the general economy, by collecting statistics, disseminating trade 
information, researching the economy, promoting tourism, issuing certificates of 
origin of goods, standardising the quality of goods, staging trade exhibitions, and 
negotiating commercial conflicts.
ii) To give consultation and make suggestions to the government on issues 
concerning national economic development.
iii) To give consultation and make suggestions to members on matters 
concerning trade, industry, agriculture, finance, or the economy and facilitate the 
members’ business operations.
iv) To make coordination between businessmen and government officials.
v) To help and promote charities.
vi) To perform other functions according to the Chamber of Commerce Act 
and those assigned by the government.
vii) The Thai Chamber of Commerce is not involved in politics.8
8Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, Khana Kamakarn Ruam Sam 
Sataban (Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking) (1986), p. 14.
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Figure B-3: Organisation of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
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Organisation. The organisation of the Thai Chamber of Commerce is as shown in 
Figure B-3. The committee of the Thai Chamber of Commerce is elected from its 
ordinary members. According to the Chamber of Commerce Act, B.E. 2509 (section 
24), the total number of committeemen must not exceed 31 persons, with a minimum 
of 3 representatives from provincial chambers of commerce, and an election will be 
held every 2 years. However, due to the protest from provincial chambers of
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commerce, the number of representatives from provincial chambers of commerce has 
been increased to 12 persons, each of whom is head of regional group of provincial 
chambers of commerce, and the number of committeemen to 29 persons.9
The committee appoints the administrative committee with the chairman of the 
committee as chairman of the administrative committee. The administrative committee 
consists of a chairman, vice chairmans (not less than one), and a secretary. *0
Besides the two committees, there are also 9 sub-committees serving various 
functions of the TCC, 10 occupational sub-committees, and the secretariat consisting 
of 4 divisions (finance and administration, promotion and development of provincial 
chambers of commerce, service, and technical) under the administrative secretary.
Membership. According to the Chamber of Commerce Act (section 19 and 20), 
the members of a chamber of commerce, consequently the members of the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce since it is Bangkok's chamber of commerce, are of four 
categories: ordinary, extraordinary, associate, and honorary. Only ordinary members 
can be elected as committeemen. Ordinary members are Thai persons, business firms 
in which the majority of partners or shareholders are of Thai nationality, trade 
associations more than one half of the total members of which are of Thai nationality, 
state enterprises, or cooperatives. Foreign subsidiaries or business organisations, the 
majority shareholders of which are of nationalities other than Thai, can only be 
associate members.
B.4.2 The Federation of Thai Industries (FTI)
Objectives. The FTI was first established as the Association of Thai Industries in
^Manoot Watanakomen, Khana Kamakan Ruam Pak Rataban Lae Ekachon Pua Khaekai Panha 
Tang Settakij: Karn Suksa Dan Karn Borihan (The Joint Public and Private Consultative 
Committee for Solving Economic Problems: A Study o f Its Administration) (Bangkok: Thailand 
Development Research Institute Foundation, 1989), p.40.
10Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, op.ciL, p. 19.
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1967 under the Trade Association Act, B.E. 2509 (1966) and later upgraded to its 
present status in 1987 under the Federation of Thai Industries Act, B.E. 2530 (1987). 
The present FTI has the following objectives.
i) To be the centre for businessmen in every industry in Thailand.
ii) To be the centre for members to exchange opinions in the interests of 
industry.
iii) To create and promote friendship among businessmen in various 
industries.
iv) To research, publicise, and promote up-to-date knowledge and technology 
concerning the manufacturing sector and commerce.
v) To create unity and stability in the country’s industries.
vi) To promote the new generation of industrialists, both in terms of quantity 
and quality.
7) To contribute to charity.
8) To perform other functions promoting the prosperity of the country's 
industries.11
Organisation. The organisation of the Federation of Thai Industries is as shown in 
Figure B-4. The committee of the FTI consists of 90 committeemen (60 elected and 
30 appointed). The committee meets and elects 23 persons as the administrative 
committee which will stay in office for 2 years.12 The operation of the FTI is 
divided into 2 major sections: first, the industrial sectors (equivalent to trade 
associations) and provincial sub-committees which look after the problems of various 
industries and provinces; and second, the sub-committees which take care of more 
specific problems such as technology and energy.
11Ibid.,p.25.
12Watanakomen, op.cit., p.28.
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Figure B-4: Organisation of the Federation of Thai Industries
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The secretariat under the administrative secretary is divided into five divisions 
(administration, foreign trade, technical, government cooperation, and public 
relations) and responsible for the normal operation of the FTI.
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M em bership. The FTI has 2 categories of members: ordinary and associate 
members. Ordinary members are registered industrial companies and trade 
associations; associate members are those which can not be classified as ordinary
members.1 ^
B.4.3 The Thai Bankers Association (TBA)
Objectives. The TBA was established in 1958 and later registered as a trade 
association in 1967. The present objectives of the TBA are as follows.
i) To promote Thai banking.
ii) To support and help the members in resolving difficulties including
negotiations with outside parties concerning mutual interests.
iii) To create a consensus among members so that the banking business 
operates in an orderly fashion.
iv) To promote study and research in banking, trade, finance, and the 
economy, and publicise the findings.
v) To ask for statistics and documents from members with their consent.
vi) To cooperate with the government in promoting trade, industry,
agriculture, finance, or other businesses.
vii) To make suggestions concerning finance and banking to relevant 
governmental agencies and other institutions.
viii) To communicate with other financial institutions, trade associations, and 
other institutions, both within and outside the country.
ix) To conform with the objectives stipulated in the Trade Association Act
x) All objectives of the TBA are not involved with politics.14
13Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, op.cit., p.29. and Watanakomen, 
op.cit., p.28.
14Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, op.cit., p.33.
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Organisation. The organisation of the TBA is as shown in Figure B-5. A group of 
members of the TBA are elected as the committee and chairman. The TBA is divided 
into 6 groups (foreign trade, systems development, personnel development, 
technical, commercial bank branch managers, and public affairs and relations) and 2 
clubs (foreign exchange and commercial bank internal auditors). There is also a 
manager who acts as coordinator between the TBA members.
Figure B-5: Organisation of the Thai Bankers Association
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Source: Adapted and translated from ibid., p.36.
M em bersh ip . The members of the TBA are of 2 categories: ordinary and 
honourary. Ordinary members are those commercial banks registered in Thailand; 
honourary members are persons unanimously invited by the committee to join the
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association.15
From the objectives of the three private institutions described, it can be seen that each 
institution has its own sphere of representation. Roughly, the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce represents the commercial and trading sector, the Federation of Thai 
Industries the manufacturing sector, and the Thai Bankers Association the banking 
and financial sector.
Besides this unique representation of the Thai private sector under three 
organisations, there is another interesting point worth mentioning here. In principle, 
the TCC has a higher hierarchical status than the FTI and TBA since the TCC is 
classified as a (central) chamber of commerce while the FTI and TBA are classified as 
a federation and a trade association respectively (the FTI was registered as a trade 
association until 1987). The members of a chamber of commerce can be the general 
public, business firms, trade associations, state enterprises, and cooperatives while 
the members of a trade association are the general public and business firms.
Furthermore, the TCC is supposed to be the national peak institution of private 
representation since the Chamber of Commerce Act, B.E. 2509 stipulates that each 
province can have only one chamber of commerce (section 14) and it must be a 
member of the TCC, the chamber of commerce of Bangkok (section 20). The 
hierarchy of representation is as shown in Figure B-6. In contrast, trade associations 
are not allowed to establish branches (Trade Association Act, B.E. 2509 (1966), 
section 8). However, the FTI and TBA, registered as trade associations, get around 
this regulation by creating the FTI's provincial sub-committees and provincial 
bankers' clubs respectively.
15Ibid., p.34.
323
Appendix B
Figure B-6: The Hierarchy of Business Organisations in Thailand
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(Bangkok: Thai Chamber of Commerce, 1984), p. 14.
One of the reasons for the representation under three institutions may lie in the 
problem of leadership of the representation. The leaders of the three private 
institutions do not seem to have confidence among themselves to the extent that they 
can feel assured that their own sector's interests would be equally looked after if the 
leaders of others sectors were to assume single as against shared leadership of the 
representation. In fact, the establishment of the Association of Thai Industries (now 
the Federation of Thai Industries) in 1967 was a defection from the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce since nearly all of its members then used to be members of the Thai
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Chamber of Commerce.16 In addition, when the Federation of Thai Industries Bill 
was debated in parliament in 1987, there were protests from chambers of commerce 
all over the country that this would reduce the status of chambers of commerce equal 
to that of trade associations, create an "industrial mafia," and finally destroy the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce.17
However, forced by necessity rather than willingness, the three institutions 
managed to get together and form the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, 
Industry and Banking (JSCCIB) in 1977. The JSCCIB conducts major private sector 
dialogues with the government (for more detailed discussion of the JSCCIB, see 
Appendix D). Each institution takes its turn in assuming the leadership of the 
JSCCIB.
There is no prospect of single representation in the near future, since the present 
scheme of a joint committee is working well. Nevertheless, a kind of cross- or inter­
membership of committees has been developing among the three private institutions; 
that is, several persons are present in more than one of the committees of the three 
institutions at the same time.18 If this pattern of committee inter-membership among 
the institutions increases, which is likely as several big business groups are 
diversifying into other sectors of the economy, then finally a form of single 
representation might be possible when similar groups of people assume the leadership 
of the three institutions.
B.4.4 Control Over Trade Associations and Chambers of Commerce
The extent and direction of government control over trade associations and chambers 
of commerce is reflected in the "non-involvement-in-politics" policy objective stated 
by the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Thai Bankers Association. Montri
16Watanakomen, op.cit., p.27.
17Ibid., p.29.
18See the lists o f names of the committeemen in Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, 
Industry and Banking, op.cit., pp.37-42.
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Chenvidyakam summarised the government policy towards business associations as 
follows:
"Public policy towards associations in Thailand has always been 
authoritarian. Such a policy persistently pursued throughout all historical 
periods has been applied to all types of associations without exception. 
Sponsorship, encouragement, manipulation are among the measures used 
in controlling the associations besides registration, supervision, and 
dissolution. Also distinctive is the policy's invariable emphasis on 
depoliticization of associational activities."19
The non-involvement-in-politics policy of business associations is due to the 
stipulation in both the Trade Association Act, B.E. 2509 (1966) (section 23) and the 
Chamber of Commerce Act, B.E. 2509 (section 30) that a trade association or a 
chamber of commerce shall not carry on a political activity. The reason for this 
stipulation is quite understandable since the law was drafted during the authoritarian 
regime and in such a regime, pressure groups including trade associations and 
chambers of commerce are generally bound to be suppressed.
In addition, it is stipulated in the two acts that the Registrar (Director-General of 
the Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce) can either refuse or accept 
an application to establish a trade association or chamber of commerce. Several 
measures were proposed to make trade associations and chambers of commerce 
readily accountable to the Registrar. For example, the Registrar has the power to 
issue a written order requiring a director to appear or explain a fact concerning the 
activities of the trade association or chamber of commerce, or to send documents 
concerning its operation or minutes of its meetings; any change in the membership or 
amendment in the regulations must be reported to the Registrar, and its annual report 
and balance sheet must be delivered to the Registrar.
19Montri Chenvidyakam, Political Control and Economic Influence: A Study o f  Trade 
Associations in Thailand, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Chicago, 1979), p. 138.
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Board o f  Trade. Besides being readily accountable to the government, the 
hierarchical structure of trade associations and chambers of commerce make them 
easily controlled and manipulated by the government. The centralised organisation of 
business representation is not only shaped by the stipulation in the Chamber of 
Commerce Act mentioned previously, that only one chamber of commerce can be 
established in a province and must be a member of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, 
but also by the stipulation that the chairman of the Thai Chamber of Commerce is 
automatically the chairman of the Board of Trade of Thailand (BoT) (Chamber of 
Commerce Act, B.E. 2509, section 24). The Board of Trade is the centre of all kinds 
of business enterprises and associations. According to the Chamber of Commerce 
Act, section 24, its committee is made up as follows.
i) The chairman of the Thai Chamber of Commerce as the Board of Trade’s 
ex-officio chairman.
ii) Two vice chairmans: the Board of Trade will elect the first vice-chairman 
from the committeemen of the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the second vice- 
chairman from the committeemen of the foreign chambers of commerce in Thailand.
iii) Every chairman of a foreign chamber of commerce as a committeeman.
iv) Members representing the trade associations, totaling four in number, 
elected by the general meeting of the Board of Trade, as committeemen.
v) Members representing the Thai Chamber of Commerce of the number 
equal to those of the committeemen in (iii) and (iv) together, elected by the general 
meeting of the Board of Trade, as committeemen.
vi) Members representing the state enterprises and the cooperatives societies, 
totalling six in number, appointed by the Ministry of Commerce, as committeemen.
The relationship between the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Board of Trade, and 
the provincial chambers of commerce is as shown in Figure B-7.
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Figure B-7: The Relationships between the Board of Trade of 
Thailand, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and 
Provincial Chambers of Commerce
Individual
Public
Provincial 
Chambers of 
Commerce
Trade
Associations
Business
Firms
The Thai 
Chamber of 
Commerce
Foreign 
Chambers of 
Commerce
Trade
Associations
State
Enterprises
State
Enterprises
Cooperatives
Cooperatives
The Board of Trade of Thailand
Source: Adapted and translated from ibid., p. 16.
The centralisation of the structure of business associations under the Board of 
Trade in which the Thai Chamber of Commerce, supported by the government, holds 
nearly half of the membership of the committee, together with the limitation of the 
establishment of foreign chambers of commerce within Bangkok (Chamber of 
Commerce Act, section 14) and the prohibition of trade associations from establishing
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branches, has made the representation of the private sector easily controlled and 
manipulated by the government
B.5 SUMMARY
It can be seen that business in Thailand has been largely dominated by the Chinese 
immigrants. Big businesses are controlled by a small number of families and jointly 
owned by a few business groups. Almost all of these business groups are Bangkok- 
based and have patrons in the government. The business groups first accumulated 
their capital through trading and later diversified into other industries. However, the 
majority of industrial firms still rely on foreign capital and technology.
The representation of the Thai private sector comes under three institutions: the 
Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, and the Thai Bankers 
Association. There is not likely to be a single body representative of the private sector 
in the near future, since the present scheme of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Industry and Banking, formed by the three institutions, is working well.
The government policy toward business associations is to control. The most 
distinctive feature of this control is the depoliticisation of the associations. This 
should be expected since the law was drafted and enacted by previous authoritarian 
regimes.
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APPENDIX C
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THAILAND:
A MACRO-VIEW
C .l INTRODUCTION
This appendix will discuss the development of government and business relations in 
Thailand since 1932. It investigates what the forms of the relationship used to take, 
and how the relationship has changed and why. The first section will deal with the 
practice of clientelism between 1932 and 1973 and the second section with the 
emergence of the newer forms of business influence -direct participation in public 
policy-making and group-based lobbying- from 1973 onwards. The third section will 
identify the factors underlying the change in the form of the relationship between 
government and business.
C.2 THE PREVALENCE OF CLIENTELISM 
IN THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITY PERIOD (1932-1973)
The business-govemment relationship between 1932 and 1973 was developed in the 
context of, among other things, a major political revolution. In 1932 a group of 
relatively young European-educated Thais overthrew the country's traditional 
absolute monarchy in an attempt to replace it with parliamentary democracy. 
However, the success of the revolution resulted in a political system in which the 
Cabinet, a ruling committee of the executive branch, was the main arena for political 
rivalry. The competitors in the arena were mainly from either the military or civil 
bureaucratic elite. Riggs wrote:
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"...the goal of the revolution was not to establish a popular constitutional 
government but rather to place commoner officials in the cockpit of power 
and to organize a polity that would rule on the behalf of the bureaucracy 
(bureaucratic polity)."1
Most political activities, as a result, concentrated on competition for ministerial posts. 
Cliques and factions, bound together by ties of friendship and long-standing 
acquaintance, were formed to compete with each other for the posts. This political 
competition was based on small ideological differences and little effort to attract 
popular votes.2
Similarly, Suriyamongkol and Guyot described the kind of bureaucratic polity 
created after the revolution as having two major characteristics. First, the 
bureaucracy, led by strong military men, ruled the country with immunity from the 
control and direction of extra-bureaucratic forces. In other words, no pressure groups 
or interest groups outside the bureaucracy itself could be formed or were strong 
enough to exert influence on the operation of the bureaucracy. Second, the resulting 
politics played across the shifting lines of personal factions rather than through such 
social structures as formal organisations, classes, or interest groups.3
This political revolution took place during a huge influx of aliens, especially 
Chinese immigrants, into Thailand. The Chinese immigrants quickly took control of 
trade and commerce which the ethnic Thais evidently found unattractive and left to 
aliens. In contrast, the Thais were more in favour of joining the civil service, which 
gained them religious merit through its association with the King. Business was 
something left to people they regarded as pariahs. Therefore, the aliens, particularly 
the Chinese, emerged as commercial intermediaries in the traditional society
^ red  W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization o f  a Bureaucratic Polity  (Honolulu: East-West 
Center Press, 1966), p.312.
2Ibid.,pp.211-212.
3Pisan Suriyamongkol and James F. Guyot, The Bureaucratic Polity at Bay (Bangkok: National 
Institute of Development Administration, 1986), p.4.
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characterised by a two-fold division of the population -the peasantry and the ruling 
officialdom.4
However, the subsequent development of nationalism since the end of the 
Second World War and the Thais1 resentment of the Chinese economic success put a 
great amount of pressure on the Chinese business community. In the light of these 
attitudes, the government created a nationalistic policy: the Thai-iflcation programme 
which consisted of the establishment of semi-official enterprises and tight business 
control. Skinner described the government control on business as follows:
"Most of these measures ... were impracticable, ineffective, or abortive.
...all these threats (business controls) and developments were ... the 
unremitting government pressure on Chinese businesses in 1951-1952...
No one knew when his particular line of business might be reserved for 
Thais or subjected to strict control, when the lease of his shop or title of 
his business property might be challenged, or when his business might be 
inspected by revenue officials or raided by police. Few businessmen in 
Bangkok found it possible to operate profitably entirely within the letter of 
the endless laws, decrees, and programs officially adopted by the 
government. In these circumstances bribery, squeeze, and the pay-off 
have become common features of business functioning in Thailand."^
At the same time the government also created a number of state and semi-official 
enterprises to take over some of the economic role of the Chinese. Therefore, faced 
with the Thai-ification programme and widespread corruption within the government 
and the bureaucracy, the Chinese found it necessary to develop business ties with 
influential Thai officials for several reasons.
Skinner reasoned that, first of all, such ties were helpful if not essential in 
obtaining routine licences and permits. Second, the business ties offered greater 
security from police interrogation, extortion, or arrest. And third, besides giving 
routine business facilitation and security, the ties also yielded special privileges for
4Ibid., p.19.
^William G. Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community o f  Thailand (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1958), p.l90.
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the Chinese businessmen.6
He also stated that the Chinese businessmen had several ways of effecting 
business alliances or connections with influential Thai officials to secure their 
permanent support. First, the Chinese businessmen reorganised many of their 
commercial and financial corporations to include top government officials and other 
members of the Thai elite on the boards of directors. Second, new corporations were 
formed on a cooperative pattern, whereby the Chinese supplied the capital and 
entrepreneurial skill and the Thai officials supplied protection for the Chinese, official 
privileges, and in some cases, government contracts. And third, Chinese 
businessmen with Thai citizenship joined semi-official Thai enterprises in a 
managerial capacity.7
In effect, the business-govemment relationship between 1932 and 1973 resulted 
in clientelism -a complex pattern of vertical linkages arising from the exchange of 
protection and support between a powerful personage (patrons) and a shifting array 
of lesser actors (clients).8 Businessmen antagonistically cooperated with influential 
government officials. The influence of business groups on the government was 
minimal and affected the policy of the state mainly in an informal, ad hoc and 
clientelistic manner.
C.3 TOWARDS DIRECT PARTICIPATION 
AND GROUP-BASED LOBBYING (1973 ONWARDS)
However, the clientelistic form of government and business relations did not 
dominate for long. Since the student revolution in October 1973, which overthrew the 
authoritarian government, newer forms of the relationship have emerged. They are 
direct participation in public policy-making and group-based lobbying by
6Ibid., pp.303-304.
7Ibid., pp.191-192.
8Suriyamongkol and Guyot, op.cit., p.8.
334
Appendix C
businessmen.
C.3.1 Direct Participation
Before this, businessmen generally refrained from open and direct participation in 
government and politics, while bureaucrats -active or retired, civilian or military- 
constituted the major group controlling political power. However, more recently, 
businessmen seems to have gained major political roles and influence.^ This can be 
reflected by the occupational distribution in the House of Representatives and in Thai 
cabinets.
Table C -l: The Percentage Distribution of the Occupations of
Members of the House of Representative (1933-1986)
Date of 
Election Business Bureaucrats Lawyers Farmers Others
Nov 1933 19.2 34.6 26.9 10.3 9.0
Nov 1937 19.8 51.7 15.5 5.5 6.5
Nov 1938 22.0 39.6 16.5 7.7 14.2
Jan 1946 20.8 44.8 17.7 7.3 9.4
Aug 1946 11.0 61.0 18.3 4.9 4.8
Jan 1948 22.2 34.4 28.3 6.1 9.0
Jun 1949 33.3 19.1 28.6 4.8 14.2
Feb 1952 20.3 27.7 35.8 3.3 12.9
Feb 1957 26.3 28.8 27.5 6.9 10.5
Dec 1957 27.5 26.3 23.1 8.1 14.0
Feb 1969 45.7 20.6 16.0 5.5 12.2
Jan 1975 34.6 12.3 17.5 8.6 27.0
Apr 1976 29.4 22.2 11.8 5.7 32.9
Apr 1979 37.2 18.4 13.6 8.6 22.2
Apr 1983 38.3 10.2 10.2 4.3 37.0
J u l1986 24.8 6.9 9.2 3.5 55.6
Source: Data between 1933 and 1983 is adapted from Pisan Suriyamongkol
and James Guyot, The Bureaucratic Polity at Bay (Bangkok: 
National Institute of Development Administration, 1986), Table VII, 
p.33. Data of 1986 is from Anek Laothamatas, "Business and 
Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence," Asian Survey,
Vol. XXVII, No.4 (April,1988), p.454.
^Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence," A sian  
Survey, Vol. XXVII, No.4 (April, 1988), p.452.
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Table C-2: Businessmen in Thai Cabinets (1963-1986)
Prime Minister
Beginning 
Date of Cabinet
Number of 
Businessmen Percent Total
Sarit Feb 1963 0 0.0 14
ThanomI Dec 1968 1 5.6 18
Thanom II Mar 1969 1 4.0 25
Sanya I Oct 1973 4 . 14.3 28
Sanya II May 1974 3 9.7 31
Seni Feb 1975 8 26.7 30
Kukrit Mar 1975 16 59.3 27
Seni Apr 1976 11 35.5 31
Thanin Oct 1976 1 5.0 17
Kriangsak I Nov 1977 2 6.1 33
Kriangsak II May 1979 9 20.9 43
Kriangsak III Feb 1980 5 13.2 38
Prem I Mar 1980 17 45.9 37
Prem II Jan 1981 12 30.0 40
Prem III Dec 1981 17 41.5 41
Prem IV May 1983 21 47.7 44
Prem V Aug 1986 21 47.7 44
Source: Data between 1963 and 1983 is adapted from Suriyamongkol and 
Guyot, op.cit., Table VIII, p.34. Data of 1986 is from Laothamatas, 
op.cit., Table 2, p.454.
Tables C-l and C-2 present concrete evidence of the increasing proportion of 
members with a business career in the House of Representatives between 1933 to 
1986 and in Thai cabinets between 1963 to 1986 respectively. The figures also 
indicate that businessmen started penetrating into the government as early as the late 
1960s.
The direct participation of businessmen in politics and government is not limited 
to the House of Representatives and the Cabinet but also extends to the political 
parties. The leadership of the three major political parties -Chat Thai, Social Action, 
and Democrat- is now controlled by big business. Chat Thai Party's leadership has 
been dominated by big business from the beginning; the defection of some factions 
from the Social Action Party has left it with a majority of leaders with a background 
in big business; and even more notable is the fact that the Democrat Party, 
traditionally the mainstay of the middle classes, is now permeated by big business.10
10Ibid., p.453.
336
Appendix C
C.3.2 Group-Based Lobbying
During the bureaucratic polity period the practice of exerting influence on the 
government through formal trade associations was hardly known. The situation 
improved slightly during the 1970s. This happened probably because trade 
associations had gained more experience and were seen by businessmen as an 
additional channel for exerting influence on the government without having to give up 
the clientelistic practice.
Montri Chenvidyakam stated that trade associations had developed several 
tactics and strategies to influence the government. The best known are as follows.
i) Market influence: Members of trade associations might collude to restrict 
trade in ways which would create trouble for consumers or the national economy and 
obtain more bargaining power with the government.
ii) Multi-pronged pressure: This is a tactic whereby associations try to 
influence the government by applying pressure at different points at the same time to 
maximise the chances of achieving a particular goal. One of the most popular ways is 
sending letters voicing their grievance to several appropriate bodies.
iii) Holding seminars: Seminars are used as an arena for associations to meet 
government agencies to make necessary modifications and adjustments.
iv) Contributions to charities: Trade associations make contributions to 
charities with the primary aim of influencing the attitudes towards the associations of 
the government agencies and high officials who are personally identified with 
particular charitable projects.
v) Social functions: Parties, luncheons and dinners organised by trade 
associations are used to establish relationships with senior administrative officials.
vi) Protests: This strong tactic to defend their interests may be used, should 
circumstances leave them with no other alternatives.11
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But, the activities and roles of trade associations during the 1970s were still relatively 
minimal and limited despite the change from a military regime to a democratic one 
between 1973 and 1976. As Montri Chenvidyakam again put it:
" Functional associations did not grow in number, did not become highly 
active, did not exert any great impact on political and policy matters, with 
the exception of labour unions... In fact, little was heard of their 
operations; their activities were rarely reported in the news media. They 
went on interacting with the bureaucrats and shunned contacts with other 
political centers and pressure groups. Probably, they were fully aware of 
the few benefits they would have gained from the new involvements. For 
this reason, functional associations, especially trade associations, play 
little role in the period of open politics."12
However, trade associations had become increasingly active in the 1980s. News 
about complaints, grievances, and demands from chambers of commerce and trade 
associations was reported almost daily in the business sections of news media. A 
content survey of an established semi-weekly business newspaper found that the 
frequency of reports on the activities of trade associations and chambers of commerce 
jumped from practically none between 1979 and 1978, to 8 per month between 1985 
and 1987. From 1979-1981, the early years of semi-democracy, to 1985-1987, the 
figures increased by about 87%.13 Moreover, business associations have developed 
several modern tactics for influencing the government such as giving press 
conferences and conducting research to generate data to support their arguments and 
causes.
^ M on tri Chenvidyakam, Political Control and Economic Influence: A Study o f  Trade 
Associations in Thailand, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University o f Chicago, 1979), pp.382- 
411.
12Ibid., pp.450-451.
^Laothamatas, op.cit., p.457.
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Table C-3: Frequency of Government Contacts by Trade 
A ssociations
Level of Contact Number of Respondents
Often Moderately Seldom
1. Ministerial Level 5 22 20
or Equivalent
2. Permanent-Secretary 5 16 26
Level or Equivalent
3. Director-General 19 26 6
Level if Equivalent
4. Parliamentary 5 9 28
Committees
5. Individual MPs 4 8 23
Source: Adapted from Laothamatas, op.cit., Table 3, p.458.
Trade associations concentrated their lobbying and other influencing activities 
on the executive branch of the government during the 1980s. Anek Laothamatas has 
recently conducted a survey among Bangkok-based trade associations and found that 
most contact made by the trade associations was at departmental level, (see Table C- 
3). Nevertheless, his content study of summonses issued by the House of 
Representatives to business associations for testimony or consultation, showed that 
during 1984 to 1987 an average of 4.45 persons a month representing some kind of 
associations (chambers of commerce or trade associations) were summoned, 
compared to 0.13 between 1975 and 1976 (the democratic years) and 0.14 between 
1977 and 1978 (the short-lived revival of the bureaucratic polity years).14 This 
indicates that contact between the legislature and business associations has also 
increased considerably.
The growth of this newer form of business influence on the government by 
using group-based lobbying developed to a stage where a formal channel of 
communication and interaction was established. In 1981 the national Joint Public and 
Private Consultative Committee on Solving Economic Problems (the JPPCC) was 
founded. The Prime Minister is the chairman of the committee. The members of the
14Ibid., p.458.
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committee from the public sector are ministers in charge of economic affairs, and the 
members from the private sector are representatives from the three major private 
institutions in Thailand -the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai 
Industries, and the Thai Bankers Association. The National Economic and Social 
Development Board serves as the secretariat of the committee. It is worth noting here 
that there is no labour, farm, or public enterprise representation on the committee (for 
more detailed discussion of the JPPCC, see Appendix D).
It is interesting to ask what are the forces underlying the transition from the 
clientelistic form of government and business relations during the bureaucratic polity 
period, to the modem form of active direct participation and group-based lobbying by 
business.
C.4 FORCES UNDERLYING THE TRANSITION 
OF THE RELATIONSHIP
In the case of Thailand, clientelism was mainly supported by first the sole control of 
political power by bureaucrats and the fact that there were not any non-bureaucratic 
groups existing or strong enough to challenge and balance the power, and second the 
domination of business by aliens, i.e. the Chinese immigrants. The explanation of the 
transition is simply that as socio-economic developments occurred, these two 
elements were undermined and deteriorated. The bureaucratic polity has been set at 
bay by the student revolution in 1973 and the status of the business community 
(dominated by the Chinese) has risen.
C.4.1 The Decline of the Bureaucratic Polity
After the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932, the bureaucrats took control of 
power and the political activities of non-bureaucratic groups such as students,
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workers, peasant and businessmen were reduced to a minimum. This situation 
allowed the bureaucrats to abuse their power unchallenged and corruption was 
widespread. Cliques and factions, mostly bureaucratic, took turns in controlling of 
the government. Certainly, the general public was not widely involved in the rivalry 
between top politicians and tended to feel that changes in the ruling groups were as 
likely to be harmful as beneficial.15
Moreover, it can be said that up to the early 1970s, the influence of interest 
groups on legal provisions and administrative practices had also been minimal, except 
for associations of Chinese origin. This, together with weak political parties and the 
public's lack of knowledge and interest in politics, left the using of power by the 
bureaucracy unchecked.
Yet society is a living thing and can change. As socio-economic developments 
have taken place and more Western values, especially from American culture, and 
mass media have permeated Thai society, the public's awareness of politics and 
government has increased, particularly among students. Originally the students were 
passive, although their social consciousness had been gradually growing for some 
time. In 1969 the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) was founded. It 
originally confined its activities to public welfare programmes. They later got 
involved in an anti-Japanese goods campaign. Finally, their activities became political 
and concentrated on the malpractice and abuse of power of the government, the 
Thanom-Prapass regime.16 In effect, the students challenged the Thai bureaucratic 
polity in a way that could not have been imagined before. The government was finally 
brought down by the students' massive demonstration in October 1973.
The fall of the government brought in several changes in Thai politics. First, the 
public's interest in politics and government increased and the spirit of democracy was 
raised in their consciousness. Second, new pressure groups were formed, a
15Riggs, op.cit., p.244.
16Prudhisan Jumbala, "Towards a Theory o f Group Formation in Thai Society and Pressure Groups 
in Thailand after the October 1973 Uprising," Asian Survey, Vol.XIV, No. 6 (June, 1974), pp.539- 
540.
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comparative rarity in the period of the 1932 revolution. Besides the student pressure 
group, other groups such as the Teachers' Center and the Teachers' Union also 
mushroomed quickly. Among the most prominent pressure groups were labour 
unions. The number of labour unions increased tremendously after the student 
uprising. With only 13 labour unions initiated in 1973, the figure increased to 78 in 
just over three years (see Table C-4). However, the number of labour unions initiated 
fell sharply to 2 and 23 in 1977 and 1978, the short return to a military regime. The 
number increased again when a semi-democratic government was installed.
Table C-4: The Number of Labour Unions for the Whole Kingdom 
(1972-1983)
Year Whole Kingdom Cumulative Total 
Initiated Withdrawn
1972 9 - 9
1973 13 - 22
1974 23 - 45
1975 66 - 111
1976 78 5 184
1977 2 22 164
1978 23 13 174
1979 52 20 206
1980 55 6 255
1981 90 11 334
1982 58 15 377
1983 47 10 414
Source: Adapted from the Central Registration Office, Labour Relations
Division, Department of Labour, compiled in Year Book o f Labour 
Statistics 1983, Department of Labour, Ministry of Interior, as 
published in Suriyamongkol and Guyot, op.cit., Table III, p.28.
According to Table C-5, labour disputes and work stoppages were high in the 
years following the uprising but fell sharply during the short come-back of the 
authoritarian regime and rose again in the semi-democratic period. Some of the 
activities of Thai labour unions are shown on Table C-6.
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Table C-5: The Number of Labour Disputes and Work Stoppages 
(1975-1983)
Year Labour Disputes3 Work Stoppages1*
Number Workers Number Workers
Involved Involved
1975 460 187,107 241 94,747
1976 340 194,469 133 65,342
1977 61 49,673 7 4,868
1978 156 98,247 21 6,842
1979 205 75,468 64 16,203
1980 174 58,461 18 3,230
1981 206 115,774 54 22,008
1982 376 100,959 22 7,061
1983 229 100,729 28 10,532
Note: a Labour disputes means any disagreement between employers and
employees concerning conditions of employment.
b Work stoppages means any stoppage of work due to the concerted 
action of employees in order to compel an employer to do or refrain 
from doing something concerning a labour dispute.
Source: Adapted from the Labour Statistics Branch, Labour Studies and
Panning Division, Department of Labour, compiled in Year Book 
o f Labor Statistics 1983, op.cit., as published in Suriyamongkol 
and Guyot, op.cit., Table IV, p.29.
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Table C-6: The Number of Labour Disputes by Types of Demand 
(1981-1983)
Type of Demand 1981 1982 1983
Wage Increase 151 294 48
Overtime Pay 27 98 112
Payment for Work Done on Weekly Rest Day 19 5 105
Bonus 93 82 59
Incentive Allowance 58 44 30
Living Allowance 119 100 77
Medical Costs 59 59 52
Other Subsidies 83 289 166
Legal Holiday 45 141 137
Leave 63 46 38
Welfare 56 126 118
Injury Protection 10 8 94
Medical Care 45 45 117
Food 37 44 114
Clothes 56 60 38
Improvement of Administration and Regulations 45 160 180
Union Operations 25 146 119
Others 108 207 173
Unspecified 24 3 7
Source: The Labour Statistics Branch, Labour Studies and Planning
Division, Department of Labour, compiled in Year Book o f Labour 
Statistics 1983, op.cit., as published in Suriyamongkol and Guyot, 
op.cit., Table V, p.31.
In short, the political power structure has changed from the bureaucratic polity 
to one in which bureaucratic power is cut and pressure groups have emerged and to a 
certain extent balanced its power. To use a political term, society has become 
relatively more pluralistic. This change, together with the increase of public interest in 
politics, has made it rather difficult for the bureaucrats to play the patronage role.
C.4.2 The Upgraded Status of Private Business
As the bureaucratic polity, an element supporting clientelism, has declined, the status 
of private business has been upgraded. As mentioned earlier, in the past, 
businessmen, dominated mostly by Chinese, were viewed as pariah entrepreneurs; 
they were often harassed and their money extorted by corrupt officials. However,
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several factors brought a change in this image.
First, the nationalistic and rather hostile policy pursued by the government 
towards Chinese aliens softened. This was due partly to the stopping of Chinese 
immigration into Thailand and their assimilation into Thai society, thus removing 
some of the threats, both psychological and economic, perceived by the indigenous 
Thais. By the early 1950s, the number of registered aliens fell to around 600,000 
persons.17 Chinese registered aliens took the biggest share of the figure, compared 
to other nationalities. However, the number of Chinese registered aliens has fallen 
constantly ever since. Table C-7 shows that there were 333,879 Chinese registered 
aliens in 1970. By 1984, the number dropped to 277,205 -an accumulated decrease 
of 56,674 persons of about 17% over fifteen years.
Table C-7: The Number of Chinese Aliens Registered in Thailand 
(1970-1984)
Year Number Accumulated Decrease
1970 333,879 -
1971 322,426 11,453
1972 321,966 11,913
1973 319,465 14,414
1974 321,927 11,952
1975 313,153 20,726
1976 309,941 23,938
1977 306,808 27,071
1978 302,430 31,449
1979 298,642 35,237
1980 294,088 39,791
1981 289,829 44,050
1982 285,137 48,742
1983 281,233 52,646
1984 277,205 56,674
Source: The Alien and Taxation Division, Police Department, Ministry of 
Interior, as published in Suriyamongkol and Guyot, op.cit., Table 
II, p.23.
Moreover, many Chinese businessmen and industrialists have become Thai 
citizens through the process of naturalisation, while many more, as time passed, have
17Suriyamongkol and Guyot, op.cit, p.22.
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departed or retired due to old age. Thus the turnover of management control to their 
off-springs, who are Thai citizens by birth and better or often highly educated, 
together with the effects of the Immigration Act and related regulations which 
virtually stopped the influx of Chinese immigrants, profoundly changed the pariah 
identity of Chinese businessmen.18
Second, since private business offers better salaries and fringe benefits, it can 
attract more highly trained, qualified professional personnel, especially those with 
education and experience from abroad. This adds more prestige to the image of the 
business community.
Third, chronic economic problems like inflation, unemployment, and trade 
deficits have caused the government to turn towards the private sector for consultation 
and cooperation. The evidence of this can be seen in the statements made in 
successive National Economic and Social Development Plans; it has been clearly 
emphasised since the third plan that the relationship between the government and the 
private sector must be developed and the private sector should be encouraged to play 
a larger role in economic and social developments.
C.5 SUMMARY
The history of government and business relations in Thailand can be roughly divided 
into two phases. The first phase lasted from 1932, the year the absolute monarchy 
was replaced by the military government, until 1973, the year the authoritarian regime 
was overthrown by the student revolution. During this period, the government's 
relationship with the business community, dominated by Chinese, took the form of 
clientelism. The bureaucrats, with sole control of political power, played the patron 
role by giving protection to businessmen in exchange for financial favours. The 
businessmen, playing the client role, were the lesser actors who influenced 
government policy defensively and in an ad hoc manner. The second phase was from
18Ibid., pp.21-22.
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1973 onwards. During this relatively more democratic period, businessmen have 
been employing newer forms of influence over the government -direct participation 
and group-based lobbying. The division into two phases indicates that one form of 
the relationship has become more dominant, not that other forms did not exist.
A few major social changes caused the transition in the form of the relationship. 
First, the bureaucratic polity declined and and pressure groups and political parties 
became stronger and balanced the power of the bureaucrats. Second, the stopping of 
Chinese immigrants into Thailand and their quick assimilation into Thai society 
reduced the threat of the Chinese economic success from the minds of the ethnic 
Thais. In addition, economic conditions have caused the government to reverse its 
hostile policy and attitude towards the private sector and to turn to businessmen for 
both formal and informal dialogue and consultation.
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APPENDIX D 
THE JOINT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
D .l INTRODUCTION
This appendix will discuss the objectives of the Joint Public and Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC) and its organisation and decision-making process. It will also 
discuss the extension of the JPPCC scheme from the central administration into other 
provinces. The later section will describe and analyse how the JPPCC scheme works 
in practice.
D.2 THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COOPERATION
The cooperation between the public and private sectors under the present form of the 
Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee for Solving Economic Problems 
(Khana Karmkarn Ruam Pak Rattaban Lae Ekachon Pua Kaekhai Panha Tang 
Settakij [Ko Ro Oo]) or the JPPCC, has a rather long and complicated history. More 
than two decades ago, the Thai government were pursuing an interventionistic 
economic policy; state monopoly and enterprises under various ministries were 
created in several sectors of the economy. The economic approach of the government 
at that time was to control trade and industry rather than to promote them. Even 
though this interventionistic policy of the government brought great prosperity and 
growth in the guided capitalist economy, it had created an economic system in which 
the state was the leader and the private sector the follower. The private sector
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institutions had little opportunity to develop and were progressing rather slowly and 
inefficiently.1
In addition, according to Sawaeng Ratanamongkolmas, the kind of attitude 
which prevailed in this economic system were not only obstructive but also 
detrimental to the development of government and business cooperation. There was 
inequality and a lack of faith and trust between the two sides. The private sector not 
only resented its inferior status in the relationship but also felt that it was too much 
controlled and regulated by the government. At the same time the government 
officials took the attitude that the private sector needed to be controlled and regulated 
because it was selfish and cared only about it own interest.2
This situation continued throughout the period of the first (1961-1965), second 
(1966-1970), and third National Economic and Social Development Plans (1971- 
1975). However, in the fourth Plan the government turned towards the private sector 
for its participation in the national economic and social development, as the socio­
economic and political conditions had become more complicated and past experience 
told the government that it could not solve the economic problems alone.3 At the 
same time there was a change in the image of the younger generation of businessmen, 
who were well educated and had become more professional in dealing with the 
bureaucracy. The growth of the private institutions was evident and they had become 
better organised. The constitution of the three leading private institutions -the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries and the Thai Bankers 
Association- also contributed favourably to the development of the relationship 
between government and business.
i Finally, the need for cooperation between the public and private sectors was 
responded to by the foundation of the Joint Public and Private Consultative
1 Sawaeng Ratanamongkolmas, Satanapab Botbat Panha Lae Naew Tang Kaekhai Kaewkab 
Kwarm Ruammue Pak Rataban Lae Ekachon (Public and Private Sector Cooperation: Status, Role, 
Problems and Recommendations), a project-evaluation report presented to the Office o f the National 
Economic and Social Development Borad (Bangkok, May, 1986), p.8.
2Loc.ciL
3Loc.cit.
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Committee in June 1981, which represents the highest and most formal and 
permanent form of government and business cooperation ever in Thailand.
D.3 ORGANISATION OF THE JPPCC
D.3.1 Mandate of the JPPCC
From a publication made by the secretariat of the JPPCC, its mandate is as follows.
i) To consider problems and obstacles facing the operation of the 
government and the private sector and organise a coordinating network for solving 
them.
ii) To coordinate joint planning and projects between the government and the 
private sector in important industries.
iii) To promote the role of the private sector in the national economic 
development.
iv) To follow up the results of work which has been assigned to other 
relevant agencies for implementation.
v) To appoint sub-committees and working committees to carry out work 
assigned by the JPPCC.4
D.3.2 Structure of the JPPCC
Because the main objective of the JPPCC is to coordinate the government and the 
private sector in solving important economic problems, the organisation is in the form 
of a joint committee. The structure of the central JPPCC is as shown in Figure D-l.
4Govemment and Private Cooperation Division, Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, Ko Ro Oo: Ku Mue Pui Prae Kwamroo Kiewkab Ko Ro Oo (The JPPCC: A 
Handbook of the JPPCC) (Bangkok, April, 1988), p.8.
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The secretariat. When the JPPCC was first established, the agency which took 
care of its secretarial work was the Economic Projects Division, of the Office of the
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National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). However, the job was 
a temporary one. Therefore, in October 1985 the Government and Private 
Cooperation Division was formed within the NESDB to be the JPPCC's permanent 
secretariat. The functions of the secretariat are described as follows.
i) To arrange and organise the meetings of the JPPCC. The task is divided 
into the technical work of providing facts and information including suggestions to 
problems being considered, and the secretarial work of preparing the meeting and its 
agenda.
ii) To act as the secretariat of the Sub-Committee for Agenda Review in the 
consideration of issues to be put on the meeting agenda.
iii) To carry out other work after the meeting such as informing other 
government agencies or private institutions of the JPPCC's resolutions.
iv) To participate in various sub-committees appointed by the JPPCC.
v) To follow up the resolution of both the central JPPCC and provincial 
JPPCCs (PJPPCCs) and coordinate the work among relevant agencies.5
The Jo in t Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and  B anking  
(JSCCIB). In the past several private groups of representatives participated in 
international conferences, such as the meeting between the Japanese Keidaren and the 
Thai groups of representatives, the Asian meeting, and meetings with bodies such as 
the EEC, as consultants or observers. Being dissatisfied with their given status and 
wishing to acquire more bargaining power, the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the 
Federation of Thai Industries (then, the association of Thai Industries) formed a joint 
committee in July 1976, which consisted of fourteen committeemen, seven from 
each, and two presidents, one from each. Later the presidents thought they should 
invite the Thai Bankers Association to join them since trade and industry normally are
5Ibid., pp.8-9.
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involved with banking. Thus, in June, 1977, the Joint Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Industry and Banking was formed with the objective of being a central 
body for the coordination of work among private institutions and with the 
government, and also for the communication and negotiation with both domestic 
organisations and international bodies.6
Figure D-2: Organisation of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Industry and Banking
The President
The Secretariat
Committeemen from 
the Federation of 
Thai Industries 
(9 Persons)
Committeemen from 
the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce 
(9 Persons)
Committeemen from 
the Thai Bankers 
Association 
(5 Persons)
Source: Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking,
Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking:
The Third conference atKhonkan, January 26,1986, seminar 
papers, p.9.
6Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, Joint Standing Committee on 
Commerce, Industry and Banking: The Third conference at Khonkan, January 26, 1986, seminar 
papers, pp.7-8.
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The structure of the JSCCIB is as shown in Figure D-2. Each of the three 
institutions takes a turn in the presidency.
D.3.3 Work and Decision-Making Process of the JPPCC
In principle, the JPPCC considers only the issues which involve both the government 
and the private sector or those which are of public interest. The agencies in the 
government sector which can propose issues for consideration by the JPPCC are 
various government agencies and committees, the Cabinet and the provincial 
JPPCCs. In the private sector, they are the members of the three private institutions 
(the Thai chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, and the Thai 
Bankers Association). The process of proposition and submission is as follows:7
i) In the government sector, if an issue is considered to involve both the 
government and the private sector, then it can be submitted to the secretariat of the 
JPPCC.
ii) In the private sector, private businesses which are the members of the 
three private institutions participating in the JPPCC, can submit issues through the 
institutions of which they are members, or to the JSCCIB which considers and then 
forward them to the JPPCCs secretariat. However, each private institution may 
submit issues to the secretariat directly without going through the JSCCIB. Trade 
associations or clubs can also submit issues to the secretariat directly or through the 
JSSCIB.8
Having received the issues, problems or complaints, the secretariat studies the cases 
by coordinating with the relevant agencies and bodies both in the government and the
G overnm ent and Private Cooperation Division, Office o f the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, op.cit., p.14.
8 Ibid., p.15.
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private sector. It will then present the cases to the JPPCC's Sub-Committee for 
Agenda Reviews for further consideration.9
The Sub-Committee for Agenda Reviews goes through the cases and selects 
some of them to be discussed in the JPPCC's meetings. Problems and complaints 
which are operational and for which there are existing agencies to take care; are sent 
to the relevant agencies for consideration.10
The cases that reach the JPPCC are considered and debated at its meetings. In 
principle, the JPPCC does not have the authority to give orders to any government 
agencies or bodies; therefore, the resolutions are passed to the Cabinet and the 
ministers in charge of economic affairs for further consideration. If the resolutions are 
approved at this final stage, then an order is issued to the relevant agencies for 
implementation.11
D.4 EXTENSION OF THE JPPCC SCHEME 
INTO OTHER PROVINCES
The extension of the JPPCC scheme into other provinces was due to the successful 
operation of the central JPPCC.12 The JPPCC has extended the cooperation between 
the government and the private sector into provinces by creating the provincial 
JPPCCs (PJPPCCs). Up to July 1988, there were 63 provincial JPPCCs distributed 
around the country (Thailand has a total of 72 provinces) (see Table D-l).
9Loc.cit.
10Loc.cit.
n Ibid., p.16.
12Ibid. p. 18.
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Table D -l: The Number of Provincial JPPCCs Formed (1983-1988)
Year Number of PJPPCCs Formed
1983 4
1984 11
1985 20
1986 8
1987 13
1988 7
Total 63
Source: Manoot Watanakomen, Khana Kamakan Ruam Pak Rataban Lae 
Ekachon Pua Khaekai Panha Tang Settakij: Karn Suksa Dan Karn 
Borihan (The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee for 
Solving Economic Problems: A Study o f Its Administration) 
(Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, 
1989), p.32.
D.4.1 Objectives and Organisation of a PJPPCC
The objectives and organisation of a PJPPCC are similar to those of the central 
JPPCC. The objectives of the PJPPCC are as follows.
i) To help local businessmen and private institutions in the province and 
encourage a greater sense of social responsibility and unity in solving business 
problems.
ii) To organise a form of government and private cooperation similar to the 
central JPPCC for solving provincial economic problems.13
The organisation of a PJPPCC is borrowed from that of the central JPPCC. The 
structure of a PJPPCC is as follows.
i) Its chairman is the governor of that province.
ii) Its vice-presidents are the vice-governor, the president of the chamber of
commerce of that province, and the chairman of the sub-committee of the Federation
13Loc.cit.
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of Thai Industries (if there is one) of that province.
iii) The public members of the PJPPCC are senior officials of the province 
who are in charge of economic affairs.
iv) The private members of the PJPPCC are representatives from the chamber 
of commerce and the sub-committee of the Federation of Thai Industries in that 
province.
v) The secretary is the head of the provincial office who is appointed in 
accordance with the resolution of the central JPPCC and the Ministry of Interior. An 
assistant secretary can be appointed if necessary. The assistant secretary may be the 
secretary of the provincial chamber of commerce or the secretary of the provincial 
sub-committee of the Federation of Thai Industries. I4
D.4.2 Tasks of a PJPPCC and Its Coordination with the Central 
JPPCC
A PJPPCC has two primary tasks. They are as follows.
1) To present policies and suggest ways for solving economic problems, 
especially those under the responsibility of the provincial governor.
2) To disseminate and publicise news and information about important 
undertakings and events including the policy of the central government, to the people 
and private provincial organisations.15
Besides this, a PJPPCC also coordinates with other agencies such as the provincial 
office of the Ministry of Commerce and the provincial office of the Ministry of 
Industry. The main objective of the PJPPCC is to concentrate on provincial problems 
and those which are under the provincial authority. However, cases which are
14Loc.cit.
15Ibid., p.19.
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beyond the authority of the province are referred to the central government and 
administration. This is accomplished as follows.
Figure D-3: The Structure of Coordination between a Provincial 
JPPCC and the Central JPPCC
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Source: Government and Private Cooperation Division, Office of the
National Economic and Social Development Board, Ko Ro Oo: Ku 
Mue Pui Prae Kwamroo Kiewkab Ko Ro Oo (The JPPCC: A 
Handbook o f the JPPCC) (Bangkok: April, 1988), p.23.
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i) Problems and suggestions at policy level which are within the authority of 
existing bodies, such as government agencies or committees appointed by the 
government, will be dealt with directly by the relevant bodies.
ii) Problems and suggestions which involve several agencies or both the 
government and the private sector are referred to the central JPPCC's secretariat (the 
Government and Private Coordination Division, NESDB) or the three private 
institutions (the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, the 
Thai Bankers Association). They then process and forward the cases to the JPPCC 
finally.
iii) Problems and suggestions which involve with the work of state 
enterprises under the Ministry of Interior and cannot be solved by the provincial are 
presented directly to the Ministry of Interior. ^
The overall structure of coordination of the PJPPCC with the central JPPCC is 
as shown in Figure D-3.
D.5 THE JPPCC SCHEME IN PRACTICE
Thus far, the JPPCC's objectives, organisation, work and decision-making process, 
and its extension to other provinces around the country have been described. This 
may be the official form of the JPPCC scheme, however, in practice, several features 
of the JPPCC scheme differ from their written forms substantially.
D.5.1 Misinterpretation and Ambiguity of the JPPCC’s Objectives
In principle, the JPPCC does not have the authority to make decisions and give 
orders to government agencies or other organisations. However, Sawaeng 
Ratanamongkolmas conducted some research into the understanding of the objectives 
of personnel involved in the JPPCC, both in the government and the private sector at
16Ibid., pp.21-22.
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upper and lower levels. He found that several different views existed. The personnel 
at the upper level in both sectors, such as members of the JPPCC and of the Sub- 
Committee for Agenda Review, understood that the JPPCC was a policy- 
coordinating body which could only suggest policies and solutions to problems but 
did not have the authority to give orders. However, the lower level personnel from 
the private sector appointed to sub-committees by the JPPCC held the view that the 
JPPCC ought to have the authority to give orders, which would make the problem­
solving process more efficient. This view of private personnel at the lower level was 
similar to that of the provincial JPPCCs' members.17
Moreover, the private sector representatives tended to have a higher expectation 
of the JPPCC: they believed that the suggestion of solutions to economic problems 
was the most basic form of cooperation and should be extended to the level of joint 
decision-making and implementation of development projects. In contrast, the 
government sector representatives held the opinion that the suggestion of solutions to 
economic problems was already the highest level of cooperation, and that the JPPCC 
should concentrate more on giving information supporting government decision­
making.18
Thus, it can be seen that the upper level personnel's understanding of the 
JPPCC's objectives was closer to the official form of the JPPCC than was that of the 
lower level personnel. Some people held the view that the JPPCC was a politically 
sensitive organisation and were dubious about the reasons why the JPPCC does not 
have the authority to give orders and why its resolutions must be authorised by the 
Cabinet since the Cabinet is also present at the JPPCC meetings.19 However, there 
were several occasions when the JPPCC just passed its resolutions to government 
agencies to be implemented. This caused dissatisfaction among officials of the 
agencies.20
17Ratamongkolmas, op.cit., p. 12.
18Ibid., pp.13-14.
19Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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From the study of the work the JPPCC so far, it can be seen that the JPPCC 
tends to concentrate its activities on solving short-term operational problems rather 
than on coordination between the government and the private sector in making plans 
and joint development projects, which is also one of the objectives stated in the 
JPPCC's publication.21
D.5.2 The Status Inequality of Representation within the JPPCC
Even though the participation status of personnel from both the government and the 
private sector are equal in principle, in practice the government's ability to design a 
policy and implement it tends to be greater than that of the private sector. Most 
committeemen from the government are better prepared than those from the private 
sector in terms of resources and legitimate authority to participate in the JPPCC. In 
contrast, the representatives from the three institutions, even though they are the 
strongest organisations representing the private sector, still have problems, for 
example of coordination within their own organisations and between themselves.22
The crucial question is to what extent these three institutions can represent the 
private sector in solving those complicated economic problems, as each institution's 
role is limited to its own line of industry. For example, the Thai Bankers Association 
whose members are commercial banks giving mainly financial services limits its 
scope to the financial industry if it implements a government policy. In fact, the 
operations and policy of most commercial banks are already under close scrutiny by
20Manoot Watanakomen, Khana Kamakan Ruam Pak Rataban Lae Ekachon Pua Khaekai Panha 
Tang Settakij: Karn Suksa Dan Karn Borihan (The Joint Public and Provate Consultative 
Committee for Solving Economic Problems: A Study of Its Administration) (Bangkok: Thailand 
Development Research Institute Foundation, 1989), p.43.
21 See Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Pramual Pol Ngarn Khana 
Kamakarn Ruam Pak Rattaban Lae Ekachon Pua Kaekhai Panha Tang Settakij (Ko Ro Oo) (The 
Compilation of Work Results o f the Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee on Solving 
Economic Problems (JPPCC)), May 1986 and December 1987.
22Ratanmongkolmas, op.cit., p. 18.
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the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand. Similarly, the chambers of 
commerce the majority of whose members are involved in trading, either import or 
export, have limited their scope to international trade. The success of the chambers of 
commerce's operations then depends on international market conditions. Finally, the 
Federation of Thai Industries whose members are manufacturing companies, still has 
internal management problems because of the variety of industries within the 
manufacturing sector 23
In addition, even though the activities of the three private institutions cover most 
o f the country's important economic sectors, the JPPCC still does not have 
representatives from the agricultural sector, despite old and chronic problems such as 
poverty and the low price of agricultural products in this sector.24 This limited 
representation of the private sector has led some people to say that the JPPCC only 
protects the interest of the rich big business groups.
Besides all these major deviations from the ideal principles of the JPPCC, there 
are other minor ones. For example, some of the issues submitted to the JPPCC may 
be arbitrarily dropped from the agenda by the Sub-Committee for Agenda Review if it 
thinks the issue is not important or does not fall into the category to be considered by 
the JPPCC. The coordination between various agencies involved in the JPPCC is still 
not efficient and is not supported by enough resources to keep up with the rapid 
growth of the JPPCC scheme. For example, there are only two persons in the Office 
of Policy and Planning, in the Ministry of Interior, to take care of the JPPCC's 
work.25
D.5.3 Perform ance of the JPPCC
The operation of the JPPCC scheme thus far has substantially promoted public and 
private cooperation and has had several successful concrete results. Several sub-
23Ibid., pp.18-19.
24Ibid., p.19.
25Watanakomen, op.cit., p.57.
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committees were appointed by the JPPCC. Some of them are as follows.
i) The Sub-Committee for Public Relations of the JPPCC (permanent).
ii) The Sub-Committee for Agenda Review (permanent).
iii) The Joint Public and Private Sub-Committee for Solving Tourism
Problems (ad hoc).
iv) The Sub-Committee for the Administration of the USIAD’s Private Sector 
Development Project (ad hoc).
v) The Sub-Committee for Coordination in Solving Customs Problems (ad
hoc).
vi) The Sub-Committee for Plans and Measures of the Consumption of Oil, 
Fuel, Natural Gas and Coal in Industry and Transportation (ad hoc).
vii) The Joint Public and Private Sub-Committee for Solving the Problems of 
the Mining Industry (ad hoc).
viii) The Sub-Committee for the Promotion of Thailand (ad hoc).26
Some of the important results of the sub-committees which should be mentioned here 
were the shortening of the customs procedure to promote export and the cutting of the 
bureaucratic red tape in major government economic agencies such as various 
departments under the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Finance.27
26See Ratanamongkolmas, op.cit., Appendix B, pp.14-19.
27For more details o f the work o f various sub-committees, see Pramual P ol Ngarn Khana 
Kamakarn Ruam Pak Rattaban Lae Ekachon Pua Kaekhai Panha Tang Settakij (Ko Ro Oo) (The 
Compilation of Work Results o f the Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee on Solving 
Economic Problems (JPPCC)), published annually by Office o f the National Economic and Social 
Development Board,
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The main objective of Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC) is to 
bring the government and the private sector together to debate important economic 
problems, the resolutions of which are passed to the Cabinet and the ministers in 
charge of economic affairs for approval. The membership of the JPPCC consists of 
the cabinet members, ministers in charge of economic affairs, and the representatives 
of the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking, which is 
formed by the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, and the 
Thai Bankers Association. The Government and Private Cooperation Division, of the 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, serves as its 
secretariat. The agenda to be considered at the JPPCC's meetings is passed through 
the secretariat to the Sub-Committee for Agenda Review.
The JPPCC scheme has grown quickly and extended to other provinces, but not 
enough resources have been made available to keep up with this growth and promote 
the concept of the JPPCC scheme. Nevertheless, so far the JPPCC operation has 
been relatively successful and contributed to several important advances such as the 
cut in the procedures of business contact with certain government agencies.
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Appendix E
PILOT STUDY: INTERVIEW GUIDE
This is the pilot study interview of my research under the topic: Government 
and Business Relations. It is an in-depth interview covering 6 sub-topics:
i) The government
ii) Business enterprises
iii) The economic system
iv) Business competition
v) Industrial policy
vi) Government and business relations
The interview should take about 2-3 hours to complete.
The Government
A) The government in general
1. As you know, a government is a very big organisation, consists of several 
departments, and performs many functions; in general when you think of the 
government, what do you think of? (Probe: What do you mean by...? How? In what 
ways?)
2. In your own words, how would describe the present government? (Probe: How 
do you feel about what you have just described? What makes you say it that way?)
3. Do you think the government is trustworthy? (Probe: Why? Do you happen to 
have any experience which makes you feel that way? Could you explain it to me?)
4. How important do you think the government is to your company? (Probe: For 
example?)
5. Do you think the government is doing something good for your company’s 
operations? (Probe: If yes, how? In what way? For example? If no, what makes you 
think that way?)
6. Do you think the government is doing something bad for your company's 
operations? (Probe: The same as the previous question.)
7. Do you think your company could do better with or without the government, or 
does it not make any difference? (Probe: what makes you think like that?)
8. Would you explain your latest contact or any experience with the government ? 
(Probe: How do you feel about it?)
9. What do you think the perfect government would be like? What is it for?
10. Suppose you had the authority to do something about the present government, 
what would you do first? (Probe: Why?)
B) The people in high positions in the government
1. What do think about these people? How do you feel about them? (Probe: As
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necessary.)
2. What kind of educational background do you think they are from?
3. What is your understanding of the characteristics of their work?
4. On what do you think they usually spend most of their time?
5. What do you think are the objectives of their work?(Probe: Would you explain a 
bit more about...?)
6. How successful do you think they are in their career?
7. Would you describe the people who are in high positions in the government and 
involved in policy-making as capable? (Probe: Why? What makes you think that 
way?)
8. Do you happen to know anyone in high positions in the government 
intimately?( Probe: How did you get to know him? How do feel about the 
relationship?)
9. Does it help to know this person? (Probe: In what way? How? Can you give me 
some example?)
10. From what kind of educational background do you think the people in high 
positions in the government should come? (Probe: Why?)
11. What kind of personality do you think they should have?
12. Do you think that there are a lot of people with the kind of background and 
personality you have just described in the government? (Probe: Why? What does that 
make you feel?)
C) The economic role of the government
1. With respect to economic matters , what do think the government should do ? In 
other words, what roles should the government play in the economic system? (Probe: 
Any other roles? (Ask for each role mentioned.) How important is this role? What 
would happen if the government failed to play this role?)
2. Besides what the government should do, what do you think the government 
should not do in the economic system? (Probe: (For each role mentioned) What 
would happen if the government insisted on assuming that role? How would this 
affect your business? What would you do about it?)
3. How satisfied are you with the present economic role of the government? 
(Probe: In what way? Would you explain to me a bit more about that?)
4. Could you tell me about any issues where the government is performing its role 
very well? (Probe: (Ask for each issue mentioned) What makes you say that? Could 
you give me any examples?)
5. Could you tell me about any issues where the government is performing its role 
very poorly? (Probe: (Ask for each issue mentioned) What makes say that?; could 
you give me any examples?)
6. As you know, some people would like the government to intervene in the 
economic system as little as possible, do you yourself believe that the government 
should let the economic system work through the law of supply and demand. (Probe:
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Why?)
7. Do you feel that the current economic role of the government is very much 
influenced by political factors or vested interests? (Probe: What makes you feel that 
way? How does that affect your attitude towards the government?)
D) The economic capability
1. Do you think the government has the ability to manage the economy? (Probe: If 
yes, what makes you think that way? If no, what is the reason for that?)
2. Do you agree that there is a good economic management team inside the 
government? (Probe: What makes you say that?)
3. Do you think the government could play to leading role in relation to firms? 
(Probe: Why?)
4. On what business matters do you think you can rely on the government? 
(Probe: Would you explain a bit more to me about that?)
5. On what business matters do you think you cannot rely on the government? 
(Probe: Would you make it a bit clearer to me?)
Business Enterprises
A) General
1. From your experience, what is a business enterprise? (Probe: What are the 
objectives of this enterprise?)
2. If somebody says that the first objective of a firm is to maximize profits, will 
you agree with him? (Probe: If yes, why? If no, what is the first objective?)
B) Role
1. What do you think are the roles of business enterprises in the economic system? 
(Probe: Which of these is the most important one? Why is this one?)
2. How do you feel about the present roles of business enterprises in the economic 
system? (Probe: What makes you feel that way?)
3. How would you describe the role of your company in the present economic 
system? (Probe: As necessary.)
C) Profit
1. What about profit? Besides its literal meaning of total revenue minus total cost, 
what does profit mean to you? (Probe: As necessary.?)
2. In your own words, how would you describe your company's policy about 
profit? (Probe: As necessary.)
D) Investment and innovation
1. What factors do you think motivate firms to invest? (Probe: What about the 
government? Do you think the government plays an important role in motivating 
firms to invest? If yes, how? If no, why?)
369
Appendix E
2. When your company is going to make an investment, what are the criteria? 
(Probe: Which one is the most important one? Why?)
3. What factors do you think motivate firms to make innovations? (Probe: What 
about the government? Do you think the government plays an important role in 
motivating firms to make innovations? If yes, how? If no, why?)
4. When your company is going to make innovations, what are the criteria? 
(Probe: Which one is the most important one? Why?)
E) Interpenetration of policy
1. In practical terms, What is your understanding of business policy? (Probe: 
What do you mean by...?)
2. What are the first five factors you take into consideration when planning your 
company's business policy? (Probe: As necessary.)
3. What about the government? Would you say that government policy has a great 
influence on your business policy? (Probe: If no, why? If yes, how? How do you 
feel about it? Do you resent that? Why?)
4. How important is the government's industrial policy to your business policy? 
(Probe: Could you give me some example?)
5. In the opposite direction, do you think your company or group can influence the 
government's industrial policy? (Probe: If yes, how? In which situation? If no, 
why?)
6. Do you think that the government's industrial policy and business policy are 
closely related? (Probe: Why?)
7. How would you go about it if you wanted the government to do something? 
(Probe: Could you explain a bit more about...?)
The Economic System
A) General
1. According to your understanding, what is an economic system? (Probe: Would 
you explain a bit more about this?)
2. In your own words, how would you describe the present economic system? 
(Probe: As necessary)
3. How do you feel about the economic system you have just described? (Probe: 
What makes you feel that?)
4. What do you think are the major problems facing the economic system? (Probe: 
(Ask for each problem mentioned) Who or what should be blamed for that 
problem?)What should the government do about it? What should firms do about it?
5. Of all these, which do you think is the most important problem? (Probe: Why?)
6. Do you think that the present economic system is one of the best compared to 
those of other countries? (Probe: What makes you say that? What do you think if it is 
compared to other countries like South Korea and Taiwan? What do you think if it is
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compared to other countries like America, Germany, Japan?)
B) T h e  m e c h a n is m  o f  a n  eco n o m ic  sy s te m
1. What is your idea of how an economic should operate or work? (Probe: Would 
you explain a bit more about...?)
2. Would you explain to me how the present economic system operates or works? 
(Probe: Would you explain a bit more about...?)
3. How satisfied are you with what you have just described? (Probe: What makes 
you say that? What or who contributes (should be blamed) for that?)
C ) T h e  fu n c tio n s  o f  a n  e c o n o m ic  sy s te m
1. What do you think are the functions of an economic system? (Probe: (Ask for 
each function mentioned) Would you explain a bit more to me about...? How 
important is it? How successfully do you think the present economic system is doing 
this function? Would you give me any examples of that?)
2. Do you think that an economic system can sometimes fail to perform any of 
these functions? Which ones? (Probe: (Ask for each function mentioned) How? In 
which situation? How serious is the failure? What should be done about it? By 
whom?)
B u sin ess C o m p e tit ion
A ) G e n e ra l
1. What does business competition mean to you? (Probe: Would you explain a bit 
more about...? Could you give me any examples?)
2. According to your experience, how would you explain the present 
characteristics of business competition? (Probe: What do you mean by ...? How 
satisfied are you with it?)
3. Do you think the government is contributing positively to the present business 
competition? (Probe: If yes, in what way?; how? If no, what makes you say that?)
4. Do you think that at the same time the government is also contributing 
negatively to the present business competition? (Probe: The same as above.)
5. Do you think your company is competing very well with other fiims? (Probe: 
What are the major factors that enable your company to do that? Does the government 
help you compete better?)
B) F u n c t io n s  o f  b u s in e s s  c o m p e tit io n
1. In your opinion, what are the functions of business competition in the market? 
(Probe: Anything else? As necessary.)
2. Which of the functions you have mentioned is the most important one? (Probe: 
Why is this function more important than the others? What will happen if business 
competition fails to perform this function? How will this effect your company? What 
do you think are the causes of this failure? How would you go about it? What should
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the government do about it?)
C ) F o rm
1. What do you think are the major problems facing the present practice of 
business competition? (For each problem mentioned probe: Who or what should be 
blamed for that? What should the government do about it? What should firms do 
about it?)
2. Of these problems, which would you say is the most serious one? (Probe: Why 
do you say that? How might this problem affect your company?)
3. Do you think that there are any firms or groups which are not competing fairly? 
(Probe: What makes you say that? Could you give me any examples? Can anything 
be done about it?; by whom?)
4. What do you think is the proper way for a firm to compete in the market? 
(Probe: Would you explain a bit more about that?)
D ) C o m p e tin g  w ith  fo re ig n  f irm s
1. Do you feel any differences between competing with foreign firms and local 
firms? (Probe: If no, what makes you say that? If yes, what are the differences? Do 
you use different strategies to compete with each of the two? What are the differences 
in the strategies?)
2. Could you tell me about any advantages or disadvantages that your firm has 
experienced in competing with foreign firms? (Probe: For each disadvantage, what is 
your company doing about it? Do you think the government can help you in this 
matter? If yes, how? If no, why?)
E ) F a c to r s  e n a b lin g  f irm s  to  c o m p e te
1. What factors do you think make a firm to compete successfully in the market? 
(Probe: For each factor, could you give me and example?)
2. Of all these factors, which one is the most crucial factor? (Probe: Why is this 
one more important than the others?)
3. What about the government? Do you think the government is in any way 
helping your company to compete more successfully in the local market? (Probe: 
Why? What about in the international market?)
F ) F a c to r s  p re v e n tin g  f irm s  f ro m  c o m p e tin g
1. What factors do you think prevent a firm from competing successfully in the 
market? (Probe for each factor: Could you give me an example about this factor?)
2. Of all these factors, which one is the most crucial factor? (Probe: Why is this 
factor more important than the others?)
3. Do you think that any of these factors are to be found in your company? (Probe: 
What are they? (Ask for each factor) What causes it? How do you go about it?)
4. What about the government? Do you feel that the government is creating any
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problems for your company? (Probe: Why?)
In d u s tr ia l  Po licy
A ) G e n e ra l
1. During the past few decades, governments in many countries have intervened in 
their countries' industries in the name of industrial policy. What does industrial policy 
mean to you? (Probe: Could you give me an example of a current industrial policy 
made by the government? How do you feel about it? How would the policy affect 
your company?)
2. Do you happen to know which agencies inside the government are responsible 
for industrial policy? (Probe: What are they? Any other agencies?)
3. How important do you think industrial policy is to a country? (Probe: In what 
way? How? What would happen if there was no industrial policy?)
4. In your opinion, what do you think are the objectives of industrial policy? 
(Probe: Do you think the government also perceives the same objectives? If no, what 
are the differences? How do you feel about that? If yes, why?)
5. (For each of the objectives mentioned above) What do you think is the best 
means to achieve this objective? (Probe: As necessary.)
B ) I n d u s t r ia l  S t r u c tu r e
1. Could you give me the first five industries in which you think this country's 
industrial companies have the best chance of winning in the international market? 
(Probe: What are your criteria for choosing these industries? Do you think the 
government has an idea similar to yours of the most favorable industries which 
industrial companies should go into ? If yes, what do you think the government is 
doing about it? How? If no, what industries do you think the government is going 
for? How do you feel about that?)
2. Do you believe that the government can determine the best industrial structure 
for the country? (Probe: If yes,what makes you believe that? If no, what makes you 
believe that? Who should know the best industrial structure for the country? Why?)
3. Do you think the government and firms can plan together which industry the 
producers should go for? (Probe: Why?)
G o v e rn m e n t a n d  B usiness R e la tio n s
A ) G e n e ra l
1. As you know, governments in most countries interact with firms in one way or 
another. In your opinion, how should firms relate to the government? (Probe: What 
do you mean by...?)
2. On the other hand, how should the government relate to firms? (Probe: As 
necessary.)
3. In your own words, how would you define "government and business
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relations?”
4. How important do you think these relations are? (Probe: In what way? Could 
you give me an example?)
5. How would you describe the present government and business relations? 
(Probe: As necessary.)
6. Would you say that your company has good relations with the government? 
(Probe: Why?)
B ) F u n c tio n s  a n d  fo rm s
1. What do you think are the functions of government and business relations? 
(Probe: Could you explain to me a bit more about that? Which is the most important? 
Why is this?)
2. (Ask for each function.) What would happen if the relations failed to perform 
this function? (Probe: What or who should be blamed for this failure? How would 
this affect your firm?)
3. What kind of government and business relationship would you describe as 
good relationship? (Probe: What or who contributes to this kind of relationship?)
4. In your opinion, what are the advantages if the government and business have 
good relationship with each other?
5. What kind of government and business relationship would you describe as bad 
relationship? (Probe: What or who should be blamed for this kind of relationship?)
6. In your opinion, What is the effect if the government and business have bad 
relationship with each other?
C ) C o m m u n ic a tio n
1. How do feel about the present communication between the government and 
business? (Probe: As necessary.)
2. Do you sometimes find it difficult to communicate with the authorities inside the 
government? (Probe: If yes, could you explain the situation to me? What or who 
should blamed for that?)
3. Do you feel that the government does not listen to what firms say? (If yes, 
could you give me an example? How do you feel about that? What would you do 
about it? If no, what makes you say that?)
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Appendix F
PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is a pilot study for a part of my research on the topic: 
Government and Business Relations in Thailand. The data from this questionnaire 
will be used in my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.
You are asked to rank several pairs of descriptive adjectives with opposite 
meanings according to their relevance or ability to describe the concepts above them.
There are in total 3 concepts and 10 pairs of adjectives underneath each concept. 
Please rank every pair of adjectives. Do not omit any pair.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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CONCEPT 1: GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THAILAND 
DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS
 Biased-Impartial
 Deteriorating-Improving
 Fruitful-Fruitless
 Distant-Intimate
 Valuable-Worthless
 Effective-Ineffective
 Flexible-Inflexible
 Tense-Relaxed
 Interesting-Boring
 Satisfactory-Unsatisfactory
CONCEPT 2: GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE PAST 12 
MONTHS
 Effective-Ineffective
 Fruitful-Fruitless
 Biased-Impartial
 Efficient-Inefficient
 Powerful-Powerless
 Valuable-Worthless
 Flexible-Inflexible
 Practical-Impractical
 Prudent-Imprudent
 Clear-Obscure
CONCEPT 3: THAI BUREAUCRATS, THAI BUSINESSMEN, AND FOREIGN 
BUSINESSMEN IN THAILAND
 Competent-Incompetent
 Cooperative-Uncooperative
 Modem-Old-fashioned
 Biased-Impartial
 Efficient-Inefficient
 Helpful-Unhelpful
 Prominent-Minor
 Powerful-Powerless
 Inflexible-Flexible
 Responsible-Irresponsible
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES
The primary question in constructing semantic differential scales is concerned with 
the selection of scales to be used. Theoretically, two basic criteria of scale selection 
are considered: scale relevance and factorial composition.1
The scale relevance means the ability of a scale to relate to or describe 
meaningfully the concepts being judged. Respondents will find it easier to rate a 
concept on a relevant scale. Moreover, relevant scales provide more sensitive 
measurement. More variance is obtained in using relevant scales and the variance of 
ratings involves less random error.2
The factorial composition refers to the structure or combination of the factor 
loadings of all scales on which a concept is judged. The primary objective in a 
semantic differential study is to obtain the measured meaning of a concept on three 
major dimensions: evaluative, potency and activity (EPA). These EPA dimensions are 
independent. Consequently, the implication is that the appropriate scales should 
measure the dimensions (i.e., scales that have high factor loadings in the EPA 
dimensions) and, at the same time, give relatively pure measures of the dimensions 
(i.e., each scale should has a high factor loading on just one single dimension).
The only objective way to select factorially pure scales is on the basis of actual 
factor analysis. Researchers experienced with the semantic differential scales are 
aware that intuition is an unreliable guide in selecting factorially pure scales. One can 
conduct ad hoc factor analyses to learn the factorial composition of new scales, but 
this is an expensive procedure since studies based on less than 30 concepts and 
hundreds of subjects are likely to be misleading.3
1 David R. Heise, "The Semantic Differential and Attitude Research," in Gene F. Summers, editor, 
Attitude Measurement (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), p.238.
2Barbara B. Koltew, "Some Characteristics of Intrajudge Trait Intercorrelations," Psychological 
M onograph , Vol.75 (1967), p.33, and B.S. Mitsos, "Personal Constructs and the Semantic 
Differential," Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol.62 (1961), pp.433-434, as quoted 
by Heise, loc.cit.
3Heise, op.cit., pp.238-239.
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Appendix F
According to these two criteria and with the limitation just stated, the more 
appropriate and convenient but theoretically accepted method of selecting the scales is 
to choose relevant scales with known factor loadings from the previous studies done 
by other researchers. In this case the thesaurus study by Osgood and others was 
chosen. The study provides as many as 76 scales of known factor loadings.4
The relevant scales selected from the thesaurus study of Osgood and others for 
each dimension of the concepts investigated by this research is shown in Table F-l. 
Six scale from the study were chosen for concept A, seven for concept B, and five 
for concept C, D and E. However, it was felt that more scales ought to be added for 
each concept for a few reasons.
First, there are interesting relevant scales other than those shown in the Table F- 
1. Second, since a good mix and alternation of scales with different factor loadings is 
a desirable feature of semantic measurement, a greater number of scales will make 
this task easier.
In order to be objective in choosing more scales to be added to the scales with 
known factor loadings, a pilot study questionnaire was constructed and distributed to 
twenty students studying economics at Thammasat University in Bangkok. The 
questionnaire presents the respondent with the five concepts under study (A, B, C, D 
and E) and asks him to rank ten pairs of descriptive adjectives underneath each 
concept according to their relevance to or ability to describe the concept above them.
The results are as shown in Table F-2. The average rank of each pair of 
adjectives was calculated by using the frequency in each ranking as the weighting 
factors. Even though, theoretically, algebraic calculation of ordinal numbers is not 
appropriate, it was done here because at least the average rank of each pair of 
adjectives can be used as a rough indicator for choosing objectively which scales are 
more suitable for the concepts under consideration.
4Charles E. Osgood et al., The Measurement o f  Meaning (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 
1957), pp.53-61.
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C oncept 1
Frequency
Scales 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9  10 AV Rank
Biased-Impartial 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 0 2 1 5.00 4
Deteriorating-Improving 2 0 0 4 3 0 5 5 0 1 5.90 7
Fruitful-Fruitless 3 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 3 4.95 3
Distant-Intimate 5 6 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 2.75 1
Valuable-Worthless 1 3 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 5.75 5
Effective-Ineffective 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 5 4 4 7.60 10
Flexible-Inflexible 0 3 4 0 3 2 2 0 3 3 5.80 6
Tense-Relaxed 4 4 5 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 3.30 2
Interesting-Boring 1 0 0 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 7.05 9
Satisfactory-Unsatisfactory 1 0 0 2 3 3 3 0 5 3 6.90 8
Total 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
C oncept 2
Frequency
Scales 1 2 •3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 AV Rank
Effective-Ineffective 4 4 4 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 3.35 1
Fruitful-Fruitless 0 0 2 0 2 2 3 5 3 3 7.30 10
Biased-Impartial 2 2 2 1 6 3 2 2 0 0 4.70 3
Efficient-Inefficient 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 2 0 0 3.55 2
Powerful-Powerless 0 2 3 5 1 5 0 0 2 2 5.30 5
Valuable-Worthless 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 4 5 6.70 9
Flexible-Inflexible 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 4 4.75 4
Practical-Impractical 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 2 5 3 6.65 8
Prudent-Imprudent 0 4 0 3 0 1 3 4 2 3 6.35 6
Clear-Obscure 3 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 4 3 6.40 7
Total 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Concept 3
Frequency
Scales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 AV Rank
Competent-Incompetent 0 2 4 1 2 4 3 1 2 1 6.15 7
Cooperative-Uncooperative 2 1 4 3 4 3 0 0 1 2 4.75 3
Modem-Old-fashioned 0 2 0 0 3 2 2 3 4 4 7.25 10
Biased-Impartial 3 4 3 3 1 0 1 2 2 1 4.40 2
Efficient-Inefficient 3 0 2 5 2 1 3 2 0 2 5.10 4
Helpful-Unhelpful 3 4 2 0 0 2 3 2 2 2 5.20 6
Prominent-Minor 1 0 0 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 7.05 9
Powerful-Powerless 5 4 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 4.15 1
Inflexible-Flexible 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 0 1 5.15 5
Responsible-Irresponsible 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 2 6.40 8
Total 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
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Appendix F
The final total number of scales for each concept was chosen arbitrarily to be 
twelve. Therefore, the unassigned scales with a higher average rank as calculated 
from the pilot study results were added to the scales previously chosen from the 
thesaurus study by Osgood and others. The unassigned scales for each concept are 
shown in Table F-3.
The scales with known factor loadings and unassigned scales were finally 
mixed together as shown in the interview schedule for managers (form B) and 
interview schedule for bureaucrats (see Appendix H and I respectively).
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Interview Schedule for Business Managers (Form A)
Appendix G
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR BUSINESS MANAGERS (FQRIMA1 
This interview is part of my Ph.D. research at the Glasgow Business School, 
University of Glasgow, Scotland. One part of this research studies the interactions 
between companies and government agencies in Thailand.
The interview is divided into 3 parts:
i) Part A: Background information on the interviewee and the company;
ii) Part B: The company’s contact and communication with government 
agencies (institutional interaction); and
iii) Part C: The impact and influence of government economic policy on the 
company (policy interaction).
Your anonymity will be strictly observed.
P a rt A: Background information on the interviewee and the company
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
0  31-40 
()  61 or above 
() Female
( )  No 
Professional subject
Company___________
Age of the interviewee
( ) 3 0  or below ( )  31-40 ( )  41-50
0  51-60 
Sex ()  Male 
Training or study abroad such as degree or diploma course
()  Yes •
( )  Science, engineering, etc.
( )  Social sciences, accounting, law, etc.
Years in the company
()  3 or below ( )  4-6 ( )7 -9
()10-12 ()13-15 ()  16 or over
Function
()  Chief executive ()  Production ()  Marketing
()  Finance ( )  Personnel ()  Other
Years in the present job
()  3 or below ()4-6  ( )7 -9
0 1 0 -1 2  ()13-15 ( )1 6  or over
The latest annual turnover of the company
() Below 300 million baht ( )  300-700
()  Above 700 million baht 
Type of company
()  Thai ( )  Joint venture
( )  Foreign subsidiary 
Membership of the management team of the company 
( )  Professional managers 
( )  Members or relatives of families owning or 
holding substantial shares in the company 
()  Combination of the above two categories 
Is the company a member of any trade association, chamber of 
commerce or the like? 0  Yes ( )  No
To what extent do you think the government controls or regulates the industry 
in which your company is?
()  No Extent ( )  Small
()  Moderate ( )  Great ()  Very Great
ISIC number of the company___________________________
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Appendix G
8. What are the overall impact of the six government economic policies you just 
mentioned on these specific aspects of your company during the past 12 months? 
Use this scale for your answers.
Scale
Much Slightly Slightly Much
Lower Lower Lower The Same Higher Higher Higher
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aspects of your company's business I Rating
1. The total costs of products or services. I
2. The quality of products or services.
3. The growth of your company.
4. The efficiency of work in your company.
5. The profit of your company.
6. The competitiveness of your company in 
the market.
7. The sales volume of your products or services. I
9. In general, what were the overall impact of government economic policy on 
your company during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
( ) 1 =  Very Bad ( ) 2  = Bad
()  3 = Slightly Bad
()  4 = Balanced or No Effect
( ) 5  = Slightly Good ( )  6 = Good
()  7 = Very Good
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10. Specifically, how much influence do you think the Thai government's economic 
policy has on these decisions within your company during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answers.
Scale
No Little Moderate Great Very Great
Influence Influence Influence Influence Influence
1 2 3 4 5
 a. Pricing decisions
 b. Decisions to enter new markets within Thailand
 c. Decisions to enter new markets abroad
 d. Decisions to develop or launch new products or services
 e. Decisions to abandon existing products or services
  f. Manpower decisions
 g. Decisions to employ new technology
 h. Decisions to decrease or increase production capacity
 i. Salary and wage decisions
 j. Sales promotion decisions
 k. Product or service distribution decisions
 1. Output level decisions
11. In general, how much influence do you think the Thai government's economic 
policy has on your company's business decisions during the past 12 months?
Use this scale for your answer.
( )  1 = Not Influence 
()  3 = Moderate Influence 
()  5 = Very Great Influence
12. Please rank these external factors according to their importance to your 
company.
 a. Political climate
 b. Your competitors
 c. The government
 e. The money market
 f. Your customers
()  2 = Little Influence 
( )  4 = Great Influence
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Interview Schedule for Business Managers (Form B)
Appendix H
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR BUSINESS MANAGERS (FORM B)
This interview is part of my Ph.D. research at the Glasgow Business School, 
University of Glasgow, Scotland. One part of this research studies and compares the 
opinions of government officials and businessmen about government and business 
relations in Thailand.
The interview is divided into 3 parts:
i) Part A: Background information on the interviewee and the company;
ii) Part B: Your opinion about the economic roles of the government and the 
private sector, and
iii) Part C: Your opinion about the appropriate form of government and 
business relations in Thailand.
Your anonymity will be strictly observed.
P art A: Background information on the interviewee and the company
1. Company __ ______________________________ ___________________
2. Age of the interviewee
( ) 3 0  or below ( )  31-40 ()  41-50
Q 51-60 ( )61 or above
3. Sex QM ale ()  Female
4. Training or study abroad such as degree or diploma course
( )  No ()  Yes
Professional subject ( )  Science, engineering, etc.
( )  Social sciences, accounting, law, etc.
Years in the company
()  3 or below 0  4-6 0 7 - 9
( )  10-12 ( )  13-15 ()  16 or over
Function
()  Chief Executive ()  Production ()  Marketing
() Finance ()  Personnel ()  Other
Years in the present job
( )  3 or below 0  4-6 0 7 - 9
()  10-12 ()  13-15 ()  16 or over
9. Company's latest annual turnover
()  Below 300 million baht ( )  300-700
()  Above 700 million baht
10. Type of company
() Thai ( )  Joint venture
( )  Foreign subsidiary
11. Membership of the company's management team
()  Professional managers 
()  Members or relatives of the families owning or 
holding substantial share in the company 
()  Combination of the above two categories
12. Is the company a member of any trade association, chamber of 
commerce or the like? 0  Yes ( )  No
13. To what extent do you think the government controls or regulates 
the industry in which your company is?
()  No Extent ( )  Small
()  Moderate ()  Great ()  Very Great
14. ISIC number of the company___________________________
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P art B; The economic roles of the government and the private sector
1. Regarding the Thai economy, please express your opinions about these 
statements by using the following scale for your answers.
Scale
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
---------------------1------  1---------------- -—I---------------------1-------------------
1 2 3 4 5
 a. The economic system which best encourages the growth of businesses
in Thailand is the one with the least government intervention.
 b. In some industries, price levels may be determined by only a few
companies, yet the government should not interfere with pricing.
 c. Regulating the standard of goods and services is something that the
government should do.
 d. The government should promote newly established companies which are
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them subsidies.
 e. The government should promote newly established companies which are
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them loans at a 
rate which is lower than that of commercial banks.
 f. The government should promote newly established companies which are
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them tax 
concessions.
 g. Using trade barriers to protect local companies from the competition of big
foreign companies is something that the government should do.
 h. The provision of trade and business information to be distributed to
companies is the function for which the government is responsible.
 i. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble
because of bad economic conditions by giving them subsidies.
 j. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble
because of bad economic conditions by giving them loans at a rate 
which is lower than those of commercial banks.
 k. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble
because of bad economic conditions by giving them tax concessions.
 ___ 1. It is rather difficult for the government to oversee and ensure fair
business competition with bias.
 m. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are
in a growth industry by giving them subsidies.
 n. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are
in a growth industry by giving them loans at a rate which is lower than 
that of commercial banks.
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 .o. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are
in a growth industry by giving them tax concessions.
 p. Regulating minimum wage levels is something that the government
should do.
 q. The level of interest rates should be allowed to float freely without any
control such as the fixing of the maximum or minimum rate by the 
government.
 r. The control of foreign currency exchange is something that the
government should do.
 s. Public utilities, such as electricity, water, telecommunication and
transportation, should be owned and operated by the government.
 t. Joint ventures between the government and companies are a good strategy
for Thailand in promoting industry.
2. Which methods do you think the private sector should use in influencing the 
government's economic policy making? Please rank the following methods?
 a. Directly participate in policy-making, for example, by being a politician.
 b. Lobby policy-makers.
 c. Be members of business associations such trade associations or chambers
of commerce and operate through these associations to influence policy- 
‘ making.
3. Please express your opinions about these statements by using the following 
scale for your answers.
Scale
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
a. The present high level of involvement in politics by businessmen will do
more good than harm to the economy of Thailand.
b. The participation of business in economic policy formulation will make 
the policy implementation easier.
c. The participation of business in economic policy formulation will make 
the policy outcome benefit only a few groups of people.
d. Business should influence the economic policy making of the government 
through trade associations or chambers of commerce only.
e. Economic policy-making should be done by the government only; 
businessmen should not get involved.
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P art C; The appropriate form of government and business relations in 
Thailand
1. Please rank the following according to your preference for how the Thai 
government should relate to companies.
 a. As a facilitator
 b. As a co-planner
 c. As a regulator
 d. As a protector
 e. As a stimulator
 f. As an initiator
2. Please rank the following according to your preference for how companies 
should relate to the Thai government.
 a. As followers
 b. As co-planners
 c. As initiators
3. In this question you are to rate three concepts according to your opinion. Here 
is an example.
Concept: Rose.
Scale: Beautiful_____ I____ I______ I_____I____ I_I Ugly
If you think a rose is VERY BEAUTIFUL , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful___ V I____ I______ I_____I____ I_____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is BEAUTIFUL, put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____I__ V I_____I_____I____ I_____J_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is SLIGHTLY BEAUTIFUL , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____I______I V I_____I____ I_____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is NEITHER BEAUTIFUL NOR UGLY , put a check (V) as 
shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____ I____ I I V I_____I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is SLIGHTLY UGLY , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____ I____ I______I_____ I_V I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is UGLY , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____I____ I______ I_____I____ I___V I_____Ugly
If you think a rose is VERY UGLY, put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful_____I____ I______ I_____I____ I______ I_V Ugly
Rate the concepts at a fairly fast speed. It is the first feeling that happens to vou that 
this question tries to get.
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CONCEPT 1: GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THAILAND 
DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS
Scale
Successful l_ I I I I I Unsuccessful
B iased_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Impartial
Harmonious I I I j  __l I Quarrelsome
Fruitful_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ I____ Fruitless
Distant   I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Intimate
B a d  _ l I I I I I Good
Valuable_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I_I  I_________ Worthless
Strong_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Weak
Flexible i I______I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Inflexible
Tense_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Relaxed
Active_____ I_____I____ J _____ I_____ I____ I____ Passive
Stable_____ I____ I______I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Changeable
CONCEPT 2: GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE PAST 12 
MONTHS
Scale
Successful_____ I____ I______I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Unsuccessful
Influential_____ I____ I______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ Uninfluential
G ood_____ I____ I______I____ 1_____ I_____ I____ Bad
Effective I I I I I I Ineffective
Biased_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ Impartial
R ight_____ I____ I______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ WRONG
Efficient_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I____Inefficient
Strong I I I I I I Weak
Powerful_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ Powerless
Flexible_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I____Inflexible
Active______I____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ Passive
Stable______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Changeable
CONCEPTS 3: THAI BUREAUCRATS
Scale
Competent______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Incompetent
Cooperative J _____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Uncooperative
Influential______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Uninfluential
Biased______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Impartial
Efficient______I____ I____ _l_____ I____ I_____ I____ Inefficient
Successful______I____ I_____ i_____ I_____ I_____ I____Unsuccessful
Helpful______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Unhelpful
Strong J _____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Weak
Powerful______ 1____ (_____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Powerless
Flexible______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Inflexible
Active_____ I_____I_____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Passive
Stable______I____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_____ I____ Changeable
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Appendix I
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SENIOR BUREAUCRATS
This interview is part of my Ph.D. research at the Glasgow Business School, 
University of Glasgow, Scotland. One part of this research studies and compares the 
opinions of government officials and businessmen about government and business 
relations in Thailand.
The interview is divided into 3 parts:
i) Part A: Background information on the interviewee and the agency
ii) Part B: Your opinion about the economic roles of the government and the 
private sector; and
iii) Part C: Your opinion about the appropriate form of government and 
business relations in Thailand.
Your anonymity will be strictly observed.
P art A: Background information on the interviewee and the agency
1. Ministry_____________________________________________________
2. Department__________________________________________________
3. Age of the interviewee
()  30 or below ( )  31-40 ( )  41-50
0  51-60 ( )61 or above
4. Sex QM ale ()  Female
5. Training or study abroad such as degree or diploma course
O  No
6. Professional subject
( )  Yes
()  Science, engineering, etc 
( )  Social sciences, accounting, law, etc
7. Years in the bureaucracy
( )  3 or below
.O  10-12
0 4 - 6  
O  13-15
0 7 - 9
()  16 or over
8. Years in the present job
()  3 or below 
( )  10-12
0  4-6 
O  13-15
()  7-9
()  16 or over
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P art B: The economic roles of the government and the private sector 
1. Regarding the Thai economy, please express your opinions about these 
statements by using the following scale for your answers.
Scale
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
_ a. The economic system which best encourages the growth of businesses 
in Thailand is the one with the least government intervention.
. b. In some industries, price levels may be determined by only a few 
companies, yet the government should not interfere with pricing.
. c. Regulating the standard of goods and services is something that the 
government should do.
. d. The government should promote newly established companies which are 
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them subsidies.
. e. The government should promote newly established companies which are 
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them loans at a 
rate which is lower than that of commercial banks.
. f. The government should promote newly established companies which are 
not strong enough to compete in the market by giving them tax 
concessions.
g. Using trade barriers to protect local companies from the competition of big 
foreign companies is something that the government should do.
h. The provision of trade and business information to be distributed to 
companies is the function for which the government is responsible.
i. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble 
because of bad economic conditions by giving them subsidies.
j. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble 
because of bad economic conditions by giving them loans at a rate 
which is lower than those of commercial banks, 
k. The government should help companies which are in financial trouble 
because of bad economic conditions by giving them tax concessions.
1. It is rather difficult for the government to oversee and ensure fair 
business competition with bias, 
m. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are 
in a growth industry by giving them subsidies, 
n. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are 
in a growth industry by giving them loans at a rate which is lower than 
that of commercial banks.
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 .o. The government should promote companies which are expanding and are
in a growth industry by giving them tax concessions.
 p. Regulating minimum wage levels is something that the government
should do.
 q. The level of interest rates should be allowed to float freely without any
control such as the fixing of the maximum or minimum rate by the 
government.
 r. The control of foreign currency exchange is something that the
government should do.
   s. Public utilities, such as electricity, water, telecommunication and
transportation, should be owned and operated by the government.
 t. Joint ventures between the government and companies are a good strategy
for Thailand in promoting industry.
2. Which methods do you think the private sector should use in influencing the 
government's economic policy making? Please rank the following methods?
 a. Directly participate in policy-making, for example, by being a politician.
 b. Lobby policy-makers.
 c. Be members of business associations such trade associations or chambers
of commerce and operate through these associations to influence policy­
making.
3. Please express your opinions about these statements by using the following 
scale for your answers.
Scale
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
a. The present high level of involvement in politics by businessmen will do 
more good than harm to the economy of Thailand.
b. The participation of business in economic policy formulation will make 
the policy implementation easier.
c. The participation of business in economic policy formulation will make 
the policy outcome benefit only a few groups of people.
d. Business should influence the economic policy making of the government 
through trade associations or chambers of commerce only.
e. Economic policy-making should be done by the government only; 
businessmen should not get involved.
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P art C: The appropriate form of government and business relations in 
Thailand
1. Please rank the following according to your preference for how the Thai 
government should relate to companies.
 a. As a facilitator
 b. As a co-planner
 c. As a regulator
 d. As a protector
 e. As a stimulator
 f. As an initiator
2. Please rank the following according to your preference for how companies 
should relate to the Thai government.
 a. As followers
 b. As co-planners
 c. As initiators
3. In this question you are to rate three concepts according to your opinion. Here 
is an example.
Concept: Rose.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_____ I_____ I____ I______ I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is VERY BEAUTIFUL , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful___ V j_____I_____I____ I______ I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is BEAUTIFUL , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful I V I_____I____ I______ I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is SLIGHTLY BEAUTIFUL , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_I V I__________ I______ I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is NEITHER BEAUTIFUL NOR UGLY , put a check (V) as 
shown below.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_____ I_I V I___________I____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is SLIGHTLY UGLY , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_____ I_____ I____ I V I_____ I_____ Ugly
If you think a rose is UGLY , put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_____ I_____ I____ I_I V I__________ Ugly
If you think a rose is VERY UGLY, put a check (V) as shown below.
Scale: Beautiful____ I_____l_____ I____ I______ I_I V Ugly
Rate the concepts at a fairly fast speed. It is the first feeling that happens to vou that 
this question tries to get.
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CONCEPT 1: GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THAILAND
DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS
Scale
Successful I I I I I I Unsuccessful
Biased_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____I_____ I____ Impartial
Harmonious_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____I_____ I____ Quarrelsome
Fruitful_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ Fruitless
Distant   I l_ I I I _l . Intimate
B ad ______I_____I_____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ Good
Valuable_____ (_____I_____ I_____I_____I_____ I____ Worthless
Strong_____ I_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____ I____ Weak
Flexible 1 1_____I_____ I_____I_____ I____Inflexible
Tense_____ I_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____I____ Relaxed
Active_____ I_____ I_____I_____ I 1 1____ Passive
Stable_____ I_____ I_____I_____ I_____I_____I____ Changeable
CONCEPT 2: THAI BUSINESSMEN
Scale
Competent  I I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Incompetent
Cooperative_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I____ I____ Uncooperative
Influential_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I____ I____ Uninfluential
Biased_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Impartial
Efficient_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Inefficient
Successful I I I I I l_  Unsuccessful
Helpful_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I____ I_____Unhelpful
Strong_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Weak
Powerful _ l_____I_____ I_____ I_____I____ I_____Powerless
Flexible_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Inflexible
Active_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I____ I_____Passive
Stable_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____ I____ I_____Changeable
CONCEPT 3: FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN IN THAILAND
Scale
Competent_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I_____I_____Incompetent
Cooperative_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I_____I_____Uncooperative
Influential_____ I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I_____I_____Uninfluential
Biased_____ I____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Impartial
Efficient______I____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Inefficient
Successful______I____ I_____ I_____ I_____I_____I_____Unsuccessful
Helpful______I____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Unhelpful
Strong_____ I_____I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Weak
Powerful______I____ I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Powerless
Flexible_____ I_____I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Inflexible
Active_____ I_____I_____I_____ I_____I____ I_____ Passive
Stable I I l_ I I I Changeable
409
Appendix J
The Distribution of M anufacturing Factories in Thailand
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Appendix J
J -l:  Numbers of Factories in Bangkok and Other Provinces 
Compiled According to the International Standard of 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) (As up to June 1989)
Industry
Preparing and preserving meat 
Diary products 
Fruit and vegetable canning 
Seafood canning and preserving 
Vegetable and animal oils 
Grain mill products 
Baked and steamed products 
Sugar
Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionary 
Other food products 
Animal feeds
Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits
Wine
Breweries
Soft drinks
Tobacco drying
Tobacco products
Textile spinning and weaving
Man-made textiles
Knitting fills
Carpets, rugs
Cord, rope and twine
Other textiles
Apparel
Tanneries, leather finishing, fur-dressing 
Leather products and leather substitutes 
Footwear
Sawmills, woodmills 
Wooden and cane containers 
Other wood and cork products 
Furniture, fixtures and flooring 
Pulp, paper and fibreboard 
Containers, paper boxes and paperboard 
Other pulp, paper and paperboard articles 
Printing and publishing 
Basic industrial chemical 
Fertilisers and pesticides 
Synthetic resins, artificial fibres 
Paints, varnishes and lacquers 
Drugs and Medicine
Soaps, perfumes, cosmetics and toiletries 
Chemical products not elsewhere classified 
Petroleum refinery and lubricating oil 
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 
Tyres and tubes
Rubber products not elsewhere classified 
Plastic products not elsewhere classified 
Pottery
Number o f Factories
Bangkok Other Provinces Total
88 221 309
43 227 270
55 179 234
20 202 222
36 158 194
257 51,836 52,093
269 853 1122
10 154 164
114 68 182
200 1111 1311
30 316 346
2 41 43
0 2 2
2 0 2
60 128 188
0 84 84
8 14 22
374 451 825
104 55 159
328 76 404
5 6 11
23 37 60
22 46 68
1364 125 1489
8 149 157
134 35 169
233 39 272
618 1,850 2,423
104 320 424
190 142 332
603 727 1,330
6 34 40
242 31 273
70 39 109
1,332 109 1441
23 59 82
6 60 66
6 16 22
62 66 128
210 88 298
102 41 143
97 127 224
2 2 4
9 21 30
48 149 197
182 253 435
1,059 285 1,344
19 266 285
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T a b le J - l :  C o n tin u e d
ISIC
Code Industry Bangkok
Number o f Factories 
Other Provinces Total
3620 Glass and glass products 25 21 46
3691 Structural, clay products 4 584 588
3692 Cement, lime and plaster 4 121 125
3699 Non-metallic mineral products 174 1,124 1,298
3711,3712 Iron, steel works and rolling mills 64 145 209
3720 Non-ferrous metals 173 139 312
3811 Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 54 41 95
3812 Furniture and fixtures primarily made of metal 176 82 258
3813 Structural, metal products 807 868 1675
3819 Fabricated metal products except machinery 2,370 566 2,936
3821 Engines and turbines 387 2,511 2,898
3822 Agricultural machinery and equipment 149 808 957
3823 Wood and metal working machinery 242 62 304
3824 Special industrial machinery and equipment 190 115 305
3825 Office, computing and accounting machinery 63 13 76
3829 Other machinery and equipment except electrical 487 168 655
3831 Electrical industrial machinery 242 156 398
3832 Radio, television and communication equipment 143 40 183
3833 Electrical appliances and housewares 25 9 34
3839 Other electrical apparatus 201 91 292
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 77 254 331
3842 Railroad equipment 2 2 4
3843 Motor vehicle 678 904 1,582
3844 Motorcycles, tricycles and bicycles 151 309 460
3845 Aircraft 2 0 2
3849 Other transport equipment 22 4 26
3850 Professional, scientific, controlling, optical goods 65 22 87
3901 Jewellery 200 8 208
3902 Musical instruments 13 1 14
3903 Sporting and athletic goods 15 9 24
3909 Other manufacturing products 157 28 185
Grand total 16,141 70,458 86,599
Source: Industrial Economics Division, Office of the Secretary, Ministry of 
Industry.
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